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Abstract 
In 2003/04 the European Union launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with the 
main objective “to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its 
neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater 
political, security, economic and cultural co-operation”. EU internally the ENP was supposed 
to unite within a single framework activities from the three pillars (EC, CFSP, JHA), with the 
main objective to overcome the often criticised pillarisation of EU foreign policy and to provide 
a coherent approach toward the neighbours.  
Academic research about EU relations with neighbouring countries focused until now primarily 
on external aspects of the ENP: its goals, impact, instruments and mechanisms. However, the 
internal aim of the ENP to provide a single and coherent framework for EU policies is only 
sporadically discussed in EU documents and has not gained any detailed academic attention. 
This dissertation aims to contribute to this gap in scientific research. It therefore examines to 
what extent the institutional setting of the ENP changed the interactions, routines and tasks of 
EU actors between 2002 and 2007, and it assesses what motivations different actors had for this 
change. By doing so, this thesis contributes to the understanding of EU foreign policy-making 
towards the neighbours in general terms, and to the debate about coherence in EU foreign 
policy-making more specifically.  
The thesis shows that the ENP framework in terms of EU actors’ roles and interaction was not 
just ‘business as usual’, but that a considerable change in EU actors’ involvement in EU foreign 
policy-making took place with the set-up of the ENP, in particular in terms of policy-
specification as well as implementation. While this change led to conflicts when the new 
framework was put into place, the interaction turned more consensual over time, what depended 
to a large extent on the concrete persons involved and on mutual perceptions. The motivation 
for this change of EU actors’ involvement within the ENP is best explained by intentional 
decisions of involved actors that were based on the conviction that an adaptation of EU actors’ 
interaction is best suited and also necessary to achieve the commonly agreed ENP objective of 
fostering stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood.  
 
Keywords 
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 ii 
Abbreviations 
AA  Association Agreement 
CA  Cooperation Agreement 
CEEC  Central and Eastern European Countries 
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
COEST Working Group on Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia of the EU Council 
of Ministers of the European Union 
COM  Commission of the European Communities 
COMAG Mashrek/Maghreb Working Party of the Council of Ministers of the European Union 
CS  Council Secretariat 
CSM  Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region 
CSP  Country Strategy Paper 
DG Relex Directorate General for the External Relations 
DG  Directorate General  
e.g.  for example 
EC  European Community 
EDC  European Defence Community 
EEAS  European External Action Service 
EFP  European Foreign Policy 
EFPM  EU foreign policy-making 
EIB  European Investment Bank 
EMAA  Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
EMFTA  Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area 
EMP  Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy 
ENPI  European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument 
EP  European Parliament 
EaP  Eastern Partnership 
EPC  European Political Cooperation 
EU  European Union 
GAC  General Affairs Council 
HR  High Representative for the CFSP 
i.e.  that is (id est) 
IGC  Intergovernmental Conference 
INTERREG Financial instrument for interregional cooperation under the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) 
NIP National Indicative Programme 
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PHARE “Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies” – one of three  EU pre-
accession instruments to assist applicant countries in preparation of joining the EU 
PR  Permanent Representation 
TACIS  Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
TEU  Treaty on European Union / Maastricht 
ToA  Treaty of Amsterdam 
UfM  Union for the Mediterranean  
 iii
 
List of Tables  
Table 1:    Relevance of Research question: linkage between institutional design, role of 
involved actors and substance of policy output ........................................................ 17 
Table 2:    The advent of an idea: “Wider Europe” from April 2002 to March 2003: ................ 88 
Table 3:    Economic Indicators of potential ENP countries ....................................................... 95 
Table 4:    From “Wider Europe” to the ENP – March 2003 till May 2004 ............................... 97 
Table 5:    The legal base of EU relations with its ENP partner countries................................ 113 
Table 6:    Allocation of the ENPI 2007-2010 .......................................................................... 119 
Table 7:    EU-Exports to Maghreb and EU-Imports from Maghreb in 2001, 2003 and 2005 . 126 
Table 8:    Main EU members in EU-Exports to and EU-Imports from Maghreb in 2004....... 126 
Table 9:    EC external assistance, 1991-2000 to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia .............. 148 
Table 10:   EU-Exports to and EU-Imports from Southern Caucasus 2005-2007 .................... 149 
Table 11:   Rotating Presidencies of the Council 2002-2007.................................................... 176 
Table 12:   Priorities of action plans with selected countries.................................................... 191 
 
 iv 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1:   Number of EU common actions and positions, 1970-2004....................................... 25 
Figure 2:   EC expenditure for „external action“ in % of general budget, 1982 – 2004 ............. 26 
Figure 3:   Proportional EC expenditure for “external actions” in subheadings, 2001- 2006 ..... 26 
Figure 4:   Carlsnaes´ model to explain a foreign policy action (Carlsnaes 1992: 254).............. 50 
Figure 5:   Coherence in EU policy ............................................................................................ 57 
Figure 6:   An „Integrated EU policy approach“27 ...................................................................... 57 
Figure 7:   The theoretical framework – Carlsnaes´ model adapted to explain change in 
interaction in EU Foreign Policy-making.................................................................. 60 
Figure 8:   The timeframe under investigation ............................................................................ 81 
Figure 9:  The ENP partner countries........................................................................................ 107 
 1 
PART I  -  The Set-up of this Research Project 
Chapter 1: Introduction & Research Design 
In March 2003 the European Union launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with 
the main objective ”to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU 
and its neighbours” (European Commission 2004b: 3). Externally, the ENP was supposed to 
give a stronger impetus to the relations with the new neighbours after the 2004 Eastern 
enlargement. Politically and economically stable neighbouring countries would be the best way 
to achieve security for the European Union at its borders. However, the ENP was also meant to 
achieve an EU internal goal: to provide more coherence in the EU policy towards the 
neighbours and to overcome the often criticised pillarisation of EU foreign policy by 
establishing a single framework that would incorporate activities from the supranational 
external relations of the European Community (EC), from the more politicised Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as from the increasingly growing third pillar of 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).1 More coherence was emphasised as the main factor to allow 
the EU to be an effective and strong partner towards and for its neighbours.   
The establishment of new institutional arrangements and the revision of existing structures to 
provide more coherence in EU activities outside of its borders have been part of the European 
integration process since its beginning in the 1950s. Several attempts of creating a common 
foreign policy had failed, like for example the European Defence Community. In 1969, the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established outside of the European Economic 
Community framework as an intergovernmental arena to coordinate the foreign policies of the 
EEC members. The EPC, however, soon showed the shortcomings and insufficiency of this 
arrangement that could also not be overcome by the association and informal incorporation of 
EPC in the EC framework with the Single European Act (see e.g. Dinan 2005: 582-588). 
The collapse of the Soviet empire, the end of the Cold war, the Gulf crisis and the civil war in 
Yugoslavia among other profound changes in the international arena during the 1990s on the 
one hand, and internal attempts to establish also a political Union on the other hand resurrected 
the discussion about how EC member states could most effectively cooperate in foreign policy 
issues. Some member states strongly criticised the inadequacy of the EPC and asked for a 
                                                     
1
 The third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs was renamed in “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” after the 
Dutch Presidency in 2004, and the new heading will also be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. For simplicity 
reasons, though, the traditional name will be used throughout this thesis. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty entered 
into force in December 2009 and abolishes formally the three pillars. However, as this thesis investigates the 
timeframe from 2000-2007 and hence a time before the Lisbon Treaty was adopted, it still uses the concepts of 
pillars; Additionally, although institutionally abolished, the Lisbon Treaty still keeps CFSP distinct from other EU 
policies, and there was not much change in the substance and content of CFSP (For a more detailed elaboration on 
the various actors and institutions involved in ESDP see Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra & Maurer 2010). 
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“communitarization of foreign policy” (Piening 1997: 38), while other members strictly refused 
to integrate foreign policy issues into the EC-framework. At last, a compromise between these 
two different positions had been incorporated in the Treaty of Maastricht: the EPC was 
transformed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that constituted the 
intergovernmental second pillar of the EU. This pillarisation, in the end at the same time, 
institutionalised the separation between supranationally pursued external economic policies and 
intergovernmentally coordinated political policies towards the outside world.  
The quest for coherent foreign policy frameworks that support the linkage of economic, 
political, social but also cultural aspects can be observed in EU foreign policy-making in 
general, but the need for a coherent and overarching framework is especially emphasised in the 
relations of the European Union with its neighbourhood. The importance of these countries for 
the security and stability of the European Union and its citizens is repeatedly highlighted by 
politicians of the EU and the member states as well stated in various documents. The European 
Security Strategy of 2003, for example, emphases “building security in our Neighbourhood” as 
one of three strategic objectives for the European Union that should lead to “a ring of well 
governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean 
with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (European Council 2003b: 7-8; for 
similar emphasis see follow-up report European Council 2008: 10-11) 
1.1. The Research Puzzle and the Research Questions 
Academic research about EU relations with neighbouring countries focused until now primarily 
on external aspects: the goals, impact, instruments and mechanisms of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Some scholars compare the ENP with the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (Aliboni 2005b; Moschella 2006; Del Sarto & Schumacher 2005; Dannreuther 
2006; Baracani 2005; Kelley 2006), while others highlight the shortcomings and challenges of 
the ENP (Smith, K. E. 2005; Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu 2007). The use of conditionality, 
the promotion of democratisation, good governance and other values are also high on the 
research agenda (Sasse 2008; Bosse 2007; Johansson-Noegués 2006; Baracani 2006; 
Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2009), while more recently the impact of the EU in third countries is 
the focus of comparative assessments (Wichmann 2007b; Weber, Smith & Baun 2007).  
However, the internal aim of the ENP to provide a single framework for EU policies from all 
three pillars is only sporadically discussed in EU documents and has not gained any detailed 
attention by academics. This dissertation aims to contribute to this gap in scientific research. It 
seeks to scrutinise more closely to what extent the single framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy provides the possibility to achieve more coherence at EU level and to 
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what extent the single framework that was established with the ENP did change the 
involvement, tasks and interaction of the respective EU actors.  
The puzzle of this focus rests on the assumption that the single framework was established to 
allow for more coherence, what implies that it was supposed to change how policies are made 
towards EU neighbours and to facilitate the interaction, routines and tasks of the involved EU 
actors to achieve a coherent EU output. The interesting aspect of this ENP framework towards 
the neighbourhood is that it was meant to combine foreign policy-making in a coherent way that 
was at this time formally, i.e. in regard of the treaty provisions, still strictly divided in economic 
EC and political CFSP aspects. At first glance, the ENP just seems to add together the output of 
supranational as well as intergovernmental forms of EU policy-making. But this thesis argues it 
indispensable to not just take this assumption for granted but to also empirically assess how 
policies are formulated, decided and implemented within this new single framework. The ENP 
framework might not only bring different elements of EU foreign policy (EFP) together, but it 
might also change and alter the content and processes of these policies. Therefore following 
main research question guides the argumentation of this thesis: 
 In what respect and to what extent did the single framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy change EU policy-making processes towards the neighbours? 
To be able to answer this main question following sub-research questions are supposed to 
facilitate the research process. 
 What role do different EU actors have in formulating, specifying, deciding and 
implementing foreign policy at EU level at different points in time between 2002 and 2007?  
 How did the interaction and task allocation of EU actors change in different stages of the 
policy cycle (agenda-setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation, evaluation) 
after the incorporation of the ENP? 
The differentiation between various stages of the policy cycle (Versluis, van Keulen & 
Stephenson 2010) allows for a more differentiated assessment, as formally decisions are still 
taken according to the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), but we might 
expect that especially in regard of policy formulation and implementation the EU actors’ 
involvement changed after the incorporation of the ENP framework and that it is especially 
informal processes that affect ENP policy-making.  
The main interest of this research is not primarily to assess what the respective pillars do on 
their own or which pillar gained more influence over time, but to examine the involvement of 
different EU actors within the ENP framework and to trace the processes that have caused a 
potential new form of division of labour and tasks. The motivation of involved actors and 
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politicians to allow or push for an assumed change is therefore the focus of the second main 
research question of this thesis:  
 What factors explain changes in interactions of actors in EU foreign policy-making 
towards the neighbourhood, and what constraints did the ENP single framework at 
the same time encounter?   
This question is crucial to assess why the member states considered a change in policy-making 
in such a sensitive area like foreign policy at all, while at the same time the Commission might 
have a certain interest to gain as much influence as possible.  
This argument emphasises a crucial background condition that I assume as important to keep in 
mind: after all, EU Foreign Policy developed primarily from the multilateral but 
intergovernmental framework of the European Political Cooperation, i.e. the coordination of the 
foreign policies of the member states. The member states are the crucial decision-makers in 
foreign policy, and only they can decide – intentionally or unintentionally – to allow other 
(supranational) actors to fulfil a role. Furthermore, we can assume that member states will 
carefully design control mechanisms to make sure that supranational institutions do not exceed 
their mandated tasks and still act in the interest of all member states (for delegation and its link 
to control see for example Tallberg 2002). On the other hand it seems, of course, quite plausible 
to assume that supranational institutions try to extend their competences also to these areas of 
policy-making. So what happened in the process of setting up the ENP? Did the interests of the 
larger EU member states change in so far that these new priorities became the decisive driving 
forces for the adaptation? Or did primarily EU-external developments motivate these changes? 
Or can the 2004 enlargement provide sufficient explanation for the single framework approach? 
Furthermore, it has to be questioned if the set-up of the ENP in this form was a deliberative and 
totally rational decision by the member states. Why did the member states and the European 
institutions choose exactly this form of interaction in policy-making towards the 
neighbourhood? Or was it merely an unintentional acceptance of already established day-to-day 
practice? And in terms of a more theoretical perspective, is this new form of policy-making a 
new form of interaction between the European actors or does it only formalise already existing 
trends.  
This research looks for “change” on the one hand in regard of the involved actors (i.e. Is a new 
body involved in ENP policy-making? Are certain actors not involved anymore?), but on the 
other hand also in regard of the tasks that they perform (Are the same actors involved, but did 
their contribution to the policy in the different stages of the policy cycle change?). Furthermore, 
this thesis assumes that different actors with their distinct institutional and cultural background 
might pursue different ideas about what a “good” policy is and what certain goals should be. 
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The timeframe under investigation is from 2002 to 2007. Although prior developments will be 
taken into consideration, it is especially this time period that will be analysed in detail, because 
those were the decisive years in setting-up, negotiating and shaping the ENP framework.  The 
year 2002 was chosen as starting point to allow comparing ENP policy-making with the EU 
arrangements that were used beforehand to cooperate with its neighbours. Although the ENP 
was developed and formally negotiated in 2003 and incorporated in 2004, this research also 
does not just stop at exactly this time, but we must assume that certain changes took some time 
for manifestation and that especially during the first two years all involved actors still had to get 
used to the new framework and find their role and position in the new arrangement (for a more 
detailed explanation of the chosen timeframe see the chapter on method on p. 72). 
In this thesis, following institutions and units are perceived as EU actors in foreign policy-
making towards the neighbourhood: The member states (and especially their permanent 
representations in Brussels) are on the one hand dealt with as a collective (the Council, the 
Council working group etc.), when the interests of the various member states are similar or in 
the same way affected. On the other hand and to a certain degree, the member states are also 
incorporated as single actors, if the interest of one specific member state is especially harmed or 
one member state has a special interest in changing the policy framework in a certain direction. 
Other actors are the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union with the Policy 
Planning and Early Warning Unit and the High Representative for the CFSP2, as well as the 
Commission and its various Directorate Generals (DGs). Similar to the member states, the 
Commission will be treated as a collective actor when appropriate, but sometimes it is also 
crucial to take a closer look ‘inside’ and go to the level of the various DGs. Beyond the latter 
especially DG Relex is of interest. The European Parliament (EP) is only incorporated in a 
limited sense, but it must not be fully ignored, as several basic ideas of how to further develop 
relations with third countries were initiated by committed members of the EP.  
This thesis, hence, aims to examine to what extent the institutional setting of the ENP changed 
the interactions, routines and tasks of EU actors and to assess what motivations different actors 
had to at least allow for this change on the one hand or to oppose certain developments.  
But before turning to more details about the set-up of this research and the theoretical 
framework, the contribution of existing academic literature to answer the outlined research 
question will be scrutinised.  
                                                     
2
 In the timeframe under investigation, the High Representative for the CFSP was Javier Solana, who held at the same 
time the post as the Secretary General of the Council Secretariat. (European Commission 2008c) 
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1.2. The State of the Literature: Researching the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
After the first years of its existence, the assessment of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) is quite diverse. The Commission cheers the new policy with small critical remarks in 
some policy areas (see for example press release European Commission 2008c; or see also 
Overall ENP Progress Report 2010: European Commission 2010c), most member states view 
the development in some aspects critically but generally positive (Lippert 2007), and European 
citizens seem to primarily ignore it (see European Commission 2007) while most scientists 
critically predict the failure of the ENP to effectively support change in and rule transfer to 
neighbouring countries (see e.g. Weber, Smith & Baun 2007).  
The perception of the ENP in the scientific literature as well as in political debates seems 
contradictory at different levels: on the one hand it is perceived as a new policy towards the EU 
neighbours, while at the same time it is compared and analysed in relation to formerly used 
frameworks and instruments. It is, in addition, cheered at to provide new impetus, and at the 
same time condemned because of its predicted failure. Three internal changes and dynamics are 
identified by scholars as shaping the ENP that also mirror the academic approach in analysing 
the ENP (see e.g. Del Sarto & Schumacher 2005: 19): Enlargement, the dissatisfaction with 
existing neighbourhood relations, and the adoption of a comprehensive security approach.  
First, scholars expand concepts and approaches that were developed to explain and understand 
the Eastern enlargement from 2004/07, while, secondly, the new ENP framework is compared 
with already existing, often criticised existing relations with the neighbouring countries (e.g. the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership); Thirdly, with the adoption of the European Security Strategy 
in 2003, also a comprehensive security approach was increasingly used to analyse EU foreign 
policy-making. The following paragraphs provide a short overview about the main research 
findings of these three strands in the academic literature, and in doing so they show that the 
scholarly focus is mainly on the impact of the ENP on the EU-external world, but that hardly 
any research strategy explicitly focuses on the EU-internal implications of the newly established 
single framework of the ENP. Their results are also linked back to the main research questions 
of this thesis to show that reflections on these research results are useful – not to provide 
definite answers to the research question of this thesis but to at least steer crucial questions and 
assumptions that might be interesting to keep in mind during the research of this thesis. 
1.2.1. ENP as Enlargement-light and as External Governance 
In policy documents, the prospect of sharing borders with new neighbours after 2004/07 was the 
most often mentioned trigger of how to organise the relations with the new neighbours (see e.g. 
joint letter of Patten/Solana 2002). The Commission cheered this latest enlargement round “as 
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the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument” (European Commission 2003c: 5). 
Scholars started to take this rationale up and to extent concepts and theoretical approaches to the 
ENP that had been developed beforehand for explaining enlargement dynamics. Instruments and 
mechanism that were used in both frameworks (like for example action plans, the use of 
evaluation and progress reports and the principle of differentiation) were scrutinised in terms of 
application and effectiveness (Kelley 2006: 49; Del Sarto & Schumacher 2005: 37).  
The increased application of tools from analyses of enlargement is especially visible in the 
extension of the external governance model to the relations with the EU neighbours. 
Schimmenfennig and Sedelmeier developed this model of rule transfer to explain how and 
under what conditions the EU is able to impact on national structures, norms and behaviour of 
acceding candidate countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, 2005). The authors 
juxtaposed a rational-choice model following the logic of consequences (external incentive 
model, use of conditionality) with a more socio-constructivist approach of logic of 
appropriateness (lesson-drawing model and social learning). They concluded that rule transfer to 
candidate countries works best for the EU when it follows the external incentive model, hence 
applies strict conditionality and is able to offer the reward of membership as positive incentive.  
This model was also modified to be applied to the EU’s relation with its near abroad. Sandra 
Lavenex (Lavenex 2008) uses the concept of “network governance” to investigate the 
organisational set-up of sectoral integration. She emphasises that it is not only the adaptation of 
third countries to EU regulations and  norms that is crucial to understand the impact of the EU 
on its neighbours, but that we should also take into account how (the reforms of) certain policy 
sectors are structured and organised according to the EU model. The advantage of this approach 
is, according to Lavenex, that networks comprise an alternative mode of governance that allow 
rule transfer without the strict application of conditionality. Network governance, hence, 
sometimes might be a suitable alternative in contrast to hierarchical forms of traditional foreign 
policy-making and it should not be ignored when observing adaptation and rule transfer. 
However, Lavenex also emphasises that the applied modes and their effects differ tremendously 
according to policy sector, and that these new forms of governance can also easily be hampered 
by hierarchical structures and traditional foreign policy aims, if they are opposing the latter.  
In a follow-up project, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009) assess 
that EU rules are increasingly expanded to the near abroad, and that external governance plays a 
decisive role. However, they also again emphasise that the effectiveness of rule transfer is 
sector-specific and highly differential, especially when compared to the processes and dynamics 
of the Eastern enlargement. Hence to be able to generalise, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig draw 
their conclusions on a number of case studies where different authors assess the mode and 
effectiveness of external governance in different issue areas (see Special issue of the Journal of 
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European Public Policy 16(6), and for example on democratic governance see Freyburg, 
Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripka & Wetzel 2009).  
This latter research model is applied to ENP partner countries, however its results focus mainly 
on the modes, instruments and impact of EU policy-making towards the near abroad, and hence 
these articles do not tell us explicitly what the ENP changed in terms of interaction at the EU 
level. In another research article, Lavenex, Lehmkuhl and Wichman concluded that sectoral 
governance seems indeed more in line with sectoral logic, and they even suggest that the macro-
institutional design of frameworks like the ENP do not have any impact on (the success of) EU 
rule transfer at all (Lavenex, Lehmkuhl & Wichmann 2009). This conclusion allows us to draw 
different assumptions in regard of the ENP actors: On the on hand, we could assume that the 
actors are always the same across the different frameworks, so that mistakes and shortcomings 
are replicated and therefore cause the same impact in different countries. This would imply for 
the ENP that it was set-up according to other existing schemes, or that its set-up was used as a 
model for other frameworks (whereas the first option seems more likely). On the other hand, we 
could assume that the actors’ involvement differs across frameworks, but that either their output 
is quite similar (ie it does not matter for the EU output which actors are involved), or that the 
EU output in the end does not matter for the impact on the ground, as there are other more 
important, probably EU external factors that explain the (failure of) impact on the ground. These 
assumptions allow for totally new research questions and therefore it is very difficult to answer 
them even partly in this thesis. However, it draws our attention to the fact that we can not just 
analyse the ENP as a whole, but that we have to be sensitive for differences across sectors and 
policies. In addition, those research results also emphasise an implicit assumption of this thesis: 
that we have to analyse EU foreign policy-making from a pluralist approach that highlights that 
it is not only member states who determine EU foreign policy-making. This is also in line with 
one of the basic assumptions of the governance turn in EU studies  that policy-making influence 
is not only in the hand of the national governments but spread across different levels (Marks, 
Hooghe & Blank 1996; Jachtenfuchs 2001). 
However, while the majority of this strand of the literature focuses on the impact dimension, 
there is one exception that takes into account the involved actors and their interests in setting up 
the ENP. Judith Kelley (Kelley 2006) identifies in her article primarily rational, bureaucratic 
power reasons to explain why the Commission proposed exactly this set-up of the ENP. 
According to her research results, former officials from DG enlargement were shifted to the new 
ENP units within DG Relex during the planning and setup stage of the ENP what lead to an 
automatic taking over of many enlargement instruments, as those functionaries had experienced 
them as successful in their previous tasks. Furthermore, Kelley shows quite convincingly that 
the Commission proposed this new form of policy-making towards the neighbours to keep its 
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successful position after enlargement also in external relations (Kelley 2006; for similar 
argumentation see Smith, M. E. & Weber 2007: 10). 
In the scientific literature this linkage between the Eastern enlargement process and the ENP is 
often used to compare the success of the two processes and to investigate to what extent EU 
external governance is also effective in neighbouring third countries. There is extensive research 
on the similarities and differences in terms of aims, instruments and impact on the ground 
between enlargement and the ENP, but the salience of and the link to the institutional dimension 
is hardly taken into account. However, we have to assume that relations with neighbouring 
countries follow a different logic and are related to different national interests of member states 
than enlargement dynamics.  
This for examples shows in regard of the missing membership perspective: Scholars who just 
too easily extend enlargement to the ENP perceive the missing carrot of an accession 
perspective as the only difference between ENP and the enlargement process, which in their line 
of argument is strong enough to make the ENP fail. Membership is here perceived as an 
incentive, ie an instrument that can be used to convince countries to reform in a certain way. 
This assumption, however, blurs an important difference: While enlargement follows the clear 
aim of transforming (potential) candidates to EU members, the relations with neighbouring 
countries seems much more driven by a foreign policy approach where actors try to either shape 
the policy-making environment in a positive and favourable manner, or to make other actors act 
in line with their own interests (Wolfers 1962). Hence, although the applied instruments during 
enlargement and ENP might be the same, the final goals differ. During the enlargement process 
there was no general debate among member states or between member states and other EU 
institutions anymore about the final outcome of enlargement. There might have been 
disagreement about details or timetables, but the general direction was set. In EU foreign policy-
making and also in the relations towards the EU neighbours this thesis will show that there 
seems to be general agreement that the EU shall work closer with willing partners, but that for 
the rest there are still various ideas and plans of how to achieve this and what the final aims 
should be.  
In my view, this not presupposed final goal of the ENP alters the dynamics within this policy 
framework in such a way that it makes it very difficult to compare it to enlargement. 
Furthermore, we have to be careful not just to take over presupposed assumptions from a 
comparative mode of EU public policy-making (where I would also include enlargement 
research) and impose them on ENP research, but we have to carefully adapt these concepts to 
complement traditional foreign policy analysis. Hence, although the ENP does not include the 
perspective of accession what creates critical reluctance of some third countries, I fully agree 
with Moschella (2006: 161) that such a comparison is misleading. The final goal of the ENP is 
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not accession and integration, but creating stability and security for EU citizens by supporting 
economic and political reforms in the neighbourhood (GAERC 2007: 2). 
1.2.2. ENP compared to existing relationships 
The second strand of the academic literature mainly compares the newly established ENP 
framework with already existing EU relations towards the East and the South. To the East, the 
enlargement in 2004 made it necessary to think about creating closer links with newly bordering 
countries. The European Union now shares borders with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and 
through the Black Sea with Georgia as gate to the Southern Caucasus.  
Research about third countries covered by the ENP has grown during the last ten years, but 
similar to the enlargement-strand these studies focus mainly on the impact and effectiveness of 
EU policies on the ground, or on the problems that can be identified (Aliboni 1996, 2005a, b; 
Aliboni & Ammor 2009; Baracani 2005; Benkö 2000; Cremona 2004; Del Sarto & Schumacher 
2005; Gillespie 1997; Gomez 1998; Pardo & Zemer 2005; Reiterer 2009; Senyücel, Güner, 
Faath & Mattes 2006; Smith, K. E. 2005; Tiirmaa-Klaar 2006). Scholars traced that the initial 
idea for setting up the ENP arrived from the need to deal with the new neighbours in the East, 
but that also the dissatisfaction with the 1995 initiated, multilateral framework of the Barcelona 
process (also called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, EMP) played a decisive role. The 
Barcelona process was perceived as moving (too) slow and as not delivering the desired results 
(Dannreuther 2006: 190). The multilateral framework of the EMP only allowed to follow the 
speed of the slowest member and did not allow more ambitious partners like Morocco or Israel 
to intensify their relations with the EU according to their individual interests.  
Nevertheless, comparative analyses between ENP and EMP demonstrated  (see among others 
Del Sarto & Schumacher 2005; Kelley 2006) that the single multilateral framework of the EMP 
was used as a template for the ENP. But instead of providing a multilateral framework the 
single setup was used to bring together all bilateral relations between the EU and its partners. 
The ENP differs from the EMP in its more positive approach to conditionality and its 
application of a benchmarking system, as this differentiated and bilateral approach allows the 
European Union to reward well-behaving partner countries3. Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005: 
22) furthermore argue that within the ENP framework the EU interests are more clearly defined 
than within the EMP: safe external borders, security and stability for European citizens are the 
final goals of the ENP, while the support of social, political and economic welfare in partner 
                                                     
3
 In the recently published progress reports the Commission announced that it will intensify cooperation with 
Ukraine, Israel, Moldova and Morocco as these partners “have shown particular ambition and capacity” (Winn & 
Lord 2001) (Santiso 2002; Smith, K. 2001; Dimier 2006; for official discussion on EU level refer to European 
Commission 2005b) 
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countries is perceived as the instrument to reach the final goals. In addition, these scholarly 
comparisons demonstratively show which EMP shortcomings have been tackled by the ENP 
framework. However, these studies do not investigate what the adaptation meant for the actors 
at European level, although it must be emphasised that the ENP officially is not meant to 
substitute the EMP but is designed as “complementary” policy. I assume, nevertheless, that it 
would be necessary to observe more closely to what extent the “old” EMP structures and the 
ENP units cooperate, and that it must not be overlooked that ENP is working quite differently 
from the still pillarised EMP.   Furthermore, the dissatisfaction and disappointment with 
previous frameworks might be an interesting factor to take into account when analysing the 
motivations of the actors to set-up the ENP. 
Summing up, these scholarly contributions comparing the ENP with previous relationships do 
not directly provide answer to the question about the internal dimension of the ENP, but later on 
in this thesis it will become clear that this research provides useful empirical material that feed 
the analysis. Only when we know how the EU relations with the neighbours worked before the 
ENP was set-up, we can investigate the supposed changes that were brought about by this new 
institutional framework.  
1.2.3. ENP as comprehensive security approach to provide cross-pillar linkage 
The third strand of research combines more current studies focusing on a comprehensive 
security approach and emphasises the cross-pillar mode of EU policy-making towards the 
outside world. While those research outputs are not directly investigating the ENP as an 
empirical case, they provide crucial assumptions about coherence and cross-pillar governance 
that help us to understand the single framework that was established with the ENP. 
In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht had formalised the clear separation of economic external 
relations that were dealt with in the former EC pillar (like common commercial policy, 
development policy) and the more politicised aspects of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy. This separation of foreign policy-making at EU level in political and economic aspects 
has also been sustained in the scientific research for a very long time. Although several scholars 
asked for a comprehensive definition of EU Foreign Policy that encompasses EC external 
relations, CFSP as well as the national foreign policies of the member states (Hill 1993: 322), 
analysis and studies focused either on the EC external relations or on CFSP, their institutional 
set-up, their outputs, and their shortcomings. Research that questioned the intergovernmental-
supranational divide was scarce (as pleasant exception see Winn & Lord 2001), and the 
application of a cross-pillar perspective was only recently  incorporated into the research 
frameworks (see for example Pilegaard 2003, 2004; Stetter 2004, 2007). This development was 
on the hand, of course, influenced by evolving theoretical approaches within the International 
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Relations literature (i.e. merging of external/internal security issues, the definition of 
“governance” in contrast to “government”), but on the other hand it was also the actual 
emergence of “coherent” approaches or cross-pillar policies of the European Union towards 
third countries that made this scientific development necessary.  
During the 1990s scholars used the formal pillarisation of the treaty as justification to look only 
at one part of the EU “system of external relations” (Hill 1993: 322), i.e. to analyse the external 
(economic) relations of the EC-pillar or the intergovernmental CFSP pillar (Wessel 2000: 
1135), what in the end also did not allow to grasp the emerging interaction and the mutual 
linkage between the two forms of policy-making and their respective main actors. Cross-pillar 
perspectives have only recently been added to the research agenda, although this approach has 
not yet been explicitly applied to the ENP.  
Theoretically, Michael Smith had already discussed the issue of “politicisation” and the linkage 
of policy areas across the pillars in 1998. He viewed the first pillar of the EU, and especially the 
external relations of the EC as agent of the actor EU and identified the process through which 
the external relations become politicised as the most crucial research question (Smith, M. 1998: 
78)4. Winn and Lord (2001) choose the EU joint actions of Mostar, Dayton and the Southern 
Caucasus during 1996 and 1999 as case studies to analyse the interaction of European actors 
beyond the pillars in regard of foreign policy-making. They concluded that the European 
Commission does have a certain scope as policy entrepreneur in pillars two and three, but that 
its role highly depends on the extent of a-priori defined national preferences of EU member 
states and the level of information of other (national) actors.  
Krause concluded with similar results, arguing that the EU-Africa relations became increasingly 
overlapping between external relations and political CFSP issues what allowed for “a mutual 
influence of the central actors of the two pillars on each other’s policy output” (Krause 2003: 
222). In regard of the ENP it is interesting how Krause shows that the Commission intentionally 
used the argument of a comprehensive and coherent approach to strengthen its entrepreneurial 
position also in political issues.  
The most extensive study on cross-pillar issues was so far conducted by Stetter who 
convincingly shows that functional linkages between policy areas allowed for a gradual 
integration also in the area of foreign policy-making (Stetter 2004: 735). However, it should 
explicitly be made clear that this form of integration is still distinct from first-pillar integration 
and that Stetter does not assume a communitarisation of CFSP issues. But the emerging cross-
                                                     
4
 In practice, during the following years a similar argument was made by critics about the incoherent EC development 
assistance and its weak use of political conditionality (Baratta 2002; Pocar 2002; Paasivirta & Rosas 2002). But 
apart from normative discussions about the use of conditionality there are only some legal analyses (Allen 1998: 
44) about the overlap of external relations and CFSP provisions. 
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pillar setting, nevertheless, changes the interaction and the roles of the involved actors, what in 
the end leads to following phenomenon:  
 “One of the key insights from this analysis is that the main differentiation in EU foreign affairs 
is neither along the ‘pillar dimension’ nor on the often assumed ‘supranational’-
‘intergovernmental’ divide – but rather on an actor dimension that cross-cuts the supranational-
intergovernmentalist divide” (Stetter 2004: 733) 
This research result links directly back to one of the underlying assumptions of the thesis: that 
the ENP not only brings together intergovernmental and supranational policies under one single 
framework, but that the latter allows for an alteration of the roles and interactions of the 
involved EU actors. Therefore, I assume that it is crucial for our understanding of the ENP to 
also investigate in more detail the changing interaction of the involved actors. 
Next to the cross-pillarisation literature, the topic of blurring boundaries between internal and 
external policies increasingly caught the attention of scholars (for state of the art and outline for 
future research see Eriksson & Rhinard 2009). Empirically, those studies focused so far mainly 
on the European Security and Defence Policy (see for example Duke & Ojanen 2006) or more 
recently on the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs (Trauner & Kruse 2008; 
Wichmann 2007a, b; Lavenex & Wichmann 2009). Especially the latter show the dilemma 
when “internal security concerns” clash with “external stabilisation needs”(Trauner & Kruse 
2008). While also these studies do not primarily deal with the ENP, the investigated policy areas 
are of course also subsumed under the roof of the ENP, and contradictions in terms of aims of 
different policies can be expected. Furthermore, and for this thesis more relevant is, however, 
the question if those dilemmas are policy-specific, or if the understanding for different goals is 
also dependent on the involved actors (ie are certain actors more inclined to bridge those 
dilemmas in objectives, or do the involved actors not matter at all?).  
While this strand of the academic literature does not deal primarily with the ENP, I argue that 
the reflection about their research results and their cross-pillar assumptions allow to consider 
interesting aspects of the EU actors’ interaction within the ENP that on the one hand have not 
been grasped until now and that on the other hand, are also crucial to understand certain aspects 
of how the ENP has been developed until now. As this thesis claims at a latter point, the claim 
for a “single framework” is the continuing quest to achieve coherence in EU foreign policy-
making.  
At this point, I want to highlight once more that the core motivation of this research project is 
not to analyse if the first or the second pillar (i.e. the supranational institutions or the member 
states) are more important for EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours, but to desist 
from this rigid pillar-separation and to look more closely what roles and tasks different actors 
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perform in foreign policy-making towards the neighbours, and how this separation of tasks 
changed over time and influenced the interaction of the respective actors.  
 
This brief elaboration on the contribution of current academic research shows that we can build 
on these theoretical and empirical results that bring up valuable insights about questions to take 
into account. This short literature review, however, also shows that the current state of academic 
research does not provide an explicit investigation of the internal dimension of the ENP and the 
institutional change provided with its set-up. Hence, while it is crucial to link to these academic 
results, a more thorough analysis is indispensable to answer the research questions of this 
doctoral thesis.   
1.3. A brief overview of the structure of this dissertation 
After this brief outline of the main rationale of this thesis, the next chapter 2 will even more 
detailed elaborate on the links to the academic literature to also more clearly show the relevance 
of the here formulated research questions. The relevance is differentiated in three categories: 
Understanding the EU foreign policy-making system over time, assessing coherence, and 
investigating the nature of the EU as international actor. By linking to these wider strands in the 
literature, it is shown how the research questions contribute to these and to what extent the 
results of this thesis sketches out future research questions that might be interesting to 
investigate.  
Chapter 3 moves then to set up the conceptual and theoretical framework of this thesis, and to 
discuss methodological challenges. The assumptions derived from the academic literature that 
have been taken before embarking on empirical research are discussed and elaborated upon, and 
the applied methods for data collection and analysis are critically presented.  
After this conceptual reflections the following chapters present the empirical evidence to answer 
the research questions in a comprehensive manner and to reflect and discuss the assumptions 
elaborated upon at the first part of the thesis. Chapter 4 starts off by looking in detail into the 
set-up of the European Neighbourhood Policy, beginning from the first time the idea was 
flooded as “wider Europe initiative” and the agenda-setting, this part especially focuses on the 
policy specification stage when different proposals were put on the table and various 
amendments proposed. Furthermore, this chapter 4 presents in a more descriptive manner the 
formal establishment and set-up of the ENP, its goals and its instruments. This chapter provides 
the reader with the background knowledge that is needed to understand and follow the 
argumentation in the subsequent chapters. 
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The main research objective of this thesis is to assess how the set-up of the ENP changed the 
interaction of EU actors in EU policy-making towards the neighbourhood. To be able to do so, 
the point of reference has to be established, what is done in chapter 5. This subsequent chapter 
shows that the ENP did not establish the EU relationship with the neighbours from scratch, but 
that frameworks, agreements etc have already been set-up beforehand. It is also shown here that  
these arrangements were already much stronger and elaborated towards the South (especially 
within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) than towards the East. The 
analysis of this chapter is relevant for the main research questions of this thesis as it shows the 
starting point upon which the ENP was build upon, highlights certain features that have also 
been relevant in the establishment of the ENP in terms of path-dependency and incrementalism, 
and also shows the different degree and intensity of EU relations with the South and the East.  
Chapter 6 finally investigates in detail how EU policy is made towards the neighbourhood once 
the ENP has been set-up and is running. First the different EU actors under investigation are 
presented and briefly introduced, before the task allocation within the ENP is analysed within 
different policy stages and by referring by traditional tasks of national foreign policy 
bureaucracies. By looking at different stages of the policy cycle it is shown that actors perform 
different tasks throughout the policy process and that it is not only the member states that are 
crucial actors, although they are the ones being most prominent in the decision-making phase. 
By allowing for a comparison with chapter 5, it will be shown what changed and what practices 
stayed the same even within the ENP.  
Chapter 7, finally, looks at the motivations to set-up the ENP, considering that a restructuring 
and reshuffling of tasks and competences always leads to unrest and even conflict. This was 
also visible in the ENP where the first ten months were marked by turf battles and conflicts 
between actors. However, the analysis in this chapter also shows that in terms of policy 
substance the different actors agree on the objectives that should be achieved, but that there is 
some disagreement, even within actors, of how those objectives can be best achieved.  
The thesis concludes by returning to the main research questions and to the assumptions that 
had been developed in the theoretical framework, and it furthermore reflects on potential 
avenues for future research. 
 
But for now as a next step, the relevance of the research focus is elaborated by linking the 
research questions to different strands of the broader academic debate. By doing so, I will also 
specify more clearly the focus of this research project. 
 
 16 
Chapter 2: Relevance of the Research Question & Specification of the Research Approach 
The research interest of this study about the changing interaction of the European actors in 
foreign policy-making towards the neighbourhood is linked to several political debates and 
contributes to different strands of the academic literature. But why should we care who is 
involved in EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours? To what extent does it make a 
difference how the different actors are involved in the policy process? Why is the research 
question of this PhD project politically and scientifically relevant? Within this section I shortly 
outline the more general and fundamental socio-political implications of the research questions. 
I start by focusing briefly on the societal and political relevance, before elaborating in more 
depth on the scientific relevance and on the linkages of this study to academic research. 
The societal and political relevance of the outlined research question is quite straight forward; 
the EU tries to find the best suitable way to establish a secure and stable neighbourhood, but 
repeated institutional adaptations and the continuous set-up of new policy frameworks leaves 
the impression that the EU is still not confident in the design of its relations with the 
neighbours. For nearly ten years the EU has emphasised the need to create a stable 
neighbourhood, and while there seems to be general agreement that stronger cooperation with 
the neighbours is needed, there is not much consensus about how this can be best achieved. 
Already in 2006, only two years after the ENP Strategy Paper (European Commission 2004b), 
the Commission published a follow up Communication entitled “Strengthening the European 
Neighbourhood Policy” (European Commission 2006f). This publication raised the suspicion 
that this was already the first attempt to rescue an unsuccessful policy initiative after only two 
years. Similar rhetoric accompanied the proposals of the Union for the Mediterranean and the 
Eastern Partnership. In 2008, the French presidency negotiated the establishment of the Union 
for the Mediterranean (UfM) which is supposed to be a re-launch of the in 1995 established 
Barcelona Process  (for Joint Declaration establishing the UfM see Paris Summit 2008; for 
background see Whitman & Juncos 2009; Reiterer 2009; Aliboni & Ammor 2009), and just a 
few month later the idea for a Eastern Partnership (EaP) was brought up by Poland and Sweden 
and meant to intensify the EU relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine (see for example European Commission 2008a). While officially the Commission 
and the Member states emphasise the complementary character of these new frameworks 
towards the ENP, critics and observers also voiced the concern that the ENP single framework 
proved as not very successful and that it will in the end be replaced by these new initiatives. 
These observations provide significance to the research question of this thesis in several ways. 
First of all, we have to question the link between institutional design, task allocation among 
actors, and the substance of the policy output. We should not assume beforehand that a change 
 17
in the institutional framework automatically alters the (role of) involved actors and/or the 
substance of the policy output, but different scenarios are possible (see Table 1).  
If we can observe that a change in the institutional framework changes the substance of the 
policy output and at the same time changes the number/role of involved actors (scenario 1), the 
assumption seems plausible that it matters which EU actors are involved in EU policy-making, 
as different actors in the policy-making process alter the substance of the policy output. Hence, 
the restructuring of the EU foreign policy machinery in Brussels after the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty, might for example also lead to a different EU foreign policy output.  
In scenario 2, an altered institutional framework changes the substance of the policy output, but 
the number and/or the role of the involved EU actors does not change. If our empirical 
observations verify this scenario, we can assume that it actually does not matter who from the 
EU level is involved in EU foreign policy-making. The different institutional design then might 
alter the cooperation with the third country or take other factors into account that shape the 
policy output. This would, however, also imply that the reoccurring turf-battles in Brussels 
between Member States, Commission and Council Secretariat are obsolete, as the policy output 
does not change, no matter how the Brussels actors share tasks and competences. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn from scenario 3 where the institutional framework changes the number 
and/or role of involved EU actors, but the substance of the EU policy output stays the same.  
Table 1: Relevance of Research question: linkage between institutional design, role of involved 
actors and substance of policy output 
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What does this tell us? 
1 change change change Institutional framework changes content of EU policy-making, because it 
changes the tasks of the involved actors; 
2 change No change change 
Institutional framework changes content of EU policy-making, while not 
altering the involvement of actors; This implies that the diverse EU actors 
in the end pursue the same kind of policies (what would make the debate 
about the involvement of more intergovernmental or supranational 
elements dispensable); 
3 change change No change 
The institutional framework mainly impacts on the task allocation and the 
number of involved actors. While it changes the actors that give their input 
in EU policy-making, this does not alter the content of EU policy-making. 
This implies in addition to scenario 2 that the number and role of involved 
EU actors does not matter for the concrete content of output; 
4 change No change No change 
The institutional framework in itself does not impact on the number and 
role of involved EU actors, and does also not directly or indirectly alter 
the substance of EU policy output. This implies that if the EU would like 
to change/upgrade its relationship with a third country it is not enough to 
just change the institutional framework, but this change would also have 
to alter the (role of) involved EU actors; 
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Finally, in scenario 4 we assume that the institutional framework changes, but this does neither 
lead to an alteration of the number and/or role of involved EU actors nor to a change in the 
substance of the policy output. This would imply that to achieve a different policy output it is 
not enough for the EU to just alter the institutional framework, but that more profound (treaty) 
changes would be needed to establish, for example, a different kind of cooperation with the 
neighbours.  
The research question of this thesis therefore relates smoothly to questions investigating the 
current changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. This latest treaty revision is based on the 
logic that for the EU to become a more prominent international actor it has to provide an 
increased single identity (or “single voice” as it is often called in the academic literature) at 
world stage. To get closer to this goal, the Lisbon Treaty mainly focuses on institutional 
changes to achieve coherence. The post of the High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy that was established with the Treaty of Amsterdam is altered and became 
the post of the “High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. 
The first office holder, Lady Catherine Asthon, is at the same time the Vice President of the 
European Commission and the Commissioner of the respective Directorate General, DG Relex5. 
Having the same actors involved in different aspects of EU foreign policy-making shall ensure a 
coherent and effective actorness of the international actor EU. The same logic is also adhered to 
the set-up of the European External Action Service (EEAS) that is currently under negotiation 
and supposed to be running lastest beginning of 2011.  
Investigating if the ENP was in the end able to create a single framework and if this changed the 
interaction and roles of the different actors, will allow us to deduct certain general assumptions 
about how institutional changes (e.g. of the Lisbon Treaty) might impact more generally on EU 
foreign policy-making. The new cross-pillar post of the High Representative as well as the 
EEAS seem on a broader level to duplicate what was argued for in regard of the ENP in 
2003/04, and it is interesting to assess what generalisations of this research project we might 
also expect to observe in the near future about EU foreign policy-making in more general terms. 
From an academic point of view, this thesis builds mainly on political science and International 
Relations as the core disciplines, but also (sub-)disciplines such as public administration, 
comparative politics, and European Studies are taken into account. By linking the research 
questions to these different strands and by discussing some crucial already established concepts 
I want to further specify my research interest, limit the focus of research and show in what way 
this research project adds to different aspects of the scientific discussion. This will be done in 
                                                     
5
 See Council Website about the new post of the HR, or also newly established Website of the European External 
Action Service: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=1847&lang=en or http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
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three steps. First, this thesis contributes to the understanding of the complex system of EU 
foreign policy-making. The development of the ENP has to be put into perspective in terms of 
time, by perceiving the development of the ENP framework as one instance of the constant 
adaptation of the EU foreign policy-making system. Furthermore, by referring to distinctions 
drawn from Foreign Policy Analysis (output vs. outcome, routine decision-making vs. history-
making decisions) the research focus is more narrowly specified. Secondly, the concepts of 
coherence and consistency lie at the core of this thesis, and the application of these more general 
concepts to EU policy-making towards the neighbourhood provides empirical and analytical 
refinements to the concepts themselves. And finally, the research questions of this thesis relates 
closely to the academic debate about the EU as an international actor.  
2.1. Understanding the EU Foreign Policy-making System over Time 
The research question about the changing interaction of EU actors in making policies towards 
the EU neighbours contributes most obviously to the understanding of how foreign policy is 
made at EU level, how these processes might have changed over time, and how they are distinct 
or similar to EU foreign policy-making towards other partners. Furthermore, in more analytical 
terms, this research adds to European integration theories (Intergovernmentalism, role of 
supranational actors, governance approaches) as well as to EU foreign policy analysis. In regard 
of the latter, it contributes to the understanding of the role of bureaucracies in foreign policy-
making, and also relies on certain distinctions like output/outcome or different forms of 
decisions.   
2.1.1. Contributing to European Integration Research and EU Governance  
EU policy-making in general, and EU foreign policy-making in particular is often described as a 
complex and not easily comprehendible process with lots of different actors involved. The EU 
comprises a peculiar political system, ranging between a traditional form of the federal state and 
an international organisation. And also the way policies are conducted within this system is 
often difficult to grasp with traditional theoretical scientific tools. Hence, for some time scholars 
had argued to treat the EU as a political system sui nlarge (Kohler-Koch & Eising 1999: 3), 
with a structure and form of policy-making that is different to the way nation states are set-up 
and conduct policies. Linked to this assumption is the “N=1” problem for scientific research, 
implying that research about the European Union has to be specific and treated differently, as 
theories and methods have to be adopted accordingly and EU studies are difficult to compare 
with traditional results from state-centred International relations or comparative politics 
research.  
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In general terms, a long standing discussion has taken place within the European integration 
literature about who the pivotal actors in European Union policy-making are (for an overview 
see Diedrichs & Wessels 2006: 209-213; Matlary 1997). Liberal intergovernmentalists assume 
that the key actors within the European Union are the member states, and that supranational 
institutions like the European Commission only provide administrative assistance to overcome 
cooperation problems (Moravcsik 1993) but that they are constantly under the control of the 
member states. In contrast, neo-functionalist scholars (see among others Schmitter 1969) 
perceive the supranational institutions as active and autonomous actors in shaping EU policies. 
In their view, the expertise of the European Commission and its assumed representation of the 
European interest legitimate possible spill over effects from other policy areas. Since the 1980s 
neo-institutionalist principal-agent approaches joined this discussion, got further elaborated 
(Kassim & Menon 2003; Pierson 1996, 1998; Pollack 1997, 1998, 2003) and settled between 
these two extreme positions of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Additionally, there 
was also a shift in theoretical discussions in regard of European integration, moving from the 
traditional dispute between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism to the assumptions of a 
multi-level governance approach (Hooghe & Marks 2003; Marks, Hooghe & Blank 1996; 
Jachtenfuchs 2001).  
However, especially during the last ten years, European integration scholars call for 
interdisciplinary and comparative research, claiming that the EU might be special but not totally 
different, and that comparison with other regions/institutions and the use of concepts and 
theories from other (sub)disciplines might provide useful insights and support the development 
of theoretical and methodological challenges for research (Hix 1998; Caporaso 1998; for a 
concise summary of arguments for/against this assumption see Caporaso, Marks, Moravcsik & 
Pollack 1997; for a similar reflection about the EU as Westphalian, regulatory or post-modern 
state see  Caporaso 1996).  
During the last years the shift to a governance approach emphasised that the EU has not 
acquired the institutional requirements and the sovereignty comparable to traditional nation 
states, but that it is able to perform public policies that are similar to those of a nation-state 
(Richardson 1996: 3, cited by White 1999: 48). The question remains to what extent this 
assumption also applies to EU policies with external character. Furthermore, several scholars 
(Pollack 1997; Tallberg 2002; Kassim & Menon 2003; Pollack 1998, 2003) have developed a 
principal-agent approach to public policy-making of the European Union, and although it is 
often stated that this framework does not apply to CFSP or the third pillar (Justice and Home 
Affairs) it will be interesting to analyse if similar mechanisms and processes can be examined in 
more integrated external policies like the ENP. Of course the peculiarities of foreign policies 
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have to get incorporated in such an analytical framework, but nevertheless interesting 
observations can be expected.  
These more current theoretical approaches have never extensively been applied to EU foreign 
policy-making (as above discussed, exceptions are e.g. Krause 2003; Stetter 2004, 2007) it was 
still argued that foreign policy is different than public policies and that these approaches would 
not be appropriate to be applied to EFP. I agree that foreign policy is different in certain aspects 
compared to other public policies. Foreign policy is much more executive-orientated (Stetter 
2004: 722), what, however, at European level normally points to a pivotal role of the 
Commission. On the other hand it has to be kept in mind, that irrespective of the change in 
interaction and the involvement of supranational actors, it is still the member states that decide 
unanimously. Nevertheless I assume that with a critical adaptation of these theoretical 
approaches to the respective differences, the underlying mechanisms and causal relations can 
also explain certain dynamics in the change of EU actors’ interaction.  
However, especially during the first ten years after the Maastricht Treaty, research about EU 
foreign policy-making and the EU as an international actor has still primarily been the 
prerogative of scholars from the field of International Relations, and cooperation between 
scholars of EU public policy-making and EU foreign policy-making was rare. 
Intergovernmentalism was the main approach and CFSP assessed as special case. This neatly 
reflected the way EU foreign policy has been set-up and perceived in reality since the Treaty of 
Maastricht.  
For decades, the preservation of national sovereignty had been the most prominent argument 
against the incorporation of foreign policy issues at European level. In the 1950s several 
attempts (e.g. the European Political Community, the Fouchet Plans for closer political but 
intergovernmental cooperation) had been launched for foreign policy integration or at least to 
allow a closer coordination of foreign policies at European level (Smith, M. E. 1998: 304). The 
European Defence Community, modelled after the Pleven plans, aimed at the creation of a pan-
European defence force, but because of sovereignty concerns the French national assembly 
rejected the idea in 1954. In 1970, however, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was 
established as an intergovernmental forum outside of the framework of the European Economic 
Community to coordinate foreign policies of the EEC members. The Single European Act 
incorporated this  informally introduced European Political Cooperation (EPC) within the EEC-
framework, but policies and institutions were still clearly separated (Hix 1999: 341-342). 
Hence, until the Treaty of Maastricht innovations were primarily meant to improve the 
cooperation and coordination of national foreign policies of the member states. 
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In contrast to these efforts to coordinate political issues of national foreign policies more 
closely, the Rome Treaty, however, had already covered three economic areas that had a strong 
external impact. First, the common market of the European Community also asked for a 
common customs system towards the outside world, which was the main focus of the Common 
Commercial Policy. Secondly, already at this time the Community had the competence to 
conclude trade, cooperation or association agreements with third countries (Piening 1997: 169-
191). And thirdly, the EC had the power to cooperate on issues of economic policies with 
international organisations like for example the United Nations (Smith, K. 2003: 34; Piening 
1997: 13-20). Hence, before the Maastricht Treaty, there was a clear separation between 
economic external policies and political external issues: the former where pursued at 
supranational EC-level, while the latter where coordinated and discussed in the 
intergovernmental framework of the EPC. 
With the end of the Cold War, the Gulf crisis and the civil war in Yugoslavia among other 
events, important changes in the international arena took place. In addition to this external 
factors, also a debate among the members of the European Communities started off about the 
need to establish a real “political Union” that would also allow for a more effective cooperation 
in foreign policy issues. While some member states still strictly refused to integrate foreign 
policy issues, others criticised the inadequacy of the EPC. At last, the compromise between 
these two different positions was the Treaty of Maastricht, where the EPC was incorporated as 
the second pillar within the institutional framework of the EU and renamed to the “Common 
Foreign and Security Policy” (CFSP). In contrast to the first EC pillar, however, this second 
pillar remained purely intergovernmental, what meant that member states remained the main 
actors, the Commission was only associated but did not have its right of initiative, and there was 
no judicial oversight of the European Court of Justice. Through this pillarisation, the already 
earlier established separation between external economic policies and external political policies 
got institutionalised.  
In line with this pillarisation, Christopher Hill argued already in 1993 that it is more useful not 
to speak of a “European Foreign Policy”6 but that the term EU “system of external relations” 
(1993: 322) is better suitable to represent the three included decentralized strands of EU foreign 
policy since the Maastricht Treaty. It comprises the sum of national policies of the member 
states, the second and intergovernmental pillar of CFSP and thirdly, the external relations of the 
European Community (EC), represented especially by the European Commission within the 
policy areas of trade, aid and development (White, Brian cited by Smith, K. 2003: 2, 217; See 
                                                     
6
 ‘European Foreign Policy’ is in the literature often used interchangeably with EU Foreign Policy, especially when it 
refers to foreign policy-making before the existence of the EU. Also in this thesis “European Foreign Policy” will 
just be used as substitute for EU Foreign Policy, and there is not difference in meaning implied;  
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also Becher 2004: 345; White 1999: 46-47)7. Already before the Maastricht Treaty established a 
political Union, the relations with developing countries were profoundly shaped by the EU 
development policies and its assistance programmes in third countries, in regard of which the 
EU was always proud to announce that it was and is, together with its member states, the most 
important donor of development and humanitarian aid. Under the heading of external relations, 
there is nowadays nearly no country with whom the EU does not have a special agreement to 
specify cooperation and common interests. The EU is, together with the United States, the most 
important trade bloc in the world, and many countries are influenced by its external trade 
policies. At the same time the CFSP has developed considerably since its institutionalisation in 
1993, and since 1999 the EU also developed the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 
Within the framework of the latter, new bureaucratic bodies and institutional units were set-up, 
and already in 2003, the EU started to run its first civilian and military missions (for more 
background on ESDP see among others Howorth 2005; Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra & Maurer 
2010). Policies are conducted differently within these three strands, and especially between 
CFSP and EC external relations different modes of policy-making exist. 
External Trade is a field of exclusive competence of the European Union under the Common 
Commercial Policy, which gives a very strong role to the European Commission (Art. 207 
TFEU, ex-Art 133 TEC). The framework for implementation is defined by the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting under the ordinary legislative procedure, and agreements 
with third countries or international organisations are recommended by the Commission, who 
receives then an authorisation and a mandate from the Council. The negotiations itself are 
negotiated by the Commission, monitored by a special committee and the European Parliament.8 
Humanitarian aid and development cooperation, on the contrary, fall under “shared parallel 
competences” (or also called “mixed competences”, see Art. 2-6 TFEU for list of competences) 
since the Lisbon Treaty, implying that these EU policies are complementary to the development 
policies of member states. The European Parliament and the Council again set the framework 
for implementing this policy, while the Commission is responsible for the project 
implementation and evaluation and monitoring (Art. 208-211 TFEU).  
CFSP on the other hand is kept separate, also in terms of the treaty text where it is not together 
with the other external policies part of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the 
                                                     
7
 While the Lisbon Treaty formally abolishes the three pillars, the use of Hill’s term seems still accurate: CFSP is 
incorporated within the EU framework, but in terms of content the Lisbon Treaty does not allow for profound 
changes. At the same time, the first dimension of Hill’s categorisation, the foreign policies of the member states, is 
absolutely untouched by the changes of the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, the timeframe of this research is roughly 
from 2000-2007, hence the changes of the Lisbon Treaty do not apply to this research focus. 
8
 The Lisbon Treaty did not change the provisions on the common commercial policy considerably. Only the 
involvement of the European parliament in setting up the framework for implementation and monitoring the 
Commission during negotiations together with the ex-133-committee is new.  
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former Treaty establishing the European Community) but outlined under Treaty on European 
Union. Despite the abolition of pillars wit the Lisbon Treaty, policies under this former second 
pillar are still kept intergovernmental, with predominantly unanimous decision-making9 in the 
Council. The Commission and the European Parliament have an “associated” but limited role, 
and the European Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction of this policy area, in which 
formally also no legislation can be passed. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the main instruments of 
the CFSP were joint actions, common positions, and common strategies, all of which are now 
renamed to “decisions”. The Lisbon Treaty mainly brought two changes to the area of CFSP: 
The European Council is now formally responsible for defining general interests and objectives, 
what it already did beforehand without a formal treaty provision. Furthermore, the post of the 
HR is slightly renamed to “High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, who 
is at the same time the Commission for External Relations and shall in the future be supported 
by a newly established European External Action Service (EEAS).  
Since the Maastricht Treaty, two different developments can be observed in EU foreign policy-
making: the CFSP as well as the EC external policies increased remarkably. During the last 15 
years the CFSP evolved considerably in terms of institutional organisation as well as in terms of 
policy output (Nuttall 2000; Smith, M. E. 1998, 2004a; Duke & Vanhoonacker 2006; Smith, M. 
E. 2004b; Christiansen & Vanhoonacker 2008; Dijkstra 2008; for a concise overview of 
developments in the European Security and Defence Policy see for example Mérand 2008; 
Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra & Maurer 2010). Officials of the member states got used to the 
different CFSP working groups (Juncos & Pomorska 2006), the Political and Security 
Committee quickly found its new role within the policy cycle (Juncos & Reynolds 2007; Duke 
2005), and more generally, the member states learnt how to work within the CFSP framework.. 
But the CFSP pillar also increased in terms of policy output. As figure 1 shows, the quantity of 
CFSP instruments (decisions, common positions and common actions) increased steadily (see 
also Smith, M. E. 2004a: 51), especially with joint actions establishing ESDP missions since 
2003.  
                                                     
9
 With the treaty revision of Amsterdam member states could also decide with majority when their policies are based 
on a Common Strategy, like it is the case in the Mediterranean policy since 2000.  
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Figure 1: Number of EU common actions and positions, 1970-2004 
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 Common Decision Common Position Joint Action total 
1970-74: 8*    2** 
1975-79: 7*    1,75** 
1980-84: 24*    6** 
1985-89: 26*    6,5** 
1993   2 2 
1994 7 1  8 
1995 2 7  9 
1996  4 2 6 
1997 6 2 2 10 
1998 1 6 4 11 
1999 2 6 1 9 
2000 5 3 4 12 
2001 6 4 3 13 
2002  2 2 4 
2003 6 4 1 11 
2004 4 5 4 13 
2005 5 6 3 14 
2006 7 7 2 16 
2007 5 5 6 16 
2008 6 6 14 26 
2009 7 4 9 20 
 
Data from Smith, M. E. 2004: 51; other data own calculation based on “Directory of European Union legislation 
in force” – “Chapter 18: Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Retrieved on 23 July 2010, from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/legis/20100701/chap18.htm  
** As the data for years 1970 till 1995 is only available in 5-years-terms the graph for these respective years 
shows the mean. 
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Figure 2: EC expenditure for „external action“ in % of general budget, 1982 – 2004 
(data from European Commission 2009: 78-82 , own graph)  
    
Figure 3: Proportional EC expenditure for “external actions” in subheadings, 2001- 2006  
(data see Annex)  
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In regard of this strong development of the CFSP pillar some scholars argued that since the 
Maastricht Treaty the intergovernmental character of foreign policy at European level has got 
institutionalised, and that if anything such as a EU Foreign Policy (EFP) ever evolves, it does so 
within the intergovernmental CFSP. In their view the member states and their representations in 
Brussels are the decisive actors in EU foreign policy-making, supported by the CFSP 
institutions to overcome cooperation problems. Hence, they define EFP primarily through CFSP 
as the direct continuation of the EPC, i.e. the coordination of national foreign policies. They 
would explain the increase of the EU budget for the heading “external relations” as presented in 
figure 2 by claiming that it is mainly the growth of the second pillar that explains this 
development.  
However, figure 3 shows the share of different subheadings within the budget line “external 
relations” and contradicts the assessment that the budget for external relations increased because 
of CFSP development. It shows that the share of CFSP expenditure within the external relation 
heading did not increase dramatically. In 2001 only 1% of the total EC budget for external 
actions was spent on CFSP what increased marginally in 2003 (1,4%), 2004 (1,8%), 2005 
(1,9%) to 3,2% in 2006. The figure also shows that the emphasis of EC expenditure lies with the 
European neighbourhood, i.e. the relations with the Middle East and Southern Mediterranean 
and with Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Central Asian republics. The current financial 
framework 2007-2013 allocates 49.463 million EUR to the heading “EU as a global player” 
which is 5,7% of the total appropriated EU budget for this timeframe (European Parliament, 
Council of the European Union & European Commission 2006: 83). 
It was, therefore, not only the second CFSP pillar that grew steadily over time, but also EC 
external relations developed further, leading also to an increasing involvement of supranational 
actors in regular policy-making towards third countries. Policies like the TACIS-programme 
towards Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the MEDA-Programme towards the Euro-
Mediterranean partner countries, or development cooperation programmes have also been 
increasingly pursued within the first EC-pillar during the last ten to twenty years (Hix 1999: 
345-346; Smith, M. 2006: 313). 
At a later point in this thesis it will be shown that the ENP is supposed to overcome the 
pillarisation and to unite the different policies with external dimensions within one framework. 
However, does this mean that the different policy-making processes are just added up, or does 
this single ENP framework also change something in the processes of how policies are 
conducted towards the neighbours? This is one of the central question to which this thesis is 
contributing to, with the aim to contribute in a more descriptive manner to the understanding of 
how policies at EU level are conducted towards the neighbours, and how this might have 
changed over time. 
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With a more analytical intention in mind, this thesis is, however, also relevant to add to the 
discussion about who the most important actors are in EFP making towards the neighbours and 
about what roles different actors fulfil. As this brief outline above about different forms of EU 
foreign policy-making has shown, there is a number of actors involved, and their competences 
differ between policy areas. The RELEX-family of the Commission consists of DG Relex 
(External Relations), DG Development, DG Trade, DG Enlargement, DG Aidco (EuropeAid), 
as well as the humanitarian aid office ECHO10. Furthermore, units with an external dimension 
are also situated in other DGs, as for example in DG Agri, DG JLS etc. Next to these actors 
situated in Brussels, there are, of course, the member states as single actors, but also as a 
collective in the different Council formations and the Presidency. The treaty revision of 
Amsterdam also created new institutions within the second pillar. The Secretary-General of the 
Council took over the post of the High Representative for the CFSP (HR) who assists the 
Council in the formulation, preparation and implementation of CFSP-related decisions. 
Furthermore, the Presidency can request the HR to represent the Council in political dialogues 
with third parties. In close cooperation with the HR, the also newly established policy planning 
and early warning unit within the General Secretariat of the Council is meant to assist the 
member states by monitoring potential political crisis situations, analysing international 
development, assessing future areas of action, or even producing policy option papers for the 
Council (for general introduction to EU foreign policy making within the different pillars see 
Hill & Smith 2005; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan 2008) And although the European Parliament 
does not have much influence in foreign policy issues, it has also its own view and priorities 
that it primarily tries to support through its budgetary competences.  
These different actors often share common views about certain policies, but at the same time 
they also have their own national or bureaucratic interests and their own perceptions about how 
a special policy should be pursued. Therefore, over time, a quite complex system of 
competences, legitimacies and interaction has evolved which is, of course, also exposed to 
constant pressure for change and adaptation. To investigate the network of actors in EU policy-
making towards neighbouring countries, their positions, interests, competences but also 
perceptions is the wider rationale behind this thesis.  
Both above described approaches of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism may have a 
point, i.e. that the policy output of the EC external relations as well as of the CFSP increased at 
the same time. It is therefore not enough to analyze the CFSP and its political instruments solely 
when looking at EU foreign policy-making. Karen Smith warned that “foreign policy is not just 
the product of the CFSP pillar” (Smith, K. 2003: 2; for an analysis of the influence of the 
                                                     
10
 Since the Lisbon Treaty, ECHO is also responsible for civil protection.  
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Commission on CFSP see  also Krause 2003: 222), while Michael Smith goes still a step further 
and suggests “to focus on the CFSP alone is fundamentally distorting, and leads us to exclude 
less dramatic but more consequential developments” (Smith, M. 1998: 78; for similar 
conclusions see Smith, M. 2001: 787). Smith even argues that the EU can only be perceived as a 
foreign policy actor by analyzing the external economic policies of the first pillar, as only in this 
area strategic action is performed (Smith, M. 1998: 78).11 
It is, however, also indispensable not only to observe an increase in policy quantity but also to 
more carefully examine the interactions between the actors, because we must not automatically 
assume that these processes have remained the same since 1993. Hence, the question behind the 
research question of this thesis is not if the first or the second pillar is more active in foreign 
policy-making, or – speaking in theoretical terms – if foreign policy-making at European level 
is primarily intergovernmental or supranational. The core contribution of this research project is 
to desist from this rigid pillar-separation and to look more critically, if and how during the last 
fifteen years the interaction between the actors and the policy process changed, and what roles 
different actors performed at different points in time.  
The second part of the research question about the reasons for a potential change in interaction 
relates to similar analyses about implementation processes or institutional change in the 
European integration literature. Why do member states delegate certain tasks to other actors or 
institutions, when it is quite logical to assume that these agents do not fully implement the 
decisions of their principals, i.e. the member states, but also impose their own interpretations of 
a “good” policy or their own institutional interests? What implications does the delegation not 
only have for the policy process itself, but also for the policy content? And if, as critiques often 
complain, there are no clearly formulated European interests, which goals do the European 
institutions pursue otherwise?  
These kind of questions the thesis relates to, even if they are not the main focus of research and 
it will not always be possible to answer them completely, but at least the research findings of 
this thesis will allow for certain reflections and assumptions that might lead to future research. 
However, the research question of this thesis not only relates to European integration research, 
but also to more traditional Foreign Policy Analysis.  
 
                                                     
11
 This assumption is highly questioned by Dave Allen who argues that neither the Commission nor CFSP have the 
ability to control their own area of competences (Missiroli 2001: 178-182). 
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2.1.2. Contributing to Foreign Policy Analysis 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is a subdiscipline located between IR and comparative politics 
that aims to understand and explain how certain foreign policies emerge and are shaped within 
different actors (i.e. normally states). Within FPA there are three debates that help to specify the 
focus of this research project more clearly. First of all, FPA clearly differentiates between 
output and outcome: 
“An ´output´ refers to whatever the foreign policy machine does in the world – make a statement 
or give aid, for example. An ´outcome´ is what happens as a result of it – general condemnation 
of the statement, or relief to the sufferers of famine, for instance.” (Clarke & Smith 1994: 172; 
for similar definition see Haftendorn 1990: 404)12 
This thesis focuses primarily on the EU foreign policy output towards the neighbourhood, but 
does not take into account the outcome of EU Foreign Policy, i.e. the effectiveness of EU 
policies in the respective third countries. The selected countries are primarily research 
objectives for analysing how interaction and foreign policy-making works on EU level, but they 
are not the focus of my research. They are only interesting for this research in that far, as EU 
Foreign Policy is directed towards them and as different EU actors might pursue different 
interests or strategies to achieve the generally defined common goals towards these countries. 
The most ideal research design would, of course, take both into account, and check for certain 
feedback loops that a potential outcome on the ground might have on the decision-making and 
outcome at EU level (i.e. to what extent problems in the implementation on the ground might 
change the policy position of different actors in Brussels). However, comparing the output of 
EU foreign policy-making in Brussels with the outcome on the ground in the third country 
comprises a totally different research question and hence also a different research design, what 
would open the scope of this research too far. Hence, this thesis focuses on the EU policy output 
in Brussels (for a very good study about the effectiveness of European Foreign Policy see 
Ginsberg 2001). There is a well-elaborated bulk of literature that investigates foreign policy-
making of nation-states, and adopting some of these concepts to the European Union might 
allow to clarify if these concepts are really only applicable to states or could also be used for 
other international actors. 
                                                     
12
 This is the common differentiation between output and outcome in FPA; However, in EU integration studies, also a 
different differentiation exists by Héritiér who differentiates between output, outcome and impact. According to 
Héritier, policy outputs are the result of the policy formulation stage, defined as the content of the formal political 
decision-making; The implementation of the policy outputs leads to short and medium term programme results 
and institutional adaptations, which together are defined as policy outcomes. The long-term implications of these 
outcomes change the status-quo, what is then finally defined as the policy impact (Windhoff-Héritier 1980). 
Héritier differentiates more closely between outcome and impact, what in the definition above is not taken into 
account and just subsumed under “outcome”. As the latter, is not the focus of this thesis, this more detailed 
definition does not seem necessary.  
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Second, a clear distinction of different forms of policy decisions seems useful to more narrowly 
specify the research focus. Categorised according to political importance and the available time 
Haftendorn (Haftendorn 1990: 403-404) differentiates three types of decisions in foreign policy-
making13: 
1. long-term strategy decisions: no pressure of time, strategies and concepts for future 
problem-solving elaborated by special working groups, policy innovations are possible 
and probable; 
2. routine decisions: moderate political importance and less pressure of time; no 
involvement of high politicians or special planning units; decided on working level by 
lower bureaucrats, often “standard operational procedure; 
3. crisis decisions: high-pressure of time and politically vitally important; often societal 
values involved, decided by high politicians. 
 
There is also a similar differentiation from the EU context that seems useful: Peterson and 
Bomberg (Peterson & Bomberg 1999: 10) categorise EU decision making in history-making, 
policy-setting, and policy-shaping decisions that take place on different levels (super-systemic,  
system, and sub-systemic). History-making decisions are mainly related to treaty changes, 
involve the Heads of States and governments, and are highly political. At the system level, 
policy-setting decisions are taken by the member states (mostly in the Council) to agree on 
common policies that should be pursued. At the subsystem level, they argue that policy-shaping 
decisions are taken by a variety of subnational, bureaucratic and supranational actors that 
specify the agreed policy-setting decisions, that try to influence Council members from the 
system level and that create transnational networks and epistemic communities.  
Most FPA studies focus on crisis decision-making, although this type of decisions represents 
just one form of foreign policy decisions while routine-decision making is especially present in 
day-to-day politics in terms of implementing and must not be neglected: 
 “foreign policy actions cannot be understood without an appreciation of their implementation 
phase, which is at least as important as that of decision-making, given that outcomes are so often 
markedly different from original intentions” (Hill 2003: 51) 
This predominant focus in the literature on crisis decision-making, however, distorts the 
generalisation of results to a certain extent, as it overemphasises the importance of highly 
political actors (who are more involved in crisis decision than the other two forms) and 
downplays the engagement of more bureaucratic actors. Interestingly enough, also bureaucratic 
politics approaches (Allison 1971; Hilsman 1993; Allison & Zelikow 1999; Allison & Halperin 
1972) focus often on crisis decisions, although crisis decisions are rather least-likely cases for 
this kind of approach: bureaucratic politics emphasises the importance of bureaucratic units 
                                                     
13
 The categories of Haftendorn were translated from German; The original categories are “Planungsentscheidungen”, 
“Routineentscheidungen” and “Krisenentscheidungen”;   
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within the decision making process, while bureaucratic actors seem more prominent in routine 
decisions and to a certain extent in long-term strategy decisions. However, in the investigated 
crisis decisions, bureaucracies are assumed to not have too much influence, according to 
Haftendorn’s categorisation.  
Contrary to most FPA studies, this research focuses mainly on day-to-day politics, looking at 
routine decisions and long-term strategy planning. There are a few reasons for this focus. First 
and foremost, the ENP allows more for a focus on routine and day-to-day politics, as this is the 
kind of policy that is dealt with within this framework: While there are a few frozen conflicts in 
the neighbourhood (for example Western Sahara or Nagorno Karabakh, next to the Middle East 
Conflict), the ENP is less focusing on crisis management and crisis decisions, and repeatedly 
the Commission even emphasised that the ENP is not suitable to deal with the frozen conflicts. 
Furthermore, it is not history-making decisions that are necessary to look at when analysing the 
ENP, as the treaty texts itself have not been changed when the ENP was set-up. But it is mainly 
policy-setting and policy-shaping decisions that are of relevance to be analysed. This follows a 
research strand in EU public policy-making that researches “interstitial institutional change” and 
claims that “the daily operation of the EU, or its long-term institutional dynamics, cannot be 
known from the formal letter of the Treaties” (Caporaso 2007: 393). From a more general 
perspective, there is already much research about the EU as a crisis manager, while the other 
two forms of foreign policy decisions are taken less into account. Moreover, also scholars 
repeatedly highlight the necessity to focus on bureaucracy as well, as “much of what happens 
depends on less glamorous bureaucratic interaction and bargaining” (Peters 1992: 121) , and 
Christopher Hill (2003: 57) even argues that routine decision-making is even more important in 
foreign policy-making than high salient crisis discussions, because within the former the 
substance of foreign policy is pursued (for similar conclusions see Smith, S. 1994: 112; Spanier 
1975: 410 cited by Rosati 1981: 249).  
Hence, the main research focus is not the definition of general common goals in EU Foreign 
policy-making towards the neighbours but this thesis investigates how the broadly defined goal 
(e.g.  creating stability and security in the near abroad) is implemented through several 
instruments, and how the different actors interact to specify these generally agreed goal.  
Finally, FPA also deals with the role of different actors in foreign policy-making. Especially 
relevant here is the research by Christopher Hill on the role of the bureaucracy in foreign policy-
making. Within states the ministries of foreign affairs perform three vital functions (Hill 2003: 
77). First, they are important for routine information gathering. During crisis and war time 
journalists and the public media might have the same possibility to provide information, but 
bureaucracies are especially important in regard of information about day-to-day developments 
and the monitoring of policy implementation. Secondly, foreign policy bureaucracies assist 
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politicians to formulate their foreign policies. Although the latter might in the end have the sole 
competence to decide, the civil servants in the foreign ministers support them in analyzing the 
huge quantities of information, in predicting and interpreting actions of other states or in 
pointing out policy options. Thirdly and last, the foreign ministry ensures a certain amount of 
continuity in external relations, as the “institutional memory” does not allow easily for total 
changes in policies.  
For a long time, bureaucracies were seen as loyal, apolitical agents that implement what 
politicians have decided (Hill 2003: 74-76), although this assumption might be questioned at 
least since Graham Allison’s theoretical approach of bureaucratic politics where he argues that  
bureaucracies also pursue their own organizational interest in increasing their role in policy-
making (Allison 1971; Allison & Halperin 1972; Allison & Zelikow 1999). By looking at the 
motivations of different actors to set-up the ENP potential conflicts between politicians (from 
the member states) and bureaucracts (from the Commission) are going to be identified.  
Why do we need to understand how EU foreign policy is emerging? Does it matter who is 
conducting EU foreign policy? In the end this debate also links back to the underlying logic of 
the research question of this thesis – do institutional frameworks matter, i.e. does the peculiar 
policy-making system of the European Union influence the way foreign policies are made 
towards the neighbours, and can we observe crucial differences from what we know how states 
formulate, decide and implement foreign policies. Such a comparison is (again) not the focus of 
this thesis, but only when we understand the institutional dimension and change of the EU 
foreign policy-making process we acquire a certain base from which the answer of such 
questions is possible.  
After outlining how the research questions contribute to our understanding of the EU foreign 
policy system, to EU integration research but also to foreign policy analysis, a next crucial step 
is the link the research focus to the concepts of coherence and consistency in foreign policy-
making.  
2.2. Assessing Coherence in EU Foreign Policy-making 
Coherence is an often emphasised demand asked for in EU foreign policy-making. The 
international performance of the EU is frequently criticised for its inefficiency und 
insufficiency, although the EU is one of the main trading blocs and the most important donor of 
development aid. The view of the EU as an “economic giant but political dwarf” (Schmalz 
2000: 109) raises the question why the EU does not use its economic weight for political 
instances. However, while a comprehensive approach is asked for by scholars, most research 
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about EFP kept the separation along the pillars alive for the first 15 years (as also already 
outlined chapters 1.2.3 and 2.1.1), as also Wessel confirms: 
“The three-pillar structure of the European Union […] is often used as a justification for separate 
analyses of the three pillars. In the early days after the signing of the Treaty on European Union, 
the pillar-structure was the form in which the Union was perceived, and subsequently analysed 
by many authors.” (Wessel 2000: 1135) 
Either scholars were experts in analysing the EC external relations that they often perceived as 
too apolitical and hence too technical, or scholars solely look at the CFSP output that in the 
view of the latter was often assessed as too highly political and ineffective. Or scholars only 
focused on the different national interests of the member states and mostly on high political 
crisis-decision making (e.g. Iraq) but the smooth running of day-to-day foreign policy-making 
at European level was mostly not the interest of research.  
As already mentioned in chapter 1.2.3, I identified three exceptions in the academic literature 
who allow for a cross-pillar approach and whose results are of interest for this study. First, 
Winn and Lord analysed EU joint actions on the cases of Mostar, Dayton and the Southern 
Caucasus to investigate the interaction of European actors beyond the pillars in regard of foreign 
policy-making.  In regard of the EU joint action in the Caucasus, Winn and Lord observed 
rational policy preferences that led to a high degree of cross-pillar coherence. The agenda 
setting was led by the member states in conjunction with the General Affairs Council (GAC) 
and several external relations DGs of the Commission. The different actors, nevertheless, 
functioned as agents of the GAC (Winn/Lord 2001: 168-169). They also found that the other 
two joint actions were not conducted in such a rational manner and did also not achieve such a 
degree of coherence. Regarding Mostar, no actor took the leadership, but at least the main actors 
shared common normative assumptions, what led to a certain degree of coherence. Concerning 
the Dayton joint action there was no well-formed preferences at all, what led to confusion and 
disagreement. The GAC tried to take the lead but was mostly challenged by the Commission or 
by NATO. This all led to little cross-pillar coherence (Winn/Lord 2001: 170-171). Winn and 
Lord conclude that the European Commission is granted a certain role as policy entrepreneur in 
EU foreign policy-making, but that it depends on the national interest constellations and the 
available information flow between actors (Winn/Lord 2001: 178).  
Winn and Lords results are of interest for the research question of this project because they 
tested different theoretical models on their case studies, and found out that as long as all 
involved actors perceive more or less the same main goals of the policy, i.e. if they support the 
same policy idea, there is no problem with coherence. Nevertheless, they did neither look in 
detail at the process of interaction between the involved actors and institutions nor did they 
incorporate bureaucratic interests as a crucial factor. 
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A second exception to intentionally desist from the pillarisation is Krause’s investigation of the 
EU’s Africa policy. Krause (2003) argues that the EU-Africa relations became increasingly 
overlapping between external relations and political CFSP issues what allowed for “a mutual 
influence of the central actors of the two pillars on each other’s policy output” (Krause 2003: 
222). She argues that because of the overlap of EC and CFSP competencies and because of the 
fact that the two pillars need each other to implement a policy, they influence each other. To 
study this relationship two directions are possible, whereas Krause choose to analyse the 
influence of the Commission towards CFSP, whereas she perceives the Commission as a policy 
entrepreneur. This entrepreneurship occurs in two different ways: First, the Commission 
develops comprehensive policy concepts with cross-pillar solutions, which are periodically sent 
as Commission communications to the Council and other supranational institutions. Secondly, 
the Commission tries to intervene in Council discussions, where primarily informal procedures 
become important (Krause 2003: 224, 236). For this thesis, Krause’s study is interesting as it 
applies a principal-agent approach to a single case study, and the results support the underlying 
assumption of this project that the intergovernmental-supranational divide does not allow for 
substantive understanding in foreign policy-making anymore. Because if CFSP would really be 
‘only’ intergovernmental than the Commission should not have been able to influence outputs 
within CFSP towards Congo. In contrast to Krause’s research that focused on a certain point in 
time the process of ‘change over time’ will be an important aspect of my research. In regard of 
the ENP it is interesting how Krause shows that the Commission intentionally used the 
argument of a comprehensive and coherent approach to strengthen its entrepreneurial position 
also in political issues. 
The third exception in the academic literature so far is a more recent publication by Stephan 
Stetter (Stetter 2007) who in his book entitled “EU Foreign and Interior Policies: Cross-Pillar 
Politics and the Social Construction of Sovereignty” argues that the pillarisation since the 
Maastricht treaty ”has over time been replaced by a cross-pillar politics setting” because of a 
“functional indivisibility” of the respective policy areas (see also Stetter 2004: 720). This finally 
led to the creation of highly-complex cross-pillar institutional structures within the examined 
two case studies of EU Middle East and migration policies. Although this extensive study is 
primarily concerned about the implications of the cross-pillar complexity on sovereignty, it 
impressively illustrates how to conduct a cross-pillar analysis on a respective case study.  
 
The demand of taking into account both pillars, EC and CFSP, is not just a scientific demand, 
but also a requirement for successful day-to-day policy-making. The changes in the 
international system and a comprehensive security approach suggest that economic and political 
issues shall not be kept separate anymore, or even more radically, that a clear separation of 
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policy areas in economic and political issues is today not possible anymore. Scholars even claim 
that it is not only nót possible anymore to differentiate between different external policies, but 
that also the division between internal and external policies got increasingly blurred (Eriksson & 
Rhinard 2009; Duke & Ojanen 2006; Weiss & Dalferth 2009). This also applies to the European 
Union and asks for an inclusion of the EC when dealing with EU external policies14 (Smith, M. 
2003: 560; Schmalz 1998: 421, 425). Despite different processes and decision-making 
mechanisms, policies of the different pillars should appear unified towards the outside world.  
In regard of formal treaty provisions, the two pillars were clearly distinct regarding decision-
making procedures, actors and their competences, means and instruments until the Lisbon 
Treaty. To accomplish a good interaction between these two pillars and their actors nonetheless 
and to ensure an effective appearance of the Union in international affairs, Art. 3 of the TEU 
explicitly asked for coherence15 in the external activities of the European Union:  
“The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the 
context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and 
the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the 
implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers.” (TEU, Art. 3)16 
The literature views this article as a fundamental principle of the external action of the EU 
(Smith, M. E. 2001: 173, 2004a: 210; Nugent 2002: 154; see e.g. Gauttier 2004: 26; Nuttall 
2001; De Wilde & Glume 2004: 2), which should guarantee that the external actions of different 
policy areas as well as of different actors do not contradict themselves, or even more 
optimistically, mutually support each other.  
                                                     
14
 The claim that it is not enough to analyse only the CFSP also asks for an inclusion of the third pillar. Nevertheless, 
I only will look at policies of the third pillar that are external-directed, i.e. when they are addressed directly toward 
a third country like for example migration issues.  
15
 There is a clear-cut legal distinction between “coherence” and “consistency” (Duke 1999; see also Gauttier 2004: 
23-26; Missiroli 2001: 178). Consistency focuses on the absence of contradiction, on compability and making 
good sense; it requires the absence of action that contradict already existing goals, for example that member states 
do not support countries where development aid from the EC is not granted because of human rights violations. 
On the other hand, coherence implies positive connections, a certain amount of synergy and the adding of value; it 
goes still a step further than consistency and asks for active support of already existing strategies. Furthermore, it 
is good to bear in mind that consistency can be achieved or not, whereas coherence is possible in different stages 
(For a more detailed discussion see Tietje 1997: 212-213). In practical terms, such a firm and clear distinction 
between these two concepts does not exist, and is also not used. The two concepts of coherence and consistency 
are used interchangeably in the treaties, especially in the translations of different languages (Nohlen, Schultze & 
Schüttemeyer 1998: 332-334). For my research a sharp distinction is not necessary and therefore a will use the 
term “coherence” in a broad definition. 
16
 With the Lisbon Treaty, this provision is replaced in substance, by Article 7 TFEU, and by Articles 13(1) and 21(3) 
TEU; Art. 13(1) TEU reads “The Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its 
values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, and ensure 
the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions”;  
 Art. 21, paragraph 3, second subparagraph TEU reads “The Union shall ensure consistency between the different 
areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and 
shall cooperate to that effect” 
     Art. 7 TFEU reads “The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its 
objectives into account and in accordance with the principle of conferral of powers.” 
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The quest for coherence in external relations is not a new issue. Within national foreign policies 
incoherence is accepted and mostly not even perceived as a problem. Hill (Hill 2003: 84-85) 
identifies it as one of the most challenging tasks for governments in foreign policy-making to 
keep “the major departments of state in harmony with each other along the way”.  For him, the 
term “foreign policy” incorporates automatically coherence as  
“The very notion of a ‘policy’ in any field implies conscious intentions and coordination. It is 
the umbrella term under which huddle the myriad particular ‘decisions’ and routinized outputs of 
an actor’s behaviour. That very often the system of policy-making fails to live up to these 
aspirations is beside the point” (Hill 2003: 4-5) 
In a similar vein, on European level more coherent action in external relations is already desired 
since 40 years, and there have been several attempts to improve the cooperation of the various 
actors. The incorporation of the European Political Cooperation within the institutional 
framework of the EU through the Maastricht Treaty was one of the first attempts to foster 
coherence, as also Smith confirms: 
“Improving the effectiveness and coherence of the European Union´s (EU) external capabilities 
was a key motivation behind the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU).” (Smith, M. E. 
2001: 171) 
The treaty revision of Amsterdam created the post of the High Representative for CFSP who 
should give impetus to the CFSP and be supported by the Policy Planning and Early Warning 
Unit in the Council Secretariat (for the development of Council Secretariat in CFSP see Juncos 
& Pomorska 2010). Furthermore, the instrument of “Common Strategies” should allow for a 
more coherent approach to important partner countries; Hence, these treaty revisions were a first 
attempt to invigorate CFSP and to allow for more coherent output.   
Also the European Security Strategy, that was prepared by Javier Solana, the High 
Representative for CFSP, and was adopted by the European Council in Brussels end of 2003, 
highlights the need for a comprehensive security approach and therefore a more coherent 
external action of the EU and its member states: 
 “The  European  Union  has  made  progress  towards  a  coherent  foreign  policy  and  
effective  crisis Management. […] Greater  coherence  is  needed  not  only  among  EU  
instruments  but  also  embracing  the  external activities of the individual member states. [...] 
we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable […] The challenge now is to bring 
together the different instruments and capabilities. [..] Diplomatic efforts, development, trade 
and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda.” (European Council 2003b: 11 and 
13) 
This quest is also strongly reinforced in the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Council “Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, 
Effectiveness and Visibility” in June 2006 that also assesses convincingly: 
“As in national administrations, even when there is sufficient political will, the EU’s impact falls 
short when there are unresolved tensions or a lack of coherence between different policies” 
(European Commission 2006b: 6) 
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Institutions were repeatedly adapted and policy papers formulated to improve the institutional 
set-up of the European Union in a way to allow for more coherence in the external performance 
of the EU. The draft for a constitutional treaty included several attempts for better and more 
coherent foreign policy-making, the most crucial probably the abolition of the pillar system. In 
the current Lisbon Treaty17 the pillars are said to be formally abolished, but CFSP is kept 
separately from other external relations provisions. Nevertheless, in terms of clarity a major 
improvement in contrast to the Treaty of Maastricht and of Amsterdam is the reference to all 
external relations provisions under one heading. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty brings about 
several adaptations that are meant to improve towards an effective and coherent EU foreign 
policy-making: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy18 
combines the posts as High Representative and Commission for External Relations (being Vice-
President of the Commission at the same time), and this institutional double-hatting shall 
support the coherent interaction of external relations policies and more political CFSP output. 
The creation of a European External Action Service (EEAS) is supposed to incorporate officials 
from the Commission (primarily DG Relex), the Council Secretariat and from the member 
states (for list of units that will move to the EEAS see Presidency of the European Union 2009), 
and this new body is meant to support the work of the High Representative in all thematic areas. 
Nevertheless, most provisions in the treaty text are vague and it their concrete implications are 
difficult to predict, as most will depend on their actual implementation. Furthermore, the Lisbon 
Treaty also reorganised the chairing of Council meetings on different levels, allowing for a 
more prestigious involvement of the HR or her substitute in CFSP and ESDP matters, while at 
the same time brining the rotating presidency back in other areas like trade. Furthermore, while 
the Foreign Affairs Council is chaired by the High Representative, its preparatory body 
COREPER II is chaired by the rotating presidency (for exact list see Vanhoonacker, Pomorska 
& Maurer 2010; Council of the European Union 2009a). While it will work with some rotating 
presidencies out to establish a sound cooperation, this institutional design also creates potential 
for conflict. However, the overall assessment about the Lisbon Treaty so far is that it at least 
includes several possibilities for improving coherence and consistency in EU foreign policy-
making, but that their success will primarily depend on what the respective officials make of it.   
                                                     
17
 The original reference to this legal text – a ‘softer’ version of constitutional draft after refused by Dutch and French 
people -  was “reform treaty”, but since its first formal recognition at the Lisbon European Council in December 
2007 it is called “Lisbon treaty”. It is composed of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 
i.e. the revised Treaty establishing the European Community) and the revised version of the Treaty on European 
Union. The latter incorporates the provisions on CFSP, while the external relations provisions are covered in Art. 
188 TFEU. 
18
 In line with the wording of the constitutional draft this position was often referred to as “EU Foreign Minister”, but 
as these wordings too strongly forced the image of a federal political system, it was changed in the Lisbon treaty 
to High Representative for Foreign Policy.  
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This brief outline about EU treaty changes in the foreign policy realm over time shows that the 
quest for more coherent action was constantly a goal at EU level. However, while this clearly 
shows that coherence is a demanded characteristic of EU foreign policy, it is even more 
important to provide a clear definition of coherence. According to Simon Nuttall (Nuttall 2005: 
97; for an earlier discussion see also Nuttall 2001), coherence in EFP may be achieved at 
different levels and either in terms of policies or in terms of polity. Vertical coherence (policy-
level) occurs between the foreign policies of the member states as well as between foreign 
policies of the member states and the external actions of the European Union. Horizontal 
coherence (policy-level), on the other hand, applies to the dimension of policies and asks for 
coherent actions in different EU policy areas. Thirdly, on an institutional coherence (polity-
level) shall occur between the different pillars (EC and CFSP) and their respective actors of EU 
foreign policy-making19. These categories of defining coherence show that coherence is a 
certain status-quo at a certain point in time at a certain level rather than a process. However, at 
the same time we can assume that a process of change has to occur to decrease or increase the 
level of coherence.  
Nuttall argues that this differentiation becomes crucial when trying to improve coherence. In his 
view, institutional coherence can be solved more easily because “only” the structure of the 
system has to be adapted, whereas improvement of horizontal coherence, i.e. coherence between 
different policies, requires a more fundamental change and an „uncomfortable debate about the 
nature of foreign policy and the quality of the EU as an international actor“ (Nuttall 2001: 3-6, 
10, for similar conclusion see Gauttier 2004: 23).  
My research question focuses on institutional coherence, i.e. the cooperation of actors between 
the pillars and within the pillars, and on how this cooperation has changed over time. There 
have already been several adaptations of the institutional set-up of the EU, but nevertheless 
there are still profound demands to improve coherence between the pillars. This thesis, however, 
questions Nuttall’s assumption that institutional coherence can be solved easily by adapting the 
structure of the system, because the repeated attempts to restructure the EU foreign policy 
system over time did not really convince in establishing an institutional that is coherent, 
effective and does not exclude one of the relevant actors like the Commission or the member 
states. Furthermore, I would argue that debates about the separation of tasks, competences and 
means, i.e. about bureaucratic power and financial means, between different bureaucratic units 
might be as “uncomfortable” and hard as a discussion about the nature of EU foreign policy in 
general. Like every institutional and every member states will try to enforce its own view about 
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 In the literature mostly only two distinctions between vertical and horizontal coherence are made. Institutional 
coherence is then subsumed to horizontal coherence. Only Simon Nuttal makes this clear distinction that will be 
relied on in this thesis, as it helps to specify very clearly the focus of this research.  
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the desired EU role in international affairs, it will also look after its position in the political 
system of the EU.  
The research question of this project primarily relates to the institutional coherence and to a 
certain extent also to horizontal coherence. Vertical coherence, i.e. the relationship between 
member states and the European level will only be taken into account in that far as the member 
states are perceived as crucial actors. And although this thesis mainly focuses on the 
institutional dimension of coherence it is important to think about the link between institutional 
and horizontal coherence, i.e. between the bureaucratic interplay of actors and the different 
policy contents. Why should the international performance and the foreign policy output of the 
EU rely on the improvement of cooperation between the different actors? First, I argue that 
purposive horizontal coherence in terms of policy content is only likely to be established if 
institutional coherence already exists. Secondly, the whole discussion of the EU speaking with 
“a single voice” is directly related to the issue of institutional coherence. And thirdly, the 
political part of EU foreign policy is often perceived to be performed within CFSP20, but as the 
second pillar must for its policy implementation rely on the national foreign policies of the 
member states as well as on the action of the European Community, political issues will not be 
pursued successfully when the two pillars do not work together accordingly.  
While this definition of coherence helps to pinpoint what this thesis is generally looking at and 
what is not taken into account, it has also be discussed how the concept of “institutional 
coherence” relates exactly to the question of “changing interaction” between actors. Why is the 
term “interaction” used in the research question, and not “coherence” or similar terms like 
“coordination” or “cooperation”? In more general terms it seems that the research questions 
relate to the general discussion about cooperation problems in the international relations and 
public policy literature. But it is really important to emphasise a clear differentiation between 
the here used “interaction” and the often-used term “cooperation”. I define interaction in very 
general terms as a “mutually influencing relation between two or more entities” (Kooiman 1999: 
75) what differs from “cooperation” in that far as the latter implies equal, sovereign and 
independent actors who are able to reach their goals more easily by cooperating with one 
another, because they both gain advantages in their cooperation. In international relations, 
cooperation as a term was informed by liberal institutionalist scholars like Keohane (see for 
example Keohane 1989) that focused on the circumstances and institutional features that make 
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 This assumption about the CFSP being the political aspect of EU foreign policy and the (economic) external 
relations as the apolitical one, is often too easily made and should be more closely reflected and investigated. 
Michael Smith, for example, argues that the real strategic action in EU foreign policy happens in the former first 
pillar, and that the former EC often provides the direction for EU foreign action: "I think the flag does follow 
trade, in the sense that the development of the EC's engagement with the world political economy is more likely to 
lead to an activist and substantial foreign policy than the arguments about CFSP." (Smith, M. 1998: 94) 
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states cooperate successfully. In the public policy literature, cooperation was mainly linked to 
game theory where different cooperative games were drawn up to feature the interaction 
between actors in negotiations (see for example Scharpf 1997). But these two strands do not 
seem to fit when we look at the relationship between the European actors in foreign policy-
making. Their interactions are more hierarchically organised and the different actors/institutions 
do not have the same duties and responsibilities21. It is still the member states who decide in the 
end, and the term interaction in the context of this research project stands primarily for division 
of labour in the agenda-setting, drafting and policy implementation process. Hence, I do not use 
the term cooperation but interaction instead to catch the relationship between EU actors in 
policy-making.  
Furthermore, the term “coordination” is often also interchangeably used for cooperation, 
although its narrow definition is quite distinct from cooperation.  It implies different interests of 
the various actors and the process of finding common goals and defining common strategies 
(Nohlen, Schultze & Schüttemeyer 1998: 333-334).22 However, following addition of Nuttall 
clearly shows that coordination mechanisms are not related to institutional coherence:  
 “Inconsistencies which arise in this category [institutional coherence] are the result, not of 
different policy objectives, as it most frequently the case with horizontal consistency, but of 
different approaches to the same problem.” (Nuttall 2005: 97) 
Hence, in Nuttall’s reading institutional coherence occurs not because the actors do not agree 
about the main goals, but because they do not agree on how to achieve these goals in more 
concrete terms, and – also more specifically linked to the EU – that the institutional structure 
does not allow the actors to work together in a coherent way. This dual understanding of 
institutional coherence relates to a long standing debate in International Relations between 
agency- and structure-focused explanations, and will be discussed in more detail in the 
theoretical framework.  
This is exactly what this thesis tries to investigate in regard of the ENP: in the next chapters it 
will become quite clear that generally all EU actors agree that strong and successful 
relationships with the neighbours are needed to achieve the main goal of creating stability and 
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 Nohlen et al. ( Smith, H. 2002; Smith, K. 2003; Bretherton & Vogler 1999; Piening 1997; Schubert & Müller-
Brandeck-Bocquet 2000; Carlsnaes & Smith 1994; Carlsnaes, Sjursen & White 2004; Peterson & Sjursen 1998; 
Zielonka 1998; Hill & Smith 2005; for further reading also see Allen & Smith 2005; Ginsberg 2001; Brown 1997; 
Hill 1998b, 1996, 1993, 1998a, 2004a; Manners & Whitman 2003; Manners 2002; Orbie 2004; Stavridis 2001; 
Tonra 2003; White 2001; Smith, K. 1998; Regelsberger, de Schoutheete de Terverant & Wessels 1997) argue that 
in the International Relations literature the term “cooperation” is often used differently than in the public policy 
literature. In International relations the term is also often used to describe the pre-stage of integration processes 
where the division of labour is organised. As the use of the term “cooperation” would cause unnecessary 
confusion, I will use the term “interaction”.  
22
 According to Nohlen et al. (333-334) coordination also means mechanisms that balance and adjust interactions 
between individual and collective actors. Both definitions of coordination, however, show that this is not the focus 
of this research project. 
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security for the European Union. But the rest of the thesis will also show that there is often 
disagreement about what the best policy would now be to achieve this goal, because of 
normative reasons that some actors believe in the success of some policies while others do not, 
but also because of more bureaucratic self-interest to establish or contain a certain power 
position in the EU political system and the different mechanisms used in the respective pillars.  
But how does the in the research question used term “interaction” now relate to “institutional 
coherence”? First of all, I assume that institutional coherence represents a certain quality of a 
status-quo, while interaction is the process that might lead to this quality.  
Secondly, a more careful reading of Nuttall’s elaboration about his different categories also 
helps to grasp the difference and linkage between the two terms. Nuttall argues that the 
differentiation in institutional, horizontal and vertical coherence is a more complex endeavour, 
while there is also a more “restricted categorisation” (Nuttall 2005: 96-97) possible that 
differentiates between banal, benign and maling consistency. Banal consistency Nuttall defines 
as the “absence of literal inconsistency”, i.e. that each pillar has its own policy output that do 
not overlap and touch upon each other, while benign refers to the “interaction” between 
EC/CFSP so that “the instruments of the Community are made available for the accomplishment 
of policy objectives defined in the second pillar“. While it seems at first glimpse that this 
category is the same like horizontal coherence, I would argue that benign consistency can also 
refer to institutional coherence, when we look how the different actors interact cross-pillar to 
use the different mechanisms for implementation. Most obviously related to institutional 
coherence and hence to this thesis, is the third category of ‘malign’ consistency that refers to the 
struggle for institutional power – the question as to whether the representatives of the member 
states in the second pillar should be able to give directives as regards EC external policies, and 
at its most base, the question as to which set of bureaucrats gets to decide” (Nuttall 2005: 96-
97); Hence, this differentiation between benign and maling consistency seems to reflect to a 
certain extent the motivation behind (in)consistency: while benign consistency puts emphasise 
on the problems occurring because of pillarisation and a complex polity, maling constancy 
focuses on bureaucratic and institutional self-interest for power. This differences regarding 
motivation link well back to the second research question of the thesis, and we will come back 
to similar arguments in the theoretical framework.  
Based on this categorisation and to sum up, the research focus of this thesis relates to benign 
and malign forms of institutional coherence. Interaction is seen as the process that leads to 
(in)coherence, and implies that on the one hand EU actors have to consult and interact to 
achieve a certain policy output, for example the Commission has the right of initiative in the 
first pillar, but only when it takes member states’ interests already at this stage into account its 
policy proposal will be successful, or another example would be member states that decide 
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something in CFSP but need EC instruments for implementation. However, interaction can also 
mean that each actor can achieve a certain policy output on its own, but that the actors have to 
interact to ensure horizontal coherence between their policies. An example for the latter could 
be civilian-military operations where the military aspect of the intergovernmental ESDP should 
be in line and mutually supportive with civilian measures taken by the Commission.  
These elaborations show that the concepts of coherence and consistency relate closely to the 
research question of this thesis about the changing interactions of EU actors within the ENP. 
This will become even clearer in chapter 4 that will show that the single framework of the ENP 
was actually meant as a potential improvement in terms of coherence of EU foreign policy-
making.  
2.3. The EU as International Actor and the Nature of EU Foreign Policy 
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests 
and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair 
trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the 
child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 
       Art. 3 TEU (Lisbon Treaty, former Art. 2) 
Art. 3 of the Lisbon Treaty outlines the main objectives of the EU as an international actor. 
Coherence and consistency are a central topic in EU foreign policy-making, but the research 
question of this thesis also relates to the broader debate about the nature of the EU as an 
international actor. Bretherton and Vogler argue that the most important requirement to be 
perceived as an international actors is “the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate 
coherent policies” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 38). By investigating how EU foreign policy is 
made towards the neighbours, this thesis also aims to shed light onto the question to what extent 
the EU can be perceived as an actor towards its neighbours.  
For decades a longstanding debate has been going between scholars researching the external 
dimension of EU foreign policy-making about the fact if the EU despite not being a traditional 
state can be an international actor and if we hence also can term the external dimension of EU 
policies as something like a foreign policy of the EU.23 Allen and Smith argue that the EC for a 
long time did not have a central authority that would be “capable of identifying, articulating, 
legitimizing, and pursuing common interests.” (1998: 46). The  Maastricht Treaty and also the 
Amsterdam Treaty made the EU “more state-like in the field of foreign and security policy”, but 
according to their view political authority is still diffused (Allen & Smith 1998: 46). They, 
                                                     
23
 For good overviews of respective academic literature see for example (Hollis & Smith 1990: 147) 
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furthermore, introduced the concept of a “variable and multi-dimensional presence” (Allen & 
Smith 1998: 47-48) of the EU in contrast to traditional international actors, arguing that the EU 
is missing a more purposive external action to be conceptualised as an actor and that its impact 
results mainly from institutional presence and internal outputs (for a precise reflection on this 
line of argumentation see also Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 5). 
Their differentiation between passive presence and active actorness pinpoints to the clear 
distinction between external relations and foreign policy. External relations comprise all 
different kind of impacts that a state, an organization, an enterprise or a citizen might have on 
the outside world. This can be purposive actions taken by those actors, but it can also include 
unintended externalities of internal policies. These impacts just exist next to each other and do 
not follow any superior goal. Foreign policy, on the contrary, implies strategic and intentional 
action, where priorities are formulated although there might exist different interests, for example 
in different policy areas (Hill 2003: 4-5). Foreign policy is “the coherent, coordinated and 
consistent identification and pursuit of national interest” (Allen 1998: 44; for a similar 
definition from a constructivist perspective see Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 38; Carlsnaes 2002: 
335; for a detailed elaboration see also Webber & Smith 2002). Or as Christopher Hill 
formulates:  
“Foreign policy is therefore both more and less than the ‘external relations’ which states generate 
continually on all fronts. It attempts to coordinate, and it is the way in which – at least in 
principle – priorities are established between competing externally-projected interests” (Hill 
2003: 4-5) 
But with this definition and its intentional implication in mind, is it possible that the EU 
conducts “foreign policy”? Or does the EU at best have external relations, ie. uncoordinated 
policies that are directed outwards but neither pursue a common goal nor any strategy? Can a 
hybrid political system like the EU even have anything like a foreign policy? There a two 
opposing strands of argumentation in the literature. 
On the one hand there are scholars who even criticize the term “EU foreign policy” itself, 
because it is “a contradiction in terms at best and a myth at worst” (White 1999: 43). Lister 
(1997: 6-8 cited by White 1999: 48) among others argues that only states can have a foreign 
policy, but the European Union as a “unique type of institution” is not a state and can therefore 
neither have a foreign policy. Similar is the argumentation of Allen (Allen 1998: 44) who 
assumes that at European level there is nothing similar like a ‘government’ that formulates the 
European interests and goals, and therefore it is not accurate to talk about a EU foreign policy at 
all.   
Absolutely contrary is the argument of Hazel Smith who assumes that the EU does “have a 
foreign policy and that it can be analysed in pretty much the same way as we can analyse that of 
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any nation-state” (Smith, H. 2002: 1-7; see also Smith, H. 1998: 153-154; for a detailed 
presentation of this discussion see a review article by Carlsnaes 2004). Other scholars also 
question the above described traditional state-orientated concept of policymaking that in their 
view does not seem accurate any more in a time of globalization. These developments do not 
imply, as Hill correctly argues, that foreign policy is not important anymore (Hill 2003: xviii-
xix) but that the definition has to be adjusted to the transformed international environment. The 
international system has changed as well as the tasks of states what leads to a “changing nature 
of contemporary foreign policy”. According to Hill, the traditional concepts and definitions of 
foreign policy do not fit the current circumstances anymore, and hence ask for a redefinition of 
foreign policy so that it also includes the contemporary changes and also allows for non-state 
actors. Hill provides a refined definition of foreign policy that is  “the sum of official external 
relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill 
2003: 3). Although Hill also assumes that foreign policies are usually pursued by states, this 
definition does not exclude political systems as the European Union. In regard of foreign policy 
analysis this implies that the latter per se does not have to be state-centric or only applicable to 
traditional nation states.  
These two different arguments perfectly demonstrate the shift in theoretical approaches that has 
taken place during the last years: not the state, its institutional set-up or its government are the 
important factors but the ability of governance and to produce policy output. In the current 
European integration literature it is not relevant to compare the European Union institutionally 
with a federal state but to look at the tasks that it performs, or as Richardson accurately 
formulates: “the EU is state-like in the sense that it has acquired for itself the policy-making 
attributes of a state across an increasingly wide range of policy sectors” (Richardson 1996: 3, 
cited by White 1999: 48). So although the EU is not a state, it is a political system that produces 
public policies that are similar to that of a state. Therefore political systems like the European 
Union might as well be analyzed like states although they do not have the same institutional 
requirements.  
My research project builds upon these broad and policy-output orientated definitions. The 
examination of the changing roles of different actors in EU foreign policy implicitly 
incorporates this broader definition of foreign policy that focuses on the output rather the state-
like features of an actor. But before we can assess if the EU meets the requirements of an actor 
towards the neighbourhood, we have to know how foreign policy is made at EU level, and also 
what kind of objectives this policy is following. Art 2 TEU24 emphasises very generally that the 
                                                     
24
 This Article 2 TEU was replaced by Art. 3 in the Lisbon Treaty, and also the wording changed significantly to “In 
its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the 
protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity 
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EU shall “assert its identity on the international scene” and Art. 11 TEU25 outlined the more 
specific objectives of the CFSP26. While these can be considered as the very broadly defined 
general objectives of EU foreign policy-making, this thesis investigates in more detail how the 
main aim of the ENP to strengthen the security of the Union is implemented toward the 
neighbours. 
 
This second chapter has shown why the research questions of this thesis are relevant, especially 
in regard of three strands of academic research. First, answering the research questions allows 
for a better understanding of how policies at EU level are made towards the neighbours. In 
doing so, this research will contribute on the one hand to EU studies but also to classical foreign 
policy analysis. Its focus is mainly output-orientated (rather than outcome-focused), targeted at 
routine decisions and long-term strategy planning (in contrast to crisis decision), and it also 
takes other bureaucratic actors apart to the member states into account. Second, the research 
questions of this thesis contribute to the refinement of the concepts of consistency and 
coherence. And finally, this thesis relates to the long standing debate to what extent the EU can 
be considered an international actor and having a foreign policy.  
                                                                                                                                                           
and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, 
in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, 
including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter”. While these objectives were to a certain extent 
already included in the treaties before Lisbon, these objectives were only mentioned in Title V about the CFSP, 
whereas now in the Lisbon Treaty this provisions apply to all external policies as well.  
25
 Article 11 was deleted and instead another Art. 21(2) of the Lisbon Treaty outlines now in more detail the “general 
provisions on the Union’s external action”. Issues like poverty eradiction and environmental protection were 
added. Furthermore Art. 21(1) emphasizes now explicitly lists the “Union's action on the international scene shall 
be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement”.  
26
 The objectives mentioned in Art. 11 TEU (until Lisbon Treaty) ar: “to safeguard the common values, fundamental 
interests, independence and integration of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to 
preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those 
on external borders; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Theoretical Framework  
This thesis focuses on the internal aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy to provide a 
single framework for all EU policies towards the neighbours. It investigates if and how the ENP 
changed the interaction of EU actors in foreign policy-making, and why such a change took 
place. This part of the thesis outlines the theoretical framework that is used to answer these 
questions as well as the methodological considerations.  
The first question to consider is what kind of discipline is most suitable to analyse how EU 
foreign policy-making is made. Scholars of EU foreign policy and CFSP experts mostly have a 
background in International Relations (IR). Security issues and foreign policy were (and still 
are) often perceived as directly linked to IR theories and as clearly distinct from broader EU 
public policy research that increasingly adapted ideas and approaches of comparative politics 
and administrative governance since the early 1990s.  
However, when reflected more carefully the application of genuine IR might lead to 
unnecessary inclarity in analysing EU foreign policy-making. The main IR theories look like 
neo-realism at the relationship between different states within the international system and like 
neo-liberalism at the main interests that drive states. They do not specifically explain how 
foreign policies are developed within the states (or in this case – the European Union) but treat 
states’ positions as given. Already Kenneth Waltz emphasised this need to clearly differentiate 
between three “levels of analysis” or “images” as Waltz re-termed them later (Waltz 1954: ix). 
He argues that a certain research question can be analysed by focusing on the level of the 
international system, the national state or also the impact of individuals (for a thorough 
discussion about the advantages and pitfalls of the different levels see Singer 1961; for 
reflections on how and when these different levels influence each other see Putnam 1988; for a 
refined application of Putnam’s model to liberal theory see Moravcsik 1997). While the first 
image is predominant, for example, in neorealist accounts and seems suitable for questions 
about the EU as international actor in the international system, it is the second image of the 
national state that asks about how foreign policy emerges and develops. The latter is also the 
main focus of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). 
The location of foreign policy analysis (FPA) within the wider field of theories is disputed by 
scholars. Most foreign policy analysts argue that their work is a subfield of IR, while others, 
primarily international relations theorists claim “that the subject matter of foreign policy 
belongs naturally to the empirical domain of public policy rather than of international 
relations” (Carlsnaes 2002: 331). The argument of the latter is that IR focuses on the 
international system, where the anarchical structure of the international system and the 
permanent threat to national security are the most important factors to explain how states 
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behave. When individual state behaviour is the object of analysis, theories of foreign policy 
should be used but IR theories would not explain much at this level of analysis (Wendt 1999 
cited by Carlsnaes 2002: 331). While IR mostly views states as “black boxes” and their 
preferences as given, FPA focuses on the development of foreign policy output by looking 
within the national political systems. The FPA scholar Haftendorn, for example, emphasises that 
foreign policy-making is not the decision of a single politician but is created by several outputs 
of cooperating or conflicting actors (Haftendorn 1990: 403). How foreign policy is created 
within states and what  kind of different forces influence this output is of major interest, also for 
this thesis.  
IR scholars are generally reluctant to perceive FPA as part of their discipline, but in contrast to 
these critical voices Hudson (Hudson 2005: 4) even suggests that IR gains a lot from FPA: first, 
it is able to provide a link between traditional IR studies and other areas of political science (e.g. 
public policy), and secondly IR theory explains a considerable amount on the level of structure, 
while it lacks an actor-approach. FPA, on the contrary, is an actor-specific theory and can 
contribute significantly to the disadvantages of the structural IR focus. 
The implication of this discussion for my own research is that classical IR theories are not 
applicable, as they would treat the EU as black box, and the output of its “system of external 
relations” as given. IR assumptions might be of interest in that far as that profound changes in 
the international system create external pressures that influence and push for changes in how EU 
foreign policy is made. The main focus of the theoretical framework, however, has to allow 
looking how foreign policy is developed within a political system and help to identify factors 
that shape the foreign policy-making output. The application of FPA to the EU is disputable, as 
was shown in the last subchapter about the question if the EU can have a foreign policy at all. 
Hence, it is obvious that theoretical frameworks and concepts have to be adapted to the 
peculiarities of the EU multi-level governance system to suit the analysis of EU foreign policy-
making. This need for adaptation is considered in this thesis in that far as it combines traditional 
FPA accounts with EU public policy theorising. However, before this chapter discusses in more 
detail the application of FPA to the EU, it is helpful for the better understanding to elaborate on 
another crucial distinction in IR and FPA: the relationship between actor and structure. Based 
on this long-standing debate, a model to explain a foreign policy action developed by Walter 
Carlsnaes is going to be introduced that is used in structuring the research approach of this 
thesis.  
Jørgensen criticises already in 1993 that academic reflections on EC external relations and EU 
foreign policy are often too descriptive instead of applying a precise analytical focus with a 
clear theoretical foundation (Jørgensen 1993: 211-215). By reflecting at the state of the art, he 
differentiates between agency and structure, emphasising that agency-centred approaches 
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presuppose that actors constitute structures, while structure-centred ones emphasize that actors 
“are shaped and shoved by structural factors” (Jørgensen 1993: 216). Also Haftendorn 
(Haftendorn 1990: 403) applies this differentiation between structure and agency to foreign 
policy-making, and she elaborates in more detail that the actor-centred approaches conceive 
foreign policy as an active process, where different actors act rationally to pursue their 
preferences. Structure-centred approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the importance of the 
institutional setting and suggest that the decision-making is primarily dependent on the 
structure. Alternatives for decisions are therefore already given within the system, and foreign 
policy is passive (for similar arguments see also Carlsnaes 1994: 277).  
Reflecting on this differentiation adds an interesting dimension to the main research focus of 
this thesis. From an actor-centred approach (in)coherence in EU foreign policy has to be defined 
as an active, purposive action where actors intentionally decide for actions that are incoherent. 
This also means that the interaction of the actors is mainly shaped by their own decisions and 
motivations, and that potential conflicts in the interaction happen purposively. On the other 
hand, from a structure-centred perspective (in)coherence emerges because of the structure of the 
decision-making system, ie the institutional set-up does not allow for different actors to 
communicate, to coordinate and to pursue coherent policies. To overcome incoherence this 
would mean that the former actor-centred approach implies that the interaction between the 
actors only improves when they intentionally decide to do so, while a structure-centred 
approach assumes that only the improvement of the institutional set-up leads to more successful 
and coherent interaction.  
Although this separation is helpful to start off with clear assumptions, it is also important to 
emphasise that the two categories of agency and structure are not independent from one another 
but constitute “dynamically interrelated empirical entities”(Carlsnaes 1994: 279; see also Hollis 
& Smith 1986: 269). The challenge of linking agency and structure is elaborated by Carlsnaes 
(1992) who argues that “human agents and social structures are in a fundamental sense 
interrelated entities”. In his view only a framework that includes both perspectives and that 
perceives both within an “intertwined temporal process” can best explain foreign policy-making 
(Carlsnaes 1992: 246; for similar conclusions see White 1999: 41). This necessary dynamic 
synthesis of structure-centred and agency-centred factors is nearly excluded in all common 
theoretical approaches, as they always take one perspective as major and do not allow a 
dynamic mutual influence. Starting from an actor-interpretative approach Carlsnaes hence 
establishes a tripartial model to explain foreign policy action (see figure 4).  
Carlsnaes’ model to explain a foreign policy action differentiates between three dimensions: 
intentional, dispositional and structural. At the intentional level (box 1 in fig. 4), the different 
choices and preferences of the actors are analysed from a rational perspective. These choices 
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and preferences are then in a next step shaped at the dispositional dimension (box 2 in fig. 4) by 
perceptions and values. By taking this dispositional dimension into account (also called 
“interpretative dimension), we can determine to what extent constructive approaches might add 
to the understanding of the possible choices made. Finally, the structural dimension (box 3 in 
fig. 4) adds objective conditions and the institutional setting as factors to our model to explain a 
foreign policy action, although the latter are not perceived as causal factors but as constraining 
conditions (Carlsnaes 1992: 255, 1994: 282-283). 
Figure 4: Carlsnaes´ model to explain a foreign policy action (Carlsnaes 1992: 254) 
 
Although not directly applicable, Carlsnaes’ model is useful to be adapted for the research focus 
of this thesis in two ways: First, he emphasises that the separation between agency and structure 
is not a black-white issue, but that in social sciences we should also consider that a combination 
of factors might lead to a certain outcome (for a methodological discussion of this issue of fuzzy 
sets see Rihoux & Ragin 2008). When establishing the theoretical framework it is useful to 
separate between agency and structure to make the argument most precise, but that should not 
imply that the two categories of agency-centred and structure-centred factors are mutually 
exclusive, i.e. that a potential verification of the structure-centred factors automatically leads to 
the conclusion that actor-centred explanations are falsified. It seems, furthermore, logical to 
assume that different factors might have a different impact over time, and it is the aim of this 
thesis not to primarily show which factors is able to predict the most variance, but to explain 
why a certain change happened  and to trace this process over time. Secondly, Carlsnaes´ 
assessment of structural factors as constraining conditions rather than causal factors an 
interesting aspect to reflect upon, as the FPA scholar states: 
“They [structural factors] do not ´cause´ actors to behave in a certain way, but they certainly 
provide the constraining conditions under which contingent actors […] necessarily have to 
operate.” (Carlsnaes 1992: 255) 
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Structural factors like the institutional set-up cannot directly cause a policy output but the action 
of different actors is dependent on the structural conditions that could hinder or support a certain 
way of action. Carlsnaes, furthermore, emphasises the need to be aware that social structures are 
intentionally established by the actors, and therefore have to be perceived as outcome, too. This 
could for example imply that the institutional set-up might be a constraining condition that does 
not allow overcoming incoherence, but then the actors can decide rationally to change the 
institutional structure in a way that more coherence is possible. The change of the institutional 
set-up hence then allows for more coherence, but it was not the institutional structure that 
triggered this change, but the actors that adapted the institutional conditions. On the other hand, 
the structure of the system feeds back to the actor’s level, and so a “continuous cycle of action-
structure interactions” is established (Carlsnaes 1994: 279, 284-285). This perception of 
structural factors as constraining conditions and the fact that Carlsnaes’ model starts with the 
intentional dimension (actors’ preferences and choices) is often criticised by authors that favour 
a structural approach. Carlsnaes himself openly admits this problem, but nevertheless he 
(Carlsnaes 1994: 285) argues that within this framework structural and agential factors can be 
combined in a comprehensive and manageable way to examine foreign policy change, what is 
not the case with other frameworks.  
For this thesis the conception of structural factors as constraining conditions sounds worthwhile 
to consider. One research question of this thesis asks about the extent to which the single 
framework of the ENP changed the EU policy-making process towards the neighbours. 
Reformulated in the language of Carlsnaes’ model, we want to find out if the structural change 
of the ENP institutional framework made a difference to the EU policy output (what Carlsnaes 
calls “foreign policy action”); Indirectly, however, we also have to perceive the ENP 
institutional framework as outcome and ask, why respective actors have changed the 
institutional set-up in a certain way. Understanding the motivations of change, might provide a 
useful explanation for the behaviour of the various actors after the institutional change. 
Following this logic of argumentation also implies that it is not the institutional structure per se 
that changes the way the EU is making foreign policy towards the neighbours, but that the 
(changed) institutional framework of the ENP enables/constrains the actors in the way they 
formulate and implement EU foreign policy. A similar logic can be applied when considering 
the quest for more coherence. While an institutional set-up can allow and support coherent 
interaction between actors, the institutional set-up in itself can not achieve more or less 
coherence. It is always the actors that might be enabled or constrained by the institutional 
setting to act in a coherent way. Hence, in this thesis structural factors will also be considered as 
constraining conditions rather than causal factors.  
 52 
Carlsnaes himself repeatedly points out that his model to explain a foreign policy action is not a 
theory per se, but a framework that allows to be filled with different theoretical assumptions. 
Hence, this model is used as an instrument to structure the theoretical framework in a 
conclusive and plausible way by bringing together different theoretical reflections from 
bureaucratic politics, the organisational process approach, social learning and European 
integration studies. However, before elaborating in more detail on the single factors, we now 
return to the question set out at the beginning of this chapter about which theoretical approach is 
(best) suitable to answer the posed research questions, because next to Foreign Policy Analysis 
also EU integration theories provide useful aspects to be taken into account in setting up the 
theoretical framework.  
EU studies and European integration theories focused for a considerable time on the classical 
debate between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism and the question of why states 
cooperate or even integrate (Rosamond 2010: 105). While the former emphasised the role of 
sovereign states and their unwillingness to shift sovereignty to the supranational EU level 
(Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig 2009), neofunctionalism emphasised the process of spill-over, 
and the role of supranational institutions and elites within this process (Niemann & Schmitter 
2009). From the 1980s onwards, however, scholars increasingly asked for a shift of the research 
question from “why states integrate” to “how the political system EU works” and to “analysing 
governance”, as Diez and Wiener formulate (Diez & Wiener 2009: 7). According to Rosamond, 
three distinct theoretical approaches tried to conceptualise these new set of questions: neo-
institutionalism, social constructivism and multi-level governance (Rosamond 2010: 104). Neo-
institutionalism brings together a subset of different approaches, ranging from rational choice 
institutionalism that focuses on the “changing relative power of institutions”, over historical 
institutionalism that emphasises path-dependency and long term effects of institutions to 
sociological institutionalism that defines institutions in a very broad way as interactions and 
norms and emphasises the importance of communicative action and socialisation. Multi-level 
governance, on the other hand, questions the hierarchical dispersion of power and the central 
role of national governments (see for example Marks, Hooghe & Blank 1996).  
All three approaches are not unique to EU studies but the emergence of new debates in IR also 
influenced EU integration theories. Similar to Foreign Policy Analysis EU integration theories 
can be located between IR and comparative politics. While IR accounts were strong in the 
classical debate of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, especially the governance turn 
allowed for an increased incorporation of comparative politics in EU studies. Most phenomena 
that are dealt with in FPA also re-occur in the more general EU literature, although often with 
different labels and by using different terms. Hence, it is also no surprise that the agency-
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structure debate also occurs in EU integration theories, again mostly as differentiation between 
theories than allowing for a combination as Carlsnaes’ model suggests above.  
This chapter now goes on in discussing the two main research questions respectively and in 
drawing up certain assumptions derived from existing theoretical accounts. First, we reflect 
upon the change in interaction in EU foreign policy-making, or to speak in methodological 
terms, on the dependent variable. In a second step, the chapter shifts its attention on the second 
research question, theorising the motivations and causes for change.  
3.1. Theorising Change in Interactions in EU Foreign Policy-making: From Horizontal 
Coherence to an Integrated Policy Approach 
Within foreign policy analysis (FPA) it is often argued that not only the existence of a certain 
policy is important but also how and why this policy came about (White 1994: 2). However, 
before we can move to the “why” it is indispensable to investigate the output itself. In the same 
vein, we can not only assume that there was some change in actors’ interaction in EU foreign 
policy-making, but we have to critically reflect on what kind of change could be expected: what 
feature is the one to be observed to talk about change? This subchapter highlights the adapted 
approach to emphasise interstitial institutional chance, and it considers this change in two ways: 
on the one hand it explains the differentiation between consensual and conflictual interaction, on 
the other hand between coherence and an integrated policy approach.  
Change in itself, and especially the development and change of institutions was and is a major 
topic in IR, comparative politics and European Studies alike. The nature and triggers of this 
change are often also the major disagreement of opposing theoretical approaches. This thesis 
follows the argumentation of interstitial institutional change, as outlined by several authors in a 
special issue of West European Politics (Vol 30, No. 2, March 2007, see especially Caporaso 
2007; Farrell & Héritier 2007b, a). This special issue discusses intensively the main approaches 
about institutional change within the EU/EC, and the main questions examined by the authors 
are first, under which conditions what kind of interstitial institutional occurs in different areas of 
decision-making and secondly, under which conditions informal interstitial institutional change 
is formalised to a latter point in time (Farrell & Héritier 2007b: 227, 236). Although the authors 
limit their research to European public policy, their results are quite interesting as a starting 
point to consider the nature of change in EU actors’ interaction in foreign policy-making after 
the set-up of the ENP.  
In line with the authors of the special issue, this thesis assumes that interactions between the 
actors change informally and through a slow process of day-to-day policy-making. Hence, this 
theoretical approach strongly opposes liberal inter
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change within the EC is intentionally decided by the member states during Intergovernmental 
Conferences in accordance with their national (primarily economic) interests:  
“Intergovernmentalist theory seeks to analyse the EC as the result of strategies pursued by 
rational governments acting on the basis of their preferences and power.”   (Moravcsik 1993: 
496) 
In Moravcsik’s view slow, informal change through day-to-day policy-making is not possible, 
and supranational institutions only play a role in that far as they can support the member states 
in controlling their domestic affairs (Moravcsik 1993: 507). In contrast, interstitial institutional 
change is based on the assumption that institutional change is a slow-moving but dynamic, 
adaptive process between institutions and actors that can not be adequately explained by solely 
looking at power relations between the member states (Farrell & Héritier 2007b). As outlined 
already beforehand, the set-up of the ENP can not be considered a history-making decision, as 
this change was no triggered by any formal treaty change, but was rather the result of several 
negotiations over time. The empirical investigation of this thesis also allows drawing certain 
conclusions if the ENP set-up was just the formalisation of already established practices, or if 
the ENP itself changed the way policies were made EU internally towards the neighbours. 
In a next step, to differentiate between conflictual and consensual interaction allows us to 
consider the contentment that certain actors perceive in regard of the policy-making process. 
Within a consensual interaction an actor might not be totally satisfied with the way the policy is 
conducted (ie. it might not be his preferred way of doing policies), but at least he accepts the 
way it is done and does not oppose it – neither rhetorically nor actively by setting 
counterproductive actions. However, again the form of interaction is not a dichotomy between 
conflict and consensus, but there is a fluent transition between more and less conflict. This 
differentiation between conflict and consensus is especially important for the factor time, what 
will be introduced in the dispositional dimension. There it is assumed to be plausible that 
especially shortly after a change in interaction more conflicts occur, while the interaction might 
become more consensual after some time (either because actors realised that their resistance 
does not pay off, or because they learnt how to interact in a more consensual manner).  
Within the European integration literature there is a huge amount of literature about the 
interplay of different actors and institutional conflict in public policy-making (see among others 
Christiansen 1997; Pollack 1997; Franchino 2000; Schmidt 2000). Multi-level governance and 
the principal-agent approach have a strong stance within this academic literature, although these 
models have only sporadically been applied to policies with an external dimension. Principal-
agent relationships are a central question of EU public policy research (see for example Pollack 
1997, 1998, 2003; Kassim & Menon 2003), and provide interesting assumptions about conflict 
in interaction between actors. Tallberg (2002) applies a rational-institutional approach to explain 
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why, how and when member states delegate certain tasks to other actors. He starts from the 
assessment that delegation entails a certain dilemma for member states, who on the one hand 
perceive a functional need to delegate, while on the other hand they feel threatened by doing so 
to loose control over the agent, so that this delegation leads to a policy that they actually did not 
want or intend. He concludes that the design and scope of delegation depends on what 
functional need is supposed to be satisfied: if member states aim at enforcing compliance, the 
agent (in EU public policy-making, the Commission and the ECJ) gets a large degree of 
discretion and can act rather independently, while member states try to control the agent when it 
is about providing policy advice in drafting and initiating legislation or when the agent is 
supposed to execute EU policy. Especially the latter is interesting for this study, as it is 
especially the execution of the previously agreed main goals that is relevant for day-to-day 
foreign policy-making. Tallberg argues that in EU public policy the Commission is strongly 
controlled through the comitology system where most policies still need the approval of the 
member states (Tallberg 2002). It is an interesting aspect to investigate, to what extent member 
states were also able to set-up certain control mechanisms within the ENP and if we can also 
observe some form of delegation within the ENP.  
Potential conflicts about the pursue of EU foreign policies across the pillars have been often 
highlighted in EU foreign policy research:  
“In general, I assume that governments attempt to balance their inherent desire for foreign policy 
autonomy against the external goals of the EU, and that EC actors like the Commission are 
generally ´pro-integrationist´.” (Smith, M. E. 2001: 174) 
Duke showed the nature and scope of these potential inter-institutional tensions between 
Commission and Council over time, illustrated for example by the action taken by the European 
Commission against the Council in the ECOWAS case that was decided by the European Court 
of Justice (Duke 2006a). On the other hand, also turf battles between the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat are inherent in the development of EU foreign policy-making, especially 
since the development of military and civilian crisis management within the ESDP  (Dijkstra 
2009). However, in this research I argue that the conflictual relationship is not only about 
formal competences and legal battles, but that conflicts are also visible in every-day policy-
making between officials of the respective institutions.  
Peculiar to the set-up of the ENP is that it brings together policy areas that vary in the way 
policies were conducted, as Smith and Weber exemplified on the role of the Commission: “The 
Commission’s role, however, still varies greatly across issue-areas, especially in the realm of 
foreign and security policy.” (Smith, M. E. & Weber 2007: 10). So what happens if policy 
areas with different governance systems are subsumed under one single framework?  
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As chapter 2.1. has shown, the quantity of foreign policy-making at European level has 
gradually increased since the treaty of Maastricht, in terms of scope on the one hand, as EC/EU 
established relations with more countries, and in terms if intensity on the other hand, as existing 
partnerships were extended to more or other policy areas. Within CFSP it is often argued that 
the policies follow solely the least common denominator of the member states, and that the 
recent cross-pillar approaches transport these least common denominator-strategies also to the 
first pillar. Absolutely the contrary argues Michael Smith who perceives the external economic 
EC-relations as the core of EU foreign policy-making with a high potential for strategic action. 
In his view, only a further development of the EC-external relations is able “to lead to an 
activist and substantial foreign policy” (Smith, M. 1998: 94), and the question is (in) how (far) 
political motives are incorporated in external economic policies or, as he formulates, to what 
extent the EC policies are politicised. This shows that this mutual influence of different ways to 
conduct policies is not a new topic in EU foreign policy research, but so far there were only few 
cases that allowed for such a study. The ENP that was set-up as a single framework towards the 
neighbours, however, allows for a more concise investigation, and it proofs as an interesting 
case study to check what kind of impact it has when policies are merged that were pursued in 
different ways beforehand. This thesis allows researching to what extent this sectoral 
differentiation in terms of policy-making still exists after the ENP framework was set-up, or if 
one (new) form of interaction emerged of how to conduct policies towards the neighbours. To 
illustrate this differentiation in a more comprehensive manner, I suggest differentiating between 
horizontal policy-making (figure 5) and an integration policy approach (see figure 6). Again, 
this differentiation should not be perceived as a nlargeme characteristic, but as two “ideal” 
types that also allow for variations in between.  
Figure 5 shows the traditional way of conducting policies within the EU system of external 
relations. The different actors pursue their own policies that should not contradict the generally 
agreed goal and the policies of other actors. A certain level of communication between these 
actors is necessary, so that they know what the other policies look like, but they do not need to 
interact to formulate their own policy at all. This form of interaction also does not necessarily 
ask for a cross-pillar interaction as every actor can formulate and implement policies on their 
own, i.e. the EC pursues its supranational policies and the CFSP formulates its 
intergovernmental positions, actions and so on, but the actors of the different pillars do not need 
to interact as long as their policies do not show a strong contradiction to the general policy goal. 
At the same time institutional coherence could be possible at the lower level (but it is not 
needed per se), if actors decide to work together to design, implement or revise a certain policy. 
Horizontal coherence between the different policies, however, is generally perceived as the 
more necessary dimension, as this is mostly what is referred to when incoherence is criticised.   
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Figure 5: Coherence in EU policy 27 
 
Figure 6: An „Integrated EU policy approach“27 
 
Figure 6, in contrast, shows an integrated policy approach where actors interact to formulate and 
implement different policies, pursued within a certain policy framework like for example the 
ENP. The EU policy goal is pursued by one or more policy areas that are subsumed within one 
single framework. The different actors on the one hand interact to set-up and shape this policy 
framework, but at the same time they also interact to formulate policies within the various 
policy areas that are targeted towards the EU policy goal.  Generally for policies to be 
successful, these actors have to work together to formulate and specify a certain policy output. 
They do not have to cooperate in the sense that they are responsible and have competences for 
the same tasks. But instead of having a clear division of competences along the pillars that are 
clearly differentiated between technical cooperation and political issues, the interaction evolves 
along different stages of the policy cycle. During the different stages of the policy process the 
various actors perform to a more or less stronger degree certain tasks, and just a smooth linkage 
                                                     
27
 Please not in regard of this figure 5: This is a simplified illustration to show the difference between coherence and 
an integrated approach. The shown policy areas and actors are used as examples and not all-inclusive, as well as 
the size of the boxes or their positioning does not imply any deeper meaning; 
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of the various actions of the respective actors leads to a policy output. These interactions can 
occur simultaneously, but it might also happen that one actor takes the lead during a certain 
period of time, while the other one just supports and gives its input, and at another point of time 
the two actor switch positions. An illustrative example from conflict management in third 
countries might allow for a better understanding: During a military mission and a latent conflict 
situation in the country it is the Council, the member states and the auxiliary (military-related) 
bodies in the Council Secretariat that lead the policy. The Commission might at this point in 
time be already involved to a certain extent and might formulate its suggestions. When the 
mission is successful and the violent conflict flattens, the interaction between the involved 
institutions changes, as the Commission has strong competences and assets in civil post-conflict 
management. The member states and the Council bodies will still be involved, but they do not 
have this strong lead anymore.  
Supporters of supranational EC-policy-making might now argue that this new form of policy-
making looks similar to ‘traditional’ supranational (i.e. first pillar) policy-making. In my 
opinion, however, there is no added value in arguing along these traditional intergovernmental-
supranational differentiation, and it even creates an unnecessary chance for misinterpretation to 
argue that the use of the policy cycle for the analysis of policy-making should automatically 
equate with supranational EU public policy-making, as the policy cycle alone is just an 
instrument to make the analysis more precise, but does not incorporate any theoretical argument 
for or against supranationalism. As already elaborated above, foreign policy is much more 
executive-orientated than regulatory or redistributive policies, what also implies that the 
implementation stage is crucial. Furthermore, in EU foreign policy it is still the member states 
that decide in the end, either with qualitative majority or unanimously28. The Council and the 
member states are the central decision-makers, “nevertheless allowing for a substantive role of 
EU actors, in particular executive actors” (Stetter 2004: 726). This peculiarity of EU foreign 
policy-making will be further elaborated on when setting up the factor of “bargaining 
advantage” at the structural dimension (see p. 69).  
Hence, while this potential shift from horizontal coherence to an integrated policy approach 
should not be misunderstood as supranationalisation, a critical reflection on public policy 
research like the principal-agent approach allow for interesting new questions. The mechanisms 
and causal relations that are examined with these approaches might to a certain extent also be 
visible in changing the way EU foreign policy is made. 
                                                     
28
 With the treaty revision of Amsterdam member states could also decide with majority when their policies are based 
on a Common Strategy, like it is the case in the Mediterranean policy since 2000.  
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The differentiation between consensual and conflictual interaction on the one, and between 
horizontal coherence and an integrated approach to policy-making on the other hand 
conceptualises the first more descriptive research question of this thesis about what kind of 
change in actors’ intereaction is observable in EU foreign policy-making after the set-up of the 
ENP. In a next step, the second research question about potential causes and motivations for 
change is reflected upon theoretically.  
3.2. Theorising What Factors Explain the Change: Motivations and Structural Conditions 
There are two possible lines of arguments in the literature about factors that might explain the 
change in interaction of different actors. One the one hand, the actors themselves might have 
certain motives why they intentionally want to change their roles and these of others (actor-
argument; in Carlsnaes’ model these would constitute the intentional and dispositional 
dimension). On the other hand and in opposition to the intentional change of roles, the 
institutional set-up could have been unintentionally changed in the past in such a way that its 
consequences allowed for a change of roles and interactions (structure-argument) to a later point 
in time. This differentiation will be also taken into account in the theoretical framework of this 
project.  
In general it is assumed that the following formulated assumptions do not mutually exclude 
each other but that they also are applicable to different degrees at different points in time. The 
main aim is to explain and understand the process of change, i.e. not to pinpoint only what main 
factor triggered this chance, but to show the mechanisms and the process that took place with 
the set-up of the ENP. Furthermore, while these assumptions are derived from the theoretical 
literature and explicitly formulated, they are not meant as strictly deducted hypotheses that are 
tested empirically afterwards, as this form of deduction is more useful in quantitative research. 
Qualitative research, however, as applied in this thesis does not mainly aim at testing theory (ie 
verifying/falsifying hypotheses) but at explaining and understanding how the ENP influenced 
the interaction of EU actors.  
The model by Carlsnaes introduced earlier and his differentiation between the intentional, 
dispositional and structural dimension is used to structure the different factors that are assumed 
to have influenced the change in EU actors’ interaction in policy-making towards the 
neighbours. Figure 6 provides an overview of these assumed factors that are going to be 
explained in more detail on the following pages.  
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Figure 7: The theoretical framework – Carlsnaes´ model adapted to explain change in interaction in EU 
Foreign Policy-making  
 
 
3.2.1. The Intentional Dimension: Bureaucratic Power and Policy Interest 
Why do actors allow or even push for change? Why is change part of their preferred interest? 
The bureaucratic politics approach argues that the interests of actors and institutions can be 
differentiated in policy-interest goals (purposive goals) and organisational interests (also 
termed, bureaucratic power or reflexive goals) (Peters 1992). 
The bureaucratic politics approach is vastly ignored within European political science and only 
slowly catches the attention of EU scholars by being incorporated in administrative governance 
research. It is, nevertheless, prominent and also highly criticized in the United States. Graham 
Allison presented the most developed and comprehensive analysis in his book “Essence of 
Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Allison 1971). By analysing the decision-
making process during the Cuban missile crisis he concludes that the classical rational actor 
model that perceives states as rational, unitary actors helps to explain certain parts in analysing 
foreign policy-making, but that this approach ignores certain important aspects, as it “reduces 
the organizational and political complications of a government to the simplification of a single 
actor” (Allison 1971: 252). Allison’s critic on the traditional rational actors model is not 
rationality in itself but states are treated as unitary black boxes. His bureaucratic politics model 
also includes rational action in so far, as he assumes that different bureaucratic units decide 
rationally, but he emphasises that they primarily pursue their own interests. Also other authors 
(see e.g. Drezner 2000: 773) emphasise the weakness of rational models where governments are 
seen as black boxes that pursue certain interests and preferences and that can not explain how 
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certain preferences emerge. Therefore Allison suggests the application of two other approaches: 
governmental politics and the organizational process approach that focus on domestic 
determinants and primarily on the constituent bureaucracies as important players (Hollis & 
Smith 1986: 270; Smith, S. 1994: 110)29. In his follow-up publications, Allison together with his 
colleague Halperin subsumed these two different approaches to the bureaucratic politics 
approach30 where they set up following main propositions (Allison & Halperin 1972; see also 
Rosati 1981: 235-238): 
• different (bureaucratic) units pursue competitive or at least not homogeneous interests. 
• their priorities and perceptions are shaped by their position in the system. 
• the solution of problems on these levels is far from straightforward and strategic, and diverse 
among the different units.31 
 
To apply the bureaucratic politics approach the researcher must first identify the various players, 
then move on to the different interests that determine each player’s stand, and finally analyse the 
different games that are played between the actors to reach an outcome in the end.  
Furthermore, different types of interest influence a player’s stand. On the one hand, there are 
general policy interests of the bureaucratic unit about what the pursued goal is and how it 
should be reached. On the other hand, Allison and Halperin identified also organizational 
interests of the bureaucracy to maintain influence, to fulfil its role and to secure the necessary 
capabilities (Allison & Halperin 1972: 48; Hudson 2005: 8).32 The player’s probability to 
succeed in the policy games depends primarily on its skill and will to use certain bargaining 
advantages like its control of the implementation, its control over information (especially about 
which other policy outcomes are possible) and of its persuasiveness with other players. In this 
case, the possession of these bargaining advantages is not that important as the other player’s 
perception over these. In action games the player’s success further depends on the power of the 
bureaucracy, i.e. its formal authority, the control over the resources necessary to carry out the 
action, the responsibility for carrying out the action, as well as the control over information that 
enables one to determine the feasibility of the action and its consequences. Furthermore, 
standard operating procedures can constrain new policy actions (Allison & Halperin 1972: 52).  
                                                     
29
 Roger Hilsman labels the organisational process approach „political process model“, and in generally it has to be 
noted that the different authors do not use the labelling of the different approaches as well as their concrete range 
consistently.  
30
 As I do not perceive it necessary I will not differentiate between governmental politics and organisational process 
model any further but use the bureaucratic politics model presented in Allison and Halperin (1972). 
31
 As Hollis and Smith (see especially Conclusion: Götz & Meyer-Sahling 2009) summarized accurately „decisions 
are not taken in accordance with some notion of a national interst, but result form pulling and hauling between 
bureaucracies“. 
32
 In addition, they also incorporated „domestic interests“ and „personal interests“ but as these do not apply to my 
research I will not elaborate them in detail here.  
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Based on these assumptions they deduce four propositions. First, decisions within and between 
bureaucracies are compromises that must avoid to harm strongly felt interests of the 
participants. Secondly, absolutely new foreign policy content is decided by central players, but 
specific details depend primarily on standard operating procedures or already existing programs 
within the organizations. Thirdly, units that are not involved in the decision game feel less 
obliged to faithfully implement decisions. And last, organizations will try to maximize its own 
interests when the decisions taken leave room for such an action (Allison & Halperin 1972: 53-
54). This assumptions will come back later when discussing the single assumptions of this 
theoretical framework.  
The critics on Allison’s and Halperin’s approach are diverse (for a good summary of different 
critics see Smith, S. 1994: 112-122). Repeatedly Allison was accused that this approach is not 
new at all but that many other authors before him had discussed the importance of 
bureaucracies, and that his own contribution was only to subsume these different works and 
provide an empirical case study. His approach would totally exclude external political forces 
(e.g. election terms) and cognitive factors derived from constructivism (Brown 1997: 78).  
Kegley and Wittkopf (Kegley & Wittkopf 1989: 56) also worked with the bureaucratic politics 
approach and suggested to further integrate two of their observations into the framework: on the 
one hand, bureaucracies emphasise the information that supports their own interests, and on the 
other hand bureaucracies do not like policy innovation as they prefer to rely on standard 
operating procedures. Information as a central feature of power between actors will be also an 
issue in the deducted assumptions, and standard operating procedures can be perceived as part 
of the unwillingness of bureaucracies for change.  
Allison’s fundamental study of bureaucratic politics as well as the above described reactions to 
this approach all deal with national foreign policy-making. An adaptation of the model to 
European Studies is rarely found. Ginsberg (Ginsberg 1989) partly used it for his analysis of 
why the EC moved or stagnated, and remarked that the model is useful to explain the 
Commission’s role. Guy Peters (Peters 1992: 82) conducted the most comprehensive study on 
the rule of bureaucratic units within the EU. Although he admits that the EC is less 
bureaucratised than many nation states, he concludes that European civil servants play an 
important role in substantial policymaking. The DGs developed “their own organizational 
cultures and approaches” and they compete for policy space where competences are not 
precisely stipulated (Peters 1992: 107). The latter relates directly to the concept of incomplete 
contracting that is considered a structural factor that influences change.  
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Based on these theoretical accounts of bureaucratic politics, two assumptions can be drawn in 
regard of the research questions of this thesis, hereby differentiating reflexive organisational 
interests and between purposive policy goals. The first assumption relates to the former: 
Assumption 1 (bureaucratic interest): The more actors believe that a change in interaction would 
enhance their bureaucratic status quo (e.g. competences, financial means), the more they are 
willing to support and accept a change in tasks, roles and interaction. 
In the above mentioned special issue of West European Politics the bureaucratic interest of 
different actors is also identified as one of the most important factors. Farrell and Héritier argue 
that “conflicts over competences between the key actors [...] will be a key driver of institutional 
change” (Farrell & Héritier 2007b: 235), and it occurs because of incomplete contracting in the 
EU treaties. The principals of EU policy-making, i.e. the member states, are not able to draft 
treaties that cover every detailed contingency, and hence, between formal treaty changes the 
involved institutions (e.g. Commission, Council or European Parliament) try to enforce their 
own interpretation of the formal treaty regulations to maximise their control and bureaucratic 
power in the policy process. Farrell and Héritier assume that (2007a: 227-231) the involved 
actors are “competence maximisers” as they use the situation of incomplete contracting to 
enhance their bureaucratic power.  
Caporaso highlights that the issue of incomplete contracting is analytically a problem because it 
is empirically very difficult to differentiate clearly from the phenomenon of power that he 
defines “as the capacity [or] as the ability of an institutional actor to get its way against the will 
of others” (Caporaso 2007: 395). In my view, it would therefore be useful to differentiate 
between maximisation of bureaucratic power as a goal in its own right and maximisation of 
bureaucratic power as a medium-term instrument to have in the long run enough institutional 
power in the policy process to enforce the policy that is preferred by the respective actor without 
having to make crucial compromises with other actors33. This differentiation basically highlights 
if the actor has a short-term or a long-term view, but it does not really make a profound change 
in the theoretically assumed causal relationship. Therefore I propose to keep in mind that the 
maximisation of bureaucratic interest can have different short- and long-term reasons, but that it 
does not in itself change anything about the assumption of actors‘ interaction.  
In regard of the research interest of European policy-making towards the neighbourhood, it 
seems quite logical to assume that the Commission and the Council Secretariat have 
bureaucratic interests to maximise their competences. The Commission was for a long time kept 
out of foreign policy-making, as it was only “associated” (Duke 2006b). After the successful 
                                                     
33
 This differentiation of power as a mean and power as a goal in itself has a longstanding tradition in International 
Relations realist theoretical discussions.  
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enlargement in 2004 and 2007 the Commission repeatedly emphasised that these accessions 
were the “most successful EU foreign policy” and officials repeatedly stated their conviction 
that the Commission could contribute very positively to EU foreign policy, especially towards 
the neighbours, as the empirical chapters will show later on. In a similar vein, the Council 
Secretariat was from its beginning mainly meant to be supporting the presidency, without 
providing any advice and input in terms of content. However, especially with the development 
of EU crisis management, a change in its role perceptions could be observed (Juncos & 
Pomorska 2010) that would allow for a more prominent role of the Council Secretariat. 
Conflicting role perceptions and turf battles, nevertheless, have already been recorded before 
between EU actors, especially between the Commission and member states: 
However, it must also be recognized that governments and the Commission are not monolithic; 
they have conflicting goals and their officials compete with each other to pursue those goals 
(Smith, M. E. 2001: 174). 
It seems hence quite rationale to assume that the Commission and the Council Secretariat would 
support a change in interaction that enhances their role in ENP policy-making. But what motive 
could member states have to change the interaction, as this would mean that they allow for more 
involvement of other non-state actors in such a sensitive area like foreign policy-making?  Here 
a more complex explanation is required. On the EU level member states encounter the problem 
that the CFSP pillar does not have any executive means to pursue its policies. If the member 
states decide common actions they can on the one hand try to implement them via their national 
foreign, or they have to rely on the first pillar to support their policies by implementing them. 
Hence, the task of implementation is with the member states or they have to rely on the 
benevolence of the EC-institutions to follow their policy. In regard of the latter possibility, 
bureaucratic politics approaches assume that “units that are not involved in the decision game 
feel less obliged to faithfully implement decisions” (Allison & Halperin 1972: 53-54). These 
problems have already been repeatedly experienced at EU level, what lead to the criticism that 
the political CFSP does in reality not have any impact despite issuing mere rhetorical 
declarations. With the acceptance of member states to integrate the different areas and change 
the involvement of (supranational) actors, they might also have the chance to use information, 
expertise and means of the EC-pillar and to critically control the faithful implementation of their 
decided policies. In this regard, also delegation theory and the earlier mentioned principal-agent 
approaches provide useful insights. Tallberg had elaborated on different motivations for 
principals to delegate to agents (Tallberg 2002) of which one was the reduction of information 
asymmetries. Tallberg argued that supranational institutions are able to provide policy expertise 
that is not accessible to all member states in the same degree.  
Hence, I assume that as long as the actors, such as the Commission and the member states 
benefit to the same extent, the change in interaction will be consensual. But as soon as one actor 
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has the impression that it looses more than it gains or that another actor benefits to a larger 
extent than it does, a conflictual situation will occur. The Commission, for example, might be 
more involved in the policy process, but as the member states then might have made sure to 
gain also more control over implementation, Commission officials might end up with the 
impression that the new form of interaction is not advantageous. Therefore they might try to set 
limits to the control possibility of the member states and switch to a more conflictual form of 
interaction. On the other hand, the member states and the Council might first get the impression 
that they now have more possibilities to control the implementation process, but they might 
experience that through the stronger involvement of the Commission in the policy process, it is 
not solely their preferred policy anymore that they want to be pursued. Hence, they try to limit 
the involvement of the Commission in the specification stage, what would cause a conflictual 
situation again.  
 
Next to the bureaucratic interest, the bureaucratic politics approach identifies policy-interest 
goals that actors try to pursue (Peters 1992). The second assumption of this thesis is linked to 
this second form of interest by incorporating the factor “policy demand” in the theoretical 
framework: 
Assumption 2 (policy interest): The more the involved actors acknowledge the demand for 
functional linkages of policies and for an effective policy in a changing international 
environment, the more they are willing to change their interactions with other actors. 
The main argument of this hypothesis is that actors recognize that they have to adapt their form 
of interaction to a more effective and “good” policy-making to satisfy a certain policy demand. 
Two reasons might explain why the old form of interaction is not appropriate anymore. On the 
one hand, I argue that changes and developments in the international arena (fight against 
terrorism as high salient issue or further increase of complexity, functional linkage between 
policy areas) cause strong demands for a more comprehensive form of policies, i.e. for 
integrated approaches (Christiansen 2001: 762; Stetter 2004: 721). Hence, the European actors 
acknowledge that in the new situation policies are functionally linked and that the best way to 
achieve successful policies also means to adapt to these developments in the way policies are 
pursued. Therefore they decide intentionally to change their pillarised and sectoral form of 
policy-making to a cross-pillar politics setting (Stetter 2004: 720).  
On the other hand, a new policy demand might occur because of rational cost/benefit 
calculations or efficiency reasons. The member states intentionally decide to involve 
supranational actors for more efficient policy-making and under a strict control mechanism, 
because the quantity and complexity of foreign policy output on EU level has grown and they 
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lack the ability to pursue their policy ideas on their own. In the end, this growth of complexity 
and quantity might also lead back to changes in the international system. 
Nevertheless, I think it is necessary to emphasise that this new form of policy demand does not 
automatically lead to the formation of a “European interest”, like it might be argued from a 
constructivist perspective. The motives for delegation and changes in the interactions that are 
used here are based on rational choice interpretations that the member states want to pursue the 
policies that are the best possible in their view and that do not cause extra costs. Hence, the 
motivation follows a rational cost-benefit calculation. Furthermore, I assume that it is important 
that this new policy does not essentially harm core national interests of the member states. This 
limitation is based on the proposition of the bureaucratic politics approach that compromises 
within and between bureaucracies “must avoid to harm strongly felt interests of the 
participants” (Allison & Halperin 1972: 53-54). Therefore I assume that the member states will 
accept the role of the Commission in their interaction, as long as they do not suspect that the 
newly pursued policy threats their national interests. It does not have to be the case that a 
national interest is actually harmed, but it is crucial if the member states have the impression or 
the feeling that the Commission wants to push through a policy that might not go in line with 
the interest of the member states.   
The idea of a rational motivation through policy demand can also be identified in EU studies, 
incorporating delegation theory and principal-agent accounts. As already mentioned within the 
first assumption of bureaucratic interest, Tallberg (2002) identified the reduction of information 
asymmetries as one potential factor that motivates member states to delegate certain tasks to 
supranational institutions, like the Commission. Member states delegate because the 
Commission provides policy expertise, and this way they can balance certain disadvantages that 
they might have opposite other member states, what hints to a bureaucratic interest. At the same 
time, a rational explanation might also show that a certain policy demand might trigger this 
motivation, in that far as the supranational institutions are perceived as more suitable to draft 
technical details in policy proposals than the politicians in the Council. Officials in the 
Commission and in the delegations in the third country might just have better knowledge about 
the best policy that should be pursued in certain circumstances. In addition, Tallberg argues that 
also the question for more efficiency in policy-making might motivate member states to 
delegate, as it has proven successful in other public policy areas that the European Council 
gives strategic guidelines, the Council adopts the rules and guidelines, but that the details for 
implementation are filled in by the Commission. In the end the latter describes well the shift 
from a pillarised way of achieving horizontal coherence to an integrated policy approach, but it 
has to be observed in detail to what extent this kind of motivation might also be visible during 
the set-up of the ENP.  
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In more concrete terms it could be expected that generally agreed common goals like for 
example creating security and stability in the near abroad are accepted by all the involved 
actors, but that differences exist in how to reach these goals. In the literature it is argued that the 
Commission often prefers trade and development as the primary means to achieve stability in 
the near abroad. In contrast to this more long term view, the member states often prefer short 
and medium term solutions that go more in line with their national preferences. The latter are 
mostly also more politically motivated, what might create a conflictual situation of interaction. 
Christiansen (2001) analysed how coherence between the pillars (inter-institutional) but also 
within the pillars (intra-institutional) changed, and he showed that inter-institutional 
coordination is increasing, but that coherence within the pillars is decreasing. His main 
explanation for this process is that increasing inter-institutional interaction causes specialisation 
and policy fragmentation, what in the long run leads to intra-institutional incoherence. He draws 
the conclusion that “this happens because the identification with and knowledge of specific 
policy environments, i.e. the inter-institutional relations, are becoming more important for 
policy-makers than their institutional identification.” (Christiansen 2001: 747). Especially in 
regard of the Commission and the Council Secretariat it will be interesting to test empirically, if 
this kind of shift is observable in EU policy-making towards the neighbours.  
In theories about organizational management the willingness of the involved actors to contribute 
action and to accomplish a common purpose are even seen as prerequisite to establish an 
organisation (Barnard 1970: 65). The same applies to cooperation. In broad terms the involved 
actors must agree about the main intended policy goal, as otherwise cooperation between them 
will not be probable. At EU level these broadly defined goals are already incorporated in the 
treaties, or as in regard of the EU policy towards the neighbourhood have also been formulated 
in the ENP strategy (European Commission 2004b). But it is the task of the different actors to 
decide and implement more concrete policies that support these general goals, and there might 
be quite different perceptions about the most successful way to do so.  
3.2.2. The Dispositional Dimension: Socialisation and Learning over Time 
Carlsnaes assumes that a causal relationship links the second dispositional dimension to the 
intentional dimension. He argues (Carlsnaes 1992: 254-255) that in explaining a foreign policy 
action it is useful to start with the intentional dimension (preferences, choices), but that we can 
“deepen the analysis by providing a causal determination [...] in which the factors 
characterizing the intentional dimension are themselves explained […] how  a particular  
intention  has  come  to  be  a particular  actor’s intention”. After identifying the bureaucratic 
and policy interests of the diverse actors at the intentional level, factors of the dispositional 
dimension derived from socialisation and learning based on a constructivist perspective help to 
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explain why actors took certain preferences, and why these might have changed over time. The 
main assumed rationale here is that the factor “time”34 is crucial in shaping change in actors’ 
interaction, especially in terms of moving from a conflictual to a consensual interaction.  
Assumption 3 (time factor): The longer the actors are able to adapt to the new form of 
interaction and the longer they have time to experience their new roles, the better the interaction 
will become over time. Hence, their new form of interaction improves over time. 
Contrary to rationalism and its ´logic of consequentialism´, constructivists argue that actors 
follow a ´logic of appropriateness´ where they “try to ´do the right thing´ rather than 
maximizing or optimising their given preferences” (March and Olson, 1989, 1998 cited by Risse 
2004). Furthermore constructivism “focus on the causal processes of socialization by which 
particular agents acquire their identities and interest”(Fearon & Wendt 2002: 57). The actors 
subordinate their individual self-interests to the importance of cooperation and coherent action 
as they are convinced that cooperation between them is expected from the other EU actors, but 
probably also from their citizens. Closely linked to this logic of appropriateness, is the 
mechanism of learning and socialisation (Beyers 2005; Checkel, J. 2005; Johnston 2005; Lewis 
2005). Once provided that the actors are willing to cooperate, it is also important that they learn 
how to cooperate successfully.  
Learning and socialisation as applied here, however, do not draw on those sociological strains 
of constructivism which assume that actors through their interaction create totally new 
preferences in terms of the pursued policy. In contrast, it is assumed here that the actors’ 
perception about what is appropriate in terms of the interaction with other actors is shaped in a 
certain way, ie they learn to more clearly define their own and others’ roles and responsibilities. 
This implies that the process of learning and socialisation does not automatically lead to the 
formation of a “European interest”, like it is often argued from a more superficial, constructivist 
perspective. It seems plausible to assume that generally the EU actors want to interact and 
achieve an EU policy output, especially when they already agree on the general objectives of 
certain policies, but that changes in interaction, introduced for example by the ENP, might cause 
distortion and the need of time for the actors to get used to the new form of interaction.35 
Adebahr, for example, argues that for organisational learning “a change of organisational 
routines” (Adebahr 2007: 8) is essential. Actors learn within the ongoing process of interaction 
                                                     
34
 For the importance of conceptualising and theorising “time” as a factor, see Special issue of the Journal of 
European Public Policy, entitled “The EU Timescape”, Vol 16(2), March 2009 (Checkel, J. 2001). 
35
 A similar argument about the strategic use of norms and appropriate behaviour is formulated by Juncos/Pomorska 
(2006) in their paper about socialisation in the Council working groups. They argue that officials in these working 
groups that the pressure for appropriate behaviour in to account when they block certain decision making 
processes, but that this is not done because of socialisation or Europeanization but because of strategic long-term 
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what their role is and to what extent they can expand this role without getting sanctioned by the 
other actors. Information processing is during this stage the main element of learning (Adebahr 
2007:10). Furthermore, the involved actors primarily experience how to best communicate and 
how to behave without creating conflict with others. At the same time, of course, actors might 
also learn from negative experiences, for example when they realise after some time that 
resistance to a certain from of interaction does not pay off.  
3.2.3. The Structural Dimension: Restraining Conditions of Bargaining Advantage, 
Unintended Consequences and the Ability to successful Communication 
In addition to the intentional and the interpretative dimension, Carlsnaes’ third structural 
dimension takes constraining conditions into account. It has to be emphasised, however, that 
structure-centred factors do not per se mean institutions, but that, quite on the contrary, 
institutions (like the Commission) are considered as actors in the theoretical framework of this 
thesis. Structure-centred factors imply relationships, division of competences, institutional 
settings etc. They grasp the relationship between institutions or between an institution and the 
member states, explain the “rule of the games” and shape interactions either in enabling or 
constraining a certain form of interaction between actors.  
Once more it has to be emphasised that the structural dimension does not constitute causal 
factors, ie they are not able to shape the change in interaction themselves, but they might be 
needed to achieve a certain change (for example from conflictual to consensual interaction). 
Hence, in methodological terms it can be argued that they are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for changing the interactions of EU actors in foreign policy-making towards the 
neighbourhood. 
Three aspects are taken into account as structural factors that constrain and enable a change in 
interaction in EU foreign policy-making: the ability for successful communication, bargaining 
advantages, and incomplete contracting. The first factor is more drawn from common 
experience than a clear theoretical school, but I nevertheless think it is an important aspect to 
keep in mind. 
Assumption 4 (communication factor36): the more the institutional set-up asks for direct contact 
between the actors and exchange of their opinions, the more likely a consensual (change in) 
interaction between these actors gets.  
                                                     
36
 The idea of „argumentative persuasion” is in more detailed elaborated by Jeffery Checkel (See Kingdon 1984) in 
his working paper about “Theorizing social interaction in European Institutions”. Checkel follows a purely 
constructivist approach he argues for the change in preferences as the dependent variable (what this thesis rejects). 
However, the processes that he describes are interesting to reflect upon also here.  
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This assumption is based on the idea that officials who know each other, meet and perhaps also 
work together for a longer time develop a more friendly understanding for each others’ 
positions than officials that never met each other face-to-face. Juncos and Pomorska, for 
example, show evidence that officials in CFSP working groups in Brussels “were exposed to a 
spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding” what they labelled as “esprit de corps” (Juncos 
& Pomorska 2006: 6). This does not automatically imply that national officials in Brussels after 
interacting with other actors do not defend the national position of their member state anymore, 
but at least these officials feel a certain need not to unnecessarily offend their partners in the 
respective working groups and institutions. Furthermore, it seems plausible to assume that 
actors who meet each other regularly also have more opportunities to explain their positions, i.e. 
to make the others understand why they act in a certain way. This structural condition is closely 
related to the factor “time”, and it also links to a certain extent back to research about general 
decision-making in the Council that showed that member states’ representatives that meet in 
COREPER every week have a quite different relationship among each other, than for example 
the ministers of the respective Council formations that meet only once per month (see for 
example Fouilleux, Maillard & Smith 2005). 
In addition to this factor of successful communication, it seems indispensable to also 
theoretically highlight that the involved actors are not the same, but that each of them has 
certain advantages and disadvanatages vis-à-vis others in the EU political system, hence that 
they might have certain bargaining advantages in the interaction with others, but also when 
changing these interactions.  
Assumption 5 (bargaining advantage): If an actor is aware that it has certain bargaining 
advantages vis-à-vis others, it is more willing to change interaction, as it is more likely that it 
might gain even more advantages. 
It was already elaborated beforehand that the member states are of course the ones how have the 
final say in terms of decision making in foreign policy-making, especially in the realm of CFSP 
and ESDP. However, while legal competences might provide a certain advantage for the 
member states as principals of EU foreign policy-making, other factors like easier access to 
information (from the EC delegation) or financial means (from the EC budget) might be 
advantageous for the Commission. The different actors involved hence are not equal in a sense 
that they have the same powers and means at their disposal. These factors, on the one hand, 
might create a certain bargaining advantage for the respective actors in their interaction, but 
they might also influence the way the interactions are changed.  
The third structural assumption that is taken into account refers to the idea of interstitial 
institutional change (as outlined in chapter 3.1) and historical institutionalism (Pierson 2004) 
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Assumption 6 (incomplete contracting / unintended consequences of institutional change): The 
interaction of actors was not intentionally and in detail decided during treaty changes, but is 
shaped through incomplete contracting and unintended consequences of institutional change 
that took place at an earlier stage.  
This assumption rests on the main idea that there was no master-plan underlying the change, but 
that the latter was triggered by certain institutional arrangements that were not directly meant to 
restructure EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours. On the one hand such decisions 
might have been taken earlier in other circumstances what in the end resulted in unintended 
consequences of prior (institutional) change in regard of the ENP interaction, or on the other 
hand those might be explained by historical institutionalism in that far as that all changes at EU 
level are path-dependent on prior arrangements and that institutions are reluctant to change. 
The idea of path-dependency is central to historical institutionalism, arguing that “time” has to 
be taken into account to understand politics at a certain point in time and that “political 
development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time”(Pierson 2004: 29). These 
processes, in addition, leave their marks on formal rules, institutional structures and norms at 
different stages in time. Furthermore, this theoretical approach rests on the idea of “incomplete 
contracting”, as “the current functioning of institutions cannot be derived from the aspirations 
of the original designers” (Pierson 1996: 126-127). Incomplete contracting assumes that the 
principals of EU policy-making, i.e. the member states, are not able to draft treaties in a way 
that they cover every detailed contingency, and hence, between formal treaty changes the 
involved institutions (e.g. Commission, Council or European Parliament) try to enforce its own 
interpretation of the formal treaty regulations to maximise their control and bureaucratic power 
in the policy process (Farrell & Héritier 2007b: 235; Caporaso 2007: 393). In regard of the 
research question of this thesis, this implies that member states during treaty negotiations did 
not have in mind to create intentionally this form of interaction in EU foreign policy-making as 
it evolved after the ENP was set-up. Furthermore, they do not even have the ability to do so 
because historical institutionalists also assume that actors decide under bounded rationality, i.e. 
that the member states were not able to calculate all the implications of their decisions at the 
point in time when the treaties were changed.  
Incomplete contracting is relevant for the alternative strand of explanation: Structural conditions 
in terms of unintended consequences of prior (institutional) change are derived from 
approaches that assume change as interstitial institutional change or from principal-agent 
accounts. For example, the Commission often argues that it should have a stronger role in EU 
foreign policy-making because of its successful input in the pre-accession process of the 
2004/07 enlargement. The Commission was given this strong role to monitor and evaluate the 
 72 
accession process, and there was no intention of the member states to also spread this 
Commission tasks to other policy areas.  
Undesired consequences are, for example, highlighted in Tallberg’s principal-agent model. 
They are part of the consequences of delegation that Tallberg tries to explain on the one hand by 
neo-functional accounts in that far that an initial delegation of power from the member states to 
the agent lead to unanticipated delegation effects so that supranational institutions could 
independently shape the integration process (as they got out of control from the principals’ 
perspective). On the other hand, Tallberg also delivers an intergovernmental explanation that 
assumes that supranational institutions are as “passive devices facilitating intergovernmental 
bargaining” who “simply fulfil functions delegated to them by member governments, which 
remain firmly in control of process of delegation” (Tallberg 2002: 33). In opposition to Tallberg 
I assume that the term “unintended consequences” is better suitable than “undesired 
consequences”, as it must not be automatically assumed that certain actors totally oppose 
developments that they did not foresee and that they did not purposively decide about.  
While all six factors fit well in the adapted version of Carlsnaes’ model, the factors provide 
assumptions towards two different aspects of the research question: while the factors from the 
intentional dimension (bureaucratic interest and policy interest), the factor of bargaining-
advantage and incomplete contracting are motives that explain why certain actors asked for a 
change in interaction or at least allowed it, factor 3 about socialisation and learning over time, as 
well as factor 4 about communication target primarily the question in what mode this change 
took place, i.e. those latter two factors might explain if this change was conflictual or 
consensual, but they are not factors that should be considered as primary motivations of actors.  
3.3. Research Strategy and Methodology 
This thesis so far outlined the research focus of this study, the relevance and linkage to current 
academic research as well as the theoretical framework. The aim is to investigate the EU 
internal objective of the ENP to provide a single coherent framework for EU foreign policy-
making, and the theoretical framework showed that the research approach draws on bringing 
together traditional Foreign Policy Analysis and EU public policy scholarship. On the next 
pages I briefly outline four aspects that give insight in how the research questions are going to 
be tackled: First, process-tracing as the main approach will be explained and its advantages for 
this kind of research emphasised. Furthermore, the way of collecting and selecting evidence and 
empirical material is presented, by also discussing the idea of explorative expert interviews. 
Thirdly, it is necessary to explain why this thesis does not follow a strictly comparative 
approach but uses the EU relationship with two countries (Morocco, Georgia) as illustrations. 
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Finally, a short overview about the selected timeframe helps the reader to be able to put the 
investigated change in a time-perspective.  
• Process-tracing as a Method to investigate Mechanisms and Processes 
This research project is not set-up in a way to be a “theory testing case study” (for the definition 
and differentiation of different kinds of theory-building research objectives in comparative 
politics see George & Bennett 2005: 74-76) where different theoretical approaches are tested for 
their validity through the elaborated variation of independent variables. The aim of this project 
is to explain the change in interactions in policy-making towards the neighbourhood by using 
established theories that have been adapted accordingly. Hence, in accordance with the 
categorisation of George and Bennett this research project could be labelled a “disciplined 
configurative case study” (2005: 75) This rationale of understanding a process rather than 
testing a theory fits well with the application of the qualitative method of process which is 
defined as following: 
“The general method of process tracing is to generate and analyse data on the causal 
mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link 
putative causes to observed effects” (Bennett & George 1997). 
Process-tracing allows deducing from collecting rich empirical material about one case and 
investigating this case in detail. Bennett and George also highlight that process tracing rather 
contributes to our understanding of causal mechanisms, while a more quantitative method of co-
variation mainly focuses on causal effects (the latter being the rationale behind more 
quantitative research projects). Hence, while the latter mainly tries to explain what factors are 
the most relevant to explain the observed outcome, process tracing looks at the processes and 
mechanisms that led to the outcome (for more elaborations on process tracing as method in the 
social sciences see also Checkel, J. T. 2003: 213; Brady & Collier 2004: 300; Bennett & George 
1997: 4). This thesis traces how the role of the different actors has changed over time, i.e. it 
looks at the process of change and what mechanisms have led to a conflictual or consensual 
interaction. It furthermore intends to trace and reconstruct empirically how the process of 
change occurred and what factors impacted on this process at different points in time. It does so 
by not only investigating the causal relationship between variables (A causes B, i.e. the 
socialised norm of good cooperation with the Commission caused a more consensual behaviour 
of the Council Secretariat), but process-tracing also allows to take necessary but not sufficient 
variables into account, as for example the unintended consequences of institutional changes and 
other as “structural” termed factors.  
Apart from the special focus on explaining a process rather than explaining an output, process-
tracing as a method also inherits two other advantages that suit this thesis well. First of all, 
scholars argue that process tracing is especially suitable when the research design is “time-
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sensitive” (Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009: 510). This argument is of course closely linked to the 
idea of focusing on a “process” rather than a “status quo”, and it fits neatly with the theoretical 
framework where time is conceptualised as a relevant factor on the interpretative dimension. In 
addition, Checkel argues that one significant advantage of process-tracing is that it allows to 
“move us beyond unproductive ‘either-or’ meta-theoretical debates to empirical applications in 
which both agents and structures matter” (Checkel, J. 2006: 636). The set-up of the theoretical 
framework of this thesis based on Carlsnaes’ model to bring together structure and agency-
related arguments, hence, seems another argument for the suitability of process tracing. 
The disadvantage of this method, however, is that it needs to look in very much detail into 
certain processes, what requires a detailed examination of a huge amount of empirical material. 
Hence, it is not possible to examine in detail within this thesis if the exactly same process of 
interaction change occurred towards all neighbours across all policy areas. This draw-back is 
one of the reasons why this thesis focuses on two illustrative case studies instead of applying a 
strictly comparative design. But before we move on to reflect on the case selection of this thesis, 
the more general approach to evidence collection and selection of empirical material is 
discussed.  
• The Collection and Selection of Empirical Evidence 
First of all, this thesis relies on relevant primary documents of the EU actors themselves about 
the ENP but also on documents that were intended to improve the interaction of actors in more 
general terms. In regard of ENP primary documents those have been taken into consideration 
that deal with the set-up of the ENP but also those that contribute to the implementation and 
monitoring of EU foreign policy-making within the ENP framework37. In addition, of course, 
secondary literature is used to provide relevant data for the analysis. This bulk of literature 
mostly either relates to academic analyses of detailed country studies, or to reports from NGOs, 
think tanks or other actors in Brussels or in the respective third countries that observe and 
commentate on EU policy-making towards the neighbours. While reports of the latter are less 
theoretical and more descriptive in nature, they provide interesting empirical material and 
observations that can be used to trace the process of change in EU actors’ behaviour, even if 
those reports do not focus on the internal aim of the ENP to change the interaction of EU actors.  
The analysis of this thesis also focuses to a large extent on the motivations of the actors to 
prefer the ENP set-up in a certain way and to allow for a specific kind of change. To be able to 
identify these motivations it is therefore indispensable to engage with these actors and identify 
their underlying motivations and reasoning. Hence, empirical evidence for this research was 
                                                     
37
 For both categories of ENP documents see for a good starting point the ENP Website of the European Commission 
at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm 
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also conducted by way of expert interviews with the relevant actors themselves in Brussels. The 
conducted interviews were semi-structure to allow for following up on certain information 
gained during the interview and to allow for adaptation to the aspects that were perceived as 
most important by the actors themselves. This way of allowing flexibility during the interview 
relates directly to one observed advantage of elite interviews compared to standardised 
interviewing (Dexter 2006: 3), i.e. it is not the researcher who defines what is perceived as 
important for the interviewee, but it is the interviewee him/herself who defines what the 
problem or the main motivation behind a certain position is. Hence, potential answers to 
questions are left open-ended first, to be interpreted by the interviewee. Only after the 
interviewee indicated certain preferences and motivations, more detailed question about the 
background and explanation for these perceived motivations were asked.  
All interviewees had been identified according to their institutional position in the EU 
Directory38 and contacted beforehand per Email. These emails contained a short and general 
elaboration about why they have been contacted by outlining that this research aims at finding 
out more about the set-up of the ENP and the institutional dynamics within this framework. At 
the same time, this outline did not go too much into detail, as doing so could have pushed 
interviewees to answer in a biased way or to feel intimidated to speak openly about their 
motivations (for more reflections of how much to reveal to interviewees beforehand and some 
other ethical issues about interviewing see Dexter 2006: 37). At the beginning of each 
interview, it was explained that just the institutional position would be used for the research and 
that notes and recordings would not be handed over to third persons without the explicit 
agreement of the interviewee. This should guarantee anonymity to the interviewees and at the 
same time allow them to speak more openly without having to fear repercussions from their 
superiors for providing certain information during the interview39. While this aspect was taken 
into account, it was rather surprising how open and reflected most of the interviewees behaved 
during the interviews. Furthermore, interviewees could choose not to be recorded on tape, but 
only a few of them decided for this option. In addition, notes were taken after each interview 
about the situation, off the record elaborations, observed behaviour of the interviewee, and other 
issues that might be relevant for the study40.  
                                                     
38
 See http://europa.eu/whoiswho/public/index.cfm?lang=en;  For the more detailed directory of the European 
Commission see also http://ec.europa.eu/staffdir/plsql/gsys_page.display_index?pLang=EN 
39
 Dexter made an interesting observation about how interviewees behave during elite-interviews: “it is the interview 
that is making the elite feel more special and willing to give information that they might not give under different 
circumstances. “ (Dexter 2006: 5) 
40
 These notes and tapes are stored with the author, and will be shown if requested. However, because anonymity had 
been guaranteed, no transcripts of the interviews have been included in this thesis.  
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At the beginning of the interview the respective expert was asked about the time that would be 
possible to take for the interview. In general, interviews lasted between 35 and 70 minutes.  
In total, 23 experts interviews were conducted during two research trips to Brussels in May and 
November 2006 with officials of the Directorate General for External Relations (RELEX), of 
the Directorate General AIDCO (EuropeAid), of the Council Secretariat, with representatives of 
the Presidency as well as several other officials of the permanent representations of the member 
states. In addition, two follow-up interviews were conducted in February 2008 with 
representatives of the third countries under investigation, and in 2009 two final interviews with 
an official working in the Cabinet of then Relex-Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and with one 
official of the German Permanent Representation were used to triangulate and cross-check few 
observations that could not be cross-verified otherwise.   
• The Units of Analysis: an illustrative Case Selection 
It was already elaborated above that this chapter follows the logic of a disciplined configurative 
case study, as categorised by George and Bennett (2005: 75). In contrast to cross-case studies 
this implies that the research design only uses a limited number of cases and it focuses on 
explaining the within-case variation, i.e. it aims to explain the processes and mechanisms that 
took place within the case rather than showing which variable is able to explain most of the 
variation. Cross-case studies, on the other hand, would be more interested in the cross-case 
variation, while the within-case evidence is only secondary. Gerring argues that both “have the 
same object in view – the explanation of a population of cases – but they go about this task 
differently” (Gerring 2007: 20-21). In a similar vein like process-tracing, the advantage of a 
configurational case study is the focus on mechanisms, while cross-case studies focus mainly on 
effects (Gerring 2007: 38). Moreover, Gerring emphasises that especially “when studying 
decisional behaviour” case study research allows for discovering and investigating “the 
intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-process procedures of the actors 
involved in a given setting” (Gerring 2007: 45). 
This shows that a case study approach together with process-tracing seems a suitable research 
approach to the research questions under investigation. The question, however, remains which 
and how many cases to select (for a concise overview for the different possibilities of how to 
select cases see Gerring 2007: 89). Ideally, of course a systematic, theory-testing (quantitative) 
comparison of EU relations towards different countries/regions and within different policy areas 
would be interesting on the long run and as follow-up project (for discussion about advantages 
of quantitative design and pitfalls of single case studies see also Pickel, Lauth, Jahn & Pickel 
2003; Keman 1999). But as long as there are no single empirical studies that give a 
comprehensive picture about this internal ENP aim, it is just not feasible to embark on such a 
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design. We just know to little about the mechanisms but also about the potential single cases to 
apply a quantitative design.  Furthermore, it has to be kept in mind that the emphasis of this 
research project is not that much the comparison between different countries but the comparison 
over time, as I am primarily interested in the process and causes of change in interactions.  
In terms of unit of analysis, this thesis of course focuses on the adaptations in Brussels when 
setting up the ENP. Hence, the ENP as a single framework and the changes brought about in the 
formal relationship with 16 EU neighbours is the first object for a case study that has to be 
considered. However, as this thesis also asks about the motivations for change (as for example 
the policy interest in general but also in more particular terms like national interests towards a 
certain country) and takes into account implementation, it is also necessary to investigate how 
the ENP worked out in practice. While it is possible to make some general observations about 
the ENP framework, it seems therefore also necessary to focus on the EU relationship with few 
specific countries that allows drawing conclusions about how the interaction of EU actors 
changed/did not change when the ENP had been implemented. This means that next to the 
general ENP framework, the EU relationship with a few countries is the unit of analysis. By 
way of selecting two specific countries this thesis is able to become more concrete in analysing 
the actual implementation of the ENP policy without staying at a very abstract and general level.  
But which two countries would be most suitable to be selected from the 16 neighbouring 
countries41 that take part in the ENP? To investigate how and why the interaction of European 
actors changed and how this process developed cases have to be selected where actors of both 
pillars are involved and where the European interest to achieve effective interaction is salient. I 
assume that the EU will especially strive for coherent action towards countries and regions that 
constitute a priority for the EU and its member states. Generally, the ENP is of course aimed at 
achieving coherence towards all countries, as it is supposed to establish one single framework, 
but we have to assume that this was not achieved right from the beginning but that this 
transition took some time. By looking at countries where the EU showed a strong interest, we 
look at most likely cases, as especially in those cases the EU actors can be expected to strive for 
a smooth transition and consensual cooperation. This also implies that by looking at these most 
likely cases this thesis assesses the potential that the ENP inherits for coherence and a smooth 
change in EU actors’ interaction.  
                                                     
41
 The countries involved in the ENP are Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan as well as the 
Mediterranean countries Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco. Furthermore, Libya participates in the ENP but not in the EMP. Contrary to that, the ENP is not directed 
towards Cyprus and Malta (who became members of the EU in the meantime) and Turkey (where negotiations 
about a possible membership are in progress). 
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Two priorities in the EU external relations have been identified after the end of the Cold War: 
the Central and East European Countries (CEEC) and the Mediterranean Region42 (Bretherton & 
Vogler 1999: 138; Smith, K. 2003: 59). The importance of these regions for the EU is explicitly 
emphasised in various documents, but it is also shown in the EC expenditure for external 
actions (see Figure 3, p. 26). The EC expenditure for the Southern Mediterranean and the 
Middle East increased steadily from 25% in 2001 to 35% in 2006 of the overall financial means 
for external actions. According to figure 3, the expenditures for the Eastern neighbours did not 
increase but it has to be kept in mind that with enlargement relations with several countries 
where not financed through this financial framework of external actions anymore but through a 
separate budget heading.  
Relations of the European Community and the European Union to the Mediterranean Countries 
already have been well established over time. Since 1995 the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) has been established, and since 2003 the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) was meant to bilaterally complement these relations. The relations with Israel and 
Palestine are highly politicised. Both are dealt with in addition and even more prominently 
within the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), but choosing this special relationship as research 
focus would distort our findings in terms of generalising observations and hence is not suitable 
for a case study for this research. Libya and its leader Gaddafi also constitute a special case 
within the ENP, where the EU and its members are torn between cooperating because of 
migration pressures and sanctioning a rogue regime. Lebanon and Syria developed stronger 
relationships with the EU especially since the Lebanon war in 2006, but were rather left aside in 
the early years of the ENP, although they were of course part of the ENP. After a first literature 
review it became quite clear that from the Southern neighbours it is the Maghreb countries 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia that have a most stable relationship with the EU. In regards of 
Algeria the problem occurs that this country is not very keen to cooperate with the EU, as it 
does not need these relations as much as other countries in the region because of oil and gas 
deposits and a high world market price for these commodities. Being left choosing between 
Morocco and Tunisia for the Southern dimension, I decided to choose Morocco as case study, as 
the EU relations with this country seem more intensified, Morocco repeatedly asked for a 
special relationship with the EU, and the EU repeatedly labelled Morocco as its model partner.  
However, the ENP is not only made up of countries at the southern shore of the Mediterranean, 
but its main aim was to re-structure the relations with countries in the East after the big 
enlargement in 2004. The main rationale of selecting a second case from the East is not to 
compare these two dimensions, but to allow for a more general picture of how the EU works 
                                                     
42
 Twelve countries of the Mediterranean region participate in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. 
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towards both, the South and the East. Selecting one case from the South and one case from the 
East ensures that no bias is included in the research design because of only focusing on one 
dimension. In the East Belarus, similar to Libya or Algeria, constitutes a difficult case for the 
EU and its member states, as its autocratic ruler only sporadically seems willing to cooperate. 
Moldova is considered the trouble-case in terms of poverty and slow development, while 
Ukraine right form the beginning voiced its discontent of not getting a clear accession 
perspective. The Southern Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, on the other 
hand, were at the beginning ignored and only considered to be added to the ENP after an 
intervention of the European Parliament. As Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova seem special in 
different regards, the Southern Caucasus countries were chosen as the main focus, and within 
them especially Georgia. The reasoning behind this choice will be explained below.  
Next to selecting two concrete country cases, it seems also necessary to draw a closer focus in 
terms of policy content. Keeping in mind that the internal aim of the ENP is to overcome the 
strict differentiation along policy areas and to engage in a cross-pillar but also cross-policy 
approach, it would be inappropriate to select according to policy areas. Hence, the decision was 
taken to look at a specific policy objective and at how different policy areas contribute to this 
more general goal. As central general policy goal the broadly defined objective of conflict 
prevention and creation of stability and security in the neighbourhood is selected. Security 
promotion and conflict prevention ask for a comprehensive approach that draws not only from 
military action but also incorporates a wide range of civilian means and a broad definition of 
security. Furthermore, this objective is highlighted as one of the most important objectives by 
the EU but also by its member states, and its salience increased dramatically after the terrorist 
attacks in New York in 2001 and Madrid in 2004.  
To sum up, this thesis will emphasise three different aspects to be investigated. On the one hand 
it looks at the more general changes in policy-making in Brussels, but on the other hand it 
investigates changes in EU policy-making towards Morocco and towards Georgia. Cross-cutting 
for all three aspects a special emphasise is laid on the general ENP objective of conflict 
prevention and security promotion in the neighbourhood. While the two country cases are 
similar to a certain extent, they also differ in a few other aspects what is going to be shown in 
more detail in the empirical part of this thesis. However, we should also be aware of some 
general features right from the start, as those allow for interesting assumptions in regard of the 
theoretical framework. We can expect that the change in interaction of EU actors might be 
slightly different in these two cases, because of following similarities and differences:  
• In regard of possible unintended consequences of institutional change the two case studies 
have the same conditions as formal treaty changes of course would be applicable to relations 
with all third countries. But the interesting question in this regard is if the interactions of the 
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actors towards Morocco changed at an earlier point in time than towards Georgia, as the 
South Caucasus was not included in the ENP from the beginning but just incorporated in this 
policy framework in 2003.  
• In a similar vein, the EU relations with Georgia started at a later point in time, and when the 
ENP was set-up there was not much that would have to be taken into account from earlier 
experiences. Hence, the factor of time is different in the two case studies.   
• Although the institutional set-up was the same for all neighbouring countries, the relations 
with Morocco developed as the most intense, and hence this relation seems the best 
observable case to examine the mechanisms and causes of change in the interplay of the 
European actors in day-to-day policy-making. Georgia was included into the ENP only in 
2003, but the interesting feature of this case is, that here a Special Representative was 
nominated, the EU conducted a CFSP law-mission in 2003, and that since then an intense 
interaction between the different actors and their policies was required.  
• The relationship with Georgia has a more politicised and conflict-driven background than the 
relations with Morocco. Hence, in the past policies towards Georgia were primarily pursued 
within the CFSP pillar what also implies that the Council and its auxiliary bodies (a special 
representative for this region and his team) were more involved in policy-making towards 
the South Caucasus than towards Morocco. The starting point of bureaucratic influence 
differs in the two cases, although I expect that in general the bureaucratic interest of the 
actors to get involved in policy-making towards these two countries is similar. Hence, it can 
be expected that the EU-Morocco relationship is more technical and spread over different 
policy areas, while the EU-Georgia relationship is still highly politicised. 
• The general EU policy goal of creating security and stability is the same in both cases, but 
towards Morocco single member states (especially Spain and France) claim stronger national 
interests to preserve what is not the case towards Georgia. Hence, the general policy demand 
is the same in the two case studies, but the national (economic) interests that might get in 
conflict with this policy demand are much stronger in regard of Morocco. 
• Both Morocco and Georgia are involved in frozen conflicts, but while the Georgian dispute 
with Russia about the autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkahzia constitutes a direct 
threat and hence a salient topic for the European Union, the Western Sahara conflict does not 
seem high on the agenda of the European Union.  
 
These elaborations show that we can expect that the EU-Georgia relationship is newer (i.e. in 
terms of not having a long past to has to be taken into account), more politicised and 
concentrated on security issues, while the EU-Morocco relationship is longstanding, well 
developed in a variety of policy areas and more technical in nature. Hence, this also leads to the 
assumption that a change in EU actors’ interaction might be expected to be smoother in the 
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Moroccan case, but that the more politicised and newer relations with Georgia might lead to 
conflicts, also because more diverse actors are involved. 
Before we, however, can now move on to check these assumptions with the empirical evidence, 
it is also crucial to be very clear on the timeframe under investigation to avoid confusion. The 
ENP was formally established with the Common Strategy in 2004, but debates about this policy 
framework already started in 2002. Furthermore, as the aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
change in EU actors’ interaction, also the situation before the ENP has to be taken into account. 
For the Southern neighbourhood partners, hence, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was 
established in 1995 has to be considered. Furthermore, we can not stop with the establishment 
of the ENP, but as we also want to find out how the policy framework was implemented in 
practice, it is extremely important to look at the first years of the ENP implementation. In total, 
hence, the main timeframe of investigation of this thesis runs from 1998 to 2007. Figure 8 
provides a short overview about the main timeframe under investigation, highlighting the main 
developments in regard of the EU relations with its neighbours, other EU internal changes that 
are relevant for this thesis, but also EU external events that are considered of having left their 
marks on EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours43.  
 
Figure 8: The timeframe under investigation 
year EU relations with neighbours EU internally EU externally 
1995 
Barcelona process 
 EMP established 
  
1996    
1997    
1998    
1999  Amsterdam Treaty in force  
2000 Common Strategy for the Mediterranean   
2001   
9/11 US terrorist attacks 
fight against terrorism starts 
US Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan 
2002 ENP discussion starts 
Convention to draft treaty 
establishing Constitution for 
Europe 
 
2003 Wider Europe Communication COM(2003)104 Nice Treaty in force US invasion Iraq 
                                                     
43
 In regard of EU-Georgia relations, please keep in mind that the Georgian War with Russia over South-Ossetia is 
not part of the timeframe under investigation anymore.  
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2004 ENP Strategy paper COM(2004)343 
2004 enlargment & 
constitutional treaty discussion Madrid train bombings 
2005 
10 years of EMP 
7 ENP Action Plans adopted 
Negative referenda on EU 
constitution 
London public transport 
bombings 
2006 
Strengthening the ENP 
COM(2006)726 
 ENPI discussion starts 
3 ENP Action Plans adopted 
 Lebanon War 
2007 
ENPI adopted 
2 ENP Action Plans 
  
2008 
12 Progress Reports 
“Union for the Mediterranean”  
“Eastern Partnership” 
 
Georgia-Russia war over South 
Ossetia 
Please note: the first stages highlighted in grey show the status-quo of the EU relations with the neighbours and 
is therefore not the central timeframe under investigation but provides the starting point of this research project. 
3.4. Conclusion: Summing up the Research Design  
This chapter presented the theoretical framework and the assumptions deduced from European 
integration literature and foreign policy analysis. In addition, it discussed the methodological 
approach of process tracing, the way of selecting cases and the collection of empirical material. 
First, the change in EU actors’ interaction was defined as the dependent variable, and two 
different categorisations were used to differentiate between consensual and conflictual change, 
but also between a more traditional coherent EU approach and an integrated EU policy-making 
approach. For structuring the independent factors that are taken into account in this study, an 
adaptation of Carlsnaes’ model to explain a foreign policy action was used as a framework that 
inherits three distinct dimensions: The intentional dimension draws on a differentiation in 
foreign policy analysis between reflexive and purposive goals, and hence brings together the 
factor of “bureaucratic power” and “policy interest”. On the dispositional dimension, the factor 
“time” is added to allow for explaining certain socialisation and learning mechanisms. The 
structural dimension, at last, adds a “communication factor” to “bargaining advantage” and 
“incomplete contracting”. While the latter are not considered as sufficient factors to lead to 
change themselves, they are conceptualised as constraining conditions that might be necessary 
to allow for change.   
In terms of methodology, this thesis follows a qualitative design of process-tracing and a 
disciplined configurative case study, as defined by George and Bennett (2005). It is explained 
how the empirical material was collected and selected and also elaborated in more detail on the 
three different levels that the empirical investigation is focusing on: on the one hand, this thesis 
of course focuses on the general changes that occurred in Brussels during the set-up of the ENP, 
but at the same time a change in EU actors’ interaction in policy-making towards Morocco and 
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Georgia are more closely observed to allow for an understanding of how the actors’ interaction 
changed when the ENP was put into practice and implemented. The timeframe under 
investigation is 2002 to 2007. While looking at these three different levels, the main emphasis is 
on how the EU manages to achieve its more general set objective of conflict prevention and 
security promotion in the neighbourhood. Different kinds of data (primary documents, 
secondary literature and expert interviews) are used for process tracing to examine the process 
and causes of change in this particular area of EU foreign policy-making. 
This thesis so far specified the design of the research, the special focus but also the theoretical 
and methodological approach. The next main part II moves to the empirical investigation of the 
assumptions made, and it starts off with chapter 4 that provides a concise overview about the 
development, main features, objectives and also instruments of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy.  
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Part II -  Presenting the Empirics 
Chapter 4: THE ENP – how it came about, what it is, and what it does 
“The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish 
an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and 
characterised by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.” 
Art. 8 TEU (Lisbon Treaty) 
In its relations with the wider world, the European Union and its member states have created 
different frameworks to handle the relationships with third countries. The immediate neighbours 
of the European Union thereby have been repeatedly emphasised as a priority for EU strategic 
action, especially since the end of the Cold War (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 138; Smith, K. 
2003: 59). It was, however, for the first time with the Lisbon Treaty that the relations with the 
neighbourhood are even  explicitly emphasised in the treaty text (see quote above).  
Yet, the relations with the immediate neighbours of the EU are arranged in different , sometimes 
overlapping frameworks that developed at different points in time and with different pace and 
intensity. Since 1994 a European Economic Area has been set-up with the EFTA countries 
Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein to allow these countries to participate in the EU common 
market without membership. Iceland is at the same time a current candidate country for EU 
accession, together with Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM). The later two are dealt with within the framework of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) that is the general instrument towards the Western Balkans and 
hence also incorporates the EU relations with all the current potential EU candidates, which are 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo. The EU-Russia 
relationship, on the other hand, is organised as a strategic partnership that is build up upon four 
common spaces44. Next to these frameworks, the rather broad framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) covers all other countries in the EU proximity from Morocco to 
Ukraine, and it is supplemented by the more current initiatives of the Union for the 
Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership.  
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched as a policy framework between 2003 
and 2004, with the main objective “to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU 
activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation” (COM 2004, 
                                                     
44
 For background information see for example about Russia: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/index_en.htm, about Western Balkans 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/index_en.htm, about EFTA members http://www.efta.int/legal-
texts/eea.aspx;  
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373 final: 3). Initially, the ENP was established to govern the relations with the EU´s new 
eastern periphery, but was geographically extended to the whole “near abroad” when the set-up 
of the new framework was debated in 2003/04 (Fernández, H. A. & Youngs 2005: 17). 
The respective ENP partner countries do not primarily have the potential for membership, but 
the EU offers them a privileged relationship within the framework of the ENP initiative, which 
builds on mutual commitment to common values, such as the rule of law, good governance, 
human rights, the principles of market economy and sustainable development. The countries 
involved in the ENP are Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.  
This chapter is meant to provide an introduction to the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
outlining its main features, formal development and set-up, its goals and instruments. By 
providing detailed background knowledge about the European Neighbourhood Policy, this 
chapter is more descriptive in nature but indispensable for the better understanding of the 
analysis in the subsequent chapters. At the same time, it shows clearly that the ENP set-up did 
not follow a general master plan, but that this new initiative was negotiated, adapted and 
changed over time by various actors.  
In a first step the evolution and development of the ENP as a policy framework will be 
investigated, putting special emphasis on the road towards the 2003 Commission 
Communication and the 2004 ENP Strategy paper. In a next step, the ENP objectives and aims 
are scrutinized, before we move to the set-up as a single framework and the instruments (action 
plans, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument), as outlined in the policy 
documents and emphasised by EU actors. This background information shall provide a sound 
knowledge of what the ENP is and how it developed formally, as this understanding is crucial to 
investigate the interaction of EU actors in setting up this policy framework and working within 
it later on.  
4.1. Towards the ENP Strategy Paper: To the “Wider Europe” Initiative and beyond 
The End of the Cold War and the subsequent EU preparations for the “big bang” enlargement in 
2004 created a momentum for reflection on how to deal with the new neighbours, especially 
with the ones in the East after enlargement. The main idea was that the widening of the 
European Union towards the new member states and the move of the EU border to the East 
would present opportunities but also challenges in terms of security, political and economic 
relations.  
In terms of security, regional conflicts, terrorism and organised crime were perceived as 
challenges, while the success of the EU impact on its new member states was perceived as an 
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opportunity to expand the EU model for stability also to the new neighbours in the East and the 
South (Boniface & Duke 2008). Politically, these new neighbours were, however, also 
perceived as a challenge, sometimes even as a threat, because of their often less democratic 
record. These reflections have most prominently been documented in the European Security 
Strategy of 2003 that had been prepared by the High Representative Javier Solana’s team and 
finally approved by the Brussels European Council in December 2003 (European Council 
2003b). This strategic document identifies five key threats and challenges for EU foreign policy, 
namely terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state 
failure, and organised crime. In a second step, the European Security Strategy also emphasises 
two strategic objectives that the EU has to take into consideration to be a successful 
international actor in the future: to support an international order based on effective 
multilateralism, as well as building security in its neighbourhood. It is especially the latter that 
shows the new mindset within the EU towards the neighbouring countries at this point in time:  
“Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that 
countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, 
weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population 
growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe” (European Security Strategy, European 
Council 2003: 7).  
While good relations with neighbours in the South were already emphasised when setting up the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, this was the first time that the EU was emphasising its 
neighbours as a strategic priority in a general EU document. Also the Commission President 
Romano Prodi as well as the European Council repeatedly highlighted that this focus on the new 
neighbours was especially crucial next to the accession process of the new member states, as 
“enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe” (European Council 2003b: 7).  
At the same time, also EU internal considerations accompanied this special emphasis on 
establishing strong relations with the neighbours (Boniface & Duke 2008). First of all, a certain 
enlargement fatigue was said to have taken place in Europe (Dannreuther 2006), and 
governments tried to push for alternatives that would ensure to keep especially Ukraine out 
(Molchanov 2004; Interview No. 7, COM). Additionally, some Southern and West European 
member states feared that with enlargement the attention would shift too much to the Eastern 
neighbours and disregard the Mediterranean dimension. Finding an equal balance between East 
and South created a tension between member states that did also not dissolve after the set-up of 
the ENP and can also be observed in the set-up of the Union for the Mediterranean and the 
Eastern Partnership.  
Next to these more general motivations, the evolution of the initial idea for the ENP was 
presented as “Wider Europe” in various documents that was finally adopted as Commission 
Communication COM 2003(104). In the following 14 months several actors presented their 
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ideas and amendments, some of which were taking into account while others were discarded. 
This in the end resulted in the ENP strategy paper that was adopted as Commission 
Communication COM 2004(373) in May 2004 and is widely considered as the founding 
document of the ENP. 
The remaining part of this subchapter shows that the ENP set-up did not follow a fixed blueprint 
that suddenly emerged, but that the set-up of the ENP was a process that was shaped by a 
variety of informal and formal mechanisms, actors and various stages.45 This part of the thesis 
traces the evolution of the ENP and shows the various proposals that shaped the ENP strategy 
paper. This is done in two stages: first, we look how concrete ideas around the “Wider Europe” 
idea emerged and culminated in the Wider Europe Communication in March 2003 (European 
Commission 2003c) (for overview see also table 2 on p. 88). In a second step, the adaptations 
and changes  of this 2003 Communication until the final ENP strategy paper (COM 2004, 373 
final) are investigated and an overview is provided in table 4 on p. 97. 
4.1.1. Initial Ideas taking Shape: on the Way to the “Wider Europe” Communication 
The first official EU document outlining the idea to consider a special relationship with the 
neighbours were the Council Conclusions of the General Affairs Council (GAC)46 in April 2002 
(General Affairs Council 2002a). Under the heading “Wider Europe: Relations between the 
future enlarged EU and its Eastern Neighbours” the General Affairs Council welcomed the 
promised contribution of High Representative Javier Solana and the Relex Commissioner Chris 
Patten to examine 
 “the possibilities for strengthening these relations, taking into account the different state of 
relations between the EU and the countries involved, as well as their level of political and 
economic development” (General Affairs Council 2002a: 10) 
As the intention of the Commission and Solana were already highlighted in the draft minutes for 
this GAC that were circulated in March (General Affairs Council 2002c) it has to be assumed 
that this was not an outcome of the debates during the Council meeting but that Solana and the 
Commissioner had actively proposed to take up this task of leading the way already before the 
foreign ministers had gathered to discuss this issue at the Council meeting. In July 2002, the 
General Affairs Council (General Affairs Council 2002a) once more repeated the same 
statement as presented in April 2002. 
                                                     
45
 From a theoretical and conceptual point of view, this idea of multiple layers that merge when a certain „window of 
opportunity“ is provided relies on the multiple stream model by Kingdon that is often used for analysis of public 
policy-making (Johansson-Noegués 2007: 22). 
46
 Before the Lisbon Treaty, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAC) met always two days on a 
row, one day in the formation of General Affairs Council (GAC) and one day in the formation as External 
Relations Council (ERC). Both times it was mostly the Foreign ministers of the member states who met (despite 
for defence issues they were often replaced by the defence ministers). The External Relations Council was 
renamed to Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) with the Lisbon Treaty 
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Table 2: The advent of an idea: “Wider Europe” from April 2002 to March 2003: 
 Institution / level Main Observations 
April 2002 2421st General Affairs 
Council (7705/02)  
Repeated by GAC in July 
(7978/02) 
• Entitled “Wider Europe: Relations between the future enlarged 
EU and its Eastern Neighbours” 
• Ask for follow-up preparation of Commission and High 
Representative 
August 2002 Joint Letter by Relex 
Commissioner Chris 
Patten and HR Solana 
• Geographical coverage: has to be clearly defined; no one size fits 
all approach; no explicit mentioning of East/South apart from 
initial focus should be on East; 
• Objective: potential accession not specified; just mentioned that 
accession alternative or preparation should be clarified; 
• Potential conflict of different goals: overriding objectives are 
“stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law along our 
borders”; 
• Poses question if new contractual arrangements are needed; 
September 2002 2450th External Relations 
Council (12134/02) 
• Differentiated approach for Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus 
• Potential conflict of different goals:  creating stability and 
narrowing the gap at the new borders 
• General focus still on “EU and its Eastern neighbours” but 
additional statement that “beyond the question of Eastern 
neighbours, the broader question of “wider Europe” deserved 
consideration 
August 2002 Commission President 
Prodi  presents Work 
Programme 2003 
• Geographical coverage left open: Relations with East and South – 
but in contrast to Council before no differentiation but emphasis 
on both regions; 
• Relations with enlarged EU’s neighbours as one of three major 
challenges for EU in 2003 
November 2002 Wider Europe – Draft 
council conclusions 
COEST Working Group 
(13967/02) and PSC 
• Eastern neighbours but potential usefulness for Southern 
neighbours recognized  
• Differentiated approach 
• Russia still as part of neighbourhood initiative  
November 2002 2463rd General Affairs 
Council (14183/02) 
• Same as above – adopted as A point (be aware representatives of 
Commission; Chris Patten and Günter Verheugen) 
December 2002 Commission’s legislative 
and work programme 
2003 
• relations with enlarged EU’s neighbours as one of three challenges 
for 2003 
• no geographical restriction – no differentiation between East and 
South 
December 2002 Speech by Commission 
President Prodi entitled 
“A Wider Europe – A 
Proximity Policy as the 
key to stability” 
• projecting stability beyond borders and share prosperity – that is 
what neighbours expect because of successful enlargement 
• “ring of friends” […] from Morocco to Russia and Black Sea 
• “everything but institutions” 
• Commission in leading role: “And we also pleaded for a strong 
commission  [during Convention], which, as guardian of the 
community interest, will strengthen the Union” and “It is the 
Commission’s responsibility to come up with a way of improving 
relations with all these countries”  
December 2002 European Council 
Copenhagen 
• enlargement will bring new dynamics in European integration = 
important opportunity “to take forward relations with 
neighbouring countries” 
• “avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and 
prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” 
• Reference to Balkans  
• “strong relations with Russia” and “enhance its relations with 
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean” 
• Commission and HR to bring forward proposals to that end 
• Explicit mentioning of cross-border and regional cooperation as 
last point 
March 2003 Wider Europe 
Communication 
COM(2003)104 
• Prepared by COEST and PSC 
• Most detailed blueprint so far (approx 25 pages) 
• All neighbours without current membership perspective (apart 
from Southern Caucasus at this time) 
• Need for comprehensive and coherent security approach 
• Differentiation within one framework and benchmarking to 
monitor progress 
• Next step: discussion with third countries, development of action 
plans, annual evaluation of implementation of action plans 
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Following up on this invitation by the GAC, Javier Solana and Chris Patten published a joint 
letter in August 2002 addressed to the then Danish presidency of the Council of Ministers 
(Patten/Solana 2002; see also Johansson-Noegués 2007: 25), outlining five main questions that 
are necessary to be answered before considering to develop more concrete ideas about the 
initiative of “Wider Europe”. Interestingly enough, these questions represent some of the main 
discussion points and criticism that accompanied the set-up and implementation of the ENP for 
years, (and most of these points are still up for criticism even today), or as Johansson-Noegués 
formulated:  
 “The Solana-Patten memo was the first coherent blueprint outlining the new policy. The letter is 
visionary, revealing a willingness to look to the medium and long term.” (Johansson-Noegués 
2007: 25) 
First, Patten and Solana argue that the geographical coverage has to be clearly defined, while 
there can not be any “one-size-fits-all approach” but that a balance has to be found between 
flexibility and coherence. They also highlight the need to clearly define the objectives of this 
new policy. In their view, the EU  
“should aim towards regional stability and co-operation, closer trade links and approximation 
and/or harmonisation of legislation and progressive extension of all relevant EU policies. 
Looking to the medium and longer term, we could foresee a gradually evolving framework for an 
economic and political space surrounding the Union, which would nevertheless stop short of full 
membership and creating shared institutions.” (Patten/Solana 2002: 1)  
Secondly, in their 2002 letter Solana and Patten already mention the question of potential 
accession of certain neighbours. Should the new policy framework towards the neighbours also 
allow for deepening the relations to the EU what in the end might lead to accession, or should 
only those country be covered, for which accession is out of question? In the latter case, the new 
policy framework would be an alternative to accession, not the way leading to potential 
membership. While Patten and Solana assess the Balkans as potential candidates and the 
Mediterranean neighbours as clearly excluded, they already foresee that the Eastern neighbours 
“fall somehow uncomfortable in between”. Their third concern is the potential conflict of 
different goals. As overriding objective they identify that “stability, prosperity, shared values 
and rule of law along our borders” as “fundamental for our own security”, and they link this 
aspect closely with their fourth point focusing on measures to achieve these goals. Surprisingly, 
they have already in 2002 identified cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, border 
management and migration issues as one of the few measures that are necessary to achieve the 
EU objectives in 2002. Last, they reflect on the more legal aspect of creating the new 
contractual agreements, questioning if the existing agreements are sufficient for deepening and 
strengthening the relationship with the EU neighbours. While Solana’s and Patten’s reflection 
concern the EU neighbours in general, they put a special emphasis on the Eastern countries in 
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the last part of their letter, emphasising that the “initial focus” should lie “on the eastern 
neighbours”.   
Following up on this joint letter by Solana and Patten, the “new neighbours initiative” was the 
next time discussed by the foreign ministers in the External Relations Council end of September 
2002 (External Relations Council 2002), Again the main objective of “creating stability and 
narrowing the gap at the new borders” was reiterated, while special emphasis was placed on the 
idea that a differentiated approach should be developed for Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. 
Finally, the foreign ministers agreed that the relevant bodies should furthermore elaborate on the 
details of the initiative, so that it can be put forward at the forthcoming European Council in 
Copenhagen.  
As instructed, the Council Working Group dealing with Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(COEST) put forward the first draft for the “Wider Europe” Conclusions (COEST Working 
Party 2002) to the Political and Security Committee on 7 November 2002, asking the PSC to 
adopt the drafted text as an ‘A’ item for the GAERC on 18/19 November 2002, implying that all 
remaining issues of disagreement between member states had been resolved in the Working 
Group already.  
However four days later the Council Secretariat also submitted its revised version to the PSC, 
mainly the same in terms of content but with some minor changes in terms of language. 
However, few changes seem to go further than just a semantic improvement and linguistic 
correction. For example point 3 in the COEST version (COEST Working Party 2002) reads  
“the speed of progress in the development of relations with the countries concerned will depend 
on their will to implement further reforms and to respect international commitments and common 
values”  
while the Secretariat version says 
 “The development of relations with the countries concerned will, of course, depend on their 
implementation of further reforms and their willingness to respect international commitments and 
common values” (General Secretariat 2002). 
While the version of the Council Secretariat reads smoother, it now not only needs the 
willingness to implement reforms of the partner countries, but the actual implementation while 
the willingness refers to the respect of international commitments and common values. At the 
same time, the original text emphasises the third countries’ willingness for reform will impact 
on the “speed of progress” to develop relations with the EU, while the version of the Council 
Secretariat deleted the “speed” and implies that relations will only be started from the side of the 
EU, if these countries already embark on certain reforms and can show their progress. While 
these differences seem rather small differences, the latter version implies that countries already 
have to embark on reforms and that a sole commitment for reforming might not be enough to 
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start a closer relationship with the EU. This last draft by the Council Secretariat was fully 
adopted by the General Affairs Council in November 2002 (General Affairs Council 2002b).  
It was, however, not only the Council who was working on this “Wider Europe” initiative, but 
also the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi increasingly reflected on the 
need to intensify the relations with the new neighbours and put forward his ideas for this new 
framework. When presenting the work programme of the Commission for 2003 to the European 
Parliament in November 2002, Prodi for example emphasised: 
“We must define what policy we intend to follow with the neighbouring countries to the East and 
to the South in the Mediterranean Basin (…). We must put the question to know what the spirit 
of Europe and what its borders are” (Romano Prodi at EP plenary in November 2002, as reported 
in Agence Europe No. 8343 2002) 
The interest of the Commission in these new ideas towards the neighbourhood is also 
prominently reflected in the Commission’s legislative and work programme 2003 (European 
Commission 2002: 5) where the “relations with the enlarged EU’s neighbours” are explicitly 
elaborated as one of three major challenges that the EU will be facing in 2003, the other two 
being “preparing for enlargement” and “defining the future of Europe”. The geographical 
coverage is left open, and reference is also made to potential future candidate countries in the 
Western Balkans. However, in contrast to the Council documents the European Commission 
does not differentiate between Eastern and Southern neighbours, but puts an equal emphasis on 
both geographical regions47.  
The Commission’s strong perception of having to play a salient role in the Wider Europe 
initiative becomes even more strongly visible in a speech that the Commission President 
Romano Prodi delivers at an academic conference in Brussels in December 2002 that is entitled 
“A wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability” (Prodi 2002). In his speech Prodi 
emphasises the “need for a new political perspective on relations with our southern and eastern 
neighbours“ (Prodi 2002: 3), as the current successful enlargement policy creates certain 
legitimate expectations with the EU neighbours. He then goes on outlining his idea of “sharing 
everything but institutions” in detail, and he emphasises that he would like “to see a ring of 
friends surrounding the Union […] from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea”. In terms of 
geographical scope Prodi does not differentiate clearly between Eastern and Southern dimension 
of this Wider Europe policy, but he puts equal emphasis on both regions.  
However, even more interesting is Prodi’s repeated emphasis of the important role of the 
Commission in this Wider Europe Initiative. The conference where Prodi was presenting his 
                                                     
47
 According to Johansson-Noegués it was also the Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh who was emphasising the 
need and pushing to incorporate also the Southern neighbours into this new neighbours initiative (Presidency of 
the Council 2004a) 
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speech was not specifically targeted towards the EU relations with the neighbours but a more 
general conference of EU foreign policy scholars, and nevertheless the Commission President 
had made a deliberate choice to talk about the new policy ideas for the neighbourhood. Also in 
terms of content, Prodi emphasises several times that he considers the Commission as most 
important actor in shaping the future EU relations with the neighbours, as the following quotes 
of his speech show: 
“And we also pleaded for a stronger Commission [to the Convention set up to draft the 
Constitutional draft treaty], which, as guardian of the community interest, will strengthen the 
Union” (Prodi 2002: 2) 
“It is the Commission’s responsibility to come up with a way to improving relations with all 
these countries” (Prodi 2002: 4). 
“We identified relations with our neighbours as a strategic objective of this Commission in 
February 2000. The job of the Commission is to seize this opportunity to find a comprehensive 
solution to the question of the Union’s relations with its neighbours” (Prodi 2002: 7) 
The Commission President clearly uses the strong involvement of the Commission in the 
successful enlargement process as an argument to ask for a strong role of the supranational 
institution in the new initiative towards the neighbours.  
A few days later on 12/13 December 2002, the European Council in Copenhagen reiterates the 
main objective of the new initiative: 
“The Union remains determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability 
and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” (European Council 2002a: 6).  
The Copenhagen European Council also repeats that the current enlargement round strengthens 
the EU’s relationship with Russia and that the EU wishes to upgrade its ties with Ukraine, 
Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries. It, furthermore, refers to the 
leadership of the Commission and the High Representative in putting forward concrete 
proposals for this new initiative.  
This reiteration of the European Council shows that the idea of a Wider Europe initiative slowly 
manifests itself as a necessary project but that the concrete shape and ideas are still vague. 
Especially in regard of the geographical coverage there does not seem to be any consensus 
among EU actors and member states, and it will be shown later on that EU actors had not even 
considered that Russia might not be part of this initiative towards the neighbours, while they 
totally ignored the Southern Caucasus countries that were added to the ENP only at a later stage 
and after insistence of the European Parliament.  
The following three months the Wider Europe initiative was not discussed anymore in Brussels, 
but the next document taking up a more concrete perspective was a Commission 
Communication on 13 March 2003, entitled “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood. A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours” (European 
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Commission 2003c). This Commission Communication was perceived as the first concrete 
template of the ENP framework, as it was with 25 pages the longest and most elaborate 
blueprint of this new policy towards the neighbours. 
This Commission document reiterates prominently the main objective of the new initiative as 
outlined by the Copenhagen European Council: “to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe 
and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union” 
(European Commission 2003c: 4). Throughout the first pages of this communication, 
enlargement is framed as the main trigger that creates the need to consider how to improve the 
EU relationship with the new neighbours. The Commission Communication is especially 
interesting in raising three fundamental questions and aspects for the future ENP that remained 
and still remain hot topics of debate: the geographical coverage, the need for a comprehensive 
and coherent security approach, as well as the need for differentiation within a single 
framework.  
First, in terms of geographical coverage, the Commission communication is quite clear: all 
neighbours that currently do not have a membership perspective (ie all apart form Turkey, 
Romania, Bulgaria and the Western Balkans) should be part of the Wider Europe initiative. 
What is interesting, however, is the mentioning of the Southern Caucasus countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia) in a footnote that states the following:  
 “Given their location, the Southern Caucasus therefore also fall outside the geographical 
coverage of this initiative for the time being.” (European Commission 2003c: 4) 
As we will see later, the Commission had to change its approach to the Southern Caucasus 
countries during 2004, when the European Parliament and some member states insisted that 
they should be part of the new initiative towards the neighbours.  
Second, under heading 1 and 3 the Commission Communication 2003(104) final emphasises the 
need for a coherent and comprehensive security approach. The achievement of security, stability 
and sustainable development for EU citizens is closely linked to the close cooperation with 
neighbours, as there is a strong interdependence between their well-being and the well-being of 
the Union. Next to that more rational argumentation, the Commission also calls upon the moral 
obligation that the EU has to support the sustainable development of its neighbours. The 
Commission outlines this need to justify its strong emphasise of a comprehensive security 
approach that should comprise the “whole range of Union’s policies (foreign, security, trade, 
development, environment, etc)” (European Commission 2003c: 3) and that should be build 
upon a “clear vision for the development of closer and more coherent relations”(European 
Commission 2003c: 9). In the following, the Commission outlines different policy areas in 
which enhanced cooperation should be considered, ranging from internal market and trade 
measures, to fight against poverty and democracy promotion to migration management and 
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therelike. In chapter 7 on the motivations for changing the institutional set-up with the ENP, we 
will see that the Commission used this concept of “coherence” and “comprehensive security” 
very deliberately to emphasise its own importance in this new framework and to get a stake in a 
policy area that by some member states was still considered as traditional foreign policy-making 
within the second CFSP pillar.  
Third, the Commission Communication discusses in detail although still in more broad and 
undefined terms the idea of differentiation within a single framework and the need for 
benchmarks to evaluate implementation and progress in an objective manner (heading two and 
four of COM 2003(104)). The respective heading title reads “different countries – common 
interest” and it emphasises that “a new EU approach cannot be a one-size-fits-all policy”. This 
terms are supposed to indicate that while the new initiative is aimed to solve common problems 
for the EU and all neighbours, this new framework also has to be sensitive and take into 
consideration the different needs and various levels of development of the third countries, 
especially as these neighbours in the East seem to have quite different priorities than those 
countries in the South. This idea of “differentiation” received a strong emphasise throughout the 
whole set-up and implementation of the ENP, and to a certain extent the peak of this emphasis 
can be considered the demand of the Polish and Swedish foreign minister in October 2010 to 
separate the financial instrument for the ENP again into two different financial instruments – 
one for the East and one for the South (see Sikorski & Bildt 2010).  
To show the different interests and positions of the respective third countries more clearly, the 
Commission also included various statistics and data in the Annex of the Wider Europe 
Communication (see for example table 3 below) that provide clear evidence for the argument 
that one single approach and one specific policy alone might not be suitable to tackle all these 
different countries. Furthermore, the Commission also highlights the different forms of formal 
agreements that exist between the EU and its new neighbours: While the EU has established 
Partnership and Cooperation agreements with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, those do not allow 
incorporating specific free trade agreements and the like, because such issues are not covered by 
the scope of these agreements. On the other hand, there are already association agreements in 
force between the EU and Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, the Palestine Authority and Jordan 
respectively, while the association agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Algeria still have been 
waited for ratification. Furthermore, Syria is still in the process of negotiating its association 
agreement with the European Union.  
However, the Commission Communication not only asks for differentiating between the 
position and interests of the third countries incorporated in the new initiative. But by 
prominently pointing to the need of clear and objective benchmarks, the Commission also 
clearly demands to differentiate according to performance in implementation. The 
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Communication points towards the application of some form of soft conditionality, ie that the 
implementation and progress of third countries in their cooperation with the EU should be 
monitored and those countries rewarded that are in line with the agreed goals.  
 
Table 3: Economic Indicators of potential ENP countries 
 
Source: European Commission (2003, 104 final): Wider Europe / Neighbourhood: A new framework for 
relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours. Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament (11.03.2003).  Brussels.  
Please note about this table: this table give a quick overview about what countries were supposed to be 
included in the new neighbourhood initiative according to the Commission; Russia was assumed to be an 
important partner within this framework, while the Southern Caucasus countries were left out. In addition, 
this table clearly shows the economic discrepancy between the different third countries under question.  
 
This very pragmatic approach is also visible in the suggestion of the next three steps at the end 
of the communication. The Commission suggests that in a next step these more concrete ideas 
should be discussed with the neighbours within the existing frameworks (Partnership and 
Cooperation Councils, or Association Councils), that action plans for each individual country 
should be developed, and  that an annual review progress should be established that monitors 
the implementation of action plan. While it took more than another year before the ENP was 
formally set-up, these suggestions for a pragmatic implementation of the ENP were taken up at 
a later point in time.  
While this Commission Communication “Wider Europe” is considered as the first concise 
document discussing some of the main ideas behind the future framework with the EU 
neighbours, there is still no single term used for the new ideas, but names for the new initiative 
vary and are used interchangeably. Next to “Wider Europe initiative”, “New Neighbourhood 
Initiative (NNI)” and others, the term “EU neighbourhood policy” is for the first time used in 
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this Commission Communication (COM 104), although it seems rather an undeliberate choice 
of wording than an intentional way of choosing a name for this new framework. As we will see, 
the term European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was only officially introduced with the ENP 
Strategy paper (COM 2004, 373 final) in May 2004. 
4.1.2. From “Wider Europe” (March 2003) to the ENP Strategy Paper (May 2004) 
The Commission Communication on “Wider Europe” was considered as the first blueprint of 
the new policy framework towards the neighbours and was welcomed by member states and EU 
institutions alike, although it was not the final document to set-up the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. The next fourteen months between March 2003 and May 2004 before the ENP Strategy 
Paper was finally adopted witnessed again a mix of ideas and plans that emerged from different 
institutional backgrounds and member states. Table 4 provides an overview of the different 
proposals, sorted in terms of time of their publication and emphasising the most important 
aspects of these policy documents. 
The first reaction to the Commission Communication came from the Nordic member states 
Sweden and Finland (Finnish Delegation 2003; Swedish Delegation 2003) as well as from the 
still candidate but prospective member Lithuania (Lithuanian Delegation 2003). The Swedish 
proposal was the most elaborate, but generally all three countries emphasised the need for a new 
financial instruments for regional and cross-border cooperation. They convincingly argued that 
the current interplay between the special sub-instrument for cross-border projects from 
INTERREG, and the TACIS and PHARE48 are not sufficient and not working, as in practice it 
is too complicated to draw on both budget lines and as it includes too much bureaucratic hassle 
to combine the different procedures and timetables. Hence, they asked for a new multi-annual 
instrument that would allow EU member states as well as partner countries to submit proposals 
and apply for tenders for specific projects and also to work more closely together across 
borders, without differentiating between EU members and non-members of the EU 
neighbourhood. 
                                                     
48
 INTERREG is the Community financial instrument for regional development. 
    TACIS was the financial instrument of the EU for the “Technical assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States” and covered the EU financial assistance to all of its Eastern Neighbours before the set-up of the ENPI.  For 
more info see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-
east/documents/annual_programmes/tacis_success_story_final_en.pdf 
    PHARE is the financial instrument to support applicant countries in their reforms for joining the EU. The original 
abbreviation stands for “Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of the Economies”. For more info see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/financial-assistance/phare/index_en.htm 
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Table 4: From “Wider Europe” to the ENP – March 2003 till May 2004 
Starting point: 
March 2003  
Wider Europe 
Commuication 
COM(2003)104 
• Prepared by COEST and PSC 
• Most detailed blueprint so far (approx 25 pages) 
• All neighbours without current membership perspective (apart 
from Southern Caucasus at this time) 
• Need for comprehensive and coherent security approach 
• Differentiation within one framework and benchmarking to 
monitor progress 
• Next step: discussion with third countries, development of 
action plans, annual evaluation of implementation of action 
plans 
March  2003 Proposal from Swedish 
delegation „The New 
Eastern Neighbours and the 
Community Instruments. A 
two-step Approach 
• With enlargement risks (security, trafficking) and benefits 
(economic and trade related potential) for border regions 
• Key actors: local and regional authorities 
• 2 tracks: short term and medium term 
• Short term: alignment of CBC/TACIS and INTERREG 
• Medium term: new proximity instrument needed to invest in 
local and regional projects and to promote transfrontier 
integration and economic development and EU eastern border 
March 2003 Proposal from Finnish 
delegation  
„A framework for relations 
with the new eastern 
neighbours“ and „A 
neighbourhood / proximity 
instrument“ 
• Emphasis need of cross-boarder and regional cooperation 
• For Finland especially important: Russian-Finnish border 
• Special emphasis on programming and projects – hence ask 
for new financial instrument next to INTERREG (EU 
instrument of structural fund – only for EU members) and 
CBC (Cross border cooperation element of TACIS) 
• Finnish experience: timetables and programming in different 
financial instrument does not go together; too much hazzle 
• New instrument should be multi-annual, decided on regional 
level with decentralised implementation; 
April 2003 Greek Presidency “food for 
thought”paper 
• Reiterates common interests, privileged relations and concept 
of differentiation;  
• Asks for establishment of new neighbourhood Instrument 
• Differentiates between Eastern neighbours (Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus) and Southern neighbours (describes 
link to Barcelona Process, and suggests to use institutional 
framework of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements to 
integrate neighbourhood policy. 
In total rather general and without substance;  
May 2003 
 
Proposal from Lithuanian 
delegation (sent as non-
paper to Solana and Patten 
already in February) 
• Outlines main areas of cooperation for country action plans 
with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
• Cross-border cooperation especially need in Justice and Home 
Affairs, environmental issues, economic cooperation, people 
to people contact, education and health 
June 2003 
 
Draft Council Conclusions 
from Presidency to Coreper 
(10302/03), and from 
COREPER to Council 
(10447/03) 
• “The Council invites the Commission with the contribution, 
where appropriate, of the High Representative “ – present 
action plans proposals, launch dialogue with third countries 
• Emphasis again of “differentiated framework that responds to 
progress made by partner countries”, common challenges, 
complementary instead of substitution of existing frameworks,  
June 2003 
 
(Draft) Council Conclusions 
from COREPER to Council 
(10447/03) – “A item” 
All the above plus  
• Libya is mentioned with footnote referring to fact that it was 
invited to accept Barcelona acquis 
• No explicit mentioning of “facilitation of legal migration” as 
mentioned in presidency draft but just “ enhanced co-operation 
on matters related to legal migration” 
• Commission is asked to prepare Communication for new 
financial instrument 
July 2003 Paving the way for a New 
Neighbourhood Instrument. 
Commission 
Communication COM 2003 
(393) final  
• Geographical coverage: East – 4 countries: Russia &  Western 
NIS (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), Southern Mediterranean (ie. 
no Southern Caucasus) – also mentioning of Western Balkans;  
• Emphasis on cross-border project financing – intersection of 
Interreg, Tacis, Phare – how to synchronise them 
• Two-step approach: stronger coordination in existing 
instruments; establishment of new ENPI that combines cross-
border and regional co-operation 
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September 2003 EU Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (European 
Parliament) Report, 
12628/03 
• Presentation of three experts criticising Commission proposals 
• Geographical diffusion: Wider Europe should also embrace 
Southern Caucasus 
• Also in debate – need to include Caucasus and Black Sea 
region into strategy – supported by EP rapporteur, Ms 
Napoletano 
• More concrete incentives needed in Action Plan; 
differentiation not sufficient; no sensitivity towards diverging 
needs of third countries 
• More multilaterialism, more emphasis on democratic values 
and human rights (especially in framework of Barcelona 
Process) – too much focus on economic issues (especially 
within Euromed) and on security (in more recent Commission 
documents) 
• Need of new contractual relationships that are more flexible 
and provide more assistance in transformation process  
October 2003 External Relations Council, 
Conclusions 13099/1/03 
• Already agreed upon on Working Group level (COEST 
Working Party & MAGHREB Working Party 2002) 
• Reviewing progress of Wider Europe Initiative 
• Asks Commission in cooperation with HR to prepare detailed 
proposals for action plans early in 2004 “in order to take this 
matter forward by June 2004” 
• Asks Commission for feasibility study of new financial 
neighbourhood instrument 
October 2003 Brussels European Council, 
Presidency Conclusions, 
15188/03 
• European Council welcomes work done so far by Commission 
and Council, and asks all parties involved to follow up, 
especially on the idea of a new financial instrument 
• “welcomes progress made on the Commission’s Wider Europe 
– New Neighbourhood Initiative.”;  
• asks Commission and Council for follow-up to “ensuring a 
comprehensive, balanced and proportionate approach, 
including a financial instrument” 
November 2003 European Parliament Report 
on “Wider Europe – 
Neighbourhood”. 
Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Human Rights, 
Common Security and 
Defence Policy 
• Geographical coverage  - include Southern Caucasus (and 
emphasis conflict resolution and prevention); include also 
Turkey without negatively impacting on its accession 
candidate status; should later also be extended to Middle 
Eastern region and Gulf states; on long run to Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Iran; 
•  Initiative should “evaluate existing EU policies and 
agreements in order to represent a step forward irrespective of, 
and not in contradiction with, the present and future aspiration 
of some of the countries concerned to join the EU in the long 
term or to establish special contractual relations,” 
• Notes that the Communication expressly mentions “.increased 
financial assistance”; 
• More financial means are needed and not just re-shuffle from 
other areas;  
November 2003 General Affairs Council, 
14486/03 
• Presentation of Commission legislative and work programme 
for 2004 – two priorities, one of which “stability – developing 
the EU’s new neighbourhood policy” 
January 2004 Irish Presidency priorities in 
regard of EU common 
strategy on Mediterranean 
region (5313/04), noted by 
General Affairs Council, 
5518/04 
• Irish priorities in regard of EU common strategy on the 
Mediterranean region (Presidency of the Council 2004b) 
includes among others support for Commission in ensuring 
rapid progress on draft Action Plans under New 
Neighbourhood policy 
• Ireland also promises in this document to work closely with 
upcoming presidencies of the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
January 2004 External Relations council, 
5519/04 
• Comments on Rose revolution in Georgia and statement that 
would like to consider inclusion of Southern Caucasus 
countries until June 2004.  
February 2004 External Relations Council, 
6294/04 
• Heard progress report by Commission and asks for drafts of 
action plans until June 
• Emphasise on coherence with existing foreign policy, and 
tasks COREPER to look into more details for future 
suggestions;  
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February 2004 European Parliament 
resolution "EU policy 
towards South Caucasus"  
• Recommendation to the Council to establish a set of initial 
minimum requirements for the South Caucasus countries to 
fulfil, in order to be included in the ‘Wider Europe - New 
Neighbourhood’ policies; 
• to give the South Caucasus region a defined status in the 
‘Wider Europe - New Neighbourhood 
March 2004 External Relations Council, 
7383/04 
• Council considers Presidency Interim Report on an EU 
strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East – outlines state of relationship, challenges,  
• Interim report: “Neighbourhood Policy – Deepening the EMP” 
May 2004 European Neighbourhood 
Policy Strategy Paper, 
Commission 
Communication COM 
(2004) 373 final 
• “Wider Europe” finally renamed to “European Neighbourhood 
Policy” – ENP 
• Provides fundamental background, discusses main objective 
and scope of ENP, fundamental principles (joint ownership, 
differentiation but common values, consistency); discusses 
instruments and main priority policy areas 
• Geographical coverage: all non-EU participations of Euro-
Mediterranean partnership with exception of Turkey; Libya 
with currently no contractual relations with EU but awaiting 
ratification of Barcelona acquis; Eastern dimension no Russia 
(strategic partnership), Belarus only light-version focusing on 
people to people and citizens’ support;  
June 2004 General Affairs Council 
Conclusions, 10189/04 
• Approved without debate as “A” item by Working parties, 
approved by COREPER (Council of the European Union 
2004, 10380/04) 
• Approved Presidency Final Report on the “EU strategic 
partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East“ 
(Presidency of the Council 2004a), where it also says “The 
Barcelona process (and its enhancement through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy)” 
• Endorses main orientation of ENP strategy paper as presented 
by Commission, and welcomes decision to include Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia; 
• Russia as key partner for EU with whom to deepen specific 
strategic partnership as agreed at St. Petersburg Summit in 
May 2003.  
• Confirms EU approach of joint ownership, common values, 
action plans and monitoring of implementation 
• Underlines added value through ENP to existing cooperation; 
hence coherence and continuity needed;  
• Repeatedly invites “Commission, with the contribution of the 
SG/HR on issues related to political cooperation and the 
CFSP” 
 
After these interventions of single member states, the then Greek presidency of the Council of 
ministers put forwards its work programme for its time at the helm of the Council of the 
European Union during the first half of 2003. They presented their proposal as “food for 
thought” (Presidency of the Council / Greece 2003), and while it reiterates and supports the idea 
of the Swedish and Finnish delegation, the document stays rather general and does not present 
any new ideas in terms of substance. It still clearly differentiates between the Eastern and 
Southern neighbours, and it suggests that for the Southern neighbours the already established 
institutions and bodies of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should be used. When compared 
to the French and Spanish leadership during their presidencies in 1995 during the set-up of the 
EMP, it clearly shows that the Greek presidency was not able to show any leadership or shape 
the debates with its own ideas, but that it was mainly single member states next to the 
Commission and the European Parliament that gave their input about the specific set-up of the 
ENP.  
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Despite the lack of clear leadership by the Greek presidency, the Wider Europe initiative was 
again discussed in the relevant Council bodies in June 2003. The COEST and COMAG working 
groups had agreed on reiterating some of the principles in this Council document: the Wider 
Europe initiative shall establish a “differentiated framework that responds to progress made by 
partner countries” and it shall rather complement than substitute current institutional 
relationships. The overall goal should be economic development ot reduce poverty and conflict 
prevention (Presidency of the Council 2003; Committee of Permanent Representatives 2003). 
Furthermore, the working parties had agreed to invite the Commission to present draft action 
plans and to launch a dialogue with the respective third countries. Where appropriate, it should 
be supported by the High Representative, what means that political and security related issues 
should not be discussed under the guidance of the Commission but og the High Representative 
for CFSP.  
At the same time there were three issues left for COREPER to negotiate that had not been 
solved at the lower Council level: Libya, an explicit mentioning of legal migration and a 
potential new financial instrument. In regard of the latter some member states like France feared 
that the development of a new financial instrument would mean a weakening of already 
established financial and institutional instruments like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
However, COREPER in the end agreed that this reluctance of some member states should be 
taken into account in future discussions, but they would nevertheless ask the Commission to 
prepare a Communication on a potential future financial instrument for the neighbourhood. In 
addition, COREPER had in the end included Libya in the list of third countries, although it 
mentioned in a footnote that is was not yet part of the Barcelona process but that given the 
better relationship between the political leadership in Libya and some EU governments it was 
expected to ratify the Barcelona acquis in the upcoming months. While some member states did 
not see a problem with mentioning the “facilitation of legal migration” as one policy area that 
closer cooperation would be useful with partner countries, member states in the end agreed to a 
more general formulation of “enhanced co-operation on matters related to legal migration” 
(Committee of Permanent Representatives 2003). COREPER was, hence, able to solve all of 
these remaining issues, and the Council Conclusions were adopted as an A-item at the June 
Council meeting, without any discussion of the ministers. 
The Commission reacted to the plea of the ministers to put forwards its ideas for a new financial 
instrument and published its Communication “Paving the way for a New Neighbourhood 
Instrument” in July 2003 (European Commission 2003a). In terms of geographical coverage, the 
Commission document refers to four countries in the East (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova) as well as the Southern neighbours. There is no mentioning of the Southern Caucasus, 
but the Commission refers to the special status of the Western Balkan countries. It emphasis the 
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need for efficient cross-border project financing that is dependent on a strong synchronisation of 
the currently intersecting instruments of INTERREG, TACIS and PHARE.  
The first EU institution to react to the Commission’s proposal was a new player that got 
involved: the European Parliament. In September 2003, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
organised a workshop with three experts to comment on the Commission’s communications on 
Wider Europe and on the new financial instrument (EU Committee on Foreign Affairs 2003). In 
geographical terms there was a strong plea to also include the Southern Caucasus and the Black 
Sea region. Furthermore, the experts supported by the MEPs criticised the lack of concrete 
incentives in the action plans that could be offered to the partner countries, as well as the lack of 
stronger contractual relationships that would also allow more financial support in times of 
transition. Another point of critique was the insufficient degree of flexibility in regard of setting 
goals in that far as the European Union did not consider enough the needs of third countries. 
Last but not least, the MEPs demanded a stronger emphasis of democratic values and human 
rights, as in their view the current institutional frameworks like the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership were too much dominated by economic aspects. In this meeting it was the first time 
that the European Parliament asked for an inclusion of the Southern Caucasus, and it was 
especially the EP rapporteur, Ms Napoletano who also in the upcoming months pushed for this 
idea (what was also confirmed in Interview No. 20, EP). 
In comparison to the EP, the reaction of the member states in the Council and in the European 
Council in regard of the Commission proposal was rather short and general. In their External 
Relations Council in October 2003 (External Relations Council 2003), they suggested a review 
process of the Wider Europe initiative, and instructed the Commission to prepare a more 
detailed proposal for action plans in early 2004, so that the member states can take these ideas 
forward in June 2004. Additionally, the Commission should conduct a feasibility study of the 
proposed financial neighbourhood instrument. The Brussels European Council at the end of 
October 2003 (European Council 2003a) also just briefly welcomed the initiative and progress 
done by the Commission and Council, and asked them to follow up on these ideas and 
especially on the proposal of a new financial instrument. The Heads of States and Government 
in their European Council conclusions also emphasise once more the need to ensure “a 
comprehensive, balanced and proportionate approach”, and it is interesting that they refer to the 
neighbourhood initiative solely as “Commission’s Wider Europe” proposal, while member 
states in the Council always emphasise that it is a common proposal that stretches over external 
relations and traditional foreign policy-making within the second intergovernmental CFSP 
pillar.  
It was again the European Parliament that came up with a very detailed and encompassing 
evaluation of the Commission’s proposal. However, this time it was not just an expert report, 
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but the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy 
under rapporteur Pasqualina Napoletano submitted a draft for an EP resolution to the plenary on 
5 November 2003. This draft was adopted by the European Parliament on 23 November 2003 as 
resolution 2003/2018(INI). In this draft (European Parliament 2003) , the EP committee gives a 
detailed account of its proposals for the EU relations with its neighbours after enlargement. One 
important element that was reiterated several times is the need to also include the Southern 
Caucasus countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the new neighbourhood initiative. The 
argument of the EP is that those three countries are also members of the Council of Europe and 
of the OSCE, and that especially in this region the EU’s support is needed for conflict resolution 
and conflict prevention, whereas in return stable countries in this region will enhance the 
security for the EU as well. However, the draft resolution also shows that the EP follows a quite 
different definition of “neighbourhood” than the Commission or the member states do. First of 
all, the EP suggests to also include Turkey as a third country in the neighbourhood initiative, 
while at the same time emphasising that this should not harm Turkey’s accession prospective. 
Secondly, the EP draft also wants to extend the neighbourhood initiative gradually over time:  
“Whereas it is necessary to see to that the Mediterranean dimension is at a later point extended to 
the wider Middle Eastern region and account is taken of the Gulf states and, in the medium to 
long term, of other countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran” (European Parliament 2003: 7) 
Next to the geographical coverage, the EP also emphasises the issue of added-value and 
financial means. It repeats several times that this new initiative should serve as a review of 
existing policies and upgrade the existing relationship “in order to represent a step forward” 
(European Parliament 2003: 7). Furthermore, it highlights that for this initiative to be successful 
increased financial support will be needed to help partner countries in their transformation and 
reforms, but also to set strong enough incentives. The EP warns that it will not be sufficient to 
just re-shuffle existing financial means, and it indicates that it will not agree to discard money 
from other regions to be able to finance the new neighbourhood initiative.  
At first neither member states nor the Commission did refer at all to the proposals made by the 
Members of the European Parliament. In their General Affairs Council in November 2003 the 
only mentioning of the neighbourhood initiative is in relation to the Commission’s legislative 
and work programme for 2004, where “stability – developing the EU’s new neighbourhood 
policy” is categorised as one of two priorities for 2004. However, it is interesting to note that the 
Commission always refers to the new neighbourhood initiative in security terms, as it does in its 
2004 work programme where it links the initiative to stability creation.  
The neighbourhood initiative was also a topic in the Presidency programme of the Irish 
presidency in the first half of 2004, when the Irish presidency presented its priorities in regard 
of the EU common strategy on the Mediterranean Region (Presidency of the Council 2004b; 
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also noted by the General Affairs Council 2004a). Among other issues, this document strongly 
emphasises the support for the Commission in drafting the action plans as soon as possible, and 
Ireland promises a strong and smooth cooperation with the succeeding Council presidencies of 
The Netherlands and Luxembourg.   
However, finally in January 2004 the suggestion of the European Parliament to also consider 
including Southern Caucasus countries was for the first time mentioned by the External 
Relations Council. Just two months after the Rose Revolution, the External Relations Council 
commented on the situation in Georgia and asked the Commission and the High Representative 
to reflect on an inclusion of those countries in the new neighbourhood initiative: 
“The Council invites the Commission, in contribution with the High Representative, and taking 
into account of the EUSR’s proposals, to bring forward a recommendation on the relationship of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Council looks 
forward to considering this recommendation before the end of the Irish presidency” (External 
Relations Council 2004a) 
One month later, the External Relations Council heard a progress report by Commissioner 
Verheugen and reminded the Commission to draft action plans until June. Furthermore, the 
ministers put a special emphasis on the need to ensure coherence and coordination with existing 
policies and “other foreign policy developments” (External Relations Council 2004b), and 
hence they asked COREPER to investigate some issues related to the neighbourhood initiative 
in more detail, so that the Council would be in the position to provide its input in more detail 
and ensure coherence with existing CFSP policies is guaranteed.  
Just a few days after this External Relations Council in February, the European Parliament 
issued a resolution entitled “EU policy towards South Caucasus” (European Parliament 2004a), 
in which it once more reiterated the needed support for the Southern Caucasus region and its 
clear position that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia should be given the opportunity to 
participate in the neighbourhood initiative. However, the focus of the Council during this time 
was more on the Mediterranean Policy, as after four years the Common Strategy on the 
Mediterranean that had been adopted in 2000 had to either be prolonged or revised. This was 
also the reason, why the Irish presidency put a special emphasis on the EU relations with the 
Mediterranean and brought it up on the agenda during their presidency. After the Irish 
presidency had presented its priority programme in January 2004, the External Relations 
Council in March 2004 (External Relations Council 2004c) considered the Presidency Interim 
Report on an EU strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East49, in which 
the current state of institutionalised relationship and challenges have been outlined. One 
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 The final report on an EU strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East was presented by the 
Irish presidency only in June 2004, when it was also approved by the European Council (Schumacher 2004: 58-
197). 
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subsection of this report also considered “Neighbourhood policy – Deepening the EMP” what 
again shows the complementary contribution that the new neighbourhood initiative was 
supposed to add to existing policy frameworks with third countries.  
It was finally in May 2004 that the Commission published its Communication COM 2004 (373 
final) entitled “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper” that set out the final blueprint 
for the new neighbourhood initiative and is considered as the founding document of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The fundamental principles and content of this 
document will be discussed in detail in the remaining parts of this chapter, but it was this 
document where the final term of “European Neighbourhood Policy” was finally introduced. 
The document lines out the fundamental background of the ENP, discusses the main objectives 
and the scope of this new framework, the fundamental principles and the instruments that 
should be used to achieve the set goals. In terms of geographical coverage the ENP strategy by 
the Commission now encompasses in the South all non-EU participants of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (with the exception of Turkey, while Libya is considered as formal 
ENP partner country, although it does not have any contractual relations with the EU at that 
moment), and in the East the neighbouring countries Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova as well as 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, for Belarus it was noted that there should only be a 
light-version focusing on people-to-people contacts and support for citizens’ initiatives, while it 
also had become apparent that Russia did not want to participate in a Neighbourhood Policy, as 
it considered itself rather as a “strategic partner” than any other neighbour at the borders of the 
European Union.  
In June 2004 the General Affairs Council approves the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Strategy Paper as presented by the Commission (General Affairs Council 2004b). All issues up 
for discussion have even been able to be solved at Working Group level, so that the Council 
conclusions on the ENP could be put forward to the Council as A-item (Council of the 
European Union 2004), what shows that there was a strong agreement between member states to 
endorse the Commission’s proposed strategy. The Council welcomes the general orientation of 
the ENP strategy paper, and confirms the main mechanisms of joint ownership, common values, 
action plans and monitoring of implementation. It also welcomes the decision to incorporate 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the ENP framework, and it emphasis the special 
relationship with Russia with whom instead of participating in the ENP a specific strategic 
partnership had been agreed at a summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003. Furthermore, in its 
conclusion the GAC also approves the presidency final report on the “EU strategic partnership 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” where it also says that the Barcelona process is 
“enhanced” through the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
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Additionally, there are two aspects that are especially interesting to be mentioned, as they go 
further than just reiterating ideas and concepts that have already been discussed in detail 
beforehand. First, the Council underlines the “added value” of the ENP which is “going beyond 
existing cooperation, both to partner countries and to the EU”. To achieve this added value the 
GAC also emphasis the need to “maintain coherence and unity of this policy, in its content, 
instruments and final goals”. Secondly, the GAC conclusions clarify for the first time formally 
and in a written document how exactly the share of labour between Commission and High 
Representative should look like, by referring to the “Commission, with the contribution of the 
SG/HR on issues related to political cooperation and the CFSP” (General Affairs Council 
2004b). While it was quite clear for the actors involved that the Commission should focus 
mainly on the aspects of external relations and the High Representative on political issues, this 
division of tasks was never beforehand explicitly mentioned. It was for the first time in this 
Council conclusions that it was clearly stated that political issues are to be dealt with by the 
High Representative.  
 
This detailed overview of the different policy documents that commented on the Wider Europe 
draft and the new neighbourhood initiative clearly show that the set-up of the ENP was not an 
hierarchical endeavour following a clear strategic idea at the very beginning, but that ideas 
emerged slowly, were shaped by different actors, and most of them found its way into the ENP 
strategy paper. This outline over time also shows that the Commission played a crucial role in 
putting forward its ideas and drafts in the Wider Europe Communication, and drawing up the 
follow-up Communications on the ENPI and the European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper. Next 
to the Commission, it was mainly the Council and the member states that contributed their 
ideas, especially in the relevant Council Working Groups or also more formally as Council 
Conclusions. Member states observed in detail what implications the ENP proposals would have 
for their position in this system of EU foreign policy-making. When the Wider Europe initiative 
was discussed in the first half of 2003, the rotating presidency (Greece) did not show any strong 
interest in providing leadership and input in this dossier, but it left it more up to the member 
states.  
The European Council played a more supervisory role, and only referred twice to the Wider 
Europe initiative. In December 2002 in the Copenhagen European Council the Heads of States 
and Governments had asked the Commission and the HR to prepare their ideas for the Wider 
Europe initiative, and in its Brussels European Council in October 2003, they welcomed the 
work done by the Commission, the Council and the HR and asked them to follow-up on the 
undertaken steps.  
 106 
The European Parliament only became involved at the end of 2003, but it was its contribution 
mainly that the Southern Caucasus countries were finally also incorporated into the ENP 
framework (next to the external trigger of the Rose Revolution in Georgia, of course). And the 
Council showed clearly with its call for more coherence and tasking of COREPR to check to 
what extent the new policy ideas are in line with existing policies in February 2004 that it does 
not consider the ENP a mere Community project, but that it will keep it under close observation. 
A similar pull and push could also be observed in the way the actors re-arranged their tasks in 
the ENP framework, but before this is going to be elaborated on in more detail, it is important to 
get a first grasp of what the ENP is. Hence, the remaining parts of this chapter will present the 
main principles and objectives, the instruments and polity, as it was laid out in the ENP strategy 
paper in May 2004.  
4.2. The Objectives and main Principles of the ENP 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2003/04, with the main objective 
“to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within 
and beyond the new borders of the Union” (European Commission 2003c: 4). It was recognised 
especially in the early months of negotiating the EU wider Europe initiative that there was a  
need for intensified links with the EU’s “ring of friends” (European Commission 2003c: 4) to 
guarantee security and stability for the Union’s citizens. Making sure that the danger of 
“Fortress Europe” does not become a reality towards the EU neighbours was one of the main 
objectives, as this could only be avoided if the EU would “offer them [its neighbours] the 
chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and 
cultural co-operation” (European Commission 2004b: 3).  
The ring of friends encompassed in 2004 finally 16 partner countries (see Figure 9). The three 
neighbours in the East (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), the three South Caucasus countries 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), and ten countries in the South (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria); The relationship with 
Libya and Belarus was, however, still strained at this moment compared to the other partner 
countries, because of their authoritarian regimes. EU member states, nevertheless, had decided 
to include those countries in the ENP to be able to support civic projects and to enable people-
to-people contacts.  
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Figure 9: The ENP partner countries50 
 
The main objective of the ENP is, hence, to create stability for the European Union by creating 
stability in its near abroad. This also follows closely the underlying logic of the European 
Security Strategy of 2003 (European Council 2003b) where it is outlined that security should be 
achieved by exporting EU prosperity, norms and the European model instead of importing 
problems and threats from the neighbours to the EU. Solana as well as other EU officials 
repeatedly emphasize that “we either export stability or import instability“ (see also Ferrero-
Waldner 2006: 2; for a scientific discussion see Christiansen, Petito & Tonra 2000: 390-391).  
Closely linked to this main objective are three other issues that are perceived as crucial to 
achieve the main objective that are briefly discussed in more detail below: The sharing of 
benefits of enlargement and added value through ENP; enhanced interdependence that leads to 
peace in the long run; as well as the idea of a comprehensive cross-pillar framework; 
First, the ENP strategy paper emphasises that the ENP should reinforce existing relationships 
and bring added value for the European Union but also its partner countries. By sharing the 
benefits of enlargement the “stability, security and well-being for all concerned”(European 
Commission 2004b: 3) should be enhanced. At the same time, the question was raised 
especially by partner countries, if this added value implies an alternative to potential accession 
or if it should rather be considered a first step to becoming an accession candidate. At the 
beginning the European Union was not very explicit on this link between the new 
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 This map was taken from European Commission, Publicaiton Office, ENP Small Leaflet, Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/information/enp-leaflet_en.pdf 
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neighbourhood initiative and potential enlargment, and the ENP strategy paper also very 
vaguely only formulates:  
“Since this policy was launched, the EU has emphasised that it offers a means to reinforce 
relations between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct from the possibilities available 
to European countries under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.”(European 
Commission 2004b: 3) 
European Union also communicated that participating in the ENP does not automatically imply 
a potential for future EU membership, while at the same time it did also not totally discard the 
idea towards the Eastern neighbours. It was especially observable with Georgia in 2004/05 and 
still is with Ukraine that for them the ENP is considered as a first step to becoming an accession 
candidate, while the EU was more reluctant in its follow-up messages to go in this direction. In 
the long run these different perceptions created a lot of frustration and disappointment with the 
neighbouring countries, because they did not understand the reluctance on the EU side. 
However, the Commission since then repeatedly emphasises that the ENP countries do not 
primarily have the potential for membership, but the EU offers them a privileged relationship 
through this initiative, which builds on mutual commitment to common values.  
Second, enhanced interdependence by enforcing political, economic and cultural links and 
networks between the EU and its neighbours is considered as the most important mechanism to 
achieve security and stability.  
“The Communication argues that enhanced interdependence – both political and economic – can 
itself be a means of stability, security and sustainable development both within and without51 the 
EU”. (European Commission 2003c: 4) 
The idea behind this concept is straight forward: By creating a privileged relationship with the 
neighbours there will be more interaction in economic, political and cultural issues. This 
cooperation in the long run will create a certain degree of interdependence between the EU and 
its neighbours, what furthermore will lead to more prosperity and hence peace. The argument, 
hence, is that interdependence in itself can guarantee security and stability.  
While this is a very idealistic approach it seems also naïve and just emphasising the positive 
side of more interdependence. It clearly follows the same logic as is inherit in the EU 
integration process in economic issues: that more trade and more free exchange of goods, 
services, capital and people will lead to more prosperity and understanding. But at the same 
time, it seems necessary to consider that there might also be losers in this stronger interaction, 
and that more interdependence can also imply more vulnerability to the problems of the partner.  
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 “without” in this context seems a wrong translation or mistake, as the correct linguistic version should read 
“beyond the EU”. 
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Third, the ENP strategy paper repeatedly emphasises the need for a comprehensive and coherent 
approach that would make the EU an efficient actor in the world, or as it is formulated in the 
ENP strategy paper: 
 “A comprehensive neighbourhood policy, integrating related components from all three ‘pillars 
of the Union’s present structure, will enable neighbouring countries to share the benefits of EU 
enlargement in terms of stability, security and well-being. […] In the implementation of the ENP 
it is the utmost importance that the institutions and member states act in a consistent and coherent 
way” (European Commission 2004b: 6) 
Coherence and consistency as a goal that the EU is internally striving for already for decades is 
repeatedly emphasised as a strong argument to ask for treating trade, development and political 
debates with equal attention and by mutually reinforcing each other. Perceiving the ENP as a 
single framework that brings together all policies of the European Union from the different 
pillars is especially a concept that the Commission was often refering to.  
In its Wider Europe-Communication of 2003 the European Commission emphasised that the 
new policy framework towards the EU neighbouring countries should encompass the “whole 
range of Union’s policy” (European Commission 2003c: 3). However, during the set-up phase 
the term “single framework” was not at all used, and there showed a slight confusion if the ENP 
is now going to be a new set of policies that abolishes and reforms the old EU policy areas, or if 
the ENP is just going to be a general framework that subsumes the existing EU policies. This, 
for example showed very strongly in the position of the European Parliament that asked for a 
review of the existing policies and an upgrade of the existing relationship (European Parliament 
2003: 7). 
However, the Commission did not take up this perspective of the European Parliament in its 
Communications about the neighbourhood initiative, but its position on ENP and coherence 
showed strongest in its 2006 Communciation that was entitled “Strengthening the ENP”:  
 “The European Neighbourhood Policy, is a priority of the EU’s external relations which seeks to 
harness the attraction and influence of Europe, with strong emphasis on institution building and 
reform. Its success depends on the active involvement of a wide range of external and internal 
policies and offers a stake in the EU’s internal market to the countries concerned.”(European 
Commission 2006b: 3) 
In the first official documents there was no notion of the “single framework” but an emphasis 
for the need of coherence and an integrated approach. At the same time the perception of the 
Commission and the Council of the ENP seemed consistent and showed in various documents, 
even although they did not use the term “single framework” yet:  
“to  formulate an ambitious,  long-term  and  integrated  approach  to  each  of  these  
[neighbouring]  countries. […]For the EU’s part, the whole range of the Union’s policies 
(foreign, security, trade, development, environment and others) will need to rise to meet this 
challenge. […] The EU should act to reinforce and unite its existing neighbourhood policy 
towards these regions [..]” (Wider Europe Communication, European Commission 2003c: 3 and 
9)  
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 “Principles and scope - A Neighbourhood Policy for a European Union acting coherently and 
efficiently in the world  - A comprehensive neighbourhood policy, integrating related 
components from all three ‘pillars’ of the Union’s present structure.” (ENP Strategy Paper, 
European Commission 2004b: 6): 
The term “single framework” was not part of the ENP jargon right from the beginning, but was 
only officially introduced after more than two years. In its December 2006 Communication 
“Strengthening the ENP” the Commission praised for the first time the “single framework” in 
addition to joint ownership, concreteness and the better use of funds as the strength of the ENP: 
 “It provides a single, clear framework covering the neighbourhood as a whole in which to 
discuss and handle the whole range of issues between the EU and each partner.” (European 
Commission 2006f: 3, emphasis added by author) 
Coherence and the “single framework” are meant to work in two ways: First, it should provide a 
framework where all neighbouring countries are covered, i.e. that all relations with third 
countries of the Eastern as well as the Southern shore are covered within this framework to 
achieve a certain level of coherence between different third countries. At the same time this 
coherent approach should, nevertheless, also allow for a differentiation in regard of the need, 
specific situation and respective national interests of the partners. Secondly, the single 
framework is meant to work EU-internally as a coordination tool for the diverse set of policy 
areas, ranging from EC issues (trade, development assistance) to political topics (including 
security issues) and cultural cooperation. But as this thesis set out from the beginning the 
question remains, to what extent the ENP as coordination tool did not only bring together the 
different policies within one framework, but if it also changed how the (informal) policy process 
within the different issue areas is conducted by EU actors. From screening ENP documents it is 
very clear that it was mainly the Commission that constantly referred to the need of having a 
single framework that encompasses all areas of EU foreign policy-making, and we will see later 
that it was also quite clear to the member states that this could be read as an attempt by the 
Commission to get more leverage also in political areas of foreign policy-making. 
Next to these three aims that are supposed to directly support the main objective of creating 
security and stability, the ENP strategy paper also clearly sets out three principles that the ENP 
should be based upon and which had already been discussed in the evolution of this policy: The 
ENP should provide a single framework which is based on shared values and common 
principles that secure the rule of law, good governance, human rights and minority rights. 
Furthermore, the EU and its partner countries commit themselves to a market economy 
approach and sustainable development. Furthermore, the ENP shall at the same time allow for 
differentiation according to the needs and the capacity for reform of the partner country. And 
last, the ENP should work under joint ownership, in that far as Action plans are negotiated 
between the EU and the partner country and that they should reflect the priorities that the 
partner country wants to focus on in their reforms.  
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These principles already show that it is a complex network of interaction between partner 
country governments, EU member states and EU institutions that is supposed to make the ENP 
work. These networks of interaction are also active in using the instruments that have been set-
up for the ENP and which will be elaborated upon in detail in the next part 
4.3. The Instruments of the ENP 
There are two main instruments that shall provide guidance to the ENP: existing frameworks 
between the EU and partner countries, as well as action plans. It was made very clear in the 
negotiations towards setting-up the ENP that this new policy framework should not substitute 
existing institutional relationships but make use of these structures and complement them, hence 
the ENP was supposed to build on the existing legal agreements that the EC/EU had build up 
over time with third countries, such as Cooperation Agreements, Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements, or Association Agreements (Interview No. 19, COM).  
These different kinds of EC/EUagreements with third countries had developed over time and 
imply a different intensity and coverage of content, while those agreements became more 
comprehensive and encompassing over time52. Trade agreements were the very first contractual 
documents used that had a strong economic focus and were limited in scope to certain products. 
Cooperation agreements were, hence, introduced to deal with a wider range of economic and 
commercial cooperation, mostly incorporating some elements of trade liberalisation. 
Cooperation agreements can be adopted by the Council with QMV, however they also asked for 
consent by the European Parliament. They establish an institutional framework for the 
relationship between the EC/EU and its partner country, by setting up a “Cooperation Council” 
which is meeting once a year at ministerial level and which is also assisted by a Parliamentary 
Cooperation Committee. Cooperation agreements are more comprehensive than the older trade 
agreements, but they at the same time do not cover such issues like allowing the establishment 
of a specific free trade agreement. Partnership and Cooperation agreements are a special 
category of this latter type of agreement which had been concluded at the end of the 1990s with 
Russia and the Newly Independent States. The ENP partner countries Ukraine, Moldova and the 
three Southern Caucasus countries rely currently on PCAs as their legal framework with the EU. 
Belarus had negotiated a PCA with the EC in 1995, but it is on hold since then and not been 
revoked because of the political situation in the country. The insufficiency of the PCAs for the 
ENP relationship also shows in that far as the EU started negotiations to establish Association 
Agreements with all Eastern neighbours apart from Belarus. Already in September 2008 the 
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 For overview (status 2009) of all kind of agreements between EU and third countries see 
http://eeas.europa.eu/association/docs/agreements_en.pdf 
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negotiation process for an Association Agreement with Ukraine started and several successful 
rounds of negotiations have taken place since then. In November 2009, an EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda has been adopted that replaces the former Action Plan and which is 
supposed to facility the entry into force of the new agreement between the EU and Ukraine. 
Since Ukraine has joined the WTO in 2008, an important aspect of the new Association 
Agreement is the set-up of a “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area”53. The latter would 
not be possible within the framework of a PCA.  
Similar negotiations are under way with Moldova since January 2010 (Foreign Affairs Council 
2010), and during a visit of the current High Representative/Vice President of the Commission 
Catherine Ashton to the Southern Caucasus countries in July 2010 the start of negotiations for 
Association Agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been announced (Europa 
Website 2010) 
For the Southern neighbours the switch from Cooperation Agreements to Association 
Agreements had already taken place earlier. Next to the Lomé countries in 1975, cooperation 
agreements had also been established with Tunisia, (1969), Israel (1975), Algeria (1976), 
Morocco (1976), Egypt (1977) and Syria (1977). However, the only one still in force is the one 
with Syria. The others had been replaced by Association Agreements under the framework of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which hence have been entitled “Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreements establishing an Association” and which have been signed with following partners: 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (1997 Interim), Tunisia (1998), Algeria (2005), Israel (2000), 
Morocco (2000), Algeria (2002), Jordan (2002), Egypt (2004), Lebanon (2006) (for overview 
see also table 4 on p. 113).  
Association Agreements are the most recent type of international agreements that the EU can 
establish with third countries, and they have to be decided in the Council by unanimity and also 
require the consent of the EP. Association Agreements allow for a closer relationship than all 
other agreements beforehand, and establish cooperation in a wide range of sectors (for more 
details see Smith, K. 2003: 52-57). This shift to more comprehensive agreements between the 
EU and its immediate neighbours has also been observed by academic scholars: 
“The EU has thus created a hierarchy of partners: its closest partners are linked by  association 
agreements; other countries (..) only by cooperation agreements. The ‘pyramid of privileges’ has 
shifted over time: in the 1980s the ACP partners were unquestionably at the top; now the EU’s 
immediate neighbours are certainly crowding the top spot. “ (Smith, K. 2003: 56). 
                                                     
53
 For updated and more detailed information see the Ukraine Country Website of the European External Action 
Service at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index_en.htm.  
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Table 5: The legal base of EU relations with its ENP partner countries 
(sorted by date of final adoption of Action Plan) 
 
Kind of 
Agreement 
Signed -- In force 
since 
Action plan 
finally adopted Comments 
Moldova PCA 1994 - 1998, July 2005 – February 
• Also part of Black Sea Synergy 
• Since January 2010: negotiations for 
Association Agreement 
Ukraine PCA 1994 - 1998, March 2005 – February 
• Since September 2008: negotiations for 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 
• 2009 Action plan replaced by EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda 
• Also part of Black Sea Synergy 
Israel AA 2000 - June 2005 – April  
Occupied 
Palestinian 
Territories  
Interim AA 1997 July 2005 – May  
Jordan AA 1997 – 2000, May 2005 – June  
Morocco AA 1996 – 2000, March 2005 – July 
• Since 13 October 2008: statut avancé 
(advanced status) adopted at 7th 
Association Council: more financial 
assistance and more effort to strengthen 
political, economic and cultural ties; 54 
Tunisia AA 1995 -- 1998, March 2005 – July  
Armenia PCA 1996 - 1999 2006 – Nov.14 
 
• 2010 launch of negotiations for 
Association Agreement 
• Also part of Black Sea Synergy 
Azerbaijan PCA 1996 - 1999 2006 – Nov.14 
• 2010 launch of negotiations for 
Association Agreement 
• Also part of Black Sea Synergy 
Georgia PCA 199 6 - 1999 2006 – Nov. 14  
• 2010 launch of negotiations for 
Association Agreement 
• Also part of Black Sea Synergy 
Lebanon AA 2002 – 2006, April 2007 - January  
Egypt AA 2001 – 2004, June 2007 - March  
Algeria55 AA 2002 – 2005, Sept. NONE  
Belarus PCA signed in march 1995 but not yet in force NONE Human Rights Dialogue since 2009 
Libya CA  NONE 
• Observer in EMP 
• 2004: lifting of EU sanctions 
• 2008 – November: negotiations on 
framework agreement started 
• NIP 2011-13 preparation for more ENPI 
financial assistance from 2011 onwards 
Syria CA 1997 NONE 
• draft EU-Syria Association Agreement on 
hold because of political conditions; now 
adopted by EU in October 2009, awaiting 
signature of Syrian government, then 
ratification of EP and MS still needed; 
• does not yet benefit from all its 
instruments and incentives, pending entry 
into force of the Association Agreement 
 
AA – Association Agreement, CA – Cooperation Agreement, PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement;  
Source: A similar overview was presented by Boniface/Duke (2008); however, this table is extended for additional information  and 
updated by using the country websites of the External Action Service (http://www.eeas.europa.eu/countries/index_en.htm) and the 
Websites of the EU Delegations in the respective countries;  
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 For more information on the “advanced status” and its implication visit following website: http://www.statut-
avance.com/index.php that is run by Moroccan scholars observing the EU-Morocco relationship.  
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 Algeria is a rather reluctant partner so far, who only agreed to the Association agreement in September 2005 after 
lengthy internal debates. Additionally, the Algerian government was reluctant to also negotiate an action plan, but 
they first wanted to see how the implementation of the association agreement works out (Interview No. 15, CS). 
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Already in June 2003 the Council had invited the Commission to draft the country action plans 
that were regarded as the main instrument for implementing the ENP Strategy paper. During the 
drafting stage of the action plans the Commission also already met the first group of partner 
countries to discuss its ideas in the course of 2004, while at those meeting also the rotating 
presidencies of the Council of Ministers, the Council Secretariat and representatives of the team 
of the High Representative Solana participated (European Commission 2004c: 3). The first 
drafts had been sent to the Council in July 2004, where after several rounds of debates and 
negotiations followed (Interview No. 19, COM). As soon as the EU member states approved the 
draft action plans, the Commissions put forward a proposal for a Council Decision for a 
European Community/Union position to be taken in the respective Association (or Partnership 
and Cooperation) Council. There the EU, its member states as well as the partner country agree 
on the action plan. These institutional framework and its sub-bodies is also used to follow up on 
more detailed aspects of the action plan after formal adoption and they monitor the 
implementation of the goals set (European Commission 2004c: 3-4). 
The European Union adopted the first seven action plans in 2005 with Jordan, Moldova, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Ukraine, Israel and the Palestinian Authority respectively. In 2006, three 
more action plans with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia followed, and in 2007 two more 
action plans have been adopted with Egypt and Lebanon. Hence, out of the 16 ENP partner 
country only four countries still do not have any action plans that guide their cooperation with 
the EU: Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria.56 Action plans are supposed to set out the priorities 
for at least three years, and should be revised after five years. This shows for example in the 
case of Ukraine, where the first action plan was replaced by an EU-Ukraine Association Agenda 
that sets out the priorities to get the new Association Agreement into force as soon as possible.  
4.3.1. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 
Next to the action plans the European Union, however, also relied on traditionally applied 
programming documents that it normally uses in its way of delivering external aid and which 
are part of its project cycle management in development assistance. Country strategy papers and 
regional strategy papers are drawn up to provide general guidelines, and multi-annual national 
indicative programmes are part of these papers and supposed to outline the general planning and 
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 For overview see also European Commission Website about the European Neighbourhood Policy, Reference 
Documents: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#2 
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identify priorities for financial cooperation.57 For all ENP partner countries such Country 
Strategy papers have been drafted for 2002-200658, and again for 2007-201359.  
Already after the Wider Europe Communication in March 2003, member states criticised the 
inadequacy of the current financial instruments of TACS and INTERREG to allow for fruitful 
cross-border cooperation. The Swedish delegation was the first one to highlight this problem 
and to ask for a new “proximity instrument”(Swedish Delegation 2003). Just a few days latter 
also the Finish delegation tabled its proposal in regard of the need of a new financial instrument 
(Finnish Delegation 2003) what in the end was also taken up by the then Greek presidency of 
the Council of Ministers (Presidency of the Council / Greece 2003). In the months to follow the 
Council had asked the Commission to prepare a Communication in this regard, which the 
Commission published in July 2003 under the title “Paving the way for a  New Neighbourhood 
Instrument” (European Commission 2003a). In November 2003, also the European Parliament 
draw the attention to financial instruments, claiming that the existing financial means would be 
not enough to meet the goals of the ENP and that a re-shuffling of money from other areas 
would neither be adviceable nor sufficient (European Parliament 2003) 
In September 2004, the European Commission proposed its first draft for a regulation of the 
Council and European Parliament to establish a new financial instrument (European 
Commission 2006d). As this instrument was supposed to alter the financial frameworks, an 
agreement under co-decision between Council and EP was needed. However, in the following 
months nothing happened apart from the European Parliament issuing two resolutions, one on 
the need for more cross-border cooperation like in the Euroregions and one on the current state 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy in January 2006 (European Parliament 2006a).  
In May 2006 the European Commission, finally, published its Communication for a regulation 
under an amended procedure. The European Parliament held its first reading in July 2006 and 
approved the Commission’s draft with several amendments (European Parliament 2006b), 
which the Commission accepted without any comments or rejections. In October 2006, finally 
the Council approved the amended Commission draft regulation as an A-item during its General 
Affairs Council (General Affairs Council 2006a). The European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was officially adopted with the publication of Regulation No. 
1638 in the Official Journal of the European Union (European Parliament & European Council 
2006).  
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 For more information see European Commission Website of EuropeAid, “How we Work”, “Programming” at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/programming_en.htm 
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 For all Country Strategy Papers 2002-2006 see http://www.eeas.europa.eu/sp/2002.htm 
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 For all Country Strategy Papers 2007-2013 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/sp/index_en.htm 
 116 
The main rational behind the new financial instrument is to replace all different kinds of 
financial instruments that had developed over time (TACIS, MEDA, cross-border mechanisms 
within INTERREG) with one financial framework, also to make it more easily to comprehend 
and more user friendly.  
The new ENPI regulation sets out that the member states and the EP delegate all 
implementation tasks to the Commission who is responsible for the programming by drafting 
annual action programmes for countries and regions and monitoring the financial expenditures. 
These kind of decision making is considered as administrative law making, and the Comission 
is therefore assisted by a management committee that is set-up under comitology and made up 
of member states representatives, which have to be kept informed and have to approve 
expenditure that are not covered by this financial regulation but might arise because of 
unexpected events or emergencies.  
Looking at the documents and explanations of the different institutions in more detail shows a 
lot about their view of how the ENP and the ENPI in more specific terms should work and who 
should be involved in what. In this regard it is especially the European Parliament that voiced its 
discontent of its involvement in the ENP so far.  
After its first reading, the European Parliament had submitted a total of 123 amendments, which 
have all been accepted by the Commission, although some have not been accepted by the 
Council and hence changed back again afterwards. In its explanatory statement that the EP had 
attached to the amendments of the ENPI draft regulation (European Parliament 2006b: 52-55) it 
becomes very clear that in general terms the EP welcomes the ENPI draft by the Commission 
but that one of the priorities behind the suggested changes is “Enhancing the role of the 
European Parliament, both in programming and in monitoring activities”. This had also already 
been very clearly emphasised by the EP in its resolution about the ENP in January of the same 
year, where it stated: 
“21. [The European Parliament] Regrets that in its strategy paper (COM 2004, 0373) the 
Commission responded only to the Council’s opinion and ignored Parliament’s comprehensive 
resolution of 20 November 2003; […] 
24. [The European Parliament] Calls on the Commission to avoid bureaucratising the whole ENP 
process and to fully consult and involve not just the Council but also Parliament when 
developing the time-frames and content of future action plans;” (European Parliament 2006a) 
The European Parliament felt neglected by the Commission and the Council of Ministers, and 
wanted to be stronger involved in the planning and programming processes of the ENP. The 
argument of the EP was that in these national, regional and thematic programming documents 
the “real shape of the co-operation” (European Parliament 2006b: 53) is emerging and that the 
European Parliament should be part of those deliberations as well. The EP criticised that in the 
form of the Commission draft regulation the Parliament would not have any role in the ENPI 
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processes and that the annual action programmes would be under the sole decision-making 
power of the Commission. The EP’s reference to “bureaucratising” criticises the fact that the 
ENPI regulation installed comitology for follow-up administrative law-making by the 
Commission instead of asking that all programming documents follow the “normal” 
Community decision-making processes between Council and European Parliament, where the 
Commission drafts and suggests but where both Council and European Parliament can block 
and suggest their amendments.  
In regard of the legislative draft regulation, the European Parliament had suggested a few 
linguistic amendments to add to the clearness of  the legislative text and which were mostly 
accepted by the Council. Furthermore, the EP added some references to aims of ensuring gender 
equality, civil society development and good governance (e.g. it asked to add Art. 2d and 2f). 
However, it is especially the competence questions of EU actors that are of interest for this 
research project which have been challenged by the EP in four particular parts of the draft 
regulation: recital 20, Article 2cc, Article 3 on the policy framework, and Article 7 on 
programming and the allocation of funds (European Parliament 2006b).  
Recital 20 in its final version states that “measures necessary for implementation should follow” 
the normal administrative law making procedure of comitology, where the Commission drafts 
administrative laws that are discussed with the member states in comitology committees but do 
not have to go through the whole formal decision-making process. The European Parliament 
opposed this comitology procedure as it is not involved in this part of administrative law 
making and hence it suggested that implementing measures should be taken according to Art. 26 
and only after these implementing measures have been deliberated upon in the EP.   
Article 2 lists the “scope of community assistance” that this regulation should cover and for 
which the Commission had proposed a last Article 2cc stating that the ENPI should also be used 
for “addressing common thematic challenges in fields of mutual concern and any other 
objectives consistent with the scope of this regulation.” The EP wanted to delete this paragraph 
with the justification that the list was already quite extensive and that such an open aspect is 
hence not needed. But at the same time it can also be reasonably argued that the EP did not like 
this paragraph in combination with its missing role in implementing measures, as then the 
Commission together with the member states could just decide on additional measures that are 
not explicitly stated in this regulation. The Council discarded the argumentation of the EP and 
left the article in the regulation as it had originally been proposed by the Commission.  
Article 3 refers to the policy framework that is established by the association or partnership and 
cooperation agreements, Council conclusions and Commission communications. In this regard 
the European Parliament wanted to add that Commission Communications that lay guidelines 
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for EU policy-making towards the neighbours should only by approved by the Council after 
consulting the EP. Also this suggestion was not taken into account by the Council in the end.  
Finally, article 7 deals with “Programming and allocation of funds” and here the EP had 
suggested an additional article 7(1) which would ask for the establishment of a “multiannual 
policy framework” that would lay down the strategic priorities for Community assistance. This 
new framework would be adopted by the normal co-decision procedure, where both Council and 
EP have a veto. The motivation behind this suggestion of the EP is quite clear – it was and will 
also in the future be involved neither in the negotiation of the action plans nor in setting up the 
national / regional indicative programmes which are adopted by the Commission. Hence the EP 
suggested introducing an additional document that they could veto upon. Again, the Council 
discarded these ideas of the EP as unnecessary.  
In a similar vein the EP demanded that the EP should be consulted for all strategy papers to be 
adopted for national or multicountry and thematic programmes. Also when considering the 
explanations of the EP in the rest of the document, it becomes very clear that this was mainly an 
attempt to avoid administrative decision making without the involvement of the EP.  
In terms of contents the three institutions agreed fully on the Commission draft, although there 
was a slight difference in what they suggested for the financial envelop of the new ENPI. The 
Commission had proposed 14 929 Million EUR for seven years, while the EP increased this 
amount to 16 978 million EUR in its amendments. The Council finally adopted the regulation 
with a financial envelop of 11 181 million EUR for the period 2007-2013. This is an increase of 
32% compared to what the EU had allocated to the two programmes of TACIS and MEDA in 
the period of 2000-2006 (Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu 2007: 22).  
From these 11 billion EUR approximately half was planned to be spent in the period 2006-2010. 
As the planning figures in table 6 show nearly 75% of the financial instrument are used for 
individual country programmes, whereas another 1,5 billion EUR is allocated to regional 
programmes and the governance facility.  
This overview on the one hand shows that in absolute terms of the individual country 
allocations Morocco (654 Mill EUR), the Palestinian Teritories (632 Mill EUR) and Egypt (559 
Mill EUR) followed by Ukraine (494 Mill EUR) get the most external assistance from the EU. 
Together these four partner countries get 55% of the individual country allocations of the ENPI 
for 2007-2010. The last column shows the allocation of the individual country programmes 
divided by the population of the respective country (statistics from 2005), ie it shows the 
financial allocation of the individual country programmes from 2007-2010 per capita. In total 
the ENP partner countries including Russia had a population of 526 million people, and hence 
the EU contributed approx.7,8 EUR/person of the ENP countries in external assistance from the 
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individual country programmes. Calculated per capita, the biggest share of the individual 
country contributions from EU external assistance 2007-2010 go to the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Moldova, Lebanon and Jordan.  
These numbers should give a first impression of the most important instrument of the ENP in 
terms of implementation on the ground – the external assistance of national and regional 
programmes. Compared to the overall EU budget for 2007-2013 of 975 billion EUR this might 
not seem a lot, but for the subheading “EU as global actor” 56 billion EUR had been allocated, 
so that in the end the ENP accounts for 20% of the total spending of this subheading.  
 
Table 6: Allocation of the ENPI 2007-2010 
in total, in % of countries involved, and per capita 
    
Million 
EUR 
% of 
individual 
country 
programmes 
% of total 
financial 
means of 
individual 
country 
programme 
per capita 
  Algeria 220 5,3 3,9 6,7 
  Armenia 98,4 2,4 1,7 30,8 
  Azerbaijan 92 2,2 1,6 11,0 
  Belarus 20 0,5 0,4 2,0 
  Egypt 558 13,5 9,9 7,9 
  Georgia 120,4 2,9 2,1 28,0 
  Israel 8 0,2 0,1 1,1 
  Jordan 265 6,4 4,7 48,2 
  Lebanon 187 4,5 3,3 49,2 
  Libya 8 0,2 0,1 1,4 
  Moldova 209,7 5,1 3,7 58,3 
  Morocco 654 15,9 11,6 22,6 
  Palestinian Territories 632 15,3 11,2 166,3 
  Syria 139 3,4 2,5 7,7 
  Tunisia 300 7,3 5,3 30,0 
  Ukraine 494 12,0 8,8 10,5 
  Russian Federation 120 2,9 2,1 0,5 
Total - individual country programmes 4125,5 100,0 73,3 
 
  
Cross-border Cooperation 
Programmes 277,1   4,9  
  Governance Facility 400   7,1  
  Inter-Regional Programme 260,8   4,6  
  Inter-Regional Programme - East 223,5   4,0  
  Inter-Regional Programme - South 343,3   6,1  
Total - multi-country et al. 1504,7   26,7 
 
TOTAL - 2007-2010 5630,2     
 
Source: Financial allocation (planned for ENPI 2007/2010) from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/0703_enpi_figures_en.pdf; Population figures for 2005 from 
(European Commission & Eurostat 2007) 
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4.4. Conclusion: What these first descriptive Empirical Accounts show 
This chapter started out to introduce to the European Neighbourhood Policy, to how the ENP 
was set up and in terms of how it was supposed to work on paper. It showed the evolution of the 
Wider Europe initiative, how different actors contributed with their own ideas, until finally the 
ENP Strategy Paper had been adopted in June 2004. It discussed the main objectives and aims, 
and outlined the main instruments that have been created and elaborated upon in these founding 
documents. But how does this empirical material now contribute to our understanding and to 
answering the research questions as outlined at the beginning of this thesis?  
The analysis of the documents and of the arguments of the actors during setting up the ENP 
provides, of course, a rather formal account of how the single ENP framework was supposed to 
change EU policy-making towards the neighbours. It does not show how it changed in practice 
(what will be investigated in the subsequent chapters) but this chapter contributes to a general 
understanding of how the involved actors thought that the ENP framework should change the 
EU policy-making towards the neighbours. It outlines therefore the original ideas that led to the 
ENP strategy paper and what the involved actors wanted to change by setting up the ENP. The 
motivations of the involved actor behind these suggested changes will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter 7.  
First of all, there was a strong consensus among all actors about the main goal that the ENP 
should work towards in terms of content: creating and enhancing security for EU citizens by 
increasing prosperity and creating stability in the neighbourhood. This was the main 
argumentation that was used by Member states in the Council, Commission officials as well as 
Members of the European Parliament. This first observation is also confirmed in other academic 
research:  
 “In the case of the ENP, the consensus on the key goals among the chiefs of government and 
foreign ministries of the member states is fairly strong. The overall goals of the ENP are clearly 
stated and shared among the member states. The ENP’s main rationale is to increase the EU’s 
security; stability in the neighbourhood is to be achieved through promoting welfare and 
democracy in the ENP participants.” (Sedelmeier 2007: 198) 
In this regard it is interesting to see that the Commission followed the same security discourse 
that was also used by the member states, arguing that the enlargement process was very 
successful in contributing to security and stability with the new member states, and that it as the 
supranational institution that contributed such crucial elements to the success of the accession 
processes should also play a stronger role in ensuring security by creating stability in the 
neighbourhood. This might be surprising as since the Maastricht Treaty the Commission was 
always very careful in not talking about “security” issues, as this was still considered in a 
narrow sense of hard military security and defence and as a traditional area of the 
intergovernmental CFSP and the member states that the Commission must not touch upon. 
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Keeping this in mind it is quite astonishing that the Commission used the discourse of “creating 
security” as the main objective of the ENP. However, we will observe at a later stage that the 
conception of what “security” means and how it can most effectively be achieved, varied 
considerably between Commission and (some) member states. At the starting point of the ENP 
the main communicated rationale behind setting up the ENP was, however, that security and 
stability for the EU can be achieved by creating security and stability in the near abroad.  
Secondly, the ENP was meant to create a coherent and single framework that brings together all 
different kinds of EU policies towards one country on the one hand, and on the other hand 
create one framework that guides EU relations with all neighbouring countries in the South and 
in the East. In this regard the ENP was not supposed to be a new policy that might even 
substitute existing policies, but it was designed as a policy framework that brings together all 
different EU policies that are applied in the EU relations with the neighbouring countries. 
Closely linked to this idea of complementing existing policies instead of replacing them, it has 
to be, thirdly, mentioned that the Council as well as the Commission repeatedly emphasised that 
the ENP as special relationship should not substitute the current legal arrangements but build on 
them. This implies that the legal contracts between the EU and the third country would remain, 
and that the ENP builds on the already existing structures and policies that have been 
established between the EU and the respective third countries.  
Last, the ideas of the Commission and the member states as represented in the Council seemed 
quite similar on how the ENP should look like: it should stretch from Morocco across the 
Southern shore till Syria in the South, and in the East it would encompass Belarus, Moldova, 
Ukraine as well as Russia. The latter refused the offer of the EU to join the European 
Neighbourhood Policy quite quickly, as Russia did reject the idea of being treated as a 
neighbour but insisted on the discourse around “partnership”. Also in regard of the financial 
instrument the ideas of Council and Commission were way closer than what the European 
Parliament seemed to have in mind. The EP saw the ENP as a framework which should in the 
long run also encompass the Middle East and could stretch until Afghanistan.  
In regard of the second question about the roles of different EU actors the set-up phase of the 
ENP showed a clear dominance of the Commission and the Member states. The European 
Parliament had presented several far-reaching ideas, but apart from the inclusion of the Southern 
Caucasus countries into the ENP its ideas have been ignored by the other actors. The EP even 
recognises this in its  follow-up resolution on the ENP in 2006, where it complains that its view 
had not been taken on board for the Strategy paper, and that by suggesting administrative law 
making for the implementation of the ENPI the Commission would “bureaucratise” the whole 
process and exclude the European Parliament totally.  
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After providing this general background about how the ENP was set-up, and what its main 
objectives and its structure were supposed to be at the very beginning, it seems a logical next 
step to compare this ENP blueprint on paper with what happened in practice when the ENP was 
implemented. However, before we move on in terms of time, this thesis takes a step backwards 
to assess how the relationships between the EU and its neighbours had evolved before the ENP 
was set-up.  
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Chapter 5: No Tabula Rasa - EU Policy-making towards the Neighbours prior to the ENP 
In 2003/04 the ENP was celebrated as a new and innovative framework to manage the relations 
of the European Union with its new neighbours. But in what respect is the ENP “new”? Did it 
just add together the institutional relations of the EU with the South and the East, or did it also 
change the quality of these relationships and contributed with “added value”, as some actors 
claimed? While these questions can also be perceived more broadly, by asking if the impact on 
the ground changes, this thesis focuses mainly on the institutional dynamics and the EU output, 
as it is formulated in the first main research question of this thesis about the extent to which the 
single ENP framework changes the EU policy-making processes towards the neighbours. The 
latter puts a special emphasis on the EU policy-making dimension and the EU output (in 
Brussels) rather than on implementation and impact on the ground (outcome dimension).  
This chapter outlines and critically assesses the already dense web of institutional links towards 
the South that had existed between the EC/EU as well as the more recent EU relations with the 
East, both before the set-up of ENP. It serves as a reference point that allows to compare the 
ENP and the EU actors involvement in day-to-day policy-making with the way EU foreign 
policy-making towards the neighbours has been set-up at an earlier point in time. This way 
should allow us to assess to what extent the ENP is really “new” and to what extent it brought 
some fundamental changes to the EU relationship with its neighbours, and especially to evaluate 
to what extent the roles and interaction of EU actors was different within these framework 
compared to the ENP. Hence, this chapter mainly focuses on the set-up of these institutional 
frameworks, the role and the competences of the EU actors within those, as well as their 
shortcomings60.  
The first part focuses on the EU relationship with the South, especially with the Maghreb 
countries of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In 
comparison to the comprehensive relationship with partner countries in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, the EU relations with the Eastern partners were at the time of the ENP set-up 
still developing and getting refined. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism 
these countries only had gained independence in 1991, and the first years of their independence 
their relationship with the EU was not the most salient topic on their reform agenda. But 
especially since the accession process of the CEEC countries that culminated in the Eastern 
enlargement 2004/07, the debates and discussions of the EU relationship with countries like 
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 While the relationships between the EU and each single country in itself is an interesting topic and worth a 
thorough investigation, this chapter only focuses on the parts relevant for the research questions, while also 
referring to background literature that might be of interest to gain more insight in the respective country’s 
relationships with the EU. 
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Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus but also the Southern Caucasus have gained in quantity and quality. 
The EU relationship with the East is discussed in the second part of this chapter.  
Already in chapter 4 and especially in table 5 (p. 113), it has been emphasised that one 
principles of the ENP was to not substitute but to complement the existing relationships. In 
more practical terms this implies that the ENP build on the existing legal agreements like the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, or the more comprehensive Association Agreements. 
While the cooperation with Eastern neighbours still relies on Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements and negotiations to upgrade to Association Agreements are currently under way at 
the end of 2010, the Southern neighbours predominantly rely on Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements that have been introduced gradually since 1995.  
5.1. Looking towards the South: The EU’s Mediterranean Policy 
“Europe is perceiving the destabilization in the Mediterranean, especially in North Africa, as a 
threat to its own interests. Economically it fears to lose control over its regular energy supply. 
Politically it fears the consequences of civil war like in Algeria, the possibility of islamistic 
takeovers, an increase in international terrorism, drug-traffic, organized crime and, more than 
anything else, an increase in North African migration with its negative impact on domestic 
policies in Europe. But this worrying scenario is only one reason for Europe’s growing interest in 
the region.” (Jünemann 1996)  
This assessment from 1996 of the EU interest towards its Southern neighbours precisely 
summarises the position of the EU and its member states during this time. And even more 
interestingly, it still catches the main concerns that the EU member states put forward in regard 
of the neighbours at the Southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Already before the 1990s a 
general consensus had developed that a cooperative and comprehensive relationship with the 
Mediterranean partners would be needed, but these attempts did neither manage to supersede the 
bilateral arrangements between single member states and partner countries nor were able to 
overcome the strong focus on economic issues and trade61. Only in 1995 the Barcelona 
Declaration finally set up the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that created the first really 
multilateral as well comprehensive framework between the EU and its Southern Neighbours in 
1995.  
However, while the quote above outlines destabilisation, terrorism, organised crime and 
migration as main political problems, these were only recognised in the mid 1990s. 
Additionally, between the 1970s and 1990s slowly a European approach to the Middle East 
conflict emerged that also impacted the EC approach to the wider region (Müller 2007). 
Beforehand the EU Mediterranean policy mainly draw on economic policies (Benkö 2000), 
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 For a comprehensive overview of the EU as an international actor in the Mediterranean between 1958-1995 see 
Schumacher (2004: 58-197). (Tovias 1997) 
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what became especially visible after the oil crisis in the 1970s. During more than 30 years, 
economic interests were the main focus of the EC/EU and its member states towards the 
Mediterranean partner countries. Europe, especially the southern member-states were and still 
are heavily reliant on energy supply (gas and petroleum) and natural resources from the 
Mediterranean. On the other hand the Mediterranean countries are an important market for EU 
imports and exports (Abellán 2002: 3; Salama 2002: 1; Smith, H. 2002: 162-163). 
Table 7 provides a general glimpse on the extent of these trade relations between the EU and 
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria respectively62. Overall, the “Mediterranean Basin” is the second 
strongest partner for EU exports, accounting for 12% of all exports just after exports within the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 28%) and slightly before exports to the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA, 11,2%); In regard of imports, the main EU trading partner is 
again NAFTA, while the Mediterranean countries account for 9,4% and are hence quite similar 
to the “Dynamic Asian economies”, EFTA and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(Eurostat 2005: 22).  
Although the European Union has certain economic interests (export market, energy supply) in 
the Maghreb countries, the Maghreb countries in return are even more dependent on the EU, 
because of the large export-orientation of their economies (in 2003 38,3 % of Algerian GDP; 
43,8% of Tunisian GDP; 27,9% of Moroccan GDP), whereas the European Union is the most 
important export-partner for these countries, accounting for more than 66% of their foreign 
trade in 2003. Furthermore, the EU supplied nearly 63% of the region’s imports in 2003. 
Tunisia is most dependent on the EU, with more than 73% of imports originating there, and 
with more than 80% of its exports going to Europe (Eurostat / Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities 4/2005b: 3, 4/2005a). The trade flows show as well a quite 
“colonial” style of trade: Next to agricultural products, the EU imports primarily manufactures 
articles and textiles from Morocco and Tunisia, that account for 42,6% and 48,2% of total 
imports from these countries. Algeria is absolutely different, as 71,8% of all imports of the EU 
from Algeria are related to mineral fuels. On the other hand, the EU primarily exports 
machinery, transport equipment, chemicals and textiles to the three Maghreb countries (DG 
Trade 2005b, c, a; for a more detailed analysis see also Piening 1997: 70) 
At the same time it is also quite unsurprising that some EU member states have closer links with 
the Southern Mediterranean and hence have stronger national (economic) interests than others. 
While for example, on average, one third of all gas imports to the EU come from the three 
Maghreb countries, Spain’s gas supply originate to 70% from Algeria (Biscop 2003: 17).  
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 As my empirical analysis primarily focuses on the three Maghreb countries Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, I will 
only present their trade data here, as it is important for my case selection to know if any country is economically 
more important to the EU, and vice versa. 
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Table 7: EU-Exports to Maghreb and EU-Imports from Maghreb in 2001, 2003 and 2005 
 
Table 8: Main EU members in EU-Exports to and EU-Imports from Maghreb in 2004 
in absolute terms and in % of total third country’s export 
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Table 8 also provides evidence for this argument by showing that it is especially France, Italy 
and Spain that have strong trade links with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Nearly 49% of all 
imports of Algeria come from France, while Morocco’s imports are slightly more equally 
distributed between France (32,4%) and Spain (23,7). Also with Tunisia, France is the main 
export partner (36,2%) of the EU member states, followed by Italy (27,6%) and Germany 
(12,5%).  In terms of imports, Italy imports more  (31,7%) from Algeria than France (21%), 
while the picture is reversed with Morocco, where France accounts for nearly 40% of all 
imports and Italy for 30%. Imports from Tunisia are strongest again towards France (35,7%), 
followed by Spain (26,9) and Germany (11,5).  
While the economic interests of the EU member states emerged and remained stable quite from 
the first attempts to strengthen the relationship, the EU today additionally has a strong strategic 
interest in its near abroad that is encompassing a broader definition of security than just 
focusing on trade relations. Scholars and practitioners repeatedly emphasise that the 
Mediterranean as well as the Middle East are important for the EU´s security, especially when 
considering a comprehensive security approach (Piening 1997: 69; Salama 2002: 1). Migration 
flows63, environmental concerns, nuclear safety or organised crime can impede European 
security and demand a coherent, effective approach. Or as Michael E. Smith and Katja Weber 
observed:  
“The challenges the EU confronts with respect to minority issues, visa, border and trade policies, 
cross-border cooperation and security policies in hopes of stabilising its neighbourhood are 
enormous. And yet, it is clearly in the EU's interest of effectively manage its relations with its 
larger neighbourhood” (Smith, M. E. & Weber 2007: 4)  
This observation already indicates that the policies provided towards the Mediterranean 
therefore do not necessarily follow an altruistic approach of the Union’s commitment to general 
norms like human rights and democracy, but reflect as well rational security concerns. Or as 
another scholar formulated it even more plainly: 
“Europe’s commitment to the democratisation of the southern Mediterranean region is primarily 
motivated by a security concern. The Barcelona Process has been fundamentally the pursuit of 
political and security objectives through economic and cultural means.” (Abellán 2002: 3) 
It was in 1995 that finally a first comprehensive institutional framework was established by the 
European Union towards its Southern neighbours with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.  
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 For a detailed analysis of the migration flows from and even more importantly through the South Mediterranean 
countries see de Haas (2007). (de Haas 2007) 
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5.1.1. From an EC Mediterranean Policy towards a comprehensive EU institutional 
Framework 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, that is often also referred to as “Barcelona Process”, was 
formally set up in November 1995, by 15 EU member states and 12 Mediterranean Countries 
under the Spanish Presidency (Jünemann 1996). However, although there was no common EU 
approach before 1995, it would be misleading to assume that the framework was established 
from scratch. Quite on the contrary, some member states, especially France and Italy, had 
already established strong economic, political and cultural links towards the Maghreb countries 
and some unsuccessful attempts had been started to strengthen the relationship between the 
European Communities and this partner countries.64 Tunisia, Mauritania and Morocco were 
French colonies and have attained independence from France only in 1956. Until 1962 Algeria 
was as French overseas départment even a legal part of the Community.65 Libya was a former 
Italian colony, although with strong political and economic influence by Great Britain after the 
Second World war (Smith, H. 2002: 160). 
In the 1960s slowly a “gradual definition of common interests” from EC member states towards 
the Southern Mediterranean emerged (Gomez 1998: 135). The first trade agreements with the 
Mediterranean countries were signed in the 1960s, when free access for their exports of 
industrial products and some concessions for agricultural exports was granted (Salama 2002: 1). 
These bilateral agreements between the EC member states and the Mediterranean countries were 
perceived as unsystematic, uncoordinated and inconsistent. To provide a solution to these 
shortcomings, the European Community launched the “Global Mediterranean Policy” as first 
general EC policy in 1972. As a novelty, aid assistance was included next to trade preferences 
(see e.g. Salama 2002: 1; Smith, C. & Latheenmaki 1998: 160; Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 154; 
Abellán 2004: 279), and while earlier attempts treated the partner countries only bilaterally, this 
new EC policy considered the Mediterranean for the first time as “homogenous region” (Bicchi 
2003: 12).66  
The war between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1973 forced the EC to rethink its relations 
with the Mediterranean Countries, also because of its dependence of oil supply from the 
Mediterranean (Rhein 2002: 701). In 1974 the “Euro-Arab Dialog” between the Arab League, 
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 The Mediterranean region is set up by three subregions. The Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia 
and Mauritania - often also referred to as the Southern Mediterranean), the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory and Syria - the Eastern Mediterranean) and the Gulf states. 
65
 The EU relations with Algeria are a very sensitive topic. Bretherton and Vogler report that there are policy 
statements on Algerian internal affairs neither in the context of the European Political Cooperation nor under 
CFSP. There have been different initiatives to tackle this blank spot, but for example initiatives of the British 
Presidency were frequently blocked by other member states (Bretherton 1999: 152). 
66
 At the same time it has to be kept in mind that Spain (and Portugal) joined the European Communities only in 
1986.  
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the President of the Commission and the Council was launched, aimed at the establishment of 
an institutional structure for dialogue on various issues. Differences about the focus of this 
arrangement yet became soon apparent: the Arabs wished a political dialog that also discussed 
the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the policy towards Israeli as well as the 
situation in Lebanon, whereas the European representatives emphasised economic issues, and 
especially oil supply (Piening 1997: 74; Rhein 2002: 701). 
The existing trade agreements were upgraded to cooperation agreements with Morocco, Tunisia 
and Algeria in 1976, which granted trade preferences to both sides and strengthened financial 
and technical cooperation through loans from the EC budget and the European Investment 
Bank. Furthermore, common institutions in the form of annual meetings of a ministers, and 
different committees of ministers (Piening 1997: 72-73; Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 153-154). 
In 1979, furthermore, EC delegations were opened in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria67. Bicchi 
argues that during the 1970s there was also a shift in European perception of the Mediterranean, 
as two new challenges were identified by EC member states: Troublesome economic relations 
and terrorism. In the 1990s these concerns were extended to migration, terrorism and potential 
Islamic fundamentalism, which emerged as new perceived threats for the European 
Communities / European Union and its citizens (Bicchi 2003: 13-14). 
Only one year after Spain and Portugal had joined the European Communities, Morocco applied 
for EEC membership in 1987, what the EC rejected by arguing of Morocco not being a 
European country. This push of Morocco for more attention in Europe is perceived as a 
response to the caused frustration regarding the relationship with the EC. Neither the Greek 
accession in 1981 nor the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 had been able to reverse this 
trend at this point in time (Smith, K. 2003: 76). The Mediterranean were of lower importance 
for the EC/EU, what increased even further immediately after the Cold war, when the EC/EU 
focused its attention on the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe (Smith, C. & 
Latheenmaki 1998: 155). At the same time, Bicchi, however, argues that it should not be left 
unnoticed that after the fall of the Soviet Union the international climate also changed in a 
positive manner, as the Russian threat was not perceived as main priority anymore and Europe 
and the EC could redirect its attention to its neighbours. Hence, while it was indeed observable 
that the main area of attention was the new Eastern neighbours right after the end of the Cold 
War, the new climate also allowed slowly for more EC attention towards the South.  
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 For more information on the EC delegations in the Maghreb countries see 
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/algeria/about_us/delegation_role/index_fr.htm (Algeria), 
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/about_us/delegation_role/index_fr.htm (Tunisia), 
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/morocco/about_us/delegation_role/index_fr.htm (Morocco) 
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In line with these reflections, the importance of the social and economic development of the 
Southern Mediterranean region for the Community’s security was stressed in a Commission 
policy paper, what let to the “New Mediterranean Policy” in 1990 and the “Renovated 
Mediterranean Policy” in 1992 (Piening 1997: 78; Abellán 2004: 279). Within the umbrella of 
these reinvigorated policy frameworks, Morocco and Tunisia were granted an enhanced market 
access, and the financial assistance for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia was increased as 
well as additional financial support granted for regional cooperation and environmental 
protection.  
Despite these new attempts to strengthen the relationship between the EC/EU and its Southern 
neighbours, the Maghreb countries were, nonetheless, unsatisfied, because they felt being 
treated only as low priority and they wanted a more preferential engagement and a similar 
treatment like the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 
155-156). On the other hand, the EC was not able to negotiate with the Maghreb countries as a 
collective, as powerful member states as well as the US wanted the isolation of Libya (Smith, H. 
2002: 166). 
The establishment of the European Union with entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993 provided a new impetus for EU foreign policy-making. The CFSP replaced the EPC and 
hence raised the hope for the EU to become a more active and efficient actor in international 
relations, and in its neighbourhood in particular. The European Council in Lisbon in 1992 
issued a separate declaration on the CFSP, which outlines the main ideas for implementation of 
this new policy area, as well as it identifies areas of join action towards particular groups of 
countries, with a special emphasis on the EU neighbours, i.e. the CEEC countries there were 
soon to be entering the accession process.  
Generally, the whole Annex I of the Lisbon European Council Conclusions shows a clear, 
special interest of the EU towards its neighbourhood. In this regard point 12, for example, 
provides three criteria that should in the future guide the definition of “important common 
interests”: “geographical proximity, important interest in the political and economic stability of 
a region or country, the existence of threats to the security interests of the Union” (European 
Council 1992: 32). This criteria clearly point to the priority status of the near abroad in regard of 
EU foreign policy action. In regard of geographical areas, special emphasis is put in this 
document on the one hand on Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and the Balkans, and on the 
other hand on the Mediterranean, and in particular on the Maghreb and the Middle East  (point 
13 as well as the whole part II, European Council 1992). For the Maghreb, the European 
Council Conclusion on the CFSP read as follows: 
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“28. The Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean as well as the Middle East are 
geographical areas in relation to which the Union has strong interests both in terms of security 
and social stability. […] 
30. the Maghreb is the Union’s Southern frontier. Its stability is of important common interest to 
the Union. Population growth, recurrent social crises, large-scale migration, and the growth of 
religious fundamentalism and integralism are problems which threaten that stability.” (European 
Council 1992: 37-38) 
In doing so, the heads of states and government clearly confirmed that stability in the Maghreb 
countries is a salient issue for the European Union, but at the same time this also shows that the 
definition of a European interest grew much more comprehensive and encompassing than just 
focusing on economic advantages like in earlier debates (for similar conclusions see also Smith, 
H. 2002: 161; Piening 1997: 79).  
The emphasis of the respective priority areas in the European Council declaration on CFSP  was 
strongly supported by the Commission that had already beforehand repeatedly emphasised the 
success of the all-encompassing strategy towards the CEEC countries and hence also implicitly 
asked for a similar framework for the Southern Mediterranean. As short term measure in regard 
of the prioritisation, the amount of development aid was increased and trade preferences 
extended towards the Mediterranean partner countries. Furthermore, the cooperation was also 
already at this point in time extended to involve at least rudimentary aspects of human rights, 
environment and democracy promotion (Salama 2002: 1). 
External events, however, complicated the relations with the Mediterranean countries at the 
same time. The Algerian government had cancelled elections after the Islamic Salvation Front  
seemed to win, what let to violence, continuing massacres and human rights abuses. Although 
the EU condemned the happenings rhetorically, it maintained assistance aid to Algeria (Smith, 
H. 2002: 161). Also towards Libya the EU was never enthusiastic in supporting the proposed 
economic sanctions, “partly because of its own commercial interests would be endangered” 
(Smith, H. 2002: 162), but it in the end followed the US and supported the UN embargo in 
1992. 
It was a proposal by Spain that triggered a more concrete debate that finally led to the Barcelona 
Process, although these ideas were first not considered to be embarked upon within the EU 
framework. Spain had proposed a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean that should be similar to the OSCE, an idea that was immediately supported by 
Italy and France and led to vivid debates from 1994 onwards (Bicchi 2003: 19-20; see also 
Gomez 1998: 140). The Commission had repeatedly asked to strengthen the relationship with 
the Mediterranean countries, and therefore welcomed the demands of the Southern member 
states to upgrade the relationship with the Mediterranean partners.  
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At its meeting in Corfu in June 2004, the European Council once more emphasised under the 
heading of CFSP the importance of the Mediterranean, its willingness to intensify the 
relationship to establish a close “cooperation guaranteeing peace, security, stability and well-
being” (European Council 1994: 10). In addition, the heads of states and governments mandated 
the Council in cooperation with the Commission to evaluate the existing institutional 
frameworks and policies and to draw up potential initiatives that could strengthen the 
relationship between the EU and its Southern Mediterranean neighbours (European Council 
1994).  
Subsequently, the Commission published its Communication entitled “Strengthening the 
Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” 
in October 1994 (European Commission 1994) which was endorsed by the European Council in 
Essen in December of the same year. This document defines the main EU interests in the 
regions, outlines strengths and weaknesses of the EC’s established Mediterranean Policy, and 
outlines its ideas for a new initiative when it calls for a “Euro-Mediterranean partnership”: 
“The Community’s long-term strategy of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, comprising 
a zone of peace and stability embracing the Union, Central and Eastern Europe and the Southern 
and Eastern Mediterranean, implies a close and continuing dialogue between those 
concerned.”(point 21 of European Commission 1994: 13)  
In a quite similar vein like during the set-up of the ENP at a later time, the Commission also 
already there used the reference to security interests to push forward its ideas of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. At the European Council Summit in Essen in December 1994 “the 
special relationship of the Union to its neighbours, particularly the Mediterranean countries” 
(European Council 1994) was identified as one of  four priority areas. Under the heading of the 
“EU’s external relations” the European Council conclusions also confirm the suggestion of the 
Commission to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and it positively supports the plans 
of the forthcoming Spanish Presidency "to convene in the second half of 1995 a Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Conference with the participation of all Mediterranean countries 
[…] addressing all relevant political, economic, social and cultural issues” (European Council 
1994) as well as the commitment of the preceding French Presidency to prioritize preparations 
in this regard.   
After this clear strategic confirmation of the European Council to establish a special relationship 
with the Southern Mediterranean countries, it was up to the subsequent rotating presidencies to 
implement these ideas during their term in office. It was for sure a decisive factor that after the 
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German presidency in the second half of 1994, France and Spain68 followed in 1995 to fulfil the 
role of rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, while Italy was at 
the helm of the Council in the first half of 1996 (Gomez 1998: 145-146; Piening 1997: 80).  
5.1.2. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Set-up and main Objectives 
In November 1995, finally, the European Council and the foreign ministers of 12 Mediterranean 
countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, 
Syria, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey69) adopted the “Barcelona Declaration” that launched the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995). The partnership was 
designed as a framework that coordinated and subsumed all relations between the European 
Union, its member states and the Mediterranean countries (Philippart 2003: 1; Bretherton & 
Vogler 1999: 159). Attached to the declaration itself, a detailed work program in the annex was 
meant to give practical advices for the implementation of the declaration (Piening 1997: 81).  
The EMP was based on a main rationale that had slowly developed during 1990s and rapidly 
grew to the cornerstone of the EMP: "Linking economic wellbeing to political stability” (Gomez 
1998: 134) was the credo that predominantly informed the approach of EU actors when setting 
up this framework. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership pursues several different but linked 
goals, and subsumes different policy areas like trade, development and human rights under a 
single framework. Issues of all three pillars of the EU are included in the partnership, although 
critics state that “the economic core of the partnership is evident” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 
159). However, at least formally on paper the EMP constitutes 
“a comprehensive, cross-pillar instrument [...] covering all the dimensions of the European 
Foreign Policy and putting together [...] the policies and the instruments of the European Union 
and the Member States” (Abellán 2002: 1; for similar findings see Smith, H. 2002: 159) 
Modelled after the template of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the EMP is set up around three baskets – a political and security, an economic and 
financial, as well as a social and cultural basket – that are interrelated and expected to mutually 
reinforce each other (Philippart 2003: 1; Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 159). The main goal of the 
Political and Security Basket is to establish “a common area of peace and stability” (Euro-
Mediterranean Conference 1995) and incorporates policies like the rule of law, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, peaceful settlement of disputes, preventing 
terrorism or proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Furthermore, a right to 
                                                     
68
 On a side remark: the Spanish foreign minister during this presidency was Javier Solana, who became the High 
Representative for the CFSP after the incorporation of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 and fulfilled and shaped this 
role for ten years.  
69
 In terms of geographical coverage, please note that in contrast to the ENP the EMP incorporated also Cyprus, 
Malta and Turkey, while Libya is not part of the EMP from 1995 onwards. (see among others McQueen 2002; 
Michalek 2007; Zaafrane & Mahjoub 2000; Martín 2004; de Ville & Reynaert 2010) 
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the self-determination of peoples was included, although Israel and Turkey were not 
comfortable with this issue. Confidence-building measures are also central within this pillar. At 
the same time the Barcelona process was created as an “independent but parallel” mechanism 
(Müller 2007: 98) to support the Middle East Peace process, as the EMP meetings proved the 
only multilateral forum where the main conflict parties met regularly. Hence, while the EMP 
was not intended to solve the conflict in the Middle East directly, it was considered to be 
positively contributing to the efforts made within the Middle East Peace Process (Müller 2007: 
98).  
The Economic and Financial Basket aims at the creation of “an area of shared prosperity’ what 
includes the establishment of a free trade area by 2010 and furthermore, economic cooperation 
and an increase of EU-aid in addition to the official development assistance from individual 
member states. The underlying rationale behind this basket was that free trade between the 
Mediterranean partners and the EU, but also between the Mediterranean Partners themselves 
would increase prosperity and be profitable for the economic and social development of the 
Mediterranean markets70. The Social and Cultural Basket, at last, focuses on the development of 
human resources through education and training, better understanding between cultures and 
exchange between civil societies, reduction of migratory pressures and joint action against drug 
trafficking.  
As this multilateral framework of the EMP is only meant to complement bilateral relations, 
there was no need for totally new contractual agreements but the already existing association 
and cooperation agreements got upgraded to Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
(EMAA). One of their main objectives is to work towards the establishment of a Free Trade 
Area between the EU and the Mediterranean partners, to create a Euro-Mediterranean Free 
Trade Area (EMFTA).71 They provide the possibility for free trade in manufactured goods and 
industrial products and include provisions on the freedom of establishment, free movement of 
capital, trade facilitation and the approximation of legislation. However, agricultural products 
are excluded from that liberalisation as the southern EU member states were concerned about 
their economic interests72.  
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 This idea of free trade automatically bringing advantages and prosperity is still strongly embedded in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, although more recent academic reflections also show that such a free trade area might 
also bring several social and economic challenges to the Mediterranean partners, in terms of social instability and 
turmoil and that the immediate profits would mainly lie with the EU and its member states (Nabiha no date; 
Escribano & Jordán 1999; For a detailed but more general assessment of EU-Mediterranean trade relations see 
also Kheir-el-din & Ghoneim no date). In addition, research also showed that interregional free trade agreements 
in itself do not automatically create more trade between Mediterranean countries (European Commission 2010a). 
71
 The EMAA with Tunisia went in force in 1998, with Morocco in 2000, and the EMAA with Algeria is signed and 
currently in the process of ratification by the parliaments. 
72
 For example, the EU only signed an agreement to liberalise trade on agri-food and fisheries with Morocco in 
September 2010, despite Morocco being considered as the model partner with EU-Mediterranean cooperation . 
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The EMP should provide a coherent and single framework for the partnership, and to be able to 
administer and support the political agreed objectives, the EU also established a single financial 
framework in 1996 to increase the efficiency of management and coherence of its external 
assistance: the MEDA program (Council of the European Union 1996). Within MEDA financial 
and technical measures are launched to support the reform of social and economic structures in 
the Mediterranean countries (Philippart 2003: 205). From 1995 to 1999 MEDA provided 3.435 
million Euros, and 5.350 million Euros in the period 2000-2006.73  
In contrast to the overall decision making procedures within the EMP, the EU institutions 
decide alone within this MEDA program, as it is a unilateral EC measure (Philippart 2003: 205). 
This arrangement is important, as MEDA also includes political and economic conditionality. 
Financial assistance and loans can be suspended when democratic principles, the rule of law or 
human rights are violated. Further the allocation of funds also asks for “progress towards 
structural reform” (European Investment Bank 2005, 2004: 1). Next to the grants of MEDA, the 
European Investment Bank (EIB)74 gives loans to the Mediterranean countries for economic and 
social modernization, development and for enhancing regional integration, primarily with the 
goal to create a Free Trade Area by 2010. Furthermore, the EIB helps to conduct different 
studies and to implement projects (Salama 2002: 17). The Commission is responsible to 
coordinate the financial activities of the EIB, the member states and other international financial 
institutions (European Council 2000b). 
 
Next to broader challenges in the international arena, it was especially the Amsterdam Treaty 
that gave a boost to the CFSP and set-up new instruments and actors. It incorporated the 
instrument of “Common Strategy” as well as it created the post of a High Representative of the 
CFSP (HR) and the Policy Unit. Furthermore, a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
has been developed steadily since 1998/1999.  In June 2000 the European Council adopted a 
“Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region” (CSM), which included in contrast to the 
EMP also Libya (European Council 2000a). Several authors perceive the CSM as a response to 
the rather disappointing progress in the EMP (Smith, H. 2002: 159) and as an attempt to 
reinvigorate the existing partnership (Abellán 2002: 9, 2004: 285-286). The broad objective of 
the CSM was threefold: reinvigorating the EMP by defining more clearly the “common 
interests” and the need for coherence, provide strategic guidance, and finally evaluate the EU’s 
role in the Middle East Peace Process (Smith, K. 2003: 77).  
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 For more details http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm or Salama 2002, p. 16; 
74
 The EIB spent  4.808 million Euro (1995-1999) and 6.400 million Euro (2000-2006) on the Mediterranean.  
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In terms of content, however, the CSM did not bring much change although new policies were 
incorporated (Smith, K. 2003: 77). Issues related to justice and home affairs (especially 
migration-related policies) were increased. Furthermore, the EU declared its intention to use the 
evolving ESDP to create a cooperative security region with its Mediterranean partners. The 
CSM, however, contributed to a more stringent EU internal organisation of the work of the 
different EU institutions. It emphasizes the need for coordination and coherence of all activities 
taken by the member states and the Community (Art. 10), strengthens the relationship of 
political and economic instruments (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 156) and clearly identifies the 
tasks of the different European institutions. 
Bretherton and Vogler (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 156) argue that the comprehensive approach 
of the EU is further emphasised in the CSM, as the relationship of political and economic 
instruments is strengthened. An important additional aspect is that the CSM it is not only related 
to political and security issues of the partnership, although Common Strategies are legally 
speaking an instrument of the CFSP, but it also incorporates economic and social policies, as 
well as justice and home affairs, which are all formally competences of the EC and the third 
pillar (Salama 2002: 8-9). In his analysis of the impact of the CSM on EU foreign policy 
coherence Abellán concludes that the  
“CSM gives incentive to bridge the pillars but it does not help to overcome the problems that 
stem from different decision-making procedures under the respective pillars.” (Abellán 2002: 12) 
However, at the same time Abellán critically notes that the set-up of the CSM itself did not at all 
go in line with the quest and rationale for coherence and consistency. During first debates of the 
strategy in the course of 1999, member states could not at all agree on a common interest and 
several were pushing for their own aims, what urged the HR Solana in his report about the 
Common Strategies later on to talk about a “Christmas tree approach” with “member states and 
the Commission insisting on covering all possible aspects and making it difficult to distinguish 
priorities form questions of secondary importance“ (Abellán 2004: 289). According to Abellán, 
it was in the end the desire of the Portuguese presidency to show a result at the end of their six 
months at the helm of the Council that pushed for an agreement (Abellán 2004: 283-284; 
Presidency of the Council 2004a; External Relations Council 2004c). 
Hence, these observations as well as the follow-up work of the Irish Presidency in 2004 
(Schumacher 2004: 217; Philippart 2003: 2; Lannon & Van Elsuwege 2004) clearly show that 
the Common Strategy towards the Mediterranean did not fulfil the objective of providing a clear 
and strategic guideline for the priorities of the cooperation with the third countries, but it 
provided an important framework for how to organise the work and cooperation of the EU 
actors within the EU. What is important to note, however, in terms of timing is that the need to 
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prolong and re-discuss the CSM after five years overlapped clearly with the debates of how to 
set-up and develop the ENP.  
5.1.3. EU actors and their Competencies within the EMP Framework 
In contrast to the earlier attempts of a EU Mediterranean Policy, the Barcelona Conference was 
the starting point of the creation of a complex network and institutional set-up of interrelated 
actors, operating on different levels and with diverse competences (Schumacher 2004: 217). The 
Barcelona declaration itself established multilateral institutions where all EU member states, 
third country representatives and representatives of the Commission and the Council Secretariat 
meet, while bilateral arrangements have been established by the Association Agreements with 
the respective third countries.  
First, on top of the multilateral EMP hierarchy are the foreign ministers who meet within the 
“Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs” and are supposed to monitor 
the implementation of the Work Programme. They meet each 18 to 24 months75, and are also 
meant to give new impetus to the process of cooperation, although in reality observers claim 
that this is not at all visible (Lannon & Van Elsuwege 2004: 43; Schumacher 2004). The 
organisation and preparation of this meeting of foreign ministers lies with the rotating EU 
presidency in the Council, and representatives of third countries are not involved. In addition, 
the rotating presidency can convene ad-hoc conferences of special ministers, ie. Euromed 
Sectoral ministerial conferences, which are often also co-organised and sometimes even 
initiated by the European Commission (Lannon & Van Elsuwege 2004: 56). The foreign 
ministers are the highest level of authority within the EMP framework, as meetings of heads of 
states and government had not been considered when the EMP was set up76. 
The main body supporting the foreign ministers is the Euro-Mediterranean Committee,  which 
has originally been set up by senior officials from the EU troika and a representative from each 
of the Mediterranean countries (and hence is also often refered to as “EMP Senior Officials 
meeting”), and which meets at least six times a year77. Representatives from other EU-member 
states as well as other countries (Mauritania and Libya78) and organisations (Arab League, 
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 The latest 9th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Affairs has taken place in November 2007 in Lisbon, 
while the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs had taken place in November 2006 
in Tampere. For a more detailed overview of all ministerial and committee meeting within the EMP framework 
see EEAS website at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/conf/index_en.htm  
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 This is one of the main differences of the Union for the Mediterranean that was set up to reinvigorate the EMP in 
2008: here the driving forces and main meeting fora are conferences of heads of states and governments.  
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 In 2008, the inofficial rule was that the Euromed Committee meets four times per rotating presidency. 
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 Libya first was excluded from the EMP, but obtained observer status in 1999. The EU would like to see Libya as a 
partner, but only when it is willing and able to adopt the already existing acquis (on human rights, 
democratisation, trade liberalisation) (Salama 2002: 3; Smith 2002: 159). Mauritania is linked to the EU through 
the Cotonou convention. 
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Union de Maghreb Arabe79) are also invited to participate in these meetings as observers and 
special guests (Schumacher 2004: 219). Over time, however, the number of participants in 
meetings of the Euromed-Committee increased, because also representatives of other EU 
member states next to the troika but also officials from the Commission and the Council 
Secretariat joined on a regular basis. Schumacher evaluates this development on the one hand 
positively, as it takes away the negative impact the rotating presidency might have in terms of 
discontinuity, but at the same time he also points out that this at the same time, intentionally or 
unintentionally, emphasises the intergovernmental character of the committee (Schumacher 
2004). The problem of discontinuity because of the rotating presidency is nowadays still an 
issue, however in this regard the Commission is often really supportive in making sure that a 
certain dossier is treated in a coherent manner (Interview No. 25 Austrian MfA).  
Although the Euro-Med Committee was originally supposed to be responsible for the whole 
range of EMP policies when it was set up, Schumacher observed a clear separation between 
political and economic/cultural issues: The Euromed Committee deals with basket II and III, 
while the political issues of basket I are kept separate and are only discussed among senior 
officials without the presence of the Commission (what was also confirmed in interviews, e.g. 
Interview No. 25 Austrian MfA). The latter is often referred to as “Senior officials committee”, 
and kept separate from the Euromed Committee, although formally there is only one Euromed 
Committee mentioned in the set-up documents (Interview No. 9, COM). This political 
formation of the EMP committee in its preparation also only relies on the Council Secretariat 
and the foreign ministry of the rotating presidency, without any involvement of the Commission 
(Lannon & Van Elsuwege 2004). At the same time, a Commission official working on the EMP 
pointed out that it is a rather “artificial” differentiation, as the representatives from the member 
states are the same people (Interview No. 9, COM).  
Next to these main institutional settings that have been created within the EMP framework there 
is also a Euromed Parliamentary Assembly, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for 
the Dialogue of Cultures, and the Euromed Civil Forum (as example see Art. 78 and 79 of EU-
Morocco Association Agreement, EC & Kingdom of Morocco 2000; see also Lannon & Van 
Elsuwege 2004: 53). 
Second, in regard of the bilateral dimension the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
also created own EMAA institutions between the EU and the respective third country: 
Association Council, Association Committees, and Association Subcommittees. Association 
Councils meet approximately once per year to “examine any major issues arising within the 
framework of this Agreement and any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest.” 
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 The Arab-Maghreb Union was formed in 1989 by Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania. 
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(Lannon & Van Elsuwege 2004) and brings together the members of the Council of Ministers, a 
Commission Representative as well as members of the government of the partner country. The 
chairmanship of Association Councils alternates between an EU representative and a member of 
government of the respective third country. Association Committees, on the other hand, meet on 
the level of senior officials (again Council, Commission and third country) and are responsible 
for the technical implementation of agreements. Furthermore, association agreements allow for 
the establishment of more specialised subcommittees, for example on “justice and security” or 
“human rights” (Lannon & Van Elsuwege 2004: 63). 
Finally, the MEDA programme had been set up from the EU side to allow for external 
assistance and, hence, it also needed an accordingly institutional mechanism to administer these 
financial funds. Within the MEDA I framework (1996-2000) the EU had established two 
regulatory  committees under comitology to monitor the work of the Commission: a special 
Med-Committee to review the spending of EC budget funds, and an Article 14 Committee with 
competences to adopt decisions regarding resources of the European Investment Bank.  For 
MEDA II (from 2000 onwards) the form of these committees changed to management 
committees under comitology. The difference is that the former committees are least flexible, 
are composed of higher grades of civil servants, and are those where the member states have the 
most power, as the Commission has to secure a qualified majority of member states for their 
administrative legislative drafts. In management committees civil servants representing the 
member states deliver an opinion on the Commission’s draft, but they can only block the 
Commission’s proposal by a qualified majority vote (see e.g. Philippart 2003: 2).  
Next to the EU member states and representatives of third countries represented in these various 
fora, the EMP does not have its own secretariat to prepare meetings at various levels, but this 
task is generally directed to the European Commission, apart from few exceptions where the 
rotating presidency of the Council takes the lead (Philippart 2003: 203-204). Originally this task 
of secretariat was only allocated to the Commission interim, but in the end it stayed with it for 
the EMP (Interview No. 25 Austrian MfA). Parliaments, civil society as well as NGOs are 
welcomed to participate in the EMP and to create their own institutional bridges, but do not 
have any power and are not directly integrated in the institutional set up (Smith, H. 2002: 160) 
 
Regarding the EU actors within the EMP, the main document clearly defining the tasks and 
relationship between the various is, interestingly enough, the Common Strategy on the 
Mediterranean. When analysed thoroughly it becomes quite clear that this document is not a 
strategy in terms of setting priorities and goals for EU external action, but its main aim seems to 
be to structure the EU internal governance system. According to the CSM and as shown in 
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several summit conclusions, the European Council provides the strategic guidelines and 
direction also for the EMP. Additionally, the European Council laid down in the CSM, that each 
Presidency of the Council should present its priorities for the implementation of the CSM (Art. 
33 CSM). The Council is responsible for the actual implementation by adopting Common 
Positions and Common Actions. The main Council configuration dealing with the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership is the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), but 
the foreign ministers are of course supported in their work by the multi-layered system within 
the Council structures (for general discussion of role of Council Working groups see Fouilleux, 
Maillard & Smith 2005; for the role of Council Working groups in CFSP see Juncos & 
Pomorska 2006).  
For the Mediterranean the most important working group is the COMAG/COMEM, an 
integrated Mashrek/Maghreb Working Party of the Council of Ministers of the European Union 
that deals with all issues related to the CFSP and Community Competences towards the 
Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria) and Mashreq (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Palestinian Authority and Syria)80.  This working group meets at least twice a week, and its main 
responsibility is to draft and formulate Council conclusions, prepare the agenda for the 
Association Councils with the respective third countries and for the committees, and to more 
generally discuss EU statements towards the region (Interview No. 1, PR Austria). Furthermore, 
the COMAG/COMEM working group representatives have often also participated in the EMP 
committee meetings, before this was changed in a way that there are only present of direct 
competences of member states and political issues are discussed (Interview No. 1, PR Austria). 
Another important task of the working group is the drafting of mandates for the negotiation 
position of the Commission, who is accompanied during such negotiations by the rotating 
presidency and by Council secretariat officials. Dossiers prepared by the COMAG/COMEM 
working group are then send up in the Council structure to be formally approved by the GAERC 
– either without discussion as A-item, or as B-item where the foreign ministers would still have 
to solve remaining issues through negotiations and debate. The latter hardly happened in regard 
of the EU Mediterranean Policy. 
During the Helsinki European Council in 1999 member states had established three permanent 
bodies that should support EU foreign policy-making, and the European Security and Defence 
Policy in more concrete terms, of which the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is also at 
few occasions involved in EU policy-making towards the Mediterranean. The PSC consists of 
separate ambassadors from the member states, and the idea is that all dossiers with a security 
aspect are debated first by this special intergovernmental body, before they are passed to the 
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 See for example an explanation provided by the Swedish Presidency (2nd half 2009) at 
http://www.se2009.eu/en/meetings_news/2009/12/1/mashrek_maghreb_working_party_comag  
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permanent representatives of the EU member states in COREPER (Juncos & Reynolds 2007; 
Duke 2005; Dijkstra 2008; Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra & Maurer 2010: 9). The rationale behind 
this set-up was that COREPER had been overloaded with work, and this way dossiers should 
already be finalised at a lower level. However, the first years after the establishment of the PSC 
showed quite a lot of rivalry between the two institutions, especially between certain 
ambassadors, as PSC ambassador felt treated as junior and secondary, while the permanent 
representatives felt overruled and played with at some occasions. In regard of the EU policy 
towards the Mediterranean, the more politicised aspects of the Middle East Peace Process pass 
all first through the PSC, while the day-to-day issues of the EMP normally go directly into 
COREPER (Interview No. 21, PR UK).   
Within the Commission, it is mainly DG Relex who is responsible for managing the relations 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The desk officers for the Mediterranean countries 
are located in unit F, where F1 deals with more general Euro-Mediterranean and regional issues, 
while the desk officers of the specific countries are located in unit F481. Additionally sectoral 
DGs like Trade or Agriculture also have subunits that deal with geographical questions, 
although the role of the desk officers in DG Relex is also to coordinate a common position of 
the Commission ranging across sectoral differences. Although the role of Commission seems 
marginal when analysing the CSM82, it is in general terms perceived by many authors as  
“the most important actor in Union policy towards the Mediterranean - taking responsibility for 
implementing the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and for promoting the Euro-Mediterranean 
Free Trade area” (Bicchi 2003: 17). 
Before the EMP, scholars reported that the entrepreneurship and role of the European 
Commission was limited, as it “kept a low profile” (Philippart 2003: 203-204; Salama 2002: 4, 
9; Smith, H. 2002: 160), and when it briefly took some leadership this only lead to a half-
backed project of the Renovated Mediterranean policy in 1990. However, that changed 
dramatically with the implementation of the EMP where the Commission plays a decisive and 
unchallenged role in basket II, the economic and financial basket. Its main responsibility lies 
within the programming as well as drafting and adopting of country and regional strategy 
papers, national and regional indicative programmes and annual financing. The Council 
monitors the work of the Commission through the above mentioned comitology committees. 
Both, the Commission and the Council are responsible for ensuring coherence of EU policies 
(Philippart 2003: 203-204; Smith, H. 2002: 162). 
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 The only reference to the Commission is Art. 34 CSM: “The Commission shall contribute to the above within its 
competences”. 
 142 
However, in terms of content, the role of the European actors differs in regard to the policy area. 
In security and political aspects, the Council together with the High Representative is the most 
important actor on EU level. Although the Commission is associated within these policy areas, 
it keeps a low profile (Smith, H. 2002: 163-164). In trade and aid aspects, the Commission has 
the main competence to negotiate with third countries and represent the EU.  
Compared to the other actors, the influence of the European Parliament (EP) is quite marginal 
within the EMP framework. Its only power lies within its competences for the EC budget, as 
well as it may delay trade and association agreements. As the EP emphasises and shows its 
concerns for human rights and democracy promotion, it often asks for a stronger use of 
conditionality clauses. The EP showed its concerns for human rights abuses strongly in 1992, 
when it delayed the agreement to the Moroccan financial protocol for ten months (Smith, C. & 
Latheenmaki 1998: 155; Salama 2002: 5), what also happened with the forth financial protocols 
for Syria and Morocco (see e.g. European Parliament 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004b, 2005b). The EP 
criticises the EMP for its lack on using political conditionality, its weak instruments and means, 
its slow development, the exclusion of civil society participation and the exclusion of some 
countries in the Mediterranean (primarily Libya). It repeatedly asks the Commission to make an 
annual report on the situation of human rights in the partner countries, as the EP is concerned by 
the fact “that the human rights aspects of the Barcelona process are still woefully deficient and 
that the situation in many countries shows no sign of improvement” (Salama 2002: 9). 
Furthermore, the EP also criticises the southern EU member states who wanted an exclusion of 
free movement of persons and of agricultural products from the partnership, as these issues 
contradict their national interests (Salama 2002: 13). The establishment of a Free Trade Area 
would still worsen this asymmetric liberalisation, so that many critics predict, that the EU would 
have the most advantages of such a customs union (Fernández, H. A. & Youngs 2005: 16-17; 
European Commission & EuropeAid Cooperation Office 2005: 2). 
5.1.4. Obsolete after only ten Years? Achievements and Shortcomings of the EMP 
When the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was established in 1995, it was celebrated by the 
European Union as a big step and important improvement for the relations of the EU with its 
Southern Neighbours. Ten years afterwards in 2005, the tenth anniversary of the EMP was still 
celebrated, but critical voices also predicted that the EMP would soon be substituted by the new 
policy framework of the ENP. The Common Strategy on the Mediterranean was by many 
already considered as an indirect but clear sign of the discomfort and discontent of politicians 
from EU member states but also partner countries. These rumours even intensified when the 
debates about a potential new policy framework “Wider Europe” took off, although the first 
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ideas for “Wider Europe” were meant to deal with the East and not with the South, as was 
shown in chapter 4.  
In February 2005, the EP published another resolution on the Mediterranean where it 
emphasises the importance of the Mediterranean for the EU and the necessity of the EMP to 
face the shared “challenges of peace, stability, terrorism and security, mutual understanding, 
the fight against trafficking in people, and. prosperity” (European Parliament 2005a: 270). It 
underlines that the EU policy “must follow a coherent and common regional approach” and 
repeatedly “deplores the failure to comply with the human rights clause in the Euro-
Mediterranean agreements”. But not only the EP, also the Commission is realistic when 
evaluating the last ten years of the EMP (European Commission & EuropeAid Cooperation 
Office 2005: 2). Especially in the area of human rights and democracy it acknowledges that the 
progress within the EMP is slow, also because the partner countries did not always fully 
implement the principles of the agreements (European Commission & EuropeAid Cooperation 
Office 2005: 3-5). The Commission highlights improvements in these areas as well as 
sustainable economic growth and education as future short and medium-term challenges, what it 
wants to be further discussed at future special conferences, like a “Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference on Human rights and Democracy” that took place in 2006 (Council of the European 
Union 2005: 54).  
Already in 2003 the Commission had published a Communication entitled “Reinvigorating EU 
actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean partners” (European 
Commission 2003b) that provided ten guidelines of how to enhance the positive impact on 
human rights and democracy promotion in the neighbourhood, highlighting the positive impact 
of a comprehensive security approach that allows for a wide conception of security. In a similar 
vein, Solana in his speech as High Representative in regard of the 10th anniversary of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in November 2005 emphasised:  
“Above all it was a political act. […] The Euro-Med Partnership is not the only international 
framework for multilateral co-operation with this region. But it is the most developed and in 
many ways preferred. The reason is that it promotes both security and reform simultaneously. We 
reject those who insist that we should sequence things, saying that either conflict resolution or 
political reform must come first. Barcelona is about pursuing both reform and security at the 
same time.” (Solana 2005) 
Keeping in mind that Solana was Spanish foreign minister at the time when the EMP was set-
up, he clearly emphasises the interesting character of the EMP as a framework that brings 
together different aspects, ranging from trade, over political issues to cultural aspects. It is, 
however, exactly this combining element of merging political reforms and economic 
development that is also raised as a major criticism in the academic assessment.  
 144 
The argument of these critics mainly runs along the lines that the EMP policies of the European 
Union are based upon a false assumption about “the expected causal link between economic and 
political liberalization” which constituted “such a central element of the Barcelona Process 
philosophy” but “has not materialized in practice” (Kienle 2005: 25). Kienle (Kienle 2005: 31) 
demonstrates in his analysis about economic and political liberalisation, that the former does not 
necessarily have to be followed by the latter. He criticises that most authors forget the important 
argument, that economic reform reinforces societal differentiation and therefore creates the need 
for new conflict resolution mechanisms. In his analysis of Morocco, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, 
Egypt and Tunisia he shows that the undertaken economic reforms sometimes coincide with 
political change, but that “the political reform that has taken place has been kept below the 
threshold that would indicate regime transformation” and also led to a reconfiguration or 
modernisation of the authoritarian regimes (Kienle 2005: 32-34). Kienle concludes that there are 
positive signs of political liberalisation to be observed in Morocco and Syria, but he also 
emphasises that there is no evidence whatsoever that would suggest that those were trigger or 
even just supported by the EMP and are based on a sustainable development rather than just 
marking single events (Kienle 2005: 28-31) (Kienle 2005: 33). Economic liberalisation can only 
impact on political transformation when it favours the emergence of new power centres, that are 
able and willing to challenge the ruling regime but which are not simply a by-product of the 
former. The EMP builds on these wrong assumptions of a causal link between economic 
liberalisation and political change, without creating such necessary new power centres. If the 
EU really wants political change in these countries, it is not enough to foster trade and economic 
reform (see also Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 156; Fernández, H. A. Y., Richard 2005: 15). Aid, 
trade and development policies have to be accompanied by a focus on political reform, 
favouring the emergence of such independent power centres (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 163; 
Aliboni 2005a: 48-49, 51-58). At the same time, new power centres could challenge the political 
authority in the third countries, what seems rather counterproductive to the EU objectives of 
creating security and stability, as it can not be reassured that these new power centres would 
also be keen on working with the European Union.  
Next to this criticism about the general rational behind the EMP, there are also a few other 
aspects that are repeatedly criticised, which are the failing record of human rights and 
democracy promotion, the ignorance towards conflicts, and the lack of providing a profound 
reform of the EU’s internal organisation that would allow effective and coherent action.  
First, one of the most salient issues of concern is the record in promoting human rights and 
democracy, as these are perceived as disappointing within the EMP, or as Aliboni formulates it 
“indeed mostly disappointing” (Aliboni 2005a: 48). Authors criticise that human rights and 
democracy are mentioned as objectives within the EMP but that they are not considered as “the 
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EMP’s most important or primary objective” (Fernández, H. A. & Youngs 2005). In addition, 
negative conditionality is not even considered, as the EC/EU does not have any experience in 
withholding or withdrawing external assistance, while at the same time positive incentives are 
only used sporadically and without any transparent reward system (Aliboni 2005a: 56; Smith, 
H. 2002: 156; Piening 1997: 81; Salama 2002: 18-19). 
Second, observers often highlight that the EMP was in the end neither able to contribute 
positively to the Middle East Peace Process conflict resolution nor to tackle any other conflict in 
the region, like the Western Sahara. The Israel-Palestine conflict is seen by the EU as part of its 
Mediterranean policy, what hinders progress in its relations with other countries of the region 
(see among others Philippart 2003: 1; Salama 2002: 2), while others at least emphasise that the 
EMP is one of the few fora where the conflicting parties meet on a regular basis and cooperate 
(Abellán 2004: 290). At the same time, EU officials involved in the EMP process for example 
elaborate quite openly that the Western Sahara conflict is not considered as suitable to be dealt 
with within the EMP, but that all involved parties agree that this conflict should be dealt with by 
the UN (Interview No. 13, CS). Creating stability and supporting the efforts of the UN seem 
important aims of the EMP, but direct conflict resolution would hamper the whole Barcelona 
process and might endanger already achieved results. Hence, conflicts like the Western Sahara 
are kept separately, and the EMP is mainly considered as supporting the Middle East Peace 
Process indirectly but there are not aspirations of getting involved more strongly within the 
EMP framework (Interview No. 10, COM; Interview No. 13, CS). 
Last, some authors also emphasise that the institutional set-up of the EMP seems not too 
straightforward and often confusing, especially for outsiders and partner countries:  
“The EU should define clear leadership roles in both the EMP and the CSM in order to articulate 
the declared priority it attaches to the Mediterranean. It should identify the actors and/or agencies 
that are expected to champion the region in general and the different dimensions of policy in 
particular. There is a growing requirement for the EU's Mediterranean partners to find a specific 
point of contact within the EU not only to channel their concerns in more positive ways, but also 
to respond to specific requests.” (Abellán 2004: 291) 
The Common Strategy for the Mediterranean was adopted to clarify the working of the EMP 
and the interaction of the different actors, but it does not at all represent and catch the formal 
and informal dynamics of EU decision making. The Commission is only mentioned once in the 
whole document, although it has the primary role in implementing the EMP in the third 
countries through programming and project management, while for example the policy-making 
process within the Council is only described superficially. Abellán goes even a step further in 
criticizing that in the end the EMP does not follow any EU aspiration or common EU interest 
but that member states just use the framework and support it when their own interests are in line 
with the EMP aims. This makes the EMP an ambitious project on paper, but as soon as it would 
 146 
come to the adoption of join actions or a common position to put these aims into practice, the 
EU member states would never be able to agree (Abellán 2004: 291).  
Apart from these points of criticism, many authors, nevertheless, also emphasis that the positive 
effects of the EMP must not be ignored as well. The Partnership survived, moved slowly 
forward and created a framework for cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean 
partners that at least tried to apply a comprehensive security approach by bringing together 
economics, political issues as well as cultural aspects. Creating different baskets in itself again 
did not allow for the aspired cross-fertilisation but at least the EMP was one single framework 
that structured the EU relationships of the third countries in the South. Furthermore, the EMP 
was built on a multilateral approach, emphasising also the regional cooperation between its 
partner countries, although in reality the success in this regard seems minor. So have the 
Maghreb countries for example ratified the Agadir Agreement in February 2004 that sets up a 
free trade agreement between Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt (Kienle 2005; Aliboni 
2005a; Fernández, H. A. & Youngs 2005), although in reality trade relations between the 
conflict-driven neighbours Morocco and Algeria for example are still very rare. Other 
commentators highlight that the rationale of the EMP works towards a long-term impact, so that 
evaluating its impact after only ten years seems inappropriate, especially when taken into 
consideration with how many states are targeted by the EMP (Fernández, H. A. & Youngs 
2005: 158). Additionally, EU actors involved in the EMP processes and mechanisms also 
concluded that the EMP is more important for establishing a good relationship with the 
neighbours than often perceived from people that do not work within this governance system, 
because its most important contribution is the creation of all different kinds of networks, where 
the cooperation works especially well on lower, and often more technical levels (Interview No. 
11, COM).  
5.2. Looking towards the East: the EU Relations with the Southern Caucasus 
In strong contrast to the dense and long-lasting relationship with the Southern Mediterranean, 
the EU relations with the East only started after the fall of the Berlin wall and the declarations of 
independence of the respective countries. The countries of the Southern Caucasus, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia only caught the attention of the EU and its member states in the late 
1990s and even more profoundly since 2003. Mayer came to the conclusion that until 1997 it 
was mainly the Commission who was shaping and providing impetus for the EU relationship 
with the Southern Caucasus, while from 1998 onwards member states showed an increasing 
interest, because they had negotiated the PCA, but also because some felt discontent to provide 
the financial means but do not have any say in the actual content of the relationship (Mayer 
2006: 153-154). All three countries of the Southern Caucasus had declared independence from 
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the Soviet Union in the course of 1991, but the first EC/EU attempts to establish a relationship 
with those countries were rather uncoordinated and lacked a comprehensive strategy towards the 
region. After this first stage that was to a large extent dominated by the Commission and its 
technical assistance programme, the cooperation became more strategic and security-orientated 
from 2003 onwards, what explains the set-up of a Special Representative and the conduct of the 
first EU rule of law mission to Georgia.  
5.2.1. The Emergence of EU Interests and increasing Cooperation 
The first steps in the EU cooperation with the Southern Caucasus mainly focused on supporting 
the transformation process that especially after the declaration of interdependence was said to be 
crucial to avoid turmoil and instability (Mayer 2006: 13). However, the EU support towards 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia was rather reactive in these first years of cooperation and did 
not follow any concrete strategy or clear objectives. This can also be observed in the allocation 
of EU external assistance towards the Southern Caucausus until 2000. Table 9 provides an 
overview of the total EU external assistance towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, where it 
differentiates between the ‘normal’ TACIS allocations and the extraordinary allocations that 
mostly cover humanitarian assistance in the framework of ECHO, especially under their food 
security programme, and other extraordinary assistance measures. The Technical Assistance for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) was the main financial instrument set-up in 
1991 to support reforms in the former Soviet countries. Two different observations are 
interesting in regard of this table. 
First of all, this table shows that most of the funds allocated to the Southern Caucasus were 
distributed as reactive measures to humanitarian situations, which have to be considered ad-hoc 
measures that did not follow any scheme of the normally much standardised planning of EU 
external assistance allocation. The percentage of the main instrument itself to support the three 
countries in their reform process, TACIS only constituted a small share (approx 20%) of the 
overall financial allocations in the timeframe between 1991 and 2000, what on the one hand also 
implies the missing of any strategic planning nor any sustainability of the financial assistance.  
Secondly, when comparing the figure for TACIS with the ENPI allocations for 2007-2010, it 
shows that the regular EU external assistance to the South Caucasus countries increased steadily 
since the first years of cooperation in the early 1990s. On the one hand, this is an effect of the 
restructuring of the financial instruments in a way that external assistance could be better 
planned and allocated and that the ENPI constitutes the main financial budget line next to few 
thematic instruments. On the other hand, however, it is also quite clear that the overall 
assistance increased (see also Annex II for a detailed overview of EU external assistance 
towards Georgia between 1992-2006). For 2008, for example the total EU external assistance 
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for Georgia amounts to EUR 181,9 million, of which however only EUR 35,4 million are 
reserved for the EU Monitoring Mission that was set-up in October 2008 (for more details see 
European Commission 2008b).  
Table 9: EC external assistance, 1991-2000 to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia 
in Million EUR 
 
 
TACIS had started in 1991, and was replaced only in 2007 by the ENPI, although some projects 
had still financial means allocated in 2008 as well. The original objectives as outlined in the 
TACIS regulation were to “support the process of transition to market economies and 
democratic societies” (Frenz & European Commission), and the first years until 1999 the 
instrument was mainly “demand driven”, implying that financial resources were distributed 
after requests from CIS ministries and mostly used for small-scall projects (Frenz & European 
Commission), but that there was no clear strategy or a-priori-planning that influenced the 
allocation of external assistance. This changed with a new revised TACIS regulation in 1999 
(Council of the European Union 2000) that followed a “dialogue driven” rationale where “EC 
priorities were equally discussed as were national proposals and priorities” (Frenz & European 
Commission). The objective of the revised TACIS instrument was slightly changed to “a 
programme to promote the transition to market economy and to reinforce democracy and the 
rule of law” (see Art. 1 of Council of the European Union 2000). Furthermore, the idea of 
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“national ownership” had been introduced, meaning that external assistance would only be 
effective if the recipient country identified with the supported measures and gained ownership 
over the process (Frenz & European Commission).  
This more structured and strategic approach of the EU is observable in the external assistance to 
the region but also accounts for the more general development of EU policy-making towards the 
region and can be best explained by the set-up of a formal relationship between the EU and 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively, with the ratification of Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (see for example PCA EU-Georgia 1999).  Those agreements had 
already been negotiated in 1996, and finally were in force in 1999. Together with TACIS, the 
PCAs are considered “to become an increasingly strategic instrument” (Frenz & European 
Commission) of the EU towards the South Caucasus region. But it was not only the 
institutionalisation of cooperation, but also a shift in EU member states attention that changed 
the perception of the Southern Caucasus as salient neighbourhood region. It was for the first 
time during the 2192nd General Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg in June 1999 that the 
Council took notice of the Southern Caucasus and elaborated upon its importance in terms of 
investments and security related issues (Mayer 2006: 140). In the mid of the 1990s the Southern 
Caucasus, and especially Azerbaijan, liberalised their energy markets, allowing national oil 
companies to negotiate contracts with international companies. This liberalisation brought a 
new interest of EU member states towards the Southern Caucasus in terms of energy security 
and transit routes (Mayer 2006). In addition, a change in perception towards new security 
threats like illegal  immigration, organised crime and environmental pollution raised awareness 
in the EU towards the salience of stable neighbours in the Southern Caucasus (Mayer 2006: 14). 
While it was not possible to get any insights in trade relations with the EU in the first ten years 
of independence of the Southern Caucasus countries, the data presented in table 10 for 2005, 
2006 and 2007 show some interesting patterns that give at least an impression of the trade 
relationship between the EU-27 and the Southern Caucasus.   
Table 10: EU-Exports to and EU-Imports from Southern Caucasus 2005-2007 
EXPORTS from EU to .. 
 
Value in million Euro % of total EU trade  
 
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 Rank 2009 
Armenia 419 478 604 0,04 0,04 0,05 101 
Azerbaijan 1495 1955 1593 0,14 0,17 0,13 60 
Georgia 681 926 1090 0,06 0,08 0,09 77 
IMPORTS to EU from ... 
 
Value in billion Euro % of total EU trade  
 
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 Rank 2009 
Armenia 514 339 354 0,05 0,03 0,025 118 
Azerbaijan 2508 5448 7349 0,21 0,40 0,51 33 
Georgia 276 471 459 0,02 0,035 0,03 83 
(Data taken from DG Trade 2010a, b, c) 
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As table 10 shows, Azerbaijan has the strongest trade relationship with the EU-27. While it only 
accounts for approx. 0,15% of the total EU-27 trade, the EU is the biggest import partner for 
Azerbaijan, accounting for 30% of all imports, followed by Turkey (19%) and Russia (17%). 
This is link is even stronger when it comes to the major export partners of Azerbaijan, where 
48,3 of all exports go to the EU-27, followed by India (11%) and the US (9,5%) (DG Trade 
2010b). However, when taking into consideration the kind of trade goods, it shows clearly that 
this strong share of exports to the EU are mainly because of energy, as 98,8% of all EU imports 
from Azerbaijan are mineral fuels, while the EU exports to Azerbaijan mainly machinery and 
transport equipment (44,7%) and manufactured articles (20,6%).  
A similar pattern is visible in the EU-27 trade with Georgia. While its share on EU imports and 
exports seem rather marginal compared to the overall EU trade, the EU is an important trade 
partner from the perspective of Georgia. The EU-27 are Georgia’s main import partners 
accounting for 28% of all imports, followed by Turkey (16,9%) and Azerbaijan (9,7%). And 
also in terms of exports, the EU-27 hold the biggest share of exports from Georgia with 33,6%, 
followed by Turkey (18,2%) and Azerbaijan (12,5%). Interestingly, Russia only accounts for 
7,4% of all imports to and 1,4% of all exports from Georgia. Again, a large share of 50,2% of 
the EU imports from Georgia are categorised as mineral fuels, and 21,2% as crude materials. In 
the opposite direction, Georgia mainly imports machinery and transport equipment (30%), and 
mineral fuels (23,8%) from the EU-27 (DG Trade 2010c).  
Armenia is the least important trading partner for the EU-27, but again the EU is an important 
partner from the viewpoint of the third country. The EU-27 account for 27,4% of all imports to 
Armenia, in comparison to second strongest partner Russia with 24,2%. Even more importantly, 
the EU-27 are Armenia’s main export partners with 44,6%, followed by Russia with 15,4% of 
all exports. The EU mainly imports manufactured goods (81,6%), while its biggest share of 
exports is made up of machinery and transport equipment (41,1%). (DG Trade 2010a).  
These trade relations show that in global terms the Southern Caucasus countries are not a too 
important market for the EU-27, with the exception of the important import of mineral fuel from 
Azerbaijan. At the same time, already at the end of the 1990s it was very clear in the EU 
rhetoric that stabilising and liberalising the markets of these three third countries seemed 
necessary to support them on their way to reforms and stabilisation.  
With the entering into force of the PCAs in 1999, the relationship between EU and the Southern 
Caucasus countries was put on a more formal footage, what the Commission announced as a 
“new stage of a strategic cooperation” (translated from Mayer 2006: 185). However, the PCAs 
in itself did not provide the desired push for a new cooperation, as they according to analysts 
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lacked incentives and political will (Ghazaryn 2008: 7). In the academic literature, a few reasons 
are identified for this lack of PCAs to provide a strong impetus.  
First, the PCAs strongly relied on a regional approach in the EU cooperation that the third 
countries themselves did not really appreciate. The EU right from the beginning treated the 
Southern Caucasus as one region, although local politicians as well as academics strongly 
emphasised that there is neither a convincing desire for regional cooperation nor a regional 
identity (Ghazaryn 2008: 6; see also Simão & Freire 2008). The conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh that even resulted in violence and war in 1994 put the relations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan on hold and is still not really resolved (Mooradian 1999; for more background on the 
conflict and conflict resolution attempts see International Crisis Group 2004a; International 
Crisis Group 2004b). In Georgia, the fight of the two autonomous regions of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia for being recognised as independent states and the inability of Georgia to integrate 
these regions into national politics, led increasingly to tensions and conflict, that in the end 
culminated in the August war with Russia in August 2008 (International Crisis Group 2010b, a).  
Secondly, the PCAs were not country-specific at all, but treated the three countries totally 
similar without recognising their different needs or national emphasis on reforms. All three 
countries had reached a certain but promising degree of economic stability and economic 
growth by the end of the 1990s, but their national directions especially in foreign policy 
orientation varied considerably. Azerbaijan was considered a rather authoritarian regime that 
was able to attract foreign investment and trade with oil (Ghazaryn 2008: 5). Armenia also had 
in place a more authoritarian regime compare to other former Communist countries in Eastern 
Europe. From the three third countries in the Southern Caucasus Georgia showed the most 
reform orientated aspirations after the Rose Revolution in 200383, working hard on decreasing 
corruption and gaining economic stability, but its progress and success remained fragile, what 
showed clearly during the war with Russia in August 2008. However, the PCAs that the EU 
negotiated did not take into account these differences in orientations, or as Ghazaryn described 
in a rather sarcastic tone:  
“The content and scope of the PCAs with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, would reveal little 
difference, that is, the name of the country in signing the agreement.” (Ghazaryn 2008: 7) 
Thirdly, the framework of the PCA was considered as too weak, too less encompassing and too 
superficial to support the necessary reform processes. Compared to the Association Agreements 
that had been put in place with the Southern Mediterranean Countries, the Cooperation Councils 
                                                     
83
 The Rose Revolution took place in Georgia in November 2003. After strong public protests after disputed 
parliamentary elections, President Eduard Shevardnadze resigned and allowed for a peaceful change in power. 
Following up on these events, presidential elections were held in 2004 and the current president Mikheil 
Saakashvili took the office of president.   
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that had been established with the PCAs were “not entitled to take decisions imposing 
obligations on the signatories, diminishing the importance of this institution” (Ghazaryn 2008: 
6). The institutional framework for cooperation end of the 1990s was not strong enough to 
ensure for clear and effective strategic guidance, and it took five more years because this EU 
approach towards the Southern Caucasus changed. Therefore, the EU revised its approach 
towards the region from 2004 onwards, identifying rule of law, support for civil society, fight 
against poverty and conflict prevention as the priorities of the cooperation (Helly 2006: 88). 
This revision of the EU relationship with the Southern Caucasus by 2003/04 resulted in an 
increasing cooperation in terms of quantity and intensity, but it also gained in terms of profile 
and focus (Mayer 2006: 248). It was in the area of CFSP that another actor was added to the 
institutional set-up to upgrade EU-Southern Caucasus relations: the special representative 
(EUSR) for the Southern Caucasus. His main task was to keep a close link with the local actors 
in the Southern Caucasus and to contribute to the ongoing conflict resolution. Next to the 
appointment of an EU special representative, the shift towards new priorities can also be 
considered as one factor contributing to the EU decision in July 2004 to launch the first EU rule 
of law missing in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to Georgia 
that was named EUJUST Themis. The mission itself was running for one year, and its main 
objective was to support Georgian authorities in their reform attempts of the judicial system.  
As already discussed in chapter 4, the Southern Caucasus countries were at the beginning not at 
all considered for the new policy framework with the neighbours. The Wider Europe 
Communication of the Commission in March 2003 even explicitly excluded them from the new 
initiative, arguing that they “fall outside the geographical coverage of this initiative for the time 
being.” (European Commission 2003c: 4). It was the European Parliament, and especially its 
EU Committee on Foreign Affairs that put the Southern Caucasus on the agenda for the Wider 
Europe initiative in September and November 2003 as well as again in February 2004 (EU 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 2003; European Parliament 2003, 2004a), asking vigorously for 
incorporating the Southern Caucasus in the new Neighbourhood Initiative. It was in reaction to 
the Rose revolution in Georgia that in January 2004 the External Relations Council asked the 
Commission and the HR to put forward considerations of how to incorporate Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia into the ENP (External Relations Council 2004a), before the Southern 
Caucasus countries were officially incorporated into the ENP Strategy Paper in May 2004. 
From 2005 onwards, the main topics in EU-Southern Caucasus cooperation were Justice and 
Home Affairs, energy and transport (Interview No. 14, CS). Since April 2009 the European 
Union is conducting negotiations about the launch of a Mobility Partnership with Georgia that 
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should include visa facilitation and readmission agreements. Similar discussions take place with 
Armenia and Azerbaijan84 
5.2.2. EU actors and their Competences towards the Southern Caucasus 
The EU relationship with the Southern Caucasus countries was in comparison to the 
Mediterranean partner countries in the South not as long-lasting and comprehensive, but 
especially after the re-focus of EU objectives in 2003 towards rule of law, good governance and 
conflict resolution, an increased number of actors was involved in shaping the EU foreign 
policy-making towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
Before 1999, it was primarily the Commission who shaped the EU relations with the Southern 
Caucasus countries by being in charge of the technical assistance via the TACIS programme. 
Member states had delegated this task of coordinating TACIS entirely to the Commission, as it 
had proven successful in the implementation of the assistance to the CEEC countries via the 
PHARE programme. Furthermore, Commission President Delors saw this engagement of the 
Commission in TACIS as an appropriate way to strengthen the role of the Commission. In 
addition, the Commission had years of experience in providing development aid and structural 
assistance programmes, and a similar more intergovernmental coordination within the Council 
structures was just not imaginable (Mayer 2006: 233-234). The Southern Caucasus was just 
sporadically discussed in the Council meetings in reaction to specific events, but it was from 
1998 onwards that member states approached the Southern Caucasus in a more comprehensive 
manner and considered a more strategic approach. Mayer85 argues that the interest of the 
Council increased because member states had been involved in negotiating the PCAs what made 
them consider the region more closely. Furthermore, crisis prevention emerged increasingly as a 
topic, and the Southern Caucasus became a focus of attention in this regard as well (Mayer 
2006: 153-154).  
Despite the more political interest of member states towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
the Commission was in charge of the technical assistance programmes and implementation, 
especially via its EC delegations on the ground in third countries. The latter provided the 
Commission, and more specifically the country desk officers in DG Relex with important 
background information and updates from the ground, and although after the Amsterdam Treaty 
also the HR was supposed to receive periodical political updates from the delegations (Mayer 
2006: 36), it was very clear that the Commission had an important information advantage 
                                                     
84
 For updated information on these current negotiations see the Commission Website of DG Home Affairs at 
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/external/external_neighbourhood_caucuses_en.htm  
85
 Mayer investigated the EU policy towards the Southern Caucasus until 2004 in his doctoral thesis, focusing 
especially on the institutional relationship between different EU actors. For a more detailed account of the EC/EU 
approach before 2004 see Mayer 2006. 
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because of this institutional linkage. The EC delegations play a major role in the identification, 
planning and supervision of projects, while since 2001 DG Relex was tasked to give political 
direction for this form of external assistance, by drafting the multi-annual programming 
documents. The EuropeAid Cooperation Office, on the other hand, was from 2001 onwards 
responsible for managing the project cycle and for the drafting of annual programmes (Frenz & 
European Commission). 
In his analysis of the EU relations with the Southern Caucasus until 2004, Mayer concludes that 
the cooperation and coordination between Commission and Council are institutionally crucial 
for EU foreign policy-making towards the Southern Caucasus. His main research finding is that 
the role of the Commission in the EU cooperation with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
should not be underestimated, as it is indeed able to shape the policy according to its own 
interests and ideas. He argues that in the realm of selecting and implementing projects the 
Commission has a considerable room for manoeuvring, especially in regard of negotiating the 
different programmes with the third countries. These projects could formally be rejected by the 
TACIS comitology committee in the Council, but getting a required qualified majority of 
member states is hardly possible, considering the different perceptions of the member states of 
the way the EU policy towards the Southern Caucasus should look like. Hence, in total, there is 
a considerable asymmetrical distribution of information and resources, which the Commission 
knows to play well (Mayer 2006: 241). At the same time Mayer, however, also emphasises that 
the Commission can not just do whatever it wants, but that the interaction between the EU 
actors and their way of negotiating a certain approach or policy is crucial, and that the stance of 
the different actors also shows the importance of underlying institutionalised norms and 
behaviour.  
While the Commission’s role in implementation and project management rather increased with 
more planned financial assistance allocated to the Southern Caucasus countries, it is in the area 
of policy formulation where it had to share its influence increasingly with the member states via 
the Council of ministers from 2003/04 onwards. Conclusions of the External Relations Councils 
can not be considered legislative acts in the traditional sense like they are used in EU public 
policy-making, but Mayer explains that they, of course, have politically a binding force for the 
Commission. Such conclusions of the Council, however, mostly incorporated rather general 
assessments and suggestions for the Southern Caucasus countries and rarely precise 
instructions. Therefore, the Commission took the Council conclusions into account when 
drafting strategy papers, but in drafting these documents it had a vast amount of leeway to set 
priorities according to its own discretion (Mayer 2006: 39). The Commission, hence, can be 
considered as an important “animator” and “policy entrepreneur” in regard of the EU relations 
with the Southern Caucasus (Mayer 2006: 242), although Mayer also accounts for its weaker 
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role in the realm of CFSP. This in combination with the more comprehensive security approach 
of the European Union as outlined in the European Security Strategy in 2003, diffused the 
agenda-setting and policy-shaping influence of different actors. Especially the European 
Security Strategy confirms this new rise of attention that the EU and its member states should 
play towards the Southern Caucasus:  
 “It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe.  We need 
to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while 
tackling political problems there.  We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the 
problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.” 
(European Council 2003b: 8) 
The European Security Strategy was officially endorsed by the Thessaloniki European Council 
in December 2003, although it was the High Representative Javier Solana, and especially his 
Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs in the General Secretariat of the 
Council, Robert Cooper who had drafted and put forward this document. Its approach and tone 
in regard of the Southern Caucasus provide a good account for the new approach of the Council 
to the EU cooperation with the Eastern neighbours.  
Within the Council of Ministers it is again a working group that at the most technical and less 
political level prepares the negotiations between member states. The Council Working party on 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) is responsible for EU relations with Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, as well as in the Central Asian 
countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkeminstan and Uzbekistan. It meets twice a 
week, and next to one representative of each member state and the rotating presidency chairing 
the meeting, it is mostly the respective Commission geographic desk officer who represents the 
Commission at this meetings (Interview No. 19, COM). All dossiers that are submitted to the 
Council in relation to the three Southern Caucasus countries are for the first time dealt with 
within this working party, before they move up to COREPER, or to PSC if the dossiers 
incorporates any highly political CFSP or ESDP related issues86.  
It has already discussed been discussed earlier that the Amsterdam Treaty incorporated vital 
changes in the area of CFSP that also contributed positively to the set-up of the ESDP. 
Observers agree that the most consequential adaptation with the Amsterdam Treaty was the set-
up of the post of the High representative for the CFSP, and especially the appointment of Javier 
                                                     
86
 The Political and Security Committee (PSC) was established on an interim by the Helsinki European Council in 
1999, and finally formally set up in 2001 by “Council Decision of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and 
Security Committee (2001/78/CFSP)”. Together with the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS) it is supposed to support the CFSP and especially the ESDP. It meets 
twice per week and is made up of PSC ambassador from the permanent representations of the member states. It 
was chaired by the Presidency, but will be chaired by “a representative of the High Representative” under the 
Lisbon Treaty (for more background on the PSC see Vanhoonacker, Dijkstra & Maurer 2010; Duke & 
Vanhoonacker 2006; Juncos & Reynolds 2007).  
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Solana as first office holder. The latter shaped the development of CFSP and ESDP in the 
subsequent years considerably, and to support the work of the HR in the different geographical 
areas of the work, the Council of Ministers can also appoint EU Special Representatives by a 
joint action. These special representatives receive their strategic guidance from the PSC, while 
being operationally under the guidance of the HR (Adebahr 2009)87. In July 2003, the Council 
established the post of a Special Representative of the EU to the Southern Caucasus (EUSR) “to 
ensure clear lines of responsibility, as well as the coordination and consistency of external 
actions of the European Union in the South Caucasus” (see point 2 Council of the European 
Union 2003a: 74). The first office holder, Heikki Talvitie, was meant to assist the conflict 
resolution in the region, to support the implementation of EU cooperation objectives on the 
ground, to ensure presence of the EU in the region and to support all involved actors in their 
reform attempts by establishing dialogue and exchange (see Art. 2 and 3 Council of the 
European Union 2003a; see also Helly 2006). Formally, the EUSR is under the authority of the 
High Representative whom he should support in its work in the region. In February 2006, the 
Council appointed as follow-up Peter Semneby as EUSR for the Southern Caucasus (Council of 
the European Union 2006c), whose mandate was recently extended until the end of February 
2011 (Council of the European Union 2010a). 
But the new impetus on ESDP developments not only triggered an EU institutional change 
towards the Southern Caucasus, but in 2003 the European Union deployed its first missions 
within the ESDP framework, and its first rule of law mission was launched in the Republic of 
Georgia. This ESDP mission named “EUJUST Themis” had been established with the Council 
Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP, with the main objective to support the Georgian authorities in 
their attempts to reform the criminal justice system. The idea for this mission was put on the 
agenda by the Estonian delegation in December 2003, and presented to the Committee for the 
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) in February 2004. While some member 
raised concerns towards an unnecessary provocation towards Russia, it was especially the 
Directorate for Civilian Crisis Management  (DG E IX) within the Directorate General for 
Extneral Relations (DG E) in the Council Secretariat that supported the request by the Estonian 
delegation (Kurowska 2008: 8). At the same time observers report some disputes with the 
Commission who at this point in time had experts on the ground for the reform of the 
penitentiary reform and respective projects running what was considered as traditional 
competence of EC external relations. Kurowska describes this period as “a symptomatic intra-
EU process” that is informed by “the infamous Council-Commission turf battle” (Kurowska 
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 For updated information on the EU special representatives see the respective website of the Council of Ministers at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=263&lang=EN; At the end of 2010, the EU was supported by 
eleven Special Representatives.   
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2008: 8). Helly reports that the EUJUST Themis head of mission, Sylvia Platz, participated in 
the ambassadorial weekly meetings of the member states, and hence provided regular 
information to the member states about the status-quo of the mission, but that the relationship 
between the mission and the Commission on the ground was strongly hampered by personal 
conflicts of the involved officials (Helly 2006: 94). On of the reasons for this battles Helly for 
example identifies in the different salary schemes, leading to a situation where the EUJUST 
Themis official receive lower salaries than the Commission officials on the ground (Helly 2006: 
98).  
This first EU rule of law mission run for a year until July 2005, during which nine senior 
officials from EU member states were placed in national institutions in Georgia to assist and 
train Georgian officials and give advice in the justice reform process (Kurowska 2008: 10; 
Helly 2006: 92). Next to the assistance of Georgian reform attempts, this mission was also 
meant to send a political signal to the partner country that it is considered as important and on 
the other hand to EU internally test civilian crisis management (Helly 2006: 91). When the 
ESDP mission was deployed, the Commission already had some projects running in the area of 
rule of law, but member states decided to, nevertheless, deploy an ESDP mission because of 
three reasons. It could be quicker deployed than any Commission programme, it would be more 
politicised and, hence, also carry more political weight, and thirdly the Council wanted to show 
that it was able to use new CFSP instruments in civilian crisis management (Helly 2006: 93).  
Although the mission after its one year of running was not able to fulfil all its objectives, it was 
decided after some quarrels between member states about the future EU support for the 
Georgian reform process that as follow up to the rule of law missing, two THEMIS experts 
would be placed in the enhanced team of the EUSR, whose mandate would be therefore 
extended. These two EU experts in the EUSR team would assist Georgia in drafting their 
criminal law implementation plan that should also reflect in the forthcoming ENP action plan 
(Kurowska 2008: 10; for more background on the ESDP mission see Helly 2006), while also the 
Commission was tasked to ensure the sustainability of the project and to follow up on its 
objectives (Interview No. 14, CS). 
As soon as it was clear that the Southern Caucasus countries would be part of the ENP from 
May 2004 onwards, the negotiations about the action plans started. In June and July 2005 
COEST was identifying the topics to be covered in the action plans in detail, before the drafts 
were circulated to the partner countries in August 2005 (Interview No. 14, CS). However, the 
final conclusion of the action plans with the partner countries was delayed by a veto of Cyprus, 
after a commercial airline from Azerbaijan ignored the EU non-recognition policy and flew to 
the Turkish Cypriot republic. As reaction to this violation, Cyprus blocked the negotiations with 
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all three Southern Caucasus countries (External Relations Council 2004a; also Interview No. 14, 
CS) for a considerable amount of time, before the action plans finally were adopted in 2006.  
5.3. Conclusion: Different Regions – different Interests – different Relationship 
This chapter outlined the main objectives, development, and institutional elements of the EU 
relationship with the neighbours in the South (Maghreb countries) and in the East (Southern 
Caucasus countries) before the European Neighbourhood Policy was formally set up in May 
2004. The aim of this analysis is to establish the ground towards which the EU actors’ 
interaction after the set-up of the ENP can be compared to.  
Towards the South, the ENP is, in contrast to the multilaterally designed Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, a bilateral framework that manages the relationship between the EU and a single 
partner country. The positive effect of this new arrangement is that the respective country can be 
better rewarded for its reforms and that the EU is able to respond more efficiently to the specific 
needs of the partner. The multilateralism of EMP often caused frustration for countries like e.g. 
Morocco who wanted to deepen the relationship with the EU more quickly than other third 
countries of the EMP. But due to the multilateral setup the EMP did not allow a special 
treatment for single countries, what meant that the whole process only could improve as quickly 
as the slowest country developed. Nevertheless it is emphasized in nearly every document of 
this time and was also strongly highlighted by interview partners from the Commission 
(Interview No. 3, COM; Interview No. 6, COM; Interview No. 7, COM) that the ENP is not 
meant to replace the EMP but that these two frameworks shall complement each other.  
There had been several attempts to redesign the EC relations with the South in the past, but it 
was only the Barcelona declaration in 1995 that managed to achieve a qualitative change 
towards more intense and comprehensive relations by establishing the EMP. Within the formal 
institutional framework of the EMP, the European Council gives the strategic direction that is 
expressed in the Common Strategy. Each Presidency of the Council should present its priorities 
for the implementation of the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean (CSM) in its working 
program (European Council 2000a) and the Council is responsible for the actual implementation 
by adopting Common Positions and Common Actions. Within the EMP the only provision in 
regard of interaction of different actors is the achievement of coherence, for which both the 
Commission and the Council are responsible. 
While the role of the Commission was not formally set out in any document, observers agreed 
strongly that its impact from the EU perspective was crucial and necessary. Nevertheless, a clear 
separation remained, where political and security issues were kept intergovernmental under the 
clear leadership of member states, while economic and to a certain extent cultural issues were 
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dealt with under strong involvement of other supranational actors, mainly the European 
Commission. Major strategic reorientations were mainly decided by the European Council, 
while the rotating presidency together with the Commission provided for setting the agenda on a 
daily basis. In terms of implementation, it was to the most extent the Commission as operator of 
the MEDA programme that organised, controlled and evaluated projects and other financial 
assistance.  
In terms of EU interests, the emphasis of the EMP is often said to strongly rely on economic 
issues like market integration, and towards Algeria especially on gas imports. These long-
standing interests were more recently joined by migration issues and also strategic security 
concerns. While migration from the Maghreb countries in itself is not a big issue, these 
countries play an important role in migration from Subsaharan countries to the European 
continent (de Haas 2007). In addition, EU member states have an interest in supporting these 
countries to establish stable democracies and sustainable social systems, to avoid unrest and 
potential violence at the EU borders.  
The EU interest towards the East was until 1999 mainly represented by the European 
Commission and its implementation of the TACIS programme to support the reform and 
stabilisation efforts of the respective countries after their independence. Only after the entering 
into force of the PCAs in 1999 also member states showed increased interest, and it was in 
2003/04 that the EU cooperation with the Southern Caucasus was upgraded in terms of quantity 
and quality, outlining new priorities in the rule of law, support for civil society fight against 
poverty and conflict prevention. In terms of trade, the Southern Caucasus markets are not 
important for the EU member states, apart from gas experts from Azerbaijan and the transit 
routes of oil and gas in general terms, while in the last years migration and the fight against 
organised crime also entered the agenda of cooperation.  
In terms of EU actors’ involvement before the set-up of the ENP, the EU relationship with the 
Southern Caucasus differs from the EU-Morocco relationship in the more active involvement of 
several actors of the Council Secretariat, especially the EUSR and the Head of Mission of 
EUJUST Themis. In comparison to the often highly technical relationship with the 
Mediterranean neighbours, the engagement with the Southern Caucasus countries was much 
less intensified before 2003, and focused primarily on energy concerns, humanitarian assistance, 
and attempts for conflict resolution. The ongoing conflicts in the region were mainly pursued 
within the CFSP pillar what led to the fact that the Council and its bodies (a special 
representative for this region and his team) were more involved in policy-making towards the 
South Caucasus than towards the Southern Dimension. However, also during the 1990s the role 
of the Commission increased steadily in implementing programmes (especially TACIS) in the 
Southern Caucasus (European Commission 2004b) 
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The Commission is similar to the relationship with the Mediterranean responsible for the 
implementation of project and external assistance, but the Council more often and in more detail 
discussed the relationship with the Southern Caucasus around 2000-2003, especially in the 
context of CFSP in terms of conflict resolution (Nagorno-Karabakh as main frozen conflict in 
the region) and with the set-up of the first rule of law mission in Georgia.  
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Chapter 6: Many Actors, different Roles, and distinct Approaches within the ENP  
This thesis aims at investigating in what respect and to what extent the single framework of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy triggered change in the EU policy-making processes towards 
the neighbours. While most research on the European Neighbourhood Policy looks at the 
relationship between the EU and third countries, or on the impact of the EU in the 
neighbourhood, the focus here lies on the EU level and the inter- and intra-institutional 
arrangements to work under the framework of the ENP. Chapter 4 looked in more detail into the 
involvement of different EU actors in the set-up of the ENP and outlined the main basic 
concepts and the underlying logics of this new framework towards the neighbours. This analysis 
gave a first impression which actors had different ideas about the content and structure of the 
ENP, and how different arrangements had been negotiated before they had been incorporated in 
the ENP strategy paper. In contrast, chapter 5 scrutinised the way the EU had designed its 
relationship with the East and the South before the ENP was set-up and especially the EU 
actors’ involvement in this pre-ENP era. This chapter is crucial in a sense as only by having 
something to compare the ENP institutional set-up to, it is possible to observe potential change.   
This current chapter 6 analysis the way that EU actors are involved in implementing the ENP 
framework and conducting EU foreign policy after the set-up of the ENP. This is done in two 
stages: First, the various actors and their main tasks are sketched out, in order to show to what 
extent the emergence of the ENP also asked for adaptation in the institutional set-up within and 
between the involved actors, and it is important for our understanding of the ENP to see that, for 
example, also the Commission is no unitary actor, but that in certain circumstances it comes 
down to the single Commission officials and desk officers and their work. Secondly, this 
chapter makes use of the concept of the policy process (Versluis, van Keulen & Stephenson 
2010) which allows to break down EU policy-making towards its neighbours in various stages: 
agenda setting, policy specification, decision-making, implementation and evaluation. This 
detailed investigation allows a mapping of the involvement of the EU actors in the various 
stages of EU policy-making towards the neighbours and leads to a comprehensive assessment of 
what the changing roles of the different actors. 
These elaborations and reflections are directly able to provide answers to the first part of the 
research question about the role that different EU actors have in formulating, specifying, 
deciding and implementing foreign policy at EU level at different points in time between 2000 
and 2007. As it already had been emphasised in the introductory chapters of this thesis, there 
was no formal change in the treaty provisions, and also the “ENP founding documents” remain 
only on a general level in regard of the institutional set-up and therefore stay vague about the 
task allocation and involvement of different actors. Hence, this chapter contributes to a better 
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understanding of how EU policy-making towards the neighbours is conducted on an every-day 
basis, following formal - but even more importantly - informal processes and mechanisms.  
Concluding and comparing those results to the preceding chapter allows to answer the question 
to what extent the interaction and task allocation of EU actors changed in different stages of the 
policy cycle (agenda-setting, formulation, decision-making, implementation, evaluation) after 
the incorporation of the ENP.  
6.1. The formal Arrangement of EU Actors within the ENP Framework 
The ENP framework did not set-up a new policy in the traditional sense, as the preceding 
chapters have shown, but its objective is to bring different policy areas together in a cross-pillar 
manner that have been pursued within the EU according to different policy-making methods and 
arenas so far. On the one hand there are policies like development, external assistance and trade 
that are dealt with within the first pillar and hence the Community method, where the 
Commission has the right of initiative, the Council and often the EP as co-legislator decide, and 
the Community implements. On the other hand, policies of the intergovernmental second and 
third pillar are added to this framework, i.e. especially elements from the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. The latter are kept absolutely intergovernmental, where the Commission holds 
just an associated role but has to share its right of initiative with the Member states, and in 
particular the rotating presidency. This cross-pillar intersection also was meant to bring different 
actors closer together that are involved in EU foreign policy-making, namely the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and its preparatory bodies, the Council Secretariat and 
the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the European 
Council88. For some of those actors the set-up of the ENP also meant an intra-institutional 
adaptation to be able to deal with the new policy framework.  
6.1.1. Within the European Commission 
During the negotiation of the ENP framework and its set-up the responsible Commissioner for 
External Relations was Chris Patten who held this office from 1999 to 2004 under the 
Commission President Romano Prodi. He was the one who was asked by the European Council 
to elaborate plans together with the High Representative Javier Solana of how to design the new 
framework towards the neighbours (see e.g. General Affairs Council 2002a: 10; Patten/Solana 
2002: 1). However, during the first half of 2003 some of his minor tasks were shifted to the then 
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 While the European Parliament had managed to leave its mark on the set-up of the ENP, by suggesting again and 
again to include the Southern Caucasus countries as well in this policy framework, its role in everyday policy-
making is rather marginal. It has to be kept informed and can send written questions to the Commission, but 
considering its weak impact on the formal and informal policy process its role will not be elaborated here.  
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Commissioner for Enlargment, Günther Verheugen. This created though quite some confusion  
and suspicion with other actors of the EU system of governance, as the following written 
question of the MEP Philip Clays to the Commission from August 2003 demonstrates:  
“Commissioner Günther Verheugen is being given a new area of responsibility. His duties will 
now include relations with the EU’s new neighbouring states, namely Russia, Ukraine, Israel and 
Morocco. This was formerly the responsibility of the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris 
Patten. Why has this area of responsibility been transferred from Commissioner Patten to 
Commissioner Verheugen? Does the Commission also intend to combine relations with other 
neighbouring states under the heading of ‘enlargement’ rather than external relations?” (Claeys 
2003) 
Günther Verheugen replied to this question on behalf of the Commission that the accession 
negotiations had been concluded successfully in December 2002, while the Commission has 
also “set out an ambitious vision for upgrading political and economic relations with the 
Eastern and Southern neighbours” (Claeys 2003). To be internally able to manage this 
workload, the Commission had decided on 9 July 2003 that the EU relations with the 
neighbouring countries stay with the Commissioner for External Relations (ie Chris Patten) but 
that the Commission for Enlargement (ie. Günther Verheugen) will “provide political guidance 
to a task force consisting of officials from the Directorates-General for External Relations and 
Enlargement” (Claeys 2003). The reason for this inter-institutional arrangement that Verheugen 
presented towards the MEP illustrates a common conviction within the Commission at this time 
that the experience and expertise of the enlargement process should not be wasted but 
“transferred” to other areas, as also Verheugen’s response shows:  
“This will ensure the Union’s contribution to the creation of an area of shared prosperity and 
stability around the enlarged Union, making use of the experience the Commission has gained 
in assisting Acceding States to prepare for accession wherever applicable. It reflects the 
Commission’s view that, in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and 
effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, all these neighbouring 
countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the Union’s internal market, as well as 
other advanced forms of co-operation in key fields of mutual interest” (Claeys 2003). 
In 2004, the confusion about which Commissioner is now exactly responsible for the Wider 
Europe initiative was solved in that far as the new Commissioner for External Relations was 
renamed to “Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy”. Under 
the Barroso I Commission, this post was taken up by the Austrian Commissioner Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner, who therefore provided the first face responsible for the new policy 
framework towards the neighbours. As deputy chair of the group of external relations 
Commissioners89 she was not only responsible for the Directorate-General External Relations 
(DG Relex) and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG Aidco) but she was also meant to 
coordinate the output of other DGs and other Commissioners responsible for EU foreign policy. 
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 Commission President Barroso himself was the chair of this Relex-group of Commissioners.  
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This Relex-family, as it is often also referred to, subsumed trade, development and enlargement. 
The Commissioner for external trade from 2004 onwards was Peter Mandelson, before he 
resigned to be able to concentrate on British politics and his post at the helm of DG Trade was 
taken over by Catherine Ashton. Louis Michel was the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and 
Development Policy at the respective time, having under his guidance the European 
Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and DG Development. And finally there was 
Olli Rehn who was responsible for DG Enlargement. However, it was not just on the political 
level of the College of Commissioners that there was an organisational adaptation to 
accommodate the new policy framework, but it was especially at the bureaucratic level in the 
Directorate-Generals that institutional re-shuffling had become necessary.  
Most of the Commission services of the Relex family already had respective desk officers for 
the countries of the neighbourhood before the set-up of the ENP. EuropeAid as implementation 
service was mainly structured around technical and thematic topics rather than along 
geographical subdivisions, while DG Trade had public servants especially assigned towards the 
regions in the East and the South. DG Development was not directly relevant for the 
neighbourhood region, while in more technical DGs there were often specific units who also 
had geographical desk officers that dealt with countries in the neighbourhood (like for example 
DG Enterprise and Industry with a unit for Mediterranean countries; or DG Justice and Home 
Affairs with desk officers relevant for countries in the East and South). These country desks 
remained as they were with the set-up of the ENP, but the main changes were introduced in DG 
Relex which was now more than ever meant to provide the main political guidance and to be the 
focal point for the respective countries. This implies that, for example, the country desk for 
Morocco was supposed to coordinate and provide the main contact point for all issues related to 
Morocco, while her/his colleagues from the other services and DGs should support him with 
their expertise but also ask for political input in case the country is discussed in a more sectoral 
proposal or project.  
With the set-up of the ENP, a new ENP unit was established within DG Relex that was build 
around the ‘Wider Europe’ task force that had already been in place during the ENP 
negotiations and had been made up of various officials from DG Relex and DG Enlargement. 
The main objective of this task force had been the drafting of the Wider Europe Communication 
(European Commission 2003c), and later on the ENP strategy paper (European Commission 
2004b). When the new ENP unit was created, officials were mostly shifted from DG 
Enlargement to this new unit in DG Relex. Most of these new officials, however, were not 
familiar with EU foreign policy-making, the neighbourhood region or in more specific terms 
with the Wider Europe communication at all, what shows in following rather cynical remark by 
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one interview partner “the first thing that I had to do was to read this Wider Europe 
communication” (Interview No. 7, COM). 
In terms of the set-up from 2004 onwards, DG Relex accommodated the ENP within three main 
directorates: D was generally termed to be responsible for the neighbourhood, E was the 
directorate for Europe and Central Asia, and the geographical focus of directorate F was the 
Mediterranean. As common in the Commission, each directorate is again made up of different 
units. Directorate D is split in a unit D1 for “general coordination” and a unit D2 for “sectoral 
coordination”. D1 has two main tasks: on the one hand it is responsible for financial issues like 
the development of the ENPI; on the other hand it is supposed to take care of communication 
and information dissemination (Interview No. 7, COM). Hence, D1 is responsible for the ENP 
framework at large, for coordination, development of the policy framework, reporting, 
monitoring and harmonization. It is also this unit that is responsible for the yearly publication of 
progress reports that are drafted by country teams. And it was also this unit D1 that drafted the 
ENPI between 2004 and 2006. Within unit D2, sectoral experts are responsible to provide 
technical knowledge and expertise within various policy areas to the desk officers. While 
country desk officers are experts in their respective country, they often do not have the technical 
expertise across all different kind of policy areas, but they can ask their colleagues in D2 to 
support them with technical details. They act as the “graue Eminenz im Hintergrund”90 
(Interview No. 7, COM), as one Commission official phrased it. Additionally, this service unit 
should mediate between the country desk officers and the other (technical) DGs, like for 
example DG Trade or DG Industry. The officials in the sectoral unit D2 use the same jargon and 
language like their colleagues in other DGs, and at the same time they can also “translate” and 
mediate between the different Commission units and suggest compromises.  
Commission officials within this sectoral coordination unit D2 had to a large extent worked in 
DG Enlargement beforehand, and they even continued working on enlargement dossiers until 
the end of 2004, even when they had already been transferred to their new posts in DG Relex 
(Interview No. 7, COM). The motivation behind this shift of expertise from DG Enlargement to 
DG Relex was again a rather pragmatic move to use the expertise and knowledge that those 
officials had gained in dealing with the accession processes:  
“The College of Commissioners discussed who should lead ENP and they found a practical 
solution: After the finalisation of the enlargement negotiations Verheugen did not have that much 
to do anymore, while Chris Patten was rushing around the world, being a busy man. Furthermore, 
it was planned to make DG Enlargement smaller. But as, of course, nobody wanted to loose this 
enlargement experts, their know-how, and experience, the College of Commissioners decided to 
integrate these people in the new ENP unit.” (Interview No. 7, COM) 
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 The English translation for this phrase would be “grey eminence that stays in the back seat”. 
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This rhetoric of the Commission also shows that Commission officials do not consider a 
difference in the technical approach to implement relations in different countries or regions. For 
them it does not matter at all if the relations with accession countries are implemented, or if it is 
the relations with neighbours that they are working on. At the same time, it has to be kept in 
mind that the Commission refers to the 2004-enlargement as the EU’s most successful foreign 
policy ever, what Commission officials hence often consider as an example of good practice 
that should serve as a role model for other policies, as also the following quote of an official 
from unit D in DG Relex shows:  
“So our job as directorate general is to be a repository of knowledge, to particularly bring the 
knowledge of the enlargement methodology – although this is not enlargement, we are borrowing 
a lot of things from them.” (Interview No. 6, COM) 
With the set-up of the ENP this new directorate D was created, but at the same time already 
existing units were transferred and put together more closely. Within directorate E the desk 
officers for the countries in the East of the ENP are located, while directorate F is responsible 
for the countries in the South. Both directorates have already existed in their own right before 
the ENP was set-up, and especially directorate F has a strong stance as it was coordinating the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the Commission since 1995. While directorate D consists of 
sectoral experts responsible for the whole ENP framework, directorate F also hosts some 
sectoral experts that are especially targeting problems and challenges that are relevant for this 
region. Furthermore, of course, the desk officers for the respective countries are located in this 
directorate. Directorate F is considered as a rather independent and solitary unit that often takes 
a strong stance to defend its own ideas and interests. In this regard, for example, one interview 
partner remarked that unit F strongly believes that the EMP has to be kept alive as the partner 
countries are attached to it, but that this “is at least the perception of unit F – and not of the 
whole DG Relex” (Interview No. 10, COM).  
Country desk officers are generally expected to coordinate the position of the Commission 
towards those countries (e.g. F4 is responsible for the Maghreb and has one desk officer for 
Morocco, one for Algeria and one for Tunisia). They are mostly representing the Commission in 
the respective Council Working Groups (Interview No. 8, COM), they are supposed to be the 
first contact point for specific country information, and are meant to collect and process 
information about developments that they gather from their daily interaction with colleagues 
from the EC delegations in the various countries and through contacts with various open sources 
(Interview No. 8, COM). They are also keeping in touch with NGOs or political groups in the 
respective third country, and consider themselves as “focal point” for all kind of relations that 
the EU has with a third country.  
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Next to this internal role of coordinating the various actors and provide a coherent position of 
the Commission in regard of a specific country, the main task of the ENP desk officers is the 
implementation of association agreements. This implies that they are responsible for the 
political contact with third countries, and that they support the work of the association 
subcommittees, committees and other bodies that might have been established by the 
Association Agreement. Furthermore, they are responsible for the implementation of the action 
plan from the EU-side, and their second main task is assisting in financial programming 
(Interview No. 19, COM). The most important source of valuable country-specific information 
for desk officers in DG Relex are the EC delegations that have been overlooked in their 
relevance by EU actors for quite some time91 (Interview No. 12, COM; Interview No. 13, CS). 
6.1.2. Within the Council of Ministers: Member States, the rotating Presidency, the General 
Secretariat of the Council, and the High Representative 
While the set-up of the ENP asked for some organisational adaptations in the Commission, the 
impact of the ENP framework development did not trigger any change in the institutional set-up 
of the Council structures. The relevant bodies had already been in place and were dealing with 
the respective policies and countries even before the set-up of the ENP. The various actors 
within the Council now also were dealing with the same dossiers like beforehand, but now they 
were categories to fall under the ENP framework. In the following, the Council Secretariat, 
bodies of member states’ representation on different Council levels, the rotating presidency, and 
the High Representative for the CFSP are examined in more detail to show their contribution in 
the EU policy-making process towards the ENP neighbours. 
The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers & the High Representative 
The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of the European Union – or Council 
Secretariat (CS) as it called more informally - is not an official institution but allocated within 
the Council structure, with its main task to assist the Council in its daily work (see Art. 23(1) of 
the Council Rules of Procedure, Council of the European Union 2009b). In academic research 
about EU policy-making it has been ignored for quite some time, although it had already been 
set up with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 (for a comprehensive analysis of 
the role of the Council Secretariat over time see Christiansen & Vanhoonacker 2008; for a 
detailed account of the role of the Council Secretariat during the European Political cooperation 
see Nuttall 2000). It is just during the last few years that scientific inquiries are also 
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 It was quite visible during the negotiations of how to implement the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the 
EEAS that the importance of the EC delegations has been recognised also by other actors in the EU foreign policy 
system, especially the Member States. EC delegations are not only upgraded to EU delegations, but from now on 
it is not only DG Relex and the Commission for External Relations who has access to their reports and provided 
information.  
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investigating the influence and impact of CS officials on the EU foreign policy-making process 
in a more theoretical and structured manner (Juncos & Pomorska 2006; Vanhoonacker & 
Dijkstra 2007; Christiansen & Vanhoonacker 2008; Dijkstra 2008; Juncos & Pomorska 2010).  
While the main task of the Council Secretariat is to support the Council in its daily work, it is 
especially the rotating presidency that it shall assist in managing the challenging job of being at 
the helm of the Council for six month “under the guidance and responsibility” of the latter (Art. 
23(3) Council Rules of Procedure). It supports the rotating presidency in its management and 
secretarial tasks (booking rooms, setting up the monthly agendas, distributing documents on 
time), but even more importantly it provides institutional memory and this way supports the 
presidency in brokering agreements in member states’ negotiations (Schout & Vanhoonacker 
2006; Vanhoonacker, Pomorska & Maurer 2010). Furthermore, the Council Secretariat is meant 
to ensure “coherence of the Council’s work” and the implementation “of its 18-month 
programme” (see Art. 23(3) of the Council Rules of Procedure, Council of the European Union 
2009b). 
The set-up of the ESDP since 1999 and the development of civilian and military crisis 
management capabilities lead to a reinforcement of the role of CS officials in this area. Already 
since the Maastricht Treaty there was the comparably small Directorate-General External 
Relations (DG E) dealing with CFSP, but it was especially the introduction of the High 
Representative for CFSP (HR) and the Policy Unit with the Treaty of Amsterdam that give new 
impetus to he role of the Council Secretariat in EU foreign policy-making (Vanhoonacker, 
Dijkstra & Maurer 2010). Staff working in the Policy Unit was institutionally integrated in the 
already existing DG E in the Council Secretariat, and the whole unit was hence meant to support 
the HR in his daily work, especially as the HR held at the same time the post of the Secretary 
General of the CS. It was with the Solana era and in the aftermath of the disappointment of the 
bad EU performance in regard of the Balkan wars that the CS was for the first time also 
“entrusted with executive tasks” (Christiansen & Vanhoonacker 2008: 760). While the Policy 
Unit that is assisting the High Representative in its daily work is an integral part of the Council 
Secretariat since the Treaty of Amsterdam, there is still a visible differentiation between the 
more secretarial and logistical support provided by Council Secretariat officials and the more 
political work done by the Policy Unit (Juncos & Pomorska 2010). The office of the High 
Representative was kept very vague when set up with the Treaty of Amsterdam, and it was its 
first office holder, Javier Solana who shaped the role of the High Representative and gave it 
substance, sometimes even more than member states had meant for from the outset. This can 
also be observed in the Council Secretariat, where the development over time left the 
“impression that there is a geographical increase of Solana’s area of influence” (Interview No. 
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13, CS), implying that the High Representative after some years in office dealt with more areas 
and regions of EU foreign policy than originally designed for.  
In regard of EU foreign policy-making towards its neighbours, several desk officers are 
responsible for dealing with the respective countries. As for the CS in general, their main 
objective is to provide consistency to the Council despite the rotation of the six-month 
presidency (Interview No. 14, CS). They are responsible to draft the Council conclusions 
together with the presidency, and if necessary when not only CFSP matters are concerned, in 
close cooperation with Commission officials. These desk officers also were regularly drafting 
speaking notes for Solana and providing briefing material for the member states. They support 
the rotating presidency not only in organisational matters, but by being able to rely on a long-
standing institutional memory they can provide valuable insights about member states’ positions 
and “hot potatoes” and can predict mostly quite well what the controversial formulations and 
aspects of a certain drafted text are going to be that the presidency should be prepared to 
negotiate with the member states (Interview No. 14, CS). Additionally, a representative of the 
CS is mostly present during negotiations with third countries, next to a representative of the 
Commission and the rotating presidency (Interview No. 15, CS).  
Next to the country desk officers, the Council Secretariat also accommodates the advisers and 
staff of the Special Representatives, and the case of the ENP especially of the Special 
Representative for the Southern Caucasus. While the work of the EU Special representatives 
(EUSRs) focuses mainly on establishing and cultivating the relationship with third country 
actors on the ground, the respective country desk officers of the CS and the EUSR staff meet 
weekly to discuss potential items that should be put on the PSC agenda or discussed in working 
groups. In this regard they are also in close contact with the respective desk officers in the 
Commission. In regard of the neighbourhood, there is especially the EUSR for the Southern 
Caucasus, but his role is assessed as quite a difficult one, given the limited resources at his 
disposal (no office in Brussels, low technical support) but also the fact that this special 
representative works in a region, where there is no clear EU strategy that he could base his work 
on (Mayer 2006: 228). The first office holder Heikki Talvitie was replaced by Peter Semneby in 
February 2006, who had at his disposal three political advisors: two were in Brussels and one 
was situated in Tbilisi, in the premises of the Commission (Interview No. 22, CS). The team of 
the EUSR is in close contact with Council Secretariat officials who provide them with the 
general overview and possibilities of  “what member states want to do or do not want to do” 
(Interview No. 22, CS). They also work closely with the Commission, especially on the ground 
in the third countries, like in Georgia, where they exchange information:  
“So we receive also what they are doing and we try to match our political messages also with 
the Community programmes available in a specific area” (Interview No. 22, CS) 
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The political advisors of the EUSR also emphasise that this close cooperation with the 
Commission is in their view crucial to the effectiveness of their work, as it is the Commission 
who has the money to fund projects (Interview No. 22, CS). At the same time, they do not really 
see an overlap in competences and perceive their cooperation with the Commission as smooth 
and going well, what they consider as a consequence of the concrete personalities holding the 
different posts: 
“I think that the EUSR is rather complementary and no replacement of what the Commission is 
doing. And I think it is working well, the two institutions working together. Now, this working 
well also is a result of the concrete people involved on this. It has a lot to do with personalities” 
(Interview No. 22, CS)  
From the perspective of CS officials there is a clear separation of tasks between them and the 
Commission. The Commission is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the action plan and 
for the programme implementation, while the CS only provides content-input when asked to do 
so by the member states. Generally CS officials assess the working atmosphere with the 
Commission as smooth and fruitful, while the CS considers itself as kind of control body in 
regard of the Commission, to make sure that the Commission stays within its limit of 
competences and within the common interest of EU member states, as “they [Commission 
officials] sometimes would give third countries more than [what] member states and Council 
are willing to give” (Interview No. 14, CS).  
Member states emphasise that especially in terms of human resources the “Council Secretariat 
is not to be compared with the Commission” (Interview No. 25 Austrian MfA), or as a 
representative of the French permanent representation also confirmed: 
 “the Council Secretariat is a small administration of advisers. They organise and give legal 
advice but do not have the human resources to do more. When asked by member states they 
prepare papers.”(Interview No. 17, PR France; also confirmed by Interview No. 16, PR France) 
In regard of EU foreign policy towards the Mediterranean the CS does not provide any input in 
terms of content at all or just on very rare occasions when explicitly asked to do so by several 
member states (Interview No. 17, PR France). In the framework of the Association Councils the 
CS is also supposed to prepare documents for all EU member states, but experience showed that 
those documents are circulated way too late because they always had to get the authorisation 
from the highest political authority (in case of the timeframe under investigation, the HR Javier 
Solana) before they could be passed on to the member states. This mechanisms proved highly 
inefficient, so that in the meantime most member states prepare those briefings again on their 
own (Interview No. 25 Austrian MfA).  
In regard of EU foreign policy-making towards the Southern Caucasus, the situation developed 
differently, as here the Policy unit in its support for the HR and the team of the EUSR also 
provide strong input in terms of content, especially in regard of CFSP, security issues and crisis 
 171
management, and for example in regard of the EU rule of law mission that was deployed to 
Georgia in 200492. Here member states had experienced a careful observation of competences, 
especially in grey areas where the PSC is involved but also the Commission works on specific 
aspects (e.g. civilian crisis management, stability and good governance project that are funded 
from the first pillar) (Interview No. 16, PR France). Generally, the contact between the  CS and 
the Policy unit in specific terms with the member states is not organised or institutionalised, but 
it depends often also on the involved people and personalities of how these interaction is build 
up (Interview No. 13, CS). In addition, interviewees repeatedly emphasised that it comes down 
to the personality and the role perception of the respective individual holding the desk in the 
Council Secretariat, as the following quote illustrates:  
 “To what extent the Council Secretariat supports the work depends on individuals and also on 
the characteristics of member states holding the rotating presidency” (Interview No. 18, PR 
Germany) 
At the same time member states’ representatives also point out that while Solana’s policy unit is 
an integral part of the Council Secretariat, it also sometimes shows frictions between the more 
content-orientated officials working for Solana, and the more administrative posts that are 
meant to support the rotating presidency logistically (Juncos & Pomorska 2010). In 2006, an 
interviewee assessed that the division of labour between the two subunits is “still in the making 
and we [i.e. the member states] also still try to fully comprehend [it, what is] […] not always 
easy” (Interview No. 18, PR Germany). What is an interesting aspect to keep in mind in terms 
of interaction with other actors is that CS officials go regularly to PSC meetings, but they never 
attend any COREPER II meetings (Interview No. 15, CS). 
The Representation of Member States within the Council 
It is the representatives of members states who have been considered to be dominating the 
policy process in the area of CFSP, while at the same time there has been a trend towards 
Brusselization, referring to a “steady enhancement of the Brussels-based decision-making 
bodies” (Allen quoted by Duke & Vanhoonacker 2006: 163). Within the governance system of 
the European Union, it is mostly in the different levels of the Council of Ministers of the 
European Union where this member states’ representatives negotiate towards a consensus 
within CFSP (for a detailed discussion about the different units and administrative bodies 
engaging in CFSP see Duke & Vanhoonacker 2006). While at the lowest hierarchy it is the 
different Council Working Parties (or also Working Groups as they are often referred to), 
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 Please note that the timeframe under investigation of this thesis only goes until 2007, and that the crisis of the 
Russian-Georgia war in August 2008 and the follow-up reactions of the EU have not been taken into account 
anymore.  
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dossiers for CFSP are afterwards moved up to the Political and Security Committee (PSC)93, 
before they are passed to COREPER II.  
In total, there are currently 38 different Council Working Parties responsible for Foreign 
Affairs, ranging from thematic working parties, like for example the Working Party on Global 
Disarmament and Arms Control or the Working Party on EFTA, to geographical working 
parties, like the Working Party on transatlantic relations or the Working party on the Western 
Balkans (for the comprehensive list of see Council of the European Union 2010b). For the third 
countries covered by the ENP there are two working groups that are mainly dealing with EU 
policy-making towards those regions: the Working party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(COEST) and the Mashreq/Maghreb Working Party (COMAG).  
Both working parties COEST and COMAG meet twice a week, if needed also more often. The 
Commission country desk officers mostly represent the Commission there when their respective 
country is on the agenda, while they also keep informal contacts with their counterparts in the 
Council Secretariat (Interview No. 19, COM). At the same time, Commission representatives 
might even change during the same meeting according to the issue discussed, what gives them 
the advantage that they are always the experts around the table, in contrast to member states’ 
representatives who are during the whole meeting the same people and have more of an “all-
rounder” background (Interview No. 1, PR Austria).  
During the last years, and especially during the timeframe under investigation, the two Council 
working parties were dealing with the political aspects of the EU relations with neighbouring 
countries issues and responsible for preparing Council conclusions in this regard (Interview No. 
1, PR Austria). COMAG also was dealing with the preparation of the agenda for the Association 
Council and the Association Committees, and was often discussing EU statements of various 
kinds. In this regard it mainly also depended on the EMP committee that had changed their 
working procedure, so that COMAG representatives only participate in those meetings if there 
is an issue discussed that falls under the competence of the member states, like for example 
political issues.  
One important task of the working group is also drafting mandates for position of the 
Commission for negotiations with partner countries, in which also the Presidency and the 
Council Secretariat participate. The latter two are present during those negotiations, because this 
way member states have a sense of “keeping control over the Commission” (Interview No. 1, 
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 The Political and Security Committee replaced the former Political Committee and was envisaged as an interim 
body already in the Helsinki European Council in 1999. It was formally established only in February 2000 (for 
more background about the implications of changing from the Political Committee to the PSC and for its 
relationship with COREPER II see Duke 2005: 16) (for the role of the PSC in ESDP see also Vanhoonacker, 
Dijkstra & Maurer 2010: 9) 
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PR Austria), so that the Commission does not negotiate against the interests of the member 
states. 
After dossiers have been discussed in the working groups, they are passed on to the PSC, or in 
same cases directly to COREPER II. Formally, all dossiers of the PSC also have to go through 
COREPER II, but informal practice and unspoken agreement had it in the past that dossiers 
once closed in PSC where not re-opened anymore in COREPER II meetings.94 EU foreign 
policy-making towards the neighbourhood illustrates very well the relationship and the very 
pragmatically changing division of labour between the PSC and COREPER II.  
Since 2005, there was a general agreement that most of the dossiers related to EMP countries 
would go directly to COREPER II, with the exception of more politicised issues of the Middle 
East Peace Process or other dossiers with a highly politicised component. Between 2003 and 
2006 it was, for example, the strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 
the component of Weapons of Mass destruction in the association agreement with Syria, or the 
Lebanon conflict that were also debated in the PSC (Interview No. 18, PR Germany; Interview 
No. 21, PR UK). Not only EMP matters, but all bilateral relations are considered nowadays to 
fall under the ENP and hence would not go through PSC but directly to COREPER II (conflicts, 
crisis management and the more “hard-security” issues as an exception, of course) (Interview 
No. 21, PR UK). However, this unspoken and informal rule only developed with the British 
presidency in the second half of 2005, as a member state representative elaborates: 
“Dossiers of the EMP are hardly ever going through PSC, but are always directly referred to 
COREPER II and the External Relations Council – but that is an adapted procedure since the 
British presidency. Until then it was the standard rule that the PSC right from the beginning 
prepares the Council Conclusions and the drafting of the text. The British changed that, because 
the British PSC-ambassador was annoyed – why not let the groups [i.e. the Council working 
parties] do their work, as it did not save any time at all [that the PSC was drafting the 
Conclusions on its own] but just doubled the time that had to be invested in the drafting. But the 
PSC had done this job already for quite some time, and it was a bit resistant to let this task be 
taken away, as some colleagues actually enjoyed this kind of work, even if that turned them 
often into an ‘editorial team’, what by and large is not what they are there for. Hence it took 
some time to get them adapted, so that they only discuss those issues that had been left unsolved 
by the working parties and do not start re-opening issues that had already been closed on the 
lower level.” (Interview No. 18, PR Germany)95 
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 The relationship the forerunner of the PSC, the PoCo, and COREPER II was often strained and overshadowed by 
internal turf battles about seniority (see also footnote 86 on p. 155). This is not the place to re-open this issue, but 
for a detailed background analysis see Duke (2005). 
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 This interview was conducted in German, and therefore the quote provided here is a free translation by the author. 
The original quote reads as follows: “Aber von der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft landet eigentlich nie 
irgendwas im PSK, sondern immer nur im Ausschussrat oder im Außenministerrat - und auch das ist ein 
verändertes Verfahren seit der britischen Präsidentschaft. Bis dahin hat in der Regel das PSK auch die 
Schlussfolgerungen von Anfang an redaktionell und das ganze Drafting gemacht. Die Briten haben das aber 
geändert, weil es dem britischen PSK-Botschafter zu dumm war, sollen doch diese ganze Gruppen [gemeint sind 
die Ratsarbeitsgruppen] einmal arbeiten und das hat am Anfang keineswegs Zeit gespart sondern verdoppelt, weil 
eben das PSK solange und so intensiv diese Ausschussfolgerungen gedraftet hat, dass sie sich diese Arbeit nicht 
nehmen lassen wollten, denn viele Kollegen hat das regelrecht Spaß gemacht, auch wenn sie dadurch selber zum 
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This account shows that the ENP framework in itself did not alter the mechanism underlying 
this division of labour between PSC and COREPER, but it helped to clarify the separation of 
tasks: normally all ENP dossiers go directly to COREPER II, just those with a highly politicised 
agenda would still have to be discussed in PSC, especially when they contain components 
related to defence, conflict or crisis management. It is interesting to keep in mind in this regard, 
that Council Secretariat country desk officers rather attend PSC than COREPER II meetings, as 
they consider PSC more crucial in terms of providing input than COREPER (Interview No. 15, 
CS). While this is a rather individual decision of the respective desk officer, it also implies that 
Council Secretariat staff then has a tendency to be more involved and informed about the 
politicised dossiers but that they are not that acquainted with the everyday ENP implementation 
of EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours. This is a bit different for the Commission 
desk officers who are present at COREPER II meetings as well (Interview No. 10, COM).  
These elaborations above show that the ENP did not trigger any direct institutional adaptation 
within the Council to deal with the new policy framework, but that it supported the 
institutionalisation of clear working procedures between different units like PSC and COREPER 
II. The example of the British presidency altering the involvement of PSC in setting-up the text 
and drafting of Council Conclusions, also emphasises the important role of the rotating 
presidency who can also be considered as a potential factor shaping the set-up and 
implementation of the ENP framework, as the next subchapter is going to show.  
The Rotating Presidency: between Organiser, honest Broker and Leadership 
The rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers has a long tradition in the European 
integration process. It had already been established in the Treaty of Paris (1952) where it was 
decided that every three months the presidency shall be taken up by another member state. With 
the Rome Treaties the period at the helm was extended to six month (Vanhoonacker, Pomorska 
& Maurer 2011 forthcoming). The rotating presidency mechanism was also used for the 
European Political Cooperation, even when it started outside of the treaty framework. After the 
Treaty of Maastricht there was one single presidency responsible for all different levels of 
member state representation, i.e. the country holding the rotating presidency was chairing all the 
different levels within the Council of Ministers (Working Parties; PSC; COREPER I and II, 
Council configurations) but also the European Council meetings.96 
                                                                                                                                                           
Redaktionsteam wurden, was im Grunde nicht ihre Aufgabe ist. Und das hat eine ganze Zeit gebraucht, dass sie 
also nur über die strittigen Punkte reden, die die Gruppe offen gelassen hat und nicht wieder den ganzen Text von 
vorne aufrollen.“ (Interview No. 18, PR Germany) 
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 This idea of one presidency on all levels changed significantly with the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of the 
permanent chair of the European Council and the High Representative chairing the FAC and her representatives 
some lower Council Working Parties and the PSC (for more details see Vanhoonacker, Pomorska & Maurer 2011 
forthcoming). 
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The idea behind this rotation system was that each member state should get the opportunity to 
be at the helm of the Council, no matter if it is a small or big member state. Academics 
classified the roles of the rotating presidencies in different categories, ranging from organizer, 
broker, political leadership to external representation (see table 1 in Schout & Vanhoonacker 
2006: 1055). It is widely contested in the literature to what extent those roles compete with each 
other and create a certain dilemma for the presidency: while political leadership would allow 
pushing for national interests this role does not at all go in line with the idea of an honest broker 
to find a compromise between competing member states. Also how much the rotating 
presidency can actually influence and impact on the EU agenda proved a quite difficult question  
to answer (for a profound literature overview and critical reflections see  Tallberg 2003). At the 
same time, this system of rotation also brought challenges for some of the member states in 
terms of logistical, organisational and leadership capacities as well as human resources 
(Elgström 2003; Kirchner 1992). It is at the same time often criticised that this system of 
rotation  contributes to a lack of continuity and coherence, as the country at the helm changes 
every six months, and there is a tendency that Spain for example focuses on Latin America, 
while for example Belgium puts its emphasis more on Africa and there like (Grant & Leonard 
2006). In addition, partner countries often show difficulties in understanding this rather complex 
system of representation, as their interlocutors not only vary according to policy area 
(Commission, presidency, or even member states) but because also the presidency-face changes 
every six months (Bengtsson, Elgström & Tallberg 2004).  
To establish more continuity and coherence between the rotating presidencies the Seville 
European Council in June 2002 therefore agreed that the six forthcoming presidencies should 
always draw up a multi-annual programme for the next three years, starting in 2004. In a similar 
vein, the two countries holding presidencies within the same year, should submit a join 
operational work programme to the Council in the preceding December of their presidency (see 
point 4 and 5 of Annex II entitled “Measures concerning the Structure and Functioning of the 
Council” of European Council 2002b). However, this mechanism did not deliver the desired 
effects and was therefore revised by the Council in 2006. From 2007 onwards, the trio 
presidencies (ie three presidencies following up on each other) should together draft a 
“Council’s 18-month programme”97 […] in closer cooperation with the Commission [… and] 
with a view to its endorsement by the General Affairs and External Relations Council” (see 
Article 4(2), Council of the European Union 2006b). Hence, for the empirical analysis within 
the timeframe under investigation in this thesis of 2002-2007, there are one multi-annual 
                                                     
97
 The respective point 2 in the Council Decision reads as following “It is also appropriate to streamline the 
programming of the activities of the Council. Accordingly, a new system based on an 18-month programme to be 
submitted for endorsement to the Council by the three Presidencies due to hold office during that given period 
should be introduced and replace the previous system”  (Council of the European Union 2006b: 47) 
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programme 2004-2006 (Council of the European Union 2003b), and four operational 
programmes of the Council from 2003-2006 (Council of the European Union & Irish and Dutch 
Delegations 2003; Council of the European Union & Luxembourg and United Kingdom 
Delegations 2004; Council of the European Union & Austrian and Finnish Delegations 2005; 
Council of the European Union & Greek and Italian Delegations 2002b) under the first system, 
as well as one 18-month programme from 2007 onwards (Council of the European Union 
2006a). 
It was no coincidence that the set-up of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995 fell under 
the Spanish presidency, or that it was during the French Presidency in 2008 that the follow-up 
project of the Mediterranean Union was put on the agenda. In EU foreign policy-making, and 
especially in CFSP it is the rotating presidency (as main focal point for member states’ request) 
who provides leadership, sets the agenda and brokers agreements. The Commission, of course, 
also still has its right of initiative but its opportunities are much more restricted, given the 
sensitive political issues at hand. The following pages look into the importance and salience that 
different presidencies gave to EU foreign policy with the neighbours and to the ENP in specific 
terms, while table 11 provides an overview of the rotating presidencies between 2002 and 2007.  
Table 11: Rotating Presidencies of the Council 2002-2007 
Time Country in Presidency Remarks 
2002 – 1st half Spain • Functional logic behind pushing for closer EU relationship with 
Mediterranean (terrorism, economic liberalisation, migration); 
bringing EMP forward but no clear input in ENP set-up; 
2002 – 2nd half Denmark • Focus on closing accession process but no indication that external 
dimension (e.g. wider Europe initiative) was taken into account; 
2003 – 1st half Greece 
2003 – 2nd half Italy 
• In Operational programme, Mediterranean region as “another high 
priority”, wider Europe as priority issue in 2003, Southern 
Caucasus mentioned but outside “wider Europe” idea.  
• No evidence that pushed specific idea for EU relationship with 
neighbours: Greek non-paper rather general and uninspired; no 
Italian proposal while Commission and EP put forward their more 
concrete ideas; 
2004 – 1st half Ireland • Ireland took note of ENP and framed it as complementary element 
to EMP; While the implementation and review of the 
Mediterranean strategy was planned for this period of time, the 
Irish presidency used this opportunity to also put some attention to 
ENP; 
2004 – 2nd half The 
Netherlands 
• Focus on Justice and Home Affairs and Hague Programme 
• Orange Revolution in Georgia mainly dealt with by HR Solana; 
2005 – 1st half Luxembourg • No profound role of ENP in presidency programme; 
2005 – 2nd half United 
Kingdom 
• Focus on EMU and inherited dossiers; 10th anniversary of EMP; 
support Commission in ENP implementation and monitoring; 
2006 – 1st half Austria 
2006 – 2nd half Finland 
• Western Balkans as priority & accession process; “ensure 
development of ENP”; first mid-term review of ENP action plans; 
provide “more substance to the ENP”; 
2007 – 1st half Germany • “strengthening and developing the ENP”; cooperation with 
neighbours on energy and migration; 
2007 – 2nd half Portugal • Emphasis on  Southern dimension of ENP; 
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When looking at the presidency programmes and its evaluations it shows that the “wider 
Europe” idea did not really result from the presidencies in the Council. While it was in April 
2002 that the Council for the first time discussed „Wider Europe: Relations between the future 
enlarged EU and its Eastern Neighbours“ (General Affairs Council 2002a) and had asked the 
Commissioner and the HR to follow up on their ideas (as discussed in Table 2 on page 88), the 
presidencies at this time do not show to have had any input on this idea. There is no mentioning 
of the EU relations with the neighbours whatsoever during the Swedish presidency in 2001 
(Elgström 2002), and also not during the Belgian turn in  2001 (Kerremans & Drieskens 2002).  
The Spanish presidency at the beginning of 2002 had naturally a focus on the EU relations with 
the Mediterranean. Barbé argues that as first priority Spain had to deal with the dossiers that it 
inherited from earlier presidencies (enlargement, Lisbon strategy), but that as second priority the 
Spanish presidency clearly put an emphasise on the “struggle against terrorism, economic 
liberalization and the development of European foreign policy (mostly relating to the 
Mediterranean region) as motors of the European integration process” (Barbé 2003: 45). While 
this focus is not really surprising, it also indicates that Spain follows a clear functional logic in 
its presidency priority by focusing on the cooperation with third countries that could follow its 
own interests of having close economic links with the Mediterranean and managing migration 
(for a conceptual discussion of “uploading” of national interests to EU foreign policy see Wong 
2011). The Spanish presidency is said to have been quite successful in facilitating and bringing 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership forward (Barbé 2003: 48), but in regard of future plans 
about how to structure the EU relationship with the neighbours there is no indication that the 
Spanish presidency took this into account when presenting its priorities and providing 
leadership. This also shows in the track record of the following Danish presidency, who put a 
special emphasis on enlargement in terms of closing the procedures in Copenhagen in a 
successful manner, but there is no evidence that would indicate that the Danish presidency took 
the external dimension of enlargement and the idea of new borders into account at all (Friis 
2003).  
2003 was the crucial year for shaping the exact set-up of the ENP (see  Table 4 on p. 97) and 
this was also acknowledged in the 2003 operational work programme of the Council that was 
submitted by the Greek and Italian presidency (Council of the European Union & Greek and 
Italian Delegations 2002a). As priorities under the heading “EU in the world: projecting 
stability” it identifies the EU relations with the Balkans, the Mediterranean and Russia, and it 
states that “wider Europe will be a priority issue in 2003” and asks for a “rapid consideration of 
the question of the enlarged EU’s relations with its ‘new neighbours’”. At the same time, there 
are lots of areas that are defined as high priority in this programme, as for example the 
Mediterranean that “will be another high priority area for the European Union [to] strengthen 
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regional cooperation”. The Southern Caucasus is also mentioned as an area of EU cooperation, 
but it is kept clearly separate from the Wider-Europe-idea.  
Considering the length of this operational programme and the crucial point of time in shaping 
shaping the future structure of the ENP, this operational programme remains rather vague, 
repeating just some general statements that the Council already had made before in various 
conclusions. This uninspired neglect of the ENP development also showed during the actual 
implementation of the presidencies in 2003, as the following observations illustrates. 
When Greece resumed the helm of the Council, the Eastern enlargement had already been 
finalised and the Laeken convention had given a new spirit to the European integration project. 
As external factor the Iraq war and the quarrels of member states about the kind of support for 
the US left doubts about the idea of a common EU foreign policy considerably (Hill 2004b). So 
although the Greek presidency tabled a “food for thought paper” (Presidency of the Council / 
Greece 2003), the Greek presidency did not show any sign to pay particular attention to “Wider 
Europe” (for a brief overview and evaluation of the Greek presidency see Dimitrakopoulos & 
Passas 2004). Their tabled paper was rather general and without concrete substance, and like the 
operational programme of the Council it mainly reiterated what member states had already 
stated in Council conclusions beforehand. 
Italy took over the Council presidency in the second half of 2003, but also they did not provide 
any leadership in shaping the ENP. Quaglia (2004) reports that the Italian presidency generally 
had a difficult stand to provide leadership, because it did not have the support of all member 
states and the EU institutions, and there was also a lot of disagreement in terms of content, as 
the following observation shows:  
 “Two important meetings between the EU and Russia (October) and the EU and the Ukraine 
(November) took place in 2003. During these summits, the positions expressed by the Italian 
Prime Minister in his role as Council President were at odds with the stance adopted by the 
Commission (and some other Member States), causing tensions amongst the institutions” 
(Quaglia 2004: 49) 
Quaglia argues that the quarrel between the Commission president Romano Prodi and the 
Council President Berlusconi was more mirroring a future conflict about competing for the 
office of prime minister in Italy, than a conflict between different EU institutions. At the same 
time we have to keep in mind that the Commission was very active in putting forward its 
proposals for a financial instrument (e.g. the ENPI draft in July 2003), and also the EP tabled at 
different occasions its ideas about “Wider Europe”. While it would go too far to deduct that this 
activity of other actors is related to the strained relationship with the presidency, there is at least 
no evidence that would suggest that those institutions consulted with the presidency at all. This 
is rather surprising if not to say odd, as the rotating presidency at this time was considered the 
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main focal point in EU foreign policy-making to set the agenda, also by putting forward drafts 
on behalf of other actors.  
As outlined above, it was for the first time in 2004 that six consecutive presidencies were 
coming up with their multi-annual programme 2004-2006 (Council of the European Union 
2003b). This programme is a rather general document and does not outline any specific ideas for 
the ENP. It discusses the Union as a global player in strong resemblance to the European 
Security Strategy (European Council 2003b) that was just published when this multi-annual 
programme had been drawn up.  In total, the multi-annual programme emphasises five different 
issues in regard of external relations, of which one is termed “building security in our 
neighbourhood” that also emphasises as one suggestion that “the Union will define a range of 
policies towards its neighbours in the East and in the South, based on shared values and 
helping to address common challenges” (Council of the European Union 2003b: 21). The 
document also refers to a Northern dimension plan that is to be developed in 2006, before it 
states that “A new neighbourhood policy will be developed, with the Commission presenting 
from 2004 proposals for Action Plans for all countries concerned and introducing 
Neighbourhood Programmes in preparation for the proposed new proximity instrument.” 
(Council of the European Union 2003b: 21). Out of the whole 57 points put forward in this 
multi-annual programme only those two directly refer to the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
Additionally, cooperation with the neighbours is mentioned in general terms in reference to the 
then very topical Lisbon strategy, under the heading of maritime safety and pollution 
prevention, where the need for a close cooperation with the neighbours is emphasised (Council 
of the European Union 2003b: 14). This indicates that it might not per se be altruistic reasons 
that determine the establishment of a prosperous neighbourhood, but that it is in areas with 
functional needs of the EU member states that the neighbours are considered as necessary 
cooperation partners.  
The main event of 2004 was undoubtedly the accession of 10 new member states in May, while 
the main topic of the two presidencies focused to a large extent on Justice and Home Affairs and 
again the Lisbon agenda (Council of the European Union & Irish and Dutch Delegations 2003). 
In regard of the EU relations with the neighbours, the Council operational work programme 
2004 emphasises that the “implementation of the Thessaloniki European Council Conclusions 
on Wider Europe/ New Neighbours policies will be a priority issue in 2004”, with special 
attention for upgrading the existing agreements with third countries. But at the same time the 
Council outlook seems rather passive, as it is looking “forward receiving from the Commission 
Actions Plans” (Council of the European Union & Irish and Dutch Delegations 2003: 46-47).  
But it was the first time in 2004 that a presidency consciously referred to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and actively put forwards its ideas, while this was done by a country 
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holding the presidency that actually does not have any specific relationship towards the 
respective third countries and might not have been expected by many observers to be the first 
one to consider the ENP as important priority: Ireland. Next to the general priorities of the 
Lisbon strategy and Justice and Home affairs, as well as improving the relationship with the US 
the Irish presidency inherited the task of re-evaluating the EU relations with the Mediterranean. 
It shows quite clearly that it was not a topic that the Irish presidency had chosen itself, but that 
this mechanism of review had been agreed beforehand and just coincided with the Irish 
presidency. Hence, it was not a deliberate choice of Ireland to be the first presidency to take the 
ENP set-up intentionally into account, but having been tasked to review the Mediterranean EU 
strategy, they took this challenge seriously, prepared well and considered it in broad terms. At 
the start of its presidency in January 2005, the Irish presidency circulated its ideas as presidency 
priorities “for the implementation of the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean Region” that 
were to be discussed in the Council Working Groups, COREPER and finally confirmed in the 
Council (Presidency of the Council 2004b). In this document, the Irish presidency puts forward 
different ideas about how to reinvigorate the EMP, but it also puts the EMP in close relationship 
to the “developments in the European Neighbourhood Policy”, emphasising its complementary 
character. In addition, it also mentions its “support to the Commission in its work to ensure 
early progress on the European Neighbourhood Policy, progressing Action Plans with some of 
the Mediterranean Partners during our Presidency” (Presidency of the Council 2004b). The 
Irish presidency put a lot of effort and time in preparing this dossier, before its final report on 
the EU strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East was approved by the 
European Council (Schumacher 2004: 58-197). It was generally considered as one of the 
successes of the Irish presidency to make “progress on international issues in the 
Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa” (Rees 2005: 57). 
The subsequent Dutch presidency focused primarily on the adoption of the Hague Programme 
within the area of Justice and Home Affairs and foreign affairs issue did not figure high on the 
agenda. The crisis with Iran as nuclear threat was dealt with by the UK, France and Germany, 
while observers state a strong leadership for the High Representative Solana in EU foreign 
policy-making: 
“the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine was mainly the concern of the Union’s foreign 
policy tzar, Javier Solana, and the Member State with the most expertise and the greatest 
strategic interests – Poland” (van Ham 2005: 61) 
The operational programme for the Council in 2005 as presented by the Luxembourg and 
British presidency (Council of the European Union & Luxembourg and United Kingdom 
Delegations 2004) highlights as main priorities again the Lisbon Agenda, the Area of Freedom 
and Security and Justice (as to what JHA had been renamed), as well as future accessions. 
Under the slogan of “extending the area of peace and security” the neighbouring countries are 
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mentioned together with the Western Balkans and the Middle East in terms of enhancing border 
security. For the rest, the programme only names three minor points in regard of the ENP that 
the Council will focus on in 2005: the ENP Action plans should be finalised; the Barcelona 
celebrates its 10th anniversary, and the strategic partnership for the Mediterranean and the 
Middle East should be continuously implemented (Council of the European Union & 
Luxembourg and United Kingdom Delegations 2004: 40).  
The Luxembourg presidency again emphasises the “drawing up and adopting action plans with 
all the neighbouring countries concerned”98, but this is the only reference in the whole 
programme to the new policy framework, and also during its presidency the ENP did not play 
any role at all (Hearl 2006). The UK presidency priorities are more elaborate but the presidency 
also emphasises that its focus in external relations is mainly driven by inherited dossiers, 
already long agreed summits, or other unforeseen external events. Next to development issues 
(e.g. Millenium goals), Africa (and here especially the difficulty with Zimbabwe), and the 
nuclear threat of Iran, the UK presidency puts a special emphasis on the 10th anniversary of the 
Barcelona process99 that it co-hosts together with Spain in Barcelona in November 2005 (UK 
Presidency of the EU 2005 2005b: 26). At the same time, the British presidency confirms its 
support for the Commission in implementing the ENP: 
“As Presidency, the UK will ensure effective co-ordination of this monitoring [of the action 
plans] and will continue to encourage partner countries to take advantage of the opportunities 
under the ENP by helping them along the process of political, social and economic reform. The 
UK Presidency will also support the Commission in negotiating Action Plans for the second 
wave of ENP countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Egypt, Lebanon). The Commission 
hopes to complete these negotiations by the end of 2005.” (UK Presidency of the EU 2005 
2005a) 
This quote clearly shows that the main responsibility for implementing the ENP lies with the 
Commission, and that they perceive the role of the presidency in terms of supporting the 
Commission and coordinating the monitoring of this process. 
In 2006, Austria and Finland took the place at the helm of the Council, and their common 
priority in regard of the ENP were “to ensure the development” of the ENP, pointing to the first 
mid-term review of ENP actions plans, the set-up of the ENPI and to the negotiation of starting 
the implementation of action plans of the Southern Caucasus countries (Council of the European 
Union & Austrian and Finnish Delegations 2005: 53-43). Furthermore, they emphasised the 
continued pursue of “objectives of the strategic partnership for the Mediterranean and Middle 
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 The Luxembourg Presidency Priorities, Retrieved from 
http://www.eu2005.lu/en/presidence/priorites_et_pgm/priorites/index.html 
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 The tenth anniversary summit of the Barcelona process in November 2005, however, turned out as a disastrous 
event. While with most of the Southern Mediterranean partners abstained from joining (with the exception of 
Turkey and PA), also EU member states could hardly agree on any common aspects. See for example Euromesco 
News December 2005, Retrieved from http://www.euromesco.net/images/enews_2_en.pdf 
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East” (Council of the European Union & Austrian and Finnish Delegations 2005: 53-43). The 
tone was to give “more substance to the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Council of the 
European Union & Austrian and Finnish Delegations 2005: 7), while especially the Austrian 
presidency highlighted the need to “use [..] European Neighbourhood Policy to further the 
EU’s energy policy objectives”(Pollak & Puntscher Riekmann 2007).  
In 2007, the German presidency took over the presidency of the Council, and while their biggest 
achievement for sure was to bring the failed constitution back on track in the form of the Lisbon 
Treaty, in regard of the ENP they were aiming at  “strengthening and developing the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and extending relations with Russia and Central Asia” (German 
Presidency 2006: 5). This phrase also featured in a very similar wording several times in the 
newly established trio presidency programme (Council of the European Union 2006a: 15). The 
cooperation with neighbouring countries was again emphasised outside the narrowly defined 
external relations chapter in terms of energy issues (German Presidency 2006: 9; Council of the 
European Union 2006a: 32 & 63) and in regard of asylum and migration policy, where the 
cooperation with the partners as countries of origin and transit should elevate the migration 
pressures to the EU and the establishment of a Southern Maritime Border Surveillance System 
facilitate the joint management of illegal immigration (German Presidency 2006: 18; see also 
Council of the European Union 2006a: 53 & 58). The consecutive Portuguese presidency shared 
the priorities established in the joint operational programme for 2007, but observers also claim 
that the Portuguese were emphasising the importance of the Southern dimension of the ENP 
because of clear self-interests:  
“In 2007, after the accession of ten central and eastern European states, the Portuguese 
representatives were determined to promote attention to the southern flank, that is, the 
Mediterranean, but especially Africa. During the second half of 2007 Portuguese authorities 
attempted to advance the co-operative efforts under way with the Mediterranean countries 
through various ministerial meetings, including the first meeting held between the southern 
Mediterranean partners regarding migration. Africa, meanwhile, was a priority area for an 
obvious geostrategic reason; a renewed focus on Africa, as opposed to central and eastern 
Europe, would enable Portugal to gain a more central role within the EU’s external relations 
(Ferreira-Pereira 2008: 65). 
This interpretation of the Portuguese emphasis on the Southern dimension of the ENP is not 
surprising but rather confirms a long standing suspicion of member states favouring either the 
Eastern or the Southern dimension of the neighbourhood, according to their own national 
benefits and their ability to shape the respective EU approach.  
6.1.3.  The European Council 
The European Council was recognised as an official EU institution only with the Treaty of 
Lisbon that entered into force in December 2009. However, the Heads of States and 
Government met in this highest political formation already since 1974, and already since then it 
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is the European Council that is supposed to give the general strategic directions for EU policy-
making when meeting at least four times a year. And although this institution is not passing 
laws or there like, it is normally considered as instructing the other levels, especially the 
Council of Ministers to take action in a certain area and in a certain direction. The following 
overview of references in the European Council presidency conclusions from 2002 to 2007 
show that the European Council repeatedly emphasised the need to strengthen the EU relations 
with the neighbourhood, but that at the same time it mainly reiterated and emphasised phrases 
that had already been discussed and agreed on beforehand in the Council. In this regard the 
European Council confirmed the path taken in other fora, but it did not provide strategic 
leadership in the way that Heads of States and Governments would shape the ideas about this 
new policy framework.  
The first time the European Council as the highest political level was considering the “Wider 
Europe” initiative was at its European Council in Copenhagen in December 2003 where it 
confirmed the intention of the EU to “take forward relations with neighbouring countries” 
(European Council 2002a: 6) and reiterated what the Council had asked beforehand, i.e. that the 
Commission and the HR prepare proposals in this regard. Ten months later it welcomed the 
work done so far by the EU institutions and asked all actors involved to follow up on the ideas 
developed already to ensure a “comprehensive, balanced, and proportionate approach, 
including a financial instrument” (European Council 2003a).  
A year later, in November 2004, the European Council welcomed the tabled proposal for the 
ENPI, and “requests a report on progress and achievements before the end of 2005” (European 
Council 2004a: 22). Just a month later, at its December summit in Brussels, the European 
Council again confirms the EU intention to strengthen and deepen the relationship with the 
neighbours (European Council 2004b: 15-17), before it commented in detail “with satisfaction” 
on “the progress made within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, referring 
especially to the first series of action plans that had been successfully finalised. It also again 
asked the Commission and the HR to report on the progress (European Council 2004b: 16) 
In 2005, The European Council referred to the ENP twice. In  June, the European Council again 
expresses its satisfaction with the first wave of action plans, next to commenting on the situation 
in Ukraine and Belarus and welcoming the appointment of an EUSR for Moldova and the report 
about the implementation of the EU strategic partnership with the Mediterranean (European 
Council 2005b). The second time the European Council refers to the ENP is in December. It 
again “welcomes the progress” in the ENP implementation process, and a special topic in this 
European Council conclusions centres around migration issues, in which cooperation with 
neighbours is considered as salient aspect (European Council 2005a). 
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Also in 2006 the European Council at three different meetings refers to the need to cooperate 
with neighbours in relation to migration and energy issues, which both figure prominently as 
main topics of the meetings (European Council 2006c: 14, 2006b, a: 14). In the conclusions of 
the June meeting, the European Council emphasises also once more the importance of the ENP 
and reiterates the main ideas behind the policy framework:  
 “The European Council reiterates the importance it attaches to the European Neighbourhood 
Policy as a means to strengthen cooperation with its neighbours and expand prosperity, stability 
and security beyond the borders of the European Union. The European Neighbourhood Policy 
seeks to support the political and economic reforms of neighbouring countries on the basis of 
partnership and building on shared values. The Union is determined to strengthen and further 
develop its Neighbourhood Policy, thus offering an increasingly close relationship and 
substantial support, as neighbouring countries fulfil their commitments to reform”. (European 
Council 2006b: 22)  
In the June 2006 meeting the Heads of States and Governments also welcome once more the 
progress in regard of the action plans (European Council 2006a: 18), and they endorse the 
GAERC conclusions of December 2006 (General Affairs Council 2006b) in regard of the 
Commission document about how to strengthen the ENP (European Commission 2006f). And 
also in 2007 the topics of the European Council in regard of the ENP stay similar: migration and 
energy policy and for both the importance to cooperate with the neighbours is again emphasised 
(European Council 2007a, c). And at last in December 2007, the European Council again 
emphasises the “strategic relevance of the relationship of the EU with the Mediterranean” and 
points to the fact that the ENP has to be considered as a “core priority within the EU’s external 
action”. It welcomes the work done by the Commission in its various communications, and asks 
all involved actors, and especially the upcoming presidencies, to keep on implementing the 
ideas of the ENP (European Council 2007b).  
 
This account of the different actors within the ENP framework shows that it was only for the 
Commission that the ENP framework led to inter-institutional adaptation. The other actors dealt 
with issues of the ENP within their usual structures and addressed the same topics, just that now 
the dossiers of the respective countries were mostly labelled as “ENP”. The involvement of 
actors also differs according to the two countries under investigation: while for the 
Mediterranean the Commission fulfils a prominent role in terms of coordinating the EMP, it is 
the Council Secretariat (and there especially the Policy Unit of Solana and the EUSR team) that 
provides also political guidance for the EU foreign policy towards the Southern Caucasus. 
Furthermore, it was surprising to see that the European Council did not take up the leadership 
role that it is often assumed to have, but that it mainly confirmed what foreign ministers had 
agreed upon in the Council or what the Commission had proposed in its Communication. In a 
similar vein, the analysis of the rotating presidencies is even more surprising, as none of the 
countries at the helm did not consider the ENP set-up or working procedures as a salient topic, 
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and only a few actually outlined specific topics that should be dealt with within the framework 
(like migration and energy) to facilitate a cooperation with the partner countries. This 
observation also points to the need to look at the way that the EU actually does its day-to-day 
policy making towards its neighbours in more detail.  
The next part looks into more detail what roles the different actors fulfil in the ENP policy 
cycle, how they interact, and how this role differentiation emerged over time.  
6.2. The Involvement and Interaction of EU actors in different Policy Stages 
“So I think it is still evolving, the whole process and also the kind of competences of who gets 
involved in what – issues are still not particularly clear. I mean what is a member-state-lead, what 
should be done by the EU-25, where should the Commission be the leader; it is not totally clear, 
so this still has to be defined.” (Interview No. 21, PR UK)  
This quote from a British diplomat working in Brussels was referring to the situation of EU 
foreign policy-making towards the neighbours in 2006. This situation was also emphasised by a 
Commission official who elaborated that the “ENP is more in set-up phase now” (Interview No. 
9, COM), when asked about the institutional cooperation in 2006. This shows that even two 
years after the ENP strategy paper there was no clear delimitation of working roles of all actors 
involved, and the system was still in flux. But this quote also highlights that competences of all 
actors involved seem clearly differentiated in the treaty text, but that it is often more complex 
and difficult in practice to clearly define the roles without overlap and conflict.  
Foreign Policy at EU level was for a long time mainly associated with the Council or the 
European Council as locus for intergovernmental policy-making between member states (see 
chapter 2.1 on page 19). Within the CFSP, which is often considered as the political element of 
the EU as an international actor, it was the member states that shaped the policy, and this mostly 
took place within the different Council structures. The Commission was only associated with 
CFSP, and also other EU institutions and actors did not have a say in this intergovernmental 
policy area. However, this separation in theory sounds more straightforward than it is in 
practice, as for example the ECOWAS case showed that needed the involvement of the ECJ to 
settle a dispute between Commission and Council about competences that were difficult to 
distinguish between political CFSP issues and economic external EC relations (Duke 2006b: 19; 
Duke & Blockmans 2010: 11). Hillion and Wessel who analyse the ECOWAS case in detail 
(Hillion & Wessel 2009) argue that from a legal point of view the treaty left a “fuzziness in 
competence distribution within the EU system of external relations”, while at the same time 
political scientists emphasise the increasing blurring of internal and external policies (Eriksson 
& Rhinard 2009). The latter complicates a clear separation of tasks even more (for a in-depth 
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study about cross-pillar tensions in the area of migration and EU Middle East Policy see Stetter 
2004) 
When taking into account the formal treaty provisions only, the role of the Commission in 
policy-making towards the neighbourhood did not change considerably during the last two 
decades, neither with the adoption of the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean nor with the 
incorporation of the ENP. But this is misleading, and several scholars already emphasized that 
the impact of the Commission on foreign policy evolved considerably during the last decades, 
leading for example to the assessment that the Commission is “the most important actor in 
Union policy towards the Mediterranean” (Smith, H. 2002: 160). This would go in line with the 
earlier research findings of this chapter that neither the European Council nor the rotating 
presidency seemed to assume strong leadership within the ENP framework.  
The formal specification of the involvement of different actors is not to be found in the treaty 
text, but the working procedures of the ENP were formally set up in the “European 
Neighbourhood Policy strategy paper” of 2004 (European Commission 2004b). It was decided 
that the Commission would draft country reports for the third countries where it will provide 
information about the political and economic situation of the country and possible needed 
reforms. Based on the results of these reports ENP action plans were drafted by the 
Commission, then discussed with the member states and finally negotiated with the third 
countries. The action plans are very concrete and technical, and identify the priorities of reform 
with each partner for the next three to five years. The Commission is responsible for the 
implementation of these action plans and the monitoring of progress through periodic progress 
reports.  
Christiansen (2001: 762) emphasises in his study on inter- and intra-institutional relations in the 
EU ”that deficits of the formal structures and the treaty provisions are compensated by informal 
arrangements”, where he also concluded that the formal treaty provisions do not tell the whole 
story about tasks and competences of EU actors. This is the reason why the rest of this chapter 
investigates in more detail how the different actors contribute to the EU policy-making towards 
the neighbours in practice. The focus thereby is not only on the interaction as provided for in the 
formally in the official documents but especially on the informal and day-to-day interaction of 
EU actors of dealing with the ENP framework.  
The analysis is structured along the concept of a policy process that distinguishes between 
agenda setting and policy specification100, decision-making, implementation and evaluation 
                                                     
100
 While this stages can be differentiated when adapting a very narrow definition, this thesis deals with them 
together, as this is sufficient for the purpose of analysis, and a more narrow definition would lead to a too 
extensive elaboration that would not fit into the focus of this thesis.  
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(Versluis, van Keulen & Stephenson 2010). While EU foreign policy analysis to a large extent 
focuses on the stage of decision-making only, the argument presented here is that such a focus 
also invites for a certain bias, as decision-making procedures are quite detailed elaborated upon 
in the treaties and hence do not allow for the analysis of informal mechanisms too well. 
Furthermore, a focus on decision-making in EU foreign policy automatically biases the results 
towards an overemphasis of the role of the member states, as those are the ones that are the 
main decision-makers in foreign policy-making.  
However, it must not be a priori assumed that the influence of other actors during other policy 
stages can be automatically ignored, or that those other stages do not shape the ENP in a 
considerable manner as well. While the concept of the policy cycle has so far been mainly used 
for the analysis of EU public policy, it has also been applied to more general foreign policy 
analysis, however only rarely to EU foreign policy analysis (see for example Webber & Smith 
2002; for one exception applying the policy cycle to EU foreign policy making see Duke & 
Vanhoonacker 2006). At the same time, such an adoption of the framework for foreign policy-
making has to, of course, take into account the peculiarities of foreign policy-making compared 
to EU public policies.  
It is also important to keep in mind that this chapter does not look into the set-up of the ENP 
(that was done in chapter 4.1, page 85 ff.), but that the analysis now departs from the idea that 
the main policy framework had already been established, especially with the ENP strategy paper 
in June 2004. Therefore it looks into more detail how the various actors now made this ENP 
framework work in practice, and how they interacted in order to pursue EU foreign policy 
towards the neighbours within this framework from 2004 to 2007. Hence, when we take about 
agenda-setting and policy specification in the first part it is not about the ideas of how to set-up 
this framework, but it is about the “smaller” scale of setting the agenda and specify policies 
within the established framework.  
The ENP framework brings together dossiers of economic policies and external assistance that 
are negotiated under Community competence, political aspects of the CFSP pillar, and more 
recently the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs of the pre-Lisbon Treaty (i.e. the 
third pillar fight against terrorism, fight against crime, migration etc), as already elaborated 
several times above. For the Southern dimension, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
was set up in a very similar way, but there the division between economic and political issues 
was still more clearly designed than within the ENP. The EMP was separated in economic, 
political and cultural baskets but this formal differentiation does not exist in the ENP, especially 
as these different areas are always incorporated in one document, e.g. the action plan.  
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The proceeding parts of this chapter show that the formal differentiation of the applied EU 
decision making procedure still exists, but also that the sharing of tasks especially in agenda-
setting changed, as now all different areas are brought together in one document (the action 
plans). This gave increased leverage to the Commission, because it was the latter who drafted 
these documents, while at the same time it had to make sure to accommodate member states’ 
concerns who could still block those proposals in the Council. Furthermore, it will be shown 
how other actors perceived the role of a specific actor, e.g. what member states thought about 
the role taken over by the Commission in the ENP.  
6.2.1. Agenda Setting and Policy Specification 
The main areas of agenda setting and policy specification on EU level concerns on the one hand 
the drawing up of the action plans, on the other hand the framing of topics that have been 
emphasised as salient areas of cooperation with third countries in various EU documents like 
the Council conclusions, European Council Presidency conclusions or the Commission 
communications. 
The action plans were negotiated and agreed upon in three stages. In 2005, the first series of 
seven action plans have been adopted between the EU and Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, 
the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine respectively. In a second step three more action 
plans with Armenia, Azerbiajan and Georgia were successfully put in place, while two more 
action plans with Egypt and Lebanon followed in 2006. Out of the 16 ENP partner countries it 
is four countries (Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria) that still do not have an action plan in place 
(see also Table 5 on p. 113) and which are often considered as the “difficult” partners that do 
not really seek a close cooperation with the EU.  
The drafting of action plans at EU level is coordinated by the respective officials in the 
Commission. Furthermore, it was the Commission who was tasked beforehand to draw up 
Country reports for all neighbouring countries that outline the existing legal framework shaping 
the EU relations with the third county, the political situation as well as the economic and social 
situation in the country (European Commission 2004a, 2005a). These reports were taken as a 
starting point to identify the needed reform agenda and should provide the EU institutions with 
a first impression of what reforms would be best to tackle first.  
After this first assessment, the draft action plans are prepared, during which the Commission is 
in charge of coordinating and collecting different suggestions, seeking close contact with 
member states’ representatives in the Council, the Council Secretariat and advisors of the 
EUSRs, as these texts are “carefully prepared together” (Interview No. 7, COM; also confirmed 
by both Interview No. 14, CS; Interview No. 15, CS), especially when it comes to the political 
aspects of the action plans: 
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“On the political aspects, my colleague from the Council Secretariat and ourselves [the team of 
the High Representative] we were involved, were asked for input, to give our comments on the 
language, but mainly we got the whole document to comment on, and we gave some suggestions 
to other things but mostly really what falls in the scope of our competences or our activities – it is 
really the CFSP, the foreign political aspects, in concrete the conflicts. Because the general 
cooperation on foreign policy is the Council Secretariat, and it is also general competences from 
the teams of the High Representative”. (Interview No. 22, CS) 
At the same time it has to be kept in mind that timing in this regard is an important aspect, as it 
is the Commission who puts forward a draft that is then forwarded to the Council and the 
member states for discussion. While those can of course provide their input and suggest 
amendments, it also is common agreement that it is more difficult to change an existing text 
than putting new ideas forward in a first draft, what provides a slight but interesting advantage 
for the Commission. The latter has of course to be careful not to intrude on the political 
CFSP/ESDP competences of member states too forcefully, but at the same time it is the first one 
that can shape drafts according to its ideas and suggestions.  
This EU-internal coordination process, however, of course also leads to some disagreement 
from time to time, as the following example shows. The political parts of the action plans differ 
considerably from partner country to partner country, to be able to adapt the content of the 
action plan to the reform process of the respective country and also to make sure that the partner 
government is in a position to agree to the content. However, there are of course also parts that 
are standard and have to be included in all action plans, as for example the respect for human 
rights. In a similar vein, it was member states who had insisted that the issue of actions against 
weapons of mass destruction should be incorporated in the action plans. However, the 
Commission found this rather disturbing and counterproductive, as some partner countries 
proved very reluctant to mention this topic at all and in the end the EU had to make concessions 
in other areas to get an agreement – and some of these concessions would have been more 
important to keep, from the point of view of the Commission (Interview No. 7, COM). While 
both Council and Commission representatives also highlight the importance of having a certain 
political aspect in the relationship, it also showed in the EU-internal negotiations of the action 
plans that the perception of how political objectives should be achieved varied. While 
Commission officials sometimes emphasise the technical aspects of an agreement, Council 
representatives have a tendency to politicise and ignore the technical nature of the relationship 
(Interview No. 7, COM). This also links to a long standing debate in the development policy, if 
reforms should right from the beginning follow a political objective, or to what extent it is better 
to first start cooperating on technical issues, and just when those show successful the political 
elements are added. Commission officials complain, for example, that such political issues like 
Weapons of Mass destruction were taking too much attention away from the issues that really 
made an impact on the ground, for example in regard of improving the living conditions of the 
poorer citizens in the partner country. They also agreed that those more technical issues are 
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often not too sexy or exciting to negotiate, but in their point of view they are as important as 
political objectives, or even more strongly formulated: 
“The long-term positive effect of these reforms might, however, be hampered by these political 
emphasises, as it blurs the real objectives and aims of the policy.” (Interview No. 7, COM) 
Another negative example for the political interference with the ENP was for example when 
Cyprus was blocking the adoption of the action plans with the Southern Caucasus countries, not 
because it fundamentally disagreed with the content of those action plans but because an Azeri 
airplan had unauthorised landed in the Turkish part of the Cypriot island, what the Cyprus 
government was considering as an affront of their sovereignty concerns. Commission officials 
often perceive such political interference as disturbing factors that harm their own efforts in 
cooperating on technical and less-politicised matters, which in the Commission’s view in the 
long term will also have a positive impact on the political situations in the countries.  
Only after an EU internal agreement those drafts are discussed with the respective third parties. 
As soon as EU member states seem to agree on a draft action plans, the Commission puts 
forward this proposal for a Council Decision for a European Community/Union position to be 
taken in the respective Association (or Partnership and Cooperation) Council. There the EU, its 
member states as well as the partner country again negotiate and agree on the action plan. This 
institutional framework and its sub-bodies (like the Association Council or Committee) are also 
used to follow up on more detailed aspects of the action plan after formal adoption and they 
monitor the implementation of the agreed objectives (Interview No. 7, COM; European 
Commission 2004c: 3-4).  
The action plans set the priorities of cooperation between the EU and the third country within 
the next years. They are meant as base that shapes the support of the EU and the distribution of 
EU external assistance. While also the EMP combined political and economic aspects within 
one document or also Association agreements integrated economic as well as political aspects, it 
is for the first time in the EU relationship with the neighbours that a more concrete plan of EU 
action is designed comprehensively within one document. It is not just that different actors put 
different parts together within one document title, but all of those aspects were drafted by the 
Commission and discussed at once.  
Table 12  illustrates the priorities put forward in the action plans with Morocco, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia (European Union 2005, 2006a, b, c). Those areas highlighted in grey 
are normally aspects that are considered dossiers of the second or third pillar. What is important 
to keep in mind in this regard is that those action plans were not endorsed by the PSC but went 
directly through COREPER, despite the elements that normally would be considered as 
CFSP/ESDP topics (Interview No. 16, PR France).  
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Table 12: Priorities of action plans with selected countries 
 Morocco Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
1 
pursuing legislative 
reform and applying 
international human 
rights provisions 
Strengthen democratic 
structures, rule of law, 
reform judiciary and 
combat of fraud and 
corruption 
Contribute to peaceful 
resolution of Nagorno 
Karabakh 
Strenthen rule of law, 
especially through 
judicial system reform 
and rebuilding state 
institutions;  
 2 
enhanced political 
dialogue on the CFSP 
and ESDP and 
enhanced cooperation 
on combating terrorism 
Strengthen respect for 
human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
Strengthen democracy 
(especially fair and 
transparent elections) 
Improve business and 
investment climate; 
continue fight against 
corruption 
 3 
negotiation of 
agreement on 
liberalising trade in 
services 
Further economic 
development, enhance 
poverty reduction 
efforts and social 
cohesion, sustainable 
development 
Strengthen protection of 
human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, 
and rule of law 
Economic development, 
poverty reduction and 
promote social cohesion 
 4 
development of  FDI 
conducive climate, 
growth and sustainable 
development; 
Improve investment 
climate, strengthening 
of private sector-led 
growth 
Improve business and 
investment climate; 
continue fight against 
corruption 
Enhance cooperation in 
JHA issues, especially 
border management 
 5 
cooperation on social 
policy to reduce poverty 
and create jobs 
Further convergence of 
economic legislation 
and administrative 
practices 
Improve functioning of 
customs 
Strengthen regional 
cooperation 
 6 
support for the 
education and training 
system, scientific 
research and 
information 
technologies to boost 
economic development 
Development of energy 
strategy 
Support balanced and 
sustainable economic 
development;  
Promote peaceful 
resolution of internal 
conflicts 
 7 
effective management 
of migration flows, […] 
readmission agreement, 
short-stay visas 
Contribute ot peaceful 
solution of Nagorno 
Karabakh conflict 
Further convergence of 
economic legislation 
and administrative 
practices 
Cooperation on Foreign 
and Security Policy 
 8 
transport sector 
development; Trans-
European Transport 
Network  
Enhanced efforts in 
regional cooperation 
Strengthening EU-
Azerbaijan bilateral 
energy cooperation 
Transport and Energy 
 9 
energy sector, and  
gradual integration into 
EU's internal electricity 
market 
 
Enhance JHA 
cooperation, especially 
in border management 
 
10   Strengthen regional 
cooperation  
Source: European Union 2005, 2006 a, b, c; (European Union 2005, 2006a, b, c) 
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While the action plans are considered the main documents specifying the objectives of EU 
cooperation with each individual partner countries, agenda-setting and policy specification, of 
course, also took place at a more general EU level, in terms of specifying the EU interest and 
future priorities that should be taken into account within the policy framework Council 
conclusions, European Council Presidency conclusions as well as in Commission 
Communications. The principles of the ENP of joint ownership, differentiation and added value 
had for the first time been emphasised in the ENP strategy paper that was published as a 
Commission Communication (European Commission 2004b). But it was also in follow-up 
Commission communications that those principles were highlighted and emphasised by the 
Commission, especially as those fitted well into the way the Commission organised its external 
assistance and project management towards other regions and countries.  
Such emphasis can be found in the yearly ENP progress reports but they figure especially in the 
2006 Communication entitled “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy” (European 
Commission 2006f). This document accompanied the ENP progress report of 2006, and the 
following quote summarises the purpose of this Communication to the point: 
 “The Commission has therefore identified a number of areas in which the ENP should be 
strengthened to ensure its success. In all these areas, this would mean an additional effort for the 
EU, but this would be outweighed by the political benefits.” (European Commission 2006f: 4) 
In total the Commission puts forward seven suggestions of how to strengthen the policy 
framework towards the neighbours, where in their view the most important issues is the 
enhancement of the “economic and trade component” that should lead to a comprehensive free 
trade agreement that would also cover agricultural products and fisheries. The latter was 
repeatedly considered as a no-go for member states like Spain who feared a too strong 
competition for its own economy from the Mediterranean partner countries. At the same time, it 
has to be kept in mind that this aspect of a free trade area, of course, falls into the strongest 
competences of the European Community, and a stronger emphasis would provide more 
leverage and freedom of design for the Commission.  
The second suggestion that the Commission puts forward is the facilitation of mobility and a 
more flexible management of migration. It states that 
 “mobility of persons is of the utmost important also for all ENP partners […] Yet our existing 
visa policies and practices often impose real difficulties and obstacles to legitimate travel.” 
(European Commission 2006f: 5) 
Member states and the Commission were very keen on selling the idea of readmission 
agreements to the partner countries, and it was of course visa facilitation that partner countries 
were mostly emphasising as their interest in this aspect of cooperation. While the assessment of 
the Commission in this regard seems justified, it also illustrates why member states often 
suspect the Commission of rather supporting the interests of third countries than those of the 
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member states. The latter is often used by member states as argument why it is important they 
keep a tight control regime on the Commission and its mandate for negotiations with third 
countries. In a similar vein, the third suggestion was to enhance “people-to-people exchange”.  
Also priority four of the Commission Communication is interesting for the current analysis as 
the Commission assess that “thus far, the ENP has been largely bilateral, between the EU and 
each partner country” (European Commission 2006f: 8) and that a more thematic orientation of 
the ENP would be more appropriate and effective. Taken this idea a step further it could be 
argued that by having a more thematic and therefore often more technical approach, it would 
depoliticise some of the relationships, what showed an obstacle to some Commission officials 
right from the beginning. Last but not least, the Commission suggested strengthening political 
cooperation to “address conflicts in the region” and again here the exact formulation of the 
Commission tellingly reads:  
 “The Union makes a very large contribution to assisting refugees and displaced persons – how 
much better if these resources could be used to promote sustained development.” (European 
Commission 2006f: 9) 
External assistance for refugees and displaced persons is an area that is mostly managed and 
taken care of by Community instruments and therefore by the Commission, what also illustrates 
again the viewpoint of the Commission that it actually might be better equipped to contribute to 
conflict resolution than the rather political and declaratory CFSP measures that member states 
take care of. The last two suggestions of the Commission put forward in this 2006 document are 
to strengthen regional cooperation as well as financial cooperation. In regard of the later the 
Commission notes that 
 “the funding available to support the ENP reform agenda will still be relatively modest [after 
the ENPI set-up] notwithstanding the ENP’s ambition to address a very comprehensive reform 
agenda” (European Commission 2006f: 12) 
At the same time the Commission keeps its suggestion quite realistic in terms of the financial 
means available for the ENPI and does not directly ask for an increase of the ENPI allocations, 
but it highlights the need to use other budget lines flexibly to allow for a successful financial 
support.  
However, as outlined in the first part of this chapter, it is not only the Commission that looked 
at the ENP and its development, but also the Council and the European Council time and again 
referred to the ENP in their official documents. The general ENP objectives have been reiterated 
in Council conclusions and European Council presidency conclusions throughout the years, 
while it was especially the Dutch presidency in 2004, and the German and Portuguese 
presidencies in 2007 that framed the need to cooperate with partner countries in relation to the 
topics of migration and energy. Member states in those documents did not specify in detail what 
such an intensified focus on migration and energy should look like, but they clearly set the 
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agenda in terms of pointing at the interest of member states to work more intensely on these 
issues within the ENP framework. But it was left to the Commission or sometimes it was even 
the Commission who was explicitly requested by the member states to draft and put forward 
proposals in this regard.    
Interesting for the analysis of agenda-setting and policy-specification is the reaction of the 
member states to this Communication “Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy”. 
The General Affairs Council took notice of the Commission Communication in December 2006 
(General Affairs Council 2006b), and asked the incoming presidencies to assess the 
Commission’s suggestions and to present a report to the Council. The German presidency took 
up this request and presented its report in June 2007 to the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (Presidency of the Council 2007), which was also taken into account by the 
Brussels European Council in June 2007 (European Council 2007c). The German Presidency in 
its report starts of by reiterating the main objectives of the ENP and by referring again to the 
often emphasised principles of joint ownership, differentiation, and added value. In terms of the 
objectives there is a clear focus on the “geopolitical imperative to foster stability” and on the 
need to “channel Europe’s great modernizing power even more efficiently” (Presidency of the 
Council 2007: 2). The threat to the EU’s stability because of “political instability and weak 
governance” is pointed out, while just in the next sentence the need to tackle “energy security” 
and “illegal migration” is emphasised. This emphasis on energy and migration is strongly in line 
with earlier Council conclusions, and again points at the perception of member states what kind 
of aspects should be targeted by the ENP. The German presidency report also emphasises the 
important role of the ENP action plans as tool to map out the reform priorities, and also in 
regard of the progress made so far the presidency seems to generally agree with the 
Commission’s assessment. However, the German presidency report reads most differently in 
regard of the reform steps needed to strengthen the ENP. While the same topics are covered 
(apart from migration what was the second priority for the Commission and was totally ignored 
by the member states), the suggestions are also framed differently and presented with a slightly 
altered argumentation. 
The first emphasis of the German presidency report is similar to the Commission’s suggestion 
on increased economic integration and the improved access to the internal market. The 
presidency argues that this would lead to a better business climate in the third country, what also 
positively influences the stability and prosperity of the partner country. The presidency even 
suggests that this economic integration should also “feature elements of asymmetry in their [the 
partner countries] favour, as appropriate” (Presidency of the Council 2007: 7). So far the 
suggestion is quite in line with what the Commission proposed, but the presidency goes a step 
further to emphasise that this would provide an eff
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cooperate. The Commission generally would not disagree with this assessment that economic 
integration is a salient topic, but while the Commission considers it is a goal in itself that should 
be achieved, the member states instrumentalise this aspect to be used as incentive for other 
political goals.  
The second suggestion, however, differs significantly from the Commission Communication. 
The latter had suggested that a more flexible migration regime (e.g. visa liberalisation) would 
provide another important incentive and is crucial for the success of the ENP. This suggestion 
was totally ignored by the presidency, i.e. migration was only framed as a problem that the ENP 
should tackle but it was not even mentioned once as part of the solution as well. The presidency 
also suggested that the incentive system has to be kept strong, but their suggestion was to “make 
better use of the EU’s financial weight” (Presidency of the Council 2007: 8) by managing the 
external assistance in a better way and by establishing new facilities to support reform in third 
countries. Also in the concluding chapter entitled “the way ahead” the efficient use of financial 
incentives and especially the strong application of positive conditionality were emphasised by 
the presidency (Presidency of the Council 2007: 10)101. In this point the Commission on the one 
hand and the presidency and the member states on the other hand showed the strongest 
disagreement. In regard of political conditionality, it has again be kept in mind that Commission 
officials are often reluctant about the use of political conditionality, not because they do not 
consider human rights etc as important aspects of reform, but because they considered it often as 
the unnecessary interference of political interests of single member states that leads to 
conditionality.  
The third suggestion of the presidency targets the increased use of cross-cutting sectoral themes 
that should lead to reinforced multilateralism. This topic was quite similarly framed to what the 
Commission was suggesting. However, for the Commission this was only priority four. In a 
similar vein the fourth presidency suggestion pointed at the need to do more in regard of 
conflict resolution, what was also highlighted by the Commission as fifth priority. And finally, 
the last suggestion of the presidency evolved around citizens’ involvement and civil society 
support, what was also emphasised by the Commission Communication, but there it was the 
third priority to be taken into account.  
This comparison shows that while all actors agreed on the general importance of the ENP and 
its main underlying principles, there were also different topics that the Commission on the hand 
and some member states on the other hand perceived as important areas for cooperation. This 
comparison also shows the potential areas for conflict: both Commission and member states 
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 As last point the German presidency report discusses the Black Sea Energy. However, as this framework is not 
relevant for the research focus of this thesis it is not taken into account.  
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agreed that migration is a salient topic, but while member states mainly wanted to tackle it is a 
problem, the Commission also emphasised its positive attributes in terms of creating incentives 
by setting up more flexible regimes for regular migration.  
This way of setting the agenda and specifying policies in terms of EU actors’ interaction within 
the ENP is quite different than the arrangements under the EMP. There, each presidency of the 
Council was to present its priorities for implementation, but it was explicitly the Council who is 
responsible for the actual implementation by adopting Common Positions and Common Actions 
(and where the Commission was only mentioned as interim secretariat and as being responsible 
together with the Council to ensure coherence). The Commission within the ENP framework is 
in the position to put its own topics on the agenda, to emphasise the aspects that it considers as 
crucial for an effective EU foreign policy towards the member states, and time and again it is 
even asked by the member states to do so.  
Closely linked to this task of suggesting and drafting policy proposals are two functions that 
Hill considers as the main tasks of foreign policy bureaucracies: gathering routine information 
and assisting in formulating policies.  Both tasks investigated below show that the Commission 
is also more strongly involved in this first stage of the policy process, because member states 
consider it as the focal point of information and expertise, what leads to the perception that the 
Commission is the best interlocutor to formulate well-informed drafts. Additionally it has to be 
kept in mind that the Commission is often perceived as the neutral representative of the 
European interest that proposes drafts that are acceptable for all member states.  
6.2.2. Decision-Making 
The decision-making stage of the policy cycle is the one where no significant change in terms of 
EU actors’ interaction occurred at all. All political issues have to be agreed upon by member 
states unanimously, while those external relations with a more economic, trade or development 
aspect fall under the Community competence and hence show a stronger involvement of the 
Commission. Within the latter areas member states, however, still are involved in administrative 
law making under comitology, when the Commission has to discuss in committees certain 
implementing acts. And one procedural change as outlined in more detail above is that since the 
British presidency ENP dossiers do not go first into PSC anymore (except for cases with crisis 
management components) but are mostly directly passed from working groups to COREPER II.  
Member state are surely the most influential actors in this stage, and informally it has also 
shown that the Commission has to consider specific national “hot issues” when assisting 
member states in drafting policy proposals. One difficult subject was for a long time, for 
example closer integration in agriculture and trades in services, what was a very difficult topic 
for Spain who feared a too strong harm for its own market. But also France and Portugal 
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showed quite reluctant in regard of liberalizing the trade in agricultural products (Interview No. 
13, CS). While the Commission of course tried to take the consideration of these member states 
into account, officials working in Brussels also remark that older member states like Italy, Spain 
or France have a certain advantage in this regard, as the Commission over time got really 
familiar with their national interests, and they had already lots of opportunities to learn how to 
push their own interests not only during the formal discussion of the draft proposal but already 
beforehand in the agenda-setting and early drafting stage (Interview No. 18, PR Germany). 
Once negotiations started with third countries the Commission of course has to keep member 
states informed and it is the latter who have to approve in the end the outcome of those 
negotiations, but mostly the Commission only needs a qualified majority, and sometimes the 
Commission strategically and actively embarks on persuading member states to reach a majority 
(Interview No. 11, COM).  
But apart from those minor issues that changed some informal practices, the decision making 
stage is still the stage that works exactly as it was envisaged in the treaty provisions.  
6.2.3. Implementation 
In EU public policy-making, the implementation stage is considered crucial for effective policy-
making. Only when policies are also implemented the way that they were intended those earlier 
taken decisions actually take effect and a political system holds up its legitimacy for existence. 
However, in the academic analysis of EU foreign policy-making the stage of implementation is 
often ignored or considered as too technical and unexciting. Hence it is hardly taken into 
consideration in CFSP research or in a more comprehensive EU foreign policy analysis, while it 
is mainly in research about the EC external relations where implementation is considered an 
important topic to measure effectiveness and to observe impact on the ground. This disregard of 
implementation in EU foreign policy research in a comprehensive manner to a certain extent 
also emerged from the rather declaratory character of EU foreign policy-making in its early 
years, when the EU mainly was commenting on outside events but was not in the position to 
actually do something actively to respond to external threats or crisis.  
However, especially in the ENP the importance of the implementation of action plans is 
repeatedly emphasised. And as all EU external relations and administrative CFSP 
expenditures102 are financed through the EU budget „the Commission has the cheque-book for 
all policies” (Interview No. 15, CS) within the ENP framework.  Hence, the Commission is the 
one responsible for administering the budget.  
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 For CFSP the expenditures for civilian crisis management is covered by separately established mechanisms, but 
missions with military components have to be financed through the member states separately. 
 198 
In the EU relations with the Southern Caucasus, Mayer concludes in his analysis that the 
relationship between Commission and Council is the most important aspect in EU policy-
making towards this region. However, he also emphasises that it is especially the 
implementation stage where the Commission has a vast amount of leverage and room for 
manoeuvre, because it is the one selecting and financing various projects (Mayer 2006: 241). 
Projects, of course, still have to be confirmed by comitology committees, what would give the 
TACIS committee of the Council theoretically the choice and power to reject certain projects by 
qualified majority, but in practice this proved rather unlikely to happen, also because member 
states sometimes disagree with the Commission but at the same time they also disagree with 
each other. In Mayer’s view, there is a clear asymmetrical distribution of information and 
resources in technical assistance programming that the Commission knows very well to use. 
This was also again and again confirmed in interviews with officials. At the same time, the 
working procedure adapted beforehand especially as outlined in the Common Strategy for the 
Mediterranean did not ascribe any specific role for the Commission in implementation but 
emphasised that it is the rotating presidency in the Council with support of the HR who shall 
implement the EU policy towards the Mediterranean. The Commission is only mentioned as 
supporting institution, as for example point 34 of the Common Strategy states vaguely that “the 
Commission shall contribute to the above within its competences” (European Council 2000a). 
This was also not changed or updated when the Common Strategy was prolonged in 2004 until 
2006 (European Council 2004c). This discrepancy between the assumed role of the Commission 
in the official documents and the actual role of the Commission in implementation towards the 
Mediterranean as shown in Mayer’s research highlights that it is not sufficient to just stick to the 
formal account of how policies are made but that it is indispensable to have a closer look of 
what is actually happening on a day-to-day basis.  
Considering the clear separation form the past between political CFSP implementation and 
economic or development-orientated external assistance, the ENP framework definitely 
challenged this clear separation. Within the ENP, it is the Commission who is in the position to 
spend money in EU external relations (Interview No. 12, COM), while member states acting 
within the CFSP framework would either have to frame their action in a way that it is covered 
by the EU budget, they would have to rely on the Commission to implement their political 
decision, or they would have to draw up national means to finance their ideas. This situation 
again provides an incredible advantage for the Commission, as the following quote from a 
Council Secretariat official illustrates:  
 “The Commission, they run projects, they have the money. And if you want to do Foreign Policy 
you need to have money – so they have the money and we do not” (Interview No. 22, CS)  
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Within the Commission it is mainly the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG Aidco) and the 
delegations who take care of programme implementation while the programmes follow strictly 
the generally used project cycle management regime as developed by the Commission 
(European Commission & EuropeAid 2004).  DG Relex was responsible for drafting the ENP 
action plans, but for the more detailed programming documents like country strategy paper or 
national indicative programme it is DG Aidco who is responsible to draw up these documents. 
However, these are of course prepared in close inter-service consultation with DG Relex 
(Interview No. 2, COM).  
The annual programming is specified in the Annual Action Programmes which are drawn up in 
the following manner:103 The EC delegations are the first ones to submit draft identification 
documents to DG Aidco and DG Relex (mostly in January-February). From February to April 
these documents build the base for internal discussions in the Commission, especially between 
officials from DG Relex and DG Aidco.  End of April the delegations again submit a draft 
document for the Annual Action Programmes to the two DGs in Brussels, which in the 
following are discussed internally but also with other DGs and are translated until mid of June. 
When those drafts of the Annual Action Programme are ready they are submitted by DG Aidco 
to the ENPI Management Committee where the Commission and the member states are 
represented to discuss these administrative documents. The ENPI Management Committee 
normally takes approximately until End of August to finalise those documents, while also the 
relevant working groups in the European Parliament are consulted. After these processes are 
successfully completed the Commission normally adopts the annual action programmes by 
September or October.  
Similar to the MEDA programme, also the ENP includes a conditionality clause, although the 
ENP framework only applies positive conditionality: positive reforms in the partner countries 
shall be rewarded by additional financial means or a closer cooperation in different areas or 
access to certain EU agencies or programmes. Human rights and democracy promotion were not 
incorporated strongly in association agreements but are now part of ENP acquis, as they have 
been taken into account in the action plans and partner countries know that they are vital 
interests for the EU. As all bilateral EU cooperation with an ENP partner country is based upon 
the action plans, close cooperation is only possible when those action plans exist (i.e. only 
limited cooperation with Algeria, Belarus, Libya and Syria who do not have an action plan).  
It, however, again became quite clear in interviews that Commission officials believe in the 
power of their own instruments to deal with these kind of issues and that no political 
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 These steps of the annual programming cycle have been taken from the ENPI Website: http://www.enpi-
programming.eu/wcm/en/programming-process/timeline.html (Last retrieved 22 February 2011). 
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conditionality is needed for partners who want to cooperate, as they assume that the 
Commission instrument give them more leverage, than what member states can achieve through 
political threats. At the same time, the implementation of the Commission in regard of EU 
external relations has also often been heavily criticised, especially by the development 
community. Often the strict project cycle management approach that the Commission follows 
and asks its partners to operate with puts a highly bureaucratic and administrative burden on 
partner institutions and also makes it easier to handle if certain apriori knowledge about EU 
project cycle management is in place. Furthermore, the Commission moved from supporting 
lots of small projects in the last years to increased budget support, i.e. providing co-financing 
for government spending in conducting certain reforms (European Commission & EuropeAid 
2007; European Commission & Development 2008). The criticism for the latter coming from 
NGOs and the development community is that this kind of assistance often strengthens the not 
always democratic regimes in the third country or targets administrative reform in terms of good 
governance, but that those projects not really are felt by the citizens of the third countries at all. 
The Court of Auditors also repeatedly critically reflects on the use of budget support by the 
Commission in external assistance, although its critique mainly focuses on the implementation 
of the measure (Court of Auditors 2010). At the same time, the multitude of budget lines and 
different ways of supporting projects or governments in neighbouring countries make it quite 
intransparent and difficult to assess how much money the EU exactly provides for a partner 
country per year (Maurer & Morgenstern 2009 ; see also academic literature on EU democracy 
promotion and its challenges, e.g. Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2009; Pridham 2007; Warkotsch 
2008; Freyburg, Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, Skripka & Wetzel 2009; Bicchi 2009; Youngs 
2001, 2009; for a detailed analysis of change in neighbouring countries in different policy areas 
see Weber, Smith & Baun 2007; for another more recent analysis see Withman & Wolff 2010). 
What those accounts show is that it is mainly the Commisison that administers the money and 
develops the detailed plans of how to support reforms in third countries. At the same time this 
referres to a long-standing dispute in EU foreign policy-making about the linkage between 
economic goals, economic means and political goals. While some Commission officials, 
especially from technical DGs, have a tendency to support the point of view that political goals 
should not disturb the progress achieved in creating stability and prosperity, it is of course 
especially member states who claim that for their political goals they also need the financial 
support and broader comprehensive assistance:  
 “We see this very clearly in the Southern Caucasus for instance, where we, the Commission, 
have funds to support rehabilitation projects in Abchasia and South Ossetia. The Council has 
the more political role, because they have a special envoy which is appointed, so the political 
talks are led by the Council, but at the same time the Council is very aware that they lack some 
basic instruments, that is very well known problem” (Interview No. 8, COM) 
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Hence, while member states “cannot go it alone”, they consider it as crucial that the 
Commission backs their ideas up and implements them accordingly also with their own efforts 
and projects. At the same time, it was not surprisingly a British official who highlighted the 
positive contributions member states can provide to this process as well: 
“And I think it is key now moving forward that the Commission really brings in the member 
states, so that the member states will get a good spirit as well, so that we kind of work together 
on these issues. Because I think the Commission will have a very important role in the ENP, but 
when it comes sometimes to political ache you need the member states, you need people, you 
need ministers, you need countries to bring through the messages and to back up what the 
Commission is asking of a country.” (Interview No. 21, PR UK) 
This quote clearly illustrates the member states generally do not disagree with what the more 
technical assistance and external assistance that is generally provided by the Commission, but it 
also clearly shows that member states consider it as crucial to nevertheless get the political 
message behind this cooperation across.  
Another aspect that was repeatedly emphasised over time and especially so in the 2006 
Communication on how to strengthen ENP is the need for more vertical coherence and the use 
of stronger complementarity between what the EU is doing within the ENP framework and how 
single EU member states are engaged in certain third countries (European Commission 2006f: 
13; also confirmed and emphasised in Interview No. 16, PR France). 
6.2.4. Evaluation 
The main evaluation tool of the ENP as outlined in the 2004 Strategy are yearly progress reports 
that are prepared and presented by the Commission104. The progress in implementing the agreed 
reform priorities as outlined in the action plans should be constantly monitored in the relevant 
bodies created by the PCA or Association Agreements, while the Commission should prepare 
this yearly assessment to provide the other EU institutions a concise overview about the 
progress made (European Commission 2004b: 3). The idea behind these yearly evaluations was 
that after some time the action plans should be reviewed in terms of content and if needed, 
adapted or new contractual relationships offered. The action plans generally are valid for five 
years, with the exception of the action plans with Israel, Moldova and Ukraine whose action 
plans were only intended with a validity of three years105. As already elaborated upon it is the 
with the set-up of the ENP created unit D1 in DG Relex that is responsible for the publication of 
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 For the collection of all progress reports published so far see Commission Website, ENP Reference Documents at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#3 (last retrieved 25 April 2011). 
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 Information also confirmed at Europa-partner Website: 
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/relations/framework/article_7239_en.htm; The shorter 
validity of the action plans for Moldova and Ukraine led to the start of negotiations for Association agreements 
with both partners in 2010 and 2009. During the current Hungarian presidency in the first half of 2011 a strategic 
review of the ENP was planned to also re-assess the need for new action plans, but this item was moved to the 
subsequent Polish presidency.  
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the progress reports that are drafted by country teams, mostly in close cooperation with the EC 
delegations on the ground. The first progress reports were published in December 2006 
(European Commission 2006a, c, e) for a few countries and in rather rudimentary form, while 
the first set of comprehensive progress reports were published in April 2008, evaluating the 
ENP in 2007 and being prepared on a yearly base from that moment onwards. The overall 
assessment summarises in a few pages the main successes and challenges of the ENP in the 
proceeding year, finishing mostly with a mixed picture that praises that the EU cooperation with 
its neighbours gets closer but also outlines some important areas where more progress will be 
needed (see e.g. European Commission 2008d, 2010c). Furthermore, this more general 
assessment is accompanied by a sectoral report where activities in different policy areas and 
measures (like Twinning, TAIEX or also integration in EU programmes) are outlined (see e.g. 
European Commission 2008e, 2010b), and the Commission also prepares individual country 
progress reports for each partner country. These ENP progress reports are discussed in the 
different fora in the Council hierarchy and the member states take account of those regularly 
after their publication in the Council meetings. However, member states are not directly 
involved in evaluating the ENP, while the set-up of new cooperation frameworks like the Union 
for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership can be considered as member states’ attempts 
to contribute their evaluations to the EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours. 
In a similar vein, the Commission published two Communications in 2006 that can be 
considered a more general evaluation of the ENP. First, the Communication “Strengthening the 
European Neighbourhood Policy” (European Commission 2006f), as already discussed in detail 
above, emphasised the Commission’s ideas of how to make the ENP more coherent, more 
efficient and more effective. Secondly, the European Commission published a second 
Communication in 2006 entitled “Europe in the World. Some Practical Proposals for Greater 
Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility” (European Commission 2006b) that not only dealt with 
the EU relations with the neighbourhood but with EU foreign policy-making in more general 
terms. The ENP was only mentioned once in this document under the heading “enlargement” 
stating in a similar vein that the ENP has to be perceived as “priority of the EU’s external 
relations” whose “success depends on the active involvement of a wide range of external and 
internal policies and offers a stake in the EU’s internal market to the countries concerned“ 
(European Commission 2006b: 3). 
This accounts show that the Council and the member states are involved in the evaluation stage 
in that far as they consider the reports submitted to them, but that it is again the Commission 
that shapes this stage by its publications and suggestions.  
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6.3. Conclusion: All New, or just ‘Old Wine in New Wineskins’? 
In 2006 Judith Kelley published an article about the ENP in the Journal of Common Market 
Studies that she entitled “new wine in old wineskins”. The main argument of Kelley’s 
contribution there is that the Commission strategically adapted enlargement policies to expand 
its foreign policy domain, i.e. that it used “old wineskins” (enlargement instruments) that it 
filled with new content (EU relations with neighbourhood) instead of the CEEC pre-accession 
policies. However, when taking the perspective of comparing the EU relations with the 
neighbours before and after the set-up of the ENP, I would argue that it is even more appropriate 
to actually challenge with the assessment about “old wine” (same policies, same instruments) in 
“new wineskins” (new framework).  
The thesis started with the question in what respect and to what extent the single ENP 
framework changed EU policy-making processes towards the neighbours. To be in the position 
to answer this question, this chapter analysed in detail the role of different EU actors in agenda-
setting and policy-specification, in decision-making, in implementation and evaluation in EU 
foreign policy-making towards the neighbours within the ENP framework. The first part showed 
that it was only the Commission where the set-up of the ENP had led to an inter-institutional 
adaptation by creating a new subunit for general and sectoral ENP coordination and subsuming 
the respective regional and country desks within the same unit. Other EU actors did not directly 
adapt their institutional structure to the ENP.  
The ENP was set-up as a framework under which all EU foreign policy-making towards the 
neighbours should take place. However, the empirical analysis showed that an 
intergovernmental assessment of the ENP would be misleading as it would assume that it is only 
member states that would shape those policies. However, it is not at all the case that it is only 
member states that shape the EU policy-making within the ENP framework, as the following 
two quotes illustrate even more provocatively: 
“But frankly, I do not see  actions that the Council does on its own, although it has the legal 
capacity in doing so.” (Interview No. 8, COM)  
 “I would not say that the Commission is not doing politics. The Commission is doing it in a 
different way.” (Interview No. 22, CS) 
When looking at the narrow stage of decision-making, not many changes happened after the set-
up of the ENP, as in political issues it is still the member states that have to decide by 
unanimity, while for external relations the Commission is in the driving seat, although member 
states still keep a certain degree of control through comitology. 
However, the empirical material and the analysis of the other policy stages showed that a sole 
reduction of the analysis to decision-making would be misleading and would not capture the full 
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picture of EU policy-making towards the neighbours. Especially the Commission’s role is not 
so much categorised by the formal decision-making power but it plays a crucial role in 
supporting, assisting and shaping member states’ decisions, especially in the policy-
specification and implementation stages. 
In agenda-setting and policy-specification the main change within the ENP framework is clearly 
the drawing up of the one document of the action plan that outlines the reform priorities for the 
respective partner country, encompassing political, economic and cultural topics. While there is 
still a differentiation in terms of political issues being discussed in more detail by the member 
states, the Council Secretariat and the EUSR staff, it provides an invaluable advantage for the 
Commission to be the “master” of the text right from the beginning and also having prepared 
the Country papers that were used as a first analysis for needed reforms. The member states 
control the Commission carefully, especially when they get suspicious, but generally it is the 
task of the Commission to draw all the different amendments and comments together and 
negotiate the draft with the third country. The role of the European Council in this stage is 
mostly an affirmative one, inviting other actors to follow-up on the progress already achieved. 
In this regard, the new ENP framework clearly differs from the EU policies towards the 
neighbours that had been established beforehand. Within the EMP the Commission associated 
and asked to contribute within its competences, but the main task of setting the agenda and 
drawing up specific work programmes was with the member states in the Council, and 
especially with the rotating presidency supported by the HR. Towards the Southern Caucasus, 
the Commission had a stronger impact in regard of implementation, but as those relations where 
younger and also more politicised, the agenda-setting role of the Council was traditionally more 
prominent. Therefore these results show that in this stage of agenda-setting and policy 
specification the ENP clearly shifted the tasks towards the Commission in terms of drafting and 
assisting in policy formulation, especially as the Commission is considered as the best-situated 
and best-suited actor. Commission officials are able to gather expertise and valuable 
information through their close link with the EC delegations, and furthermore the geographical 
desk officers in DG Relex have the possibility to get support from sectoral units within DG 
Relex or from other DGs (Trade, Agriculture etc.) that can provide their technical expertise. 
The member states, as the deciding authorities, have the difficulty during these negotiations that 
first, it is impossible for them to look at every point and to assess the impact in detail, and that 
secondly, at this point of time the member states can only agree or disagree to the drafts, but 
they can not put forward comprehensive drafts themselves anymore. Furthermore, the 
Commission sometimes acts in a very strategic way to achieve acceptance of their proposed 
policies, especially if only a qualitative majority with the member states is needed during the 
comitology stage. 
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After the formal decision-making, it is the implementation stage where the Commission fulfils a 
very important role, that should not be reduced to economic and development aspects only. It is 
the Commission who is responsible for the implementation of the ENP action plans and the 
Association Agreements (or Cooperation and Partnership Agreements for the Southern 
Caucasus), administering the EU external assistance and other financial resources for the EU 
cooperation with the neighbours.  
While the ENP shows certain features of EU policy-making that have already been in place 
beforehand, there was a clear adaptation of task allocation with in the ENP framework. The next 
chapter will investigate in more detail the second research question of this thesis and look at the 
motivations behind this change, by answering the questions of why member states allow for a 
stronger involvement of other actors like the Commission, and why on the other hand the 
European Commission pushed for a stronger involvement.   
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Chapter 7: Explaining change in EU Actors’ Tasks and Interactions within the ENP 
The thesis so far showed the development of the ENP, and compared the tasks and roles of the 
EU actors in different policy stages within the ENP framework with the situation before the set-
up of the ENP. This comparison has been done by drawing on and tracing the different ideas 
within the various EU documents and by showing the development over time, especially by 
investigating the EU foreign policy-making towards Morocco and Georgia. This analysis so far 
showed what changed in the task distribution and interaction of EU actors with the set-up of the 
ENP.  
This chapter 7 moves its attention to the factors that explain the way that this change of EU 
actors’ task allocation and interaction has taken place. It therefore directly relates to the second 
research question of this thesis about what factors explain the changes in interactions of actors 
in EU foreign policy making. After careful consideration it shows that his main question inherits 
two different aspects that are worth to be differentiated for the depth of the empirical analysis: 
first, in what manner this change has taken place, but secondly also why the action of and the 
interaction between EU actors has changed? 
Foreign policy is perceived as the most sensible area to national sovereignty, and the pillar-
structure that was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty is often argued to clearly show this 
reluctance of Member States to allow for a closer cooperation in this area at EU level (Corbett 
1992). For some years scholars and practitioners have even argued that a re-intergovern-
mentalisation of EU policy-making is taking place, implying that instead of more integration we 
can observe a stronger involvement of member states and that therefore more cooperation 
instead of integration is taking place. These conclusions rest on the observation that especially 
the CFSP as well as the ESDP increased in activity and salience and that both policy areas 
became more prominent, because member states engage more intensely in the coordination of 
their foreign policies. But why would Member States then allow for the increased involvement 
of the Commission in foreign policy-making towards the neighbourhood, as it was observed in 
the previous chapter? Did they not perceive the ENP as foreign policy, or quite on the contrary, 
did they have intentional reasons to allow for this change? These are the questions that this 
chapter is looking at in more detail.  
The theoretical framework of this thesis (see chapter 3, p. 59 ff) specifies six different 
assumptions derived from the academic literature that might help to explain why the change in 
interactions in the ENP occurred. In the foreign policy analysis literature and especially in the 
bureaucratic politics approach scholars differentiate between reflexive goals and purposive 
goals. Reflexive goals are various organisational interests in terms of increasing competences or 
(financial) means, while purposive goals are targeted towards a policy demand and the idea of 
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how a specific policy should look like. In regard of the latter, actors recognize that they have to 
adapt their form of interaction to a more effective way of policy-making, what might be 
triggered by two different ways of reasoning: On the one hand an increased functional linkage 
of different policy areas might also ask for a more integrated approach at EU level 
(Christiansen, Jørgensen & Wiener 2001: 762; Stetter 2004: 720-721), while on the other hand a 
new policy demand might occur because of rational cost/benefit calculations or efficiency 
reasons. Following this logic member states intentionally decide to involve supranational actors 
for more efficient policy-making while applying a strict control mechanism, because the 
quantity and complexity of foreign policy output on EU level has grown and they lack the 
ability to pursue their policy ideas on their own. 
In contrast to these intentional assumptions, some scholars argue that member states lack 
information and follow a bounded rationality, implying that at the point of time when they set 
up a new institution or framework, they are not totally aware of the consequences that this 
decision will have in the future. If this way of reasoning is applicable to the ENP it can be 
assumed that the ENP set-up was for example closely linked to the enlargement process, and 
that member states were not aware of what they actually agreed to when they set-up the ENP.  
Following these different theoretical assumptions, this thesis assumed at the outset that the 
process of change varied between more conflictual and more consensual stages of interaction 
over time. Change and especially institutional change always asks for adaptations, and 
considering that the EU actors first have to get acquainted to the new situation and the newly 
established framework, it seems likely that at the beginning the relationships proved more 
conflictual. Furthermore, it is interesting to investigate to what extent these conflictual stages 
have been overcome over time and by what means. The theoretical framework of this thesis 
pointed out two factors that might have contributed to a smoothing out of potential conflicts 
over time: the process of socialisation and learning over time (assumption 3) as well as the 
available communication channels (assumption 4) as the main process that might explain the 
manner in which the change of roles and interactions took place after the set-up of the ENP. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the intentional factors of bureaucratic interest (assumption 1) 
and policy interest (assumption 2) as intentional factors, as well as bargaining advantages 
(assumption 5) and incomplete contracting (assumption 6) as situational factors might have 
impacted on the EU actors’ choice to contribute to the process of change.  
It must also be acknowledged here that motivations and underlying interests that shape actors 
behaviour are a complex and delicate unit of analysis for social scientists. Motivations can not 
be traced directly, and the reasons actors often name as source for their decisions do not have to 
be the real incentives and driving forces of their chosen action, but might represent their 
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interpretation of socially and politically acceptable reasoning. Hence, while this thesis does not 
claim to be able to trace all highlighted factors in the actors’ motivations over time within the 
whole of the ENP and in its entirety, it attempts to analyse the collected evidence in a structured 
and critical manner to be at least able to identify tendencies that hint towards the explanatory 
power of the different factors. This implies that while the causal relationship between the 
identified factors and the process of change can not be shown in its entirety, the critical analysis 
and careful triangulation of empirical material allow at least for the conclusion which factors are 
more likely to have played a strong role and which factors do not show any explanatory power 
in regard of the analysed processes at all. This is done mainly by interpreting and analysing the 
expert interviews that have been conducted in Brussels and by taking into account other 
secondary analyses that elaborated upon potential motives for change. After careful 
triangulation of data gained through these expert interviews, certain tendencies and explanations 
can be considered as having had a stronger impact on EU actors’ behaviour than others.  
Last but not least, it has to be taken into account, that the main formal decision-making power to 
change the set-up of how the EU conducts its policies towards the neighbours has been and still 
is with the member states. This provides them with a strong position in pushing for their 
motivations and interests in changing the interaction, but at the same time we must not ignore 
the impact that the Commission might have, as the Commission of course might have had 
opportunities to frame certain suggestions and drafts in a way that favour its own idea of how 
the EU relationship with the neighbours should look like.  
7.1. From Conflict to Consensus: Adapting to Change over Time? 
When the ENP was set-up in 2003, it took quite some time before it was fully up and running. 
The first officials had been moved from DG Enlargement to the new ENP units in DG Relex, 
but were still working on enlargement dossiers until the new member states became EU 
members in 2004. It took some time until the financial instrument, the ENPI was set-up, and 
even in 2006 officials in different institutions emphasised that the ENP is still in flux and that 
the exact division of labour between different EU actors is still not fully settled (Interview No. 
21, PR UK). It is not surprising that EU actors needed some time to adapt and find their place 
within the ENP framework, although the timeframe of two years after the adoption of the ENP 
strategy seems quite a long times for the new framework still not to be settled totally, especially 
as the first evaluations were already taking place in 2006.  
A Commission official reported, for example, that at the beginning EU actors involved in ENP 
acted very cautiously, because the ENP was clearly perceived as foreign policy-making and 
something related to CFSP and hence to the intergovernmental mode of policy-making. This 
perception changed only slowly towards recognising that the Commission also has an important 
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role to play in comprehensive security issues (Interview No. 5, COM). This shift in perception 
within the ENP also coincided with the set-up of an own unit in DG Relex that was dealing with 
security issues (directorate A in DG Relex). While this new directorate was not directly linked 
to the ENP units, it of course impacted on the general atmosphere between Commission and 
other actors that developed during these months. Several interviewees confirmed that there is 
indeed institutional rivalry between different actors, especially between the Council and the 
Commission. And this rivalry is especially visible when it comes down to security issues 
(Interview No. 5, COM), but at the same time it should be taken into consideration that even 
within the various institutions fierce fights between different subunits had been taken place at 
this point in time (Interview No. 11, COM). 
All actors involved in the ENP, however, are reported to have followed in their daily interaction 
a pragmatic approach of cooperation, and it was still considered to be work in progress to 
clearly define the roles and tasks of all actors involved (Interview No. 5, COM). Similar 
experiences were also reported from Commission officials of the ENP units, as the following 
quote points to some conflictual situations in the first months of the ENP: 
“In general it has to be noted, that we had quite some confrontations with the Council at the 
beginning – but these were mainly problems at the beginning of a new policy.” (Interview No. 
7, COM) 
The Council learnt quickly to appreciate the role of the Commission in supporting long-term 
reform processes, but a certain degree of jealousy in the areas of CFSP naturally remained. But 
earlier strategy papers of the Council, like the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean, had 
shown to everyone involved that such initiatives have no effect at all if they do not involve and 
have the support of the Commission (Interview No. 7, COM). From the Commission side, this 
was one of the reasons named why the cooperation improved over the years. This change in 
attitude also shows in the fact that at some point the Council and the Council Secretariat even 
started to ask for expertise from the Commission. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the High 
Representative Solana had constantly worked on building a huge team around him that despite 
its size had to realise that “they can not do everything alone” (Interview No. 7, COM). Several 
times they tried to draft their own policy papers and suggestions, in which they also clearly 
interfered in first pillar competences. However, their attempts failed and were not really 
successful in practice, as for example a draft paper on a border assistance mission to Israel 
showed. This project failed miserably because it was neither effective nor coherent without the 
Commission’s involvement (Interview No. 7, COM). According to Commission officials, this 
kind of experience showed to all involved actors that such behaviour is rather unproductive and 
should be avoided in the future conduct of EU foreign policy-making (Interview No. 7, COM).  
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In the case of the EU relations with Georgia, problems in organising the interaction between EU 
actors just occurred during the negotiations about the role of the Special Representative for the 
Southern Caucasus (EURS) in 2003, but those turf-battles at the beginning of the ENP could be 
soon overcome, as the following quote illustrates tellingly:  
 “I would be lying if I would say that at the beginning there was no confusion and some sort of 
conflict. Everybody tries to defend its own camp, and so when we were discussing the mandate 
of the EU special representative we had the Commission being very careful to be sure that the 
EURS well not impede on their competences. [..] Now this is working well, also as a result of 
the concrete people involved. It has to do with the personalities a lot.” (Interview No. 22, CS) 
In the case of Georgia in 2003, the Council, the Commission and the team of the Special 
representative after a short period of customising appreciate their mutual and consensual 
interaction very positively. Repeatedly the involved actors emphasized that they have a very 
pragmatic share of work and that they work as a team (Interview No. 5, COM; Interview No. 
14, CS; Interview No. 22, CS; Interview No. 19, COM).  
This might lead to the misconception that the increasing involvement of the Commission did not 
create any problems after the first starting months, but especially the member states have 
sometimes certain concerns about the Commission’s behaviour when they have the impression 
that the Commission tries to hide information or that they loose the control over the 
Commission, as will be shown later on especially in the EU relationship with Morocco. These 
accounts, however, also highlight the importance of two factors that have not been taken into 
account explicitly in the theoretical framework: it is crucial to have a good interaction in terms 
of communication, building trust and establishing a good working relationship with the people 
of the different institutions, what mostly comes down to personal relationships. Additionally, it 
is not always so much what different actors do, but how others perceive them and their 
motivations.  
Communication channels are important to coordinate and work together, but what is surprising 
in regard of the empirical evidence is that the smooth working between different EU actors does 
not so much follow the logic of socialisation that takes place automatically as soon as actors 
have regular contact, but that successful communication mostly comes down to personalities of 
the respective officials and their perceptions. It was surprising to experience in interviews that 
the interaction of EU actors towards the Southern Caucasus was reported to be generally 
smoother and less conflictual than the cooperation between EU actors towards Morocco. This 
was surprising in that far as in the EU policy-making towards the Southern Caucasus a higher 
variety and number of actors is involved, the content is more politically salient because it also 
covers crisis management issues, and the EU policy is younger and not institutionalised on a 
very high level. However, EU actors involved in shaping the EU policy towards the Southern 
Caucasus were talking highly appreciative about each other, seem to have good and close 
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communication channels, know each other well and generally work closely together in a 
consensus seeking and friendly atmosphere. The EU policy-making with Morocco, on the other 
hand, encompasses more technical elements, is well institutionalised and follows a long 
tradition over time. Nevertheless it was the latter where conflicts between EU actors occurred, 
especially between member states and the specific country desk officers in DG Relex. It showed 
that these conflictual situations occurred because of various personalities in the responsible 
Commission unit that displayed a very strong confidence and conviction of their own ideas 
rather than showing a strong sense of cooperation with the member states (Interview No. 18, PR 
Germany; Interview No. 17, PR France). Furthermore, the member states had to recall proposals 
from this unit to third countries several times, as these drafts clearly exceeded the mandate of 
the Commission and were not in the interest of the member states (Interview No. 18, PR 
Germany). Hence, it was observable in the investigated cases of Morocco and Georgia that the 
coordination of and with other actors is highly depend on the respective personalities in charge. 
Representatives from the Council Secretariat as well as from the member states complained 
about the bad cooperation with some Commission officials in unit F of DG Relex, as they often 
were not informed in an appropriate way. The member states ascribe these problems not 
generally to the Commission but specifically to this unit. In the Southern Caucasus unit this 
kind of problems did not occur at all, and the Council, the Commission as well as the team of 
the special representative emphasized their team-like way of cooperating. The EU approach 
towards the Southern Caucasus must not directly be compared to the Southern dimension, but 
this observation indicates that personal contacts and the attitude of the individual officials 
towards cooperation with other institutions play a significant role (Interview No. 5, COM; 
Interview No. 14, CS; Interview No. 22, CS). 
This leads to the consideration of the first aspect that was not taken explicitly into account in the 
theoretical framework: persons matter. Personal relationships matter and can shape the 
atmosphere in which EU foreign policy-making is conducted in a positive manner, as the 
following two quotes illustrate:  
“It depends also on the personal relationship. I have a very good relationship with some 
Commission colleagues, with others we do not exchange so much information, as they want to 
keep their staff or we might disagree on certain approaches.” (Interview No. 15, CS) 
“I mean contact is good – I hope the others would confirm that -  even on Maghreb/Mashreq 
where debate can get heated on issues like the MEPP. I think we have quite personal 
relationships because of the fact that we meet twice a week, through also a range of social 
contacts, lunches and stuff like that. We know each other quite well which makes a huge 
difference because it is very easy to get annoyed with each other” (Interview No. 21, PR UK) 
The first quote shows that positive personal relationships can of course not be established with 
everyone involved but are selective, and that also the interpretation of the contact partner in 
terms of policy content might impede on these personal relationships, especially when we 
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consider later that some Commission units have quite a different approach to drive development 
forward in partner countries than member states. The second quote refers mainly to the 
relationship between member states in the Council hierarchy and it pinpoints to the idea that 
regular contact facilitates a good atmosphere to smooth out conflicts, but that of course such 
personal relationships do not re-shape interests in a way that there are no conflicts.   
Furthermore, it is not only personalities but to a huge degree it is perceptions of different actors 
towards each other that seem highly crucial for the mode of EU actors’ interaction. This second 
aspect that was rather implied than explicitly developed in the theoretical framework follows a 
more constructivist perception, arguing that, for example, the member states will not only 
sanction the Commission if the latter goes to far, but emphasising that the member states will 
already sanction the Commission when they perceive that the Commission impedes on their 
competences and national interest. The impression that certain behaviour leaves with member 
states can often cause even ill-founded mistrust between the interacting institutions, and once 
mistrust emerged it is rather difficult to get it out of the involved actors’ minds again, as the 
following quote illustrates:  
“I think strengthened coordination and dialogue is extremely important, and I think the 
Commission has to be careful that the member states do not feel like it tries to bring everything 
through. Because that would lead to break down in cooperation and a suspicion on the minds - 
Trust is the key, and suspicion and feelings have to get balanced and if not, if that is not the 
reality, if you have got the feeling. Because a lot is about impression and so on; I mean that could 
project on the tracks very, very quickly.” (Interview No. 21, PR UK)  
It also showed in other interviews that it is not so much about the actual doings of the 
Commission, but if the member states get the impression that the Commission plays on its 
information advantage or tries to hide something from member states, they become suspicious 
and their attitude turns more conflictual, even if nothing happened yet or it was just a matter of 
miscommunication or misinterpretation (Interview No. 16, PR France; Interview No. 17, PR 
France). 
This thesis had started out by formulating two assumptions about the way the change might be 
shaped and positively influenced by two factors: First, it was assumed that the longer actors are 
able to adapt and the longer they experience their new roles, the better the interaction will 
become over time (assumption 3 about the time factor). Secondly, a communication-factor was 
assumed to impact on the mode of change, assuming that the more the institutional set-up would 
ask and allow for direct contact between the actors and the exchange of their opinions, the more 
likely it would be that a consensual form of interaction would emerge over time (assumption 4).  
Both assumptions can be verified to a certain extent though not in their entity and can profit 
from a slight adaptation. The factor of time proved surely crucial to lead from a more conflictual 
relationship to a more consensual interaction, especially as over time the different actors learn to 
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work within their prescribed roles and as they finish defining their limits. However, it was not 
observable that involved EU actors socialise in a constructivist sense in that far as they would 
adapt their interests and positions through regular interaction that might converge at some point. 
It was rather a more rational approach to learning that could be observed: EU actors learn to use 
their roles in a way so that they do not conflict constantly with other actors’ role perceptions and 
that it allows for an efficient way of policy-making106. It seems likely that exactly this kind of 
process also took place within the ENP framework, although a more specific follow up study on 
the exact mechanisms would be necessary to highlight the exact processes that have taken place.  
Also the second assumption (assumption 4 from the theoretical framework) pointed in the right 
direction and shows that communication channels are important elements to consider in this 
change of interactions within the ENP, but again the detailed factors proved slightly different 
than assumed. The empirics showed that it is personal relationships and perceptions within this 
communication channels that matter the most. Just because actors have the possibility to 
exchange their views, opinions and arguments for positions does not automatically lead from a 
conflictual to a consensual relationship, as the assumption formulated. But regular contact and 
efficient communication allows for the establishment of a good working environment and for a 
getting to know of the different actors. On these grounds personal relationships can be build that 
in a next step facilitate a smooth form of interaction. Hence, communication channels seem 
necessary prerequisites for such personal relationships to emerge, but they are not sufficient to 
establish a good and friendly working environment. Furthermore, communication channels 
might be in place, but if the respective actors mistrust each other (as was the case between the 
member states and the desk officer for Morocco in DG Relex) these channels alone are not able 
to contribute to a more consensual relationship. The latter also emphasises the need to take into 
account that it is not the action of different actors that matter, but that perceptions about certain 
situations are more important to take into account when looking for conflictual situations. 
Hence, while both assumptions point in the right direction and can be partly verified, they have 
to be adapted in that far that they take into account the importance of personalities and the 
salience of perceptions instead of actual events and behaviour.  
7.2. Explanations for changing Roles and Interaction within the ENP 
Next to these two procedural factors four factors have been identified in the theoretical 
framework that could explain why the ENP framework was set-up in the first place and why the 
interaction changed. The factors of bureaucratic interest and of policy interest would assume an 
                                                     
106
 Similar adaptations and rational learning processes were observed in the Council CFSP working groups where 
academics termed this way of learning as “strategic socialisation” (Juncos & Pomorska 2006). 
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intentional change that was deliberately asked for by the involved actors, implying that they 
changed the interaction because it would bring them more political power (e.g. in terms of 
competences, financial means, policy steering capabilities) or because they considered a certain 
functional need to have a coherent framework or follow a specific policy that could not be 
achieved successfully within the prior existing frameworks. On the other hand the factor of 
bargaining advantage and incomplete contracting are situational factors that might enable or 
restrain change in a certain direction but can not be considered as active factors that motivate 
actors’ behaviour.  
When asking actors why the ENP framework was set-up and why the interaction of the involved 
EU actors was adapted it became quite clear that this was an intentional move. Especially 
member states acknowledge that the enlargement and the need for a stronger cooperation with 
neighbouring third countries, as in the area of migration and energy, asked for a new framework 
that would allow for more comprehensive and stronger ties. In a similar vein, all actors 
highlighted the need to cooperate in an even stronger cross-pillar mode and to adapt the 
interaction in a way that would allow for the most effective policy output. It is especially worth 
to mention that it was also the member states and officials from the Council Secretariat that 
emphasised the need to get the Commission more involved, as otherwise this framework might 
not work or member states might not be in the position to use the framework to achieve their 
objectives. Generally, most of the reasoning that was provided for to explain this move can be 
structured around three tasks that interestingly enough Christopher Hill identified as core tasks 
of national foreign policy bureaucracies (Hill 2003: 77): routine information gathering, 
assistance in formulating policies, and providing coherence over time. The use of those 
categories shall not imply that the Commission has to be considered acting like a national 
foreign policy bureaucracy, because this would need a more careful consideration and 
elaboration and a different research design. But this categorisation is used in the next parts to 
structure what reasons member states were putting forward to explain their decision to allow for 
such a strong involvement of other actors. At the same time, these accounts also show that 
member states also tried to stay in control and that there were also other constrains and 
incentives at work that added to the conviction of having to create a more efficient policy 
framework with the ENP. 
7.2.1. Routine Information Gathering 
The ENP framework brings together 27 EU member states and 16 partner countries in the 
neighbourhood. It encompasses all different kind of policy areas that the EU embarks upon in 
their cooperation with the partner countries and is based on a complex set of institutional 
structures. The complexity and diversity that is brought together within the ENP framework also 
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puts a certain pressure and constrain on actors involved to always be up to date and to provide 
expertise in all the different aspects covered by the ENP. The gathering of information, 
processing of the collected data and application of this gained knowledge and expertise for 
policy formulation therefore is more difficult to achieve than in more simple frameworks, like 
for example the EMP had provided for with its clearly separated baskets.  
Within the ENP it is the most important task of DG Relex to collect and provide information to 
assess and monitor in a very detailed manner the implementation of the association agreements 
and of the ENP action plans (Interview No. 10, COM). The country desk officers are the focal 
points that can rely on the EC delegations’ expertise about the on-site situation as well as on the 
more technical assistance of the sectoral ENP units and of other DGs (Interview No. 7, COM; 
Interview No. 8, COM). And although the member states and the Council Secretariat closely 
observe the involvement of the Commission, they view the role of the Commission in gathering 
information very positively and acknowledge that it fulfils a very important task that in the 
existing multi-level governance system of the EU can only be sufficiently performed by the 
Commission (Interview No. 21, PR UK). Nevertheless, the member states become sometimes 
also quite jealous of the advantages that the Commission has at its disposal (Interview No. 13, 
CS), especially when they get the feeling that the Commission relies on its information-
advantage: 
“Vis-à-vis the working groups they [Commission officials] explain certain positions on a punctual 
basis but not regularly, and concerning information it depends – when they only need majority 
vote they often wait quite long and give the proposals to the member states just some days before 
the decision – so that they do not have time to look at the proposals in exact details and find 
points they would disagree with. For us it is not possible to look at every point in detail, 
especially when there should be a joint paper afterwards. It is a game.” (Interview No. 17, PR 
France) 
Officials of other member states also confirm this problem, although they emphasize that this 
cannot be generalized to the Commission per se, as the delivery of information depends very 
much on the personal attitude of the civil servant whom they are working with (Interview No. 
18, PR Germany). Additionally, after some problems at the start of the ENP member states also 
developed their own ways of getting information about what is discussed within the 
Commission and within other fora. One British representative, for example, emphasised the 
need to be pro-active in terms of seeking information from the Commission:  
“You have got to just hang out in the Commission basically, set up meetings, have special 
working groups and so on. You just have to get tight in.” (Interview No. 21, PR UK) 
But not always the way of seeking information is done in such a subtle and positive approach, 
and member states also from time to time have to retort to more drastic measures to be heard by 
the Commission in their plea for more information: 
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“Sometimes head of units do not want to answer questions of member states – like the Italian 
[country desk officer] during ENPI negotiations – so what we did, we [the member states] called 
his boss, his head of unit, the deputy director-general, the director-general and we drowned them 
in non-papers.” (Interview No. 18, PR Germany) 
Furthermore, it was repeatedly emphasised from different actors that the sharing of information 
is not a problem anymore during the negotiations with third countries, as all involved actors are 
aware of the importance to have a common standpoint vis-à-vis third parties (e.g. Interview No. 
15, CS). Officially, also the Commission highlighted the need to improve the exchange of 
information with the Council and the member states as a very important asset to strengthen the 
role of the EU as foreign policy actor (European Commission 2006b: 7-8). 
In regard of collecting information, especially about the situations in third countries, it is the EC 
delegations that are of major importance and provide an important source for the Commission. 
Some member states, especially the bigger ones and those with special links to certain countries, 
of course, have mostly their own well-equipped embassies in those countries that provide this 
kind of information, but compared to the whole of EU member states the EC delegations surely 
support the Commission in being perceived as the focal point and expert. At the same time, 
even representatives of bigger member states appreciate the role of the Commission on the 
ground, because it focuses on traditionally more technical and often more trade related aspects 
than the more politicised national embassies. This is tellingly illustrated by the following quote:  
“I think it is quite a good thing. I think it is quite useful because it goes back to what I said: you 
need some technical experience and time to devote to sit down really to know the country inside 
out. And know the technical issues. If you think at Rabat where the Commission delegation is – 
they have a real strong presence and they have technical experts who can look at things, at issues 
that we would traditionally not look at in great depth and they make recommendations on that. 
And I think that it is an extremely useful starting point, because you need that. You need to know 
where you are before you start your judgements. And you need that detailed technical stuff that 
the Commission provides.” (Interview No. 21, PR UK) 
The importance of the EC delegations was also a salient topic during the negotiations of the 
constitutional draft treaty and the Lisbon treaty respectively. By upgrading EC delegations to 
EU delegations, the Council Secretariat as well as the member states expected that through the 
set-up of an External Action Service they would be able to “use this huge potential” of the EC 
delegations more directly (Interview No. 15, CS). The Commission, of course, viewed this 
development more sceptical, as it feared losing an important source of power vis-à-vis the other 
actors. 
These accounts show that generally it was assessed as crucial to install the Commission as main 
focal point to gather information within the ENP framework. Again the personal relationship 
between member states representatives and specific Commission officials had been highlighted 
as an important factor shaping the flow of information. Furthermore, member states get 
suspicious, if they get the impression that the Commission is playing on its information 
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advantage. On the other hand, the Commission of course is aware of its advantage in terms of 
expertise and information vis-à-vis the member states, and sometimes it uses this advantage for 
its own purposes.  
Concluding it can be assessed that in terms of gathering information the policy-factor showed 
strongest, especially when it is read in regard of increasing efficiency and effectiveness, i.e. that 
installing the Commission as focal point for information gathering is the most efficient way of 
sharing information and it allows for the most efficient information flow. To a certain extent it 
can also be argued that there was a functional need to have the Commission as focal point, as it 
clearly had shown beforehand that member states would not be able to gather, process and 
analyse this bulk of information themselves, while at the same time it was clear that these 
information gathering would be necessary to make the ENP work.  
7.2.2. Assistance in formulating Policies 
Apart from information gathering and formulating its own ideas for future policies, Hill’s 
categorisation of traditional roles of foreign policy bureaucracies highlights an important feature 
that proved as important in foreign policy-making and can also be observed at EU level: the 
Commission might not be always successful and allowed to formulate its own policy ideas, but 
surely it fulfils an important role in supporting member states in formulating policies. This 
means that because EU foreign policy incorporates intergovernmental features, it is not the 
Commission itself who just formulates these policies. But drafting documents that serve as 
starting point for member states’ deliberations provide it with an important role in EU foreign 
policy-making towards the neighbourhood - even if in the end other actors might have the sole 
competence to decide.  
In 2004 and 2005, the Commission prepared the country reports, which highlighted the most 
needed reforms in the partner countries and were the starting point for further policy 
developments. It drafted the more detailed and very technical ENP action plans, which 
afterwards were discussed with the member states (Interview No. 14, CS). And even if member 
states still add certain political items later on or suggest certain changes, it is always an 
advantage to put forward a draft that can only be altered but not totally dismissed by other 
stakeholders. In putting forward drafts the Commission can also rely on the multitude and 
diversity of member states, because there might be one or a few that oppose certain paragraphs 
or suggestions, but generally the Commission’s proposals should at least have the support of the 
majority of member states. In negotiations those member states opposing can then try still to get 
certain concessions and to get certain alterations accepted, but they are not really able to get rid 
of the proposal in total to put forward their own ideas (Interview No. 17, PR France). 
Furthermore, member states as the deciding authorities have the difficulty that during this later 
 218 
involvement  it is impossible for them to look at every point and to assess the impact in detail 
(Interview No. 17, PR France). According to the experience of this latter French official, the 
Commission sometimes also acts in a very strategic way to achieve acceptance of their proposed 
policies, especially if only a qualitative majority is needed during the comitology stage. 
Through tactically linking different issues (for example agriculture and the free movement of 
workers) in one discussion it “tries to persuade the member states” (Interview No. 11, COM). 
Therefore the member states sometimes have the feeling that the huge power of drafting 
proposals “culminates in a rule of the Commission” (Interview No. 16, PR France) in the 
framework of the ENP. Not all member states formulate it in a such rigorous way, but they 
agree that the power of the Commission increased steadily during the last years (Interview No. 
13, CS; Interview No. 18, PR Germany).  
If the member states have such trouble in controlling the Commission and show quite a lot of 
incidents with strong mistrust, why did they allow for an involvement of the Commission in the 
first place? Considering the situational factors we might argue that it was an intended 
consequence of prior institutional change, i.e. that when the Member States adopted the ENP 
framework they were not aware of the kind of political power shift that this would lead to. Yet 
this argumentation seems rather illogical, as it is still the member states that decide, and they 
would within the ENP framework formally still be in the position to ignore the Commission’s 
proposals and drafts. In a similar vein also the second situational factor of a potential bargaining 
advantage does not show any explanatory power in this case, because it was the member states 
who had a much stronger position in setting-up the ENP and it would not seem to follow a 
rational logic that they install a system that would harm their own interests and make them loose 
control over the Commission.  
So why did and do member states still allow the Commission to put forward drafts or even more 
precisely, why do they even ask the Commission to put forward drafts within the ENP time and 
again, if they experienced that sometimes that makes them worse off in the inter-institutional 
bargaining system? To be able to explain this situation, we have to turn to one of intentional 
factors that have been assumed to explain why member states agreed to this change in actors’ 
interaction: the policy interest factor. It became quite apparent when the ENP was set-up that the 
member states perceived a strong need to create a more comprehensive and efficient framework 
to deal with the new neighbours at its borders. This functional need was also shared by the 
Commission, in that far as all actors involved emphasised as main ENP objective the need to 
create stability and security in the EU’s neighbourhood, as the following examples illustrates:  
 “Inter-institutional fights are sometimes even stronger than the fights between institutions. 
However, in terms of content there is no discussion – they follow the same objective.” 
(Interview No. 11, COM) 
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This observation was also confirmed by Mayer’s analysis of the EU policy towards the 
Southern Caucasus, where he concludes that the EU relations with the Southern Caucasus 
countries might be driven and motivated by different interests and preferences, but that those 
interests not contradict each other but rather create a multi-faceted picture (Mayer 2006: 233). 
Hence, the policy interest factor explains what happened in that far as it assumes that all 
involved EU actors agreed on the main common objective of the ENP framework, and that they 
perceive the need to have this framework and the respective task allocation to be able to achieve 
this objective.  
At the same time, this policy interest factor, however, can even be interpreted even stronger to 
assume that the actors were convinced that a certain division of labour would also increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the ENP framework in achieving security, stability and 
prosperity at the EU borders. Again, this was also an aspect that Mayer confirmed in his study 
on the EU-Southern Caucasus relations, as he argues that the Commission was mandated by the 
Council to implement TACIS and the financial aspects, because it would have been more 
expensive and too complicated to establish another institutional framework in which these tasks 
could have been performed successfully. He argues, therefore, that although the Commission 
was not the preferred choice of the Council in absolute terms, it was in relation to the costs and 
under considering all other factors the only practical choice that was possible (Mayer 2006: 
234).  
At the same time, it also showed that the Commission repeatedly frames its expertise in a way 
that emphasises its positive impact on similar process like they can be expected to take place in 
the ENP framework. The Commission considers the accession process of the 2004 enlargement 
as the most successful EU foreign policy, and argues that it showed there convincingly that it is 
able to transfer EU rules, norms and stabilise third countries. Hence, by using the arguments of 
the successful 2004 enlargement round, the Commission pushes for more room of manoeuvring 
in the political steering of day-to-day foreign policy making towards the neighbourhood, i.e. it 
pushes for more bureaucratic influence in order to achieve the commonly accepted goal of 
creating stability and security in the neighbourhood.  
Apart from the general agreement of all involved actors that the main objective of the ENP is to 
create stability and security for the EU by creating a stable and prosperous neighbourhood, all 
involved actors indeed also emphasize that the Commission is doing a very important job that 
could not be done by the MS or the Council alone(Interview No. 21, PR UK): 
 “I think this is very useful and that is what the EU is very good at. Because we can very often 
talk in very vague terms about reform, we need this, we need that country to do that. We need to 
break that down and go into real depth, which I think the Commission is in particular good at. 
You know what the benchmarks in sanitary affairs are that they need to meet to taxes the EU 
market? I mean these things are quite technical – or at least it seems so – but they are highly 
important in terms of trade access which can make a real difference.” (Interview No. 21, PR UK) 
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All actors agree on the main ENP objective and that it is necessary for an efficient ENP 
framework to have the Commission closely involved, as it is also emphasised in the European 
Security Strategy (European Council 2008: 8; see also Ferrero-Waldner 2006: 2; for a scientific 
discussion see Christiansen, Petito & Tonra 2000: 390-391), but it also becomes visible time 
and again that sometimes different perceptions and convictions exist about how this stable 
environment shall be reached, i.e. what instruments and mechanisms should best be used to 
achieve stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood. The EU actors not always agree on what 
instruments and processes they assume most efficient and effective to achieve the agreed goal, 
and this controversy the traditional divide between technical approach and political approach 
becomes apparent. Some actors argue that technical cooperation for development in a third 
country should also follow political objectives, while others emphasise that technical 
cooperation for development is a goal in itself that should not be hampered by political 
considerations. These cleavages do not only show between the Commission and the Member 
States, but often also different approaches exist between member states and different 
perceptions within the Commission (e.g. DG Trade vs. DG Relex): 
“In the Commission there is a huge competition between DGs: trade against Relex, trade 
against agriculture etc” (Interview No. 15, CS) 
In this discussion at the same time a certain discrepancy evolved, as on the one hand member 
states and Council Secretariat officials often accuse the Commission of interfering in political 
dossiers, while on the other hand Commission officials claim that member states often 
unnecessarily politicise their technical attempts to support developments in partner countries.  
Formally, there is of course still a clear division between economic Community competences 
and political competences of the member states. But Council Secretariat officials as well as the 
member states often get the impression that the Commission also wants to cover political 
aspects (Interview No. 15, CS; Interview No. 16, PR France). But first of all this is nothing 
specific to the ENP but it had been observed in EU foreign policy-making for years (Nuttall 
1992, 2000; Dijkstra 2009) that the Commission on the one hand tries to extent its own ground 
of working, or to formulate it more neutral, that the Commission perceives the distinction 
between political CFSP issues and communitarised external relations issues differently than 
member states. Yet and quite naturally, the latter carefully control what the Commission is 
including in its negotiations with the third countries (Interview No. 1, PR Austria).  
All involved actors agree that action plans are a useful and indispensable instrument for the 
ENP to identify the main areas of cooperation with the partner countries. However, while 
member states often would ask for a more strict use of political conditionality, most 
Commission officials reject this idea in that far as they consider it not efficient and even 
harming the already achieved results. Or as one Commission official formulated:  
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“We can not buy reforms, and not force them out from other countries; it will always depend on 
the willingness of the third country to embark on certain reforms” (Interview No. 7, COM).  
Commission officials also rather agree that they have a more long-term view on the EU 
relationship with the neighbours, while they consider the Council to be more interested in 
political issues and having a “totally different timeframe in mind” (Interview No. 7, COM). In 
the Commission’s view, reforms need time, and the EU should grant this time to their partner 
countries instead of interfering in those reform processes with often unsuccessful political 
initiatives or by applying political conditionality. At the same time, Commission officials also 
point out that there is not only a different perception present in the Council, but that also within 
the Commission different approaches to this question of linkage between economic and political 
goals can be observed (Interview No. 7, COM). At the same time, Commission officials seem to 
agree on a rather more pragmatic assessment of what the ENP can deliver than what the member 
states would consider. The former highlight that reforms as agreed upon in the action plans can 
only be successful and sustainable if third country also recognises their usefulness. And in this 
regard they would prefer the EU to have more clarity on this approach that “in the end the ENP 
is a reform anchor for willing third countries”, not more and not less (Interview No. 7, COM).  
Closely linked to this wariness of the Commission to link political objectives to technical 
measures to improve the situations in third countries is the conviction of especially sectoral 
policy officers in the Commission that it does not matter where a certain project is conducted, 
implying that the political sensitiveness of differentiating between different political partners is 
inappropriate to achieve success in terms of social development on the ground. They are for 
example interested to improve the quality of drinking water, and then it does not matter for them 
if they embark on this project in Beirut or in Odessa, as they will always need the same 
expertise (Interview No. 7, COM). In a similar vein, generally it is desirable to have a coherent 
approach, but Commission officials also do not see the usefulness of creating artificial cross-
linkages that just harm the reform process in a certain technical area, i.e. if improvements in the 
transport sector are at the core of a certain activity, then their success should be the main 
objective, and they should not be hampered by human rights debates, as the latter have nothing 
to do with what the reform process is actually about. This reluctance to consider political 
aspects in their more technical work is one of the main points of critique from other actors, as 
the following quote illustrates about the EU-Morocco relations:  
“For example, I find that the unit dealing with Maghreb has a very trade-orientated vision and 
considers aspects like human rights or governance as irritants.” (Interview No. 15, CS) 
Another aspect related to this difficult intersection between technical and political issues is the 
problem that it is often difficult to clearly distinguish between CFSP and external relations, as it 
has been experienced in the Southern Caucasus. There the Commission covers also political 
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issues in its day-to-day policy-making, also because of the strong emphasis on conflict 
resolution and post-conflict development, and it provides suggestions and ideas to the Council 
Secretariat and the presidency. However, in the EU policy-making towards the Southern 
Caucasus this intersection between technical and political aspects of the EU policies was 
overcome by a quite pragmatic approach of all involved EU actors to share the work (Interview 
No. 16, PR France). The Commission at the same time proved careful not to go beyond its 
competences, but at the same time all involved EU actors agree that it represents continuity and 
expertise that complements the activities of the EUSR and other political elements of CFSP in 
an efficient manner.  
The use of political conditionality is often mentioned as one aspect that shows a clear 
disagreement between Commission and Council, especially when it comes to the use of 
negative conditionality. However, when investigating the perception of EU actors in regard of 
this instrument for sanctioning and providing incentives for partner countries in more details it 
shows that the assessment that the Commission would generally oppose political conditionality, 
while member states would like to use it more often is rather too superficial and does therefore 
not catch the complexity of this topic. The Commission generally does not reject the idea of 
political conditionality per se, but it highlights some practical problems that it considers to harm 
this instrument. First of all, in regard of its bureaucratic interest the sanctioning of a third 
country by freezing certain financial assistance is considered counterproductive by the involved 
desk officers, as towards a partner country allocated financial means not spent within two years 
are “lost for DG Relex” and go back into the general budget (Interview No. 4, COM; Interview 
No. 2, COM). But it is not only a self-interest that the Commission puts forward as argument 
against the use of negative conditionality, but they also show a high degree of conviction that 
such sanctioning mechanisms would not work within the ENP, as the Commission does not 
have the leverage by using any other means to convince the third country (Interview No. 11, 
COM). Furthermore, Commission officials highlight that it is not only them who seem reluctant 
towards the use of freezing financial assistance, but that it was hardly every the case that all 
member states would agree on the use of negative conditionality and that it is most likely that 
there is at least one member states that would oppose such measures (Interview No. 3, COM). 
This latter argumentation is also shared by officials in the Council secretariat and member 
states’ representatives (Interview No. 14, CS; Interview No. 21, PR UK), who would generally 
welcome a more flexible approach of using this instrument, also highlight the political 
unlikelihood that it might actually be put in to practice (Interview No. 13, CS). 
Another element where Commission officials as well as member states agree is that it is useful 
to be able to use the “carrots” of financial assistance for political reforms in third countries, but 
that those reforms are only effective when they also fit in the reform programme of the third 
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country and when the government of the partner country backs the agreed objectives for reform 
that have been agreed upon the action plan and makes them part of their broader reform project 
(Interview No. 21, PR UK). 
These empirical accounts show that the policy factor of achieving an efficient and successful 
cooperation between EU actors to work towards the general ENP objective of creating stability 
and prosperity in the neighbourhood is strongest in regard of the Commission supporting the 
member states in drafting and formulating policies. While also here the functional interpretation 
of increased external pressures are at work that ask for an efficient EU response to cooperate 
closely with partner countries, there is also a strong conviction among the involved actors that 
an adapted interaction within the ENP framework is necessary to make this new framework 
towards the neighbours work successfully. At the same time, there is potential for conflict 
because of the different perceptions of how these general objectives can be best achieved, 
contrasting a rather technical approach by some Commission officials with a more politicised 
approach by member states and some other actors. However, after a short period of conflict at 
the start of the ENP the EU actors learnt to be sensitive towards those diverging perceptions and 
with the exception of some minor conflicts they established a consensual way of working 
together towards the agreed ENP objectives.  
7.2.3. Providing Coherence through Institutional Memory  
Next to the task of gathering information and assisting member states in formulating policies, 
Hill considers the providing of coherence through institutional memory the third essential 
contribution of national foreign policy bureaucracies. While coherence in the first chapter of this 
thesis has been defined rather in institutional terms, Hill’s interpretation (Hill 2003: 77) refers 
mainly to the idea of providing coherence over time, i.e. ensuring that EU foreign policy-
making towards the neighbourhood is not hampered by a constant stop-go-process but that 
certain objectives and policies are pursued strategically over a longer period of time.  
At European level this task is meant to be performed by the Council Secretariat whose primary 
task is to assist the rotating presidency and ensure continuity in the formulated policies of the 
Council. The civil servants of the Commission view themselves performing this task in the area 
of the ENP, as in their view also the officials in the Council Secretariat change regularly 
(Interview No. 8, COM; Interview No. 19, COM). Furthermore, Commission officials highlight 
that for such slow-moving processes like the ENP and the EMP the day-to-day policy-making 
of the Commission is more important than short-term political ad-hoc decisions of the Council. 
Profound improvements take time and need the support of more technical and long-term 
strategies (Interview No. 7, COM) which in the end make the EMP and ENP more successful 
than possible alternative, more interventionist approaches (Interview No. 1, PR Austria). 
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The argument of achieving coherence and consistency over time is predominantly used by the 
Commission to argue for its stronger involvement in EU foreign policy-making towards the 
neighbours, but it was not at all emphasised as an important motivation by member states. When 
considered in more detail, it becomes clear that this quest for coherence allows the Commission 
to frame its bureaucratic interest for a stronger involvement in more altruistic terms, as in 
practice it also has be kept in mind that also Commission officials switch within DGs in regular 
intervals of three to five years. Hence, in regard of the ENP this third function of providing 
coherence is mainly used as a well-sounding reason of the Commission that allows it to frame 
its bureaucratic interest in a more general EU interest to improve EU foreign policy-making. 
This was also visible in the ENP strategy document where the importance of coherence was 
emphasised by the Commission. Member States generally do not seem to disagree with this 
assessment, as it was also highlighted as an important factor in the European Security Strategy 
in 2003, but they did not explicitly put coherence up front as motivation for adapting the 
interaction of EU actors in the ENP framework.   
7.3. Conclusion: When theoretical Assumptions meet Empirics 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate which assumptions prove most likely to explain in 
what mode and why the contribution of various EU actors in foreign policy-making towards the 
neighbourhood changed with the set-up of the ENP. In doing so it related to the assumption that 
had been put forward in the theoretical framework of this thesis. 
First of all, it was assumed that the change towards the new way of interacting within the ENP 
framework created conflict and confusion with the involved EU actors. It was confirmed by 
different sides that at the beginning of the ENP conflicts emerged, although it was also always 
emphasised that these were mainly problems related to actors finding their new position within 
the new policy-making arrangement and that those could be overcome after some time of 
getting used to the adaptations. The theoretical framework in regard of the mode of change had 
identified following two factors that might plausibly explain the way this process of change 
developed over time from a more conflictual mode to a consensual interaction: 
Assumption 3 (time factor): The longer the actors are able to adapt to the new form of 
interaction and the longer they have time to experience their new roles, the better the interaction 
will become over time. Hence, their new form of interaction improves over time. 
Assumption 4 (communication factor): the more the institutional set-up asks for direct contact 
between the actors and exchange of their opinions, the more likely a consensual (change in) 
interaction between these actors gets.  
The empirical analysis confirmed that the factor of time provides a strong explanatory power. 
Commission officials were cautious in the first weeks of the ENP, as they were not sure how to 
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work within the new cross-pillar framework without impeding on political issues that were 
traditionally dealt with under CFSP. In these first months several conflicts over competences 
were observable, but over time this cooperation became more smooth and consensual. However, 
this should not imply that conflicts were not taking place at all anymore. On few occasions 
member states got suspicious of what the Commission was suggesting, claiming that it got 
involved in too political dossiers or claiming that the Commission does not take into account 
their national interests sufficiently. At the same time it was surprising to observe that it was 
actually in the EU foreign policy-making towards the Southern Caucasus that the interaction 
adapted quickly to a consensual and cooperative way of interaction. This was surprising in that 
far as the EU relations with the Southern Caucasus are generally more politicised, given the 
content of the cooperation focusing to a large extent on crisis management, post-conflict 
development, and developing sound governance structures. However, in this case the involved 
EU actors managed after few quarrels about the exact mandate of the EUSR to establish a good 
working climate that allowed for solving conflicts over competences in a more consensual 
manner. Quite on the contrary, it was in the rather technical, highly institutionalised and long-
standing EU foreign policy-making arrangements towards Morocco where repeated conflicts 
between member states and Commission officials occurred. These conflictual situations proved 
to be mainly caused by difficult inter-personal relationships and by member states developing a 
serious mistrust towards some of the Commission officials involved. 
The empirical analysis showed that both prior formulated assumptions can be verified to a 
certain extent, while at the same time their explanatory power would profit from a slight 
adaptation, allowing for taking into account the importance of personalities and perceptions. 
The factor of time surely contributed to the switch from more conflictual relations to a 
consensual mode of interaction and cooperation, however it showed that this was not because of 
socialisation and adaptations of interests, but the involved EU actors learnt in a more strategic 
way of how to interact without creating constantly conflicts and stalemates. In regard of the 
institutional possibility for close contact and communication, it has to be pointed out that 
regular communication channel alone are not sufficient to lead form conflict to consensus, but 
that those communication channels rather act as necessary conditions that are necessary for EU 
actors to get to know each other. Yet, the pure existence of these channels alone is not 
sufficient, as it then depends on the personalities involved if the interaction can become more 
consensual or not. In the case of the EU relations with the Southern Caucasus, this showed to be 
the case, while in the case of EU foreign policy-making towards Morocco existing 
communication channels were not able to overcome the dislike and mistrust between member 
states on the one hand and the involved personalities from the Commission on the other hand.  
 226 
The second aspect of the research question about factors explaining the change of tasks and 
interactions within the ENP framework focuses more on the factors that explain why this 
change occurred at all. In this regard, following four assumptions had been identified in the 
theoretical framework:  
Assumption 1 (bureaucratic interest): The more actors believe that a change in interaction would 
enhance their bureaucratic status quo (e.g. competences, financial means), the more they are 
willing to support and accept a change in tasks, roles and interaction. 
Assumption 2 (policy interest): The more the involved actors acknowledge the demand for 
functional linkages of policies and for an effective policy in a changing international 
environment, the more they are willing to change their interactions with other actors. 
Assumption 5 (bargaining advantage): If an actor is aware that it has certain bargaining 
advantages vis-à-vis others, it is more willing to change interaction, as it is more likely that it 
might gain even more advantages. 
Assumption 6 (incomplete contracting / unintended consequences of institutional change): The 
interaction of actors was not intentionally and in detail decided during treaty changes, but is 
shaped through incomplete contracting and unintended consequences of institutional change 
that took place at an earlier stage.  
The first two assumptions about the bureaucratic interest and the policy interest are considered 
to lead to intentional change in that far as those might be motivations that actors pursue actively 
because they are convinced that a change in task allocation and interaction would satisfy those 
motivations. On the other hand, the last two assumptions of bargaining advantage and 
incomplete contracting are rather situational factors that might limit or enable change in a 
certain direction but can by themselves not trigger the change.  
The empirical results of the analysis show the change in tasks and interaction was rather 
intentional than a passive coincidence. The bargaining advantage does not really provide strong 
explanations, apart from the fact that it might hint towards a certain path-dependency: once the 
Commission was asked to be involved in setting-up the ENP, the latter also made sure to foster 
its own bureaucratic interests. From the perspective of the member states this assumption 5, 
however, does not provide any real explanation. And while member states not at all stages in the 
set-up process might have been aware of what the set-up of the ENP and the task allocation 
means for certain actors, they did not show totally ignorant to the fact that they allow for the 
involvement of another actor, especially in the policy-specification and implementation stage. 
However, the constant struggle of the member states at the same time to ensure control over the 
Commission also shows that they were quite aware of the consequences of the changing roles 
and tasks. From the out-set it might not have been too obvious that the set-up of the ENP 
framework would imply such a strong involvement of the Commission in the day-to-day policy 
making, but at the same time some of those task allocations also developed over time and 
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member states seemed rather confident, if not pleased to have the Commission involved. 
Member States quite knew about the changes introduced by the ENP framework, and most of 
the time also appreciated a stronger involvement of the agent Commission 
This also implies that it is rather the intentional factors that allow for an explanation of the 
change in EU actors’ task allocation and changing interaction. And within those two, it is 
mainly the policy-demand factor that could be identified as the core motive for change.  
The policy-demand factors is quite visible when the Council Secretariat and the member states 
acknowledge the decisive involvement of the Commission in the current ENP policy process, 
because they emphasise that they would not be able to formulate the complex policies towards 
these countries on their own nor would they be able to deal with the huge amount of necessary 
information that has to be gathered to fulfil those tasks. This has changed considerably during 
the last ten years in the EU foreign policy-making mechanisms towards the neighbourhood. 
Within the prior frameworks towards the South and the East, the Commission was only meant 
to fulfil administrative tasks like preparing the meetings. But after some time the member states 
acknowledged that they also have to allow for an involvement of the Commission. The latter 
has the capacity (and especially its delegations in the third countries) to gather information and 
draft policy documents, what Member states alone would not be able to do effectively on their 
own. Given the highly technical nature of some ENP documents, the Member States repeatedly 
acknowledged that they would neither have the expertise nor the time to look at all these details 
in their meetings.   
However, in line with the bureaucratic interest-hypotheses general turf battles between the 
institutions also become visible, especially when the Member States get the impression that the 
Commission “is playing games” with them and wants to sell them a policy that they might not 
agree to. But the Commission also puts forward policy-demand arguments when explaining for 
their push to be more strongly involved in the ENP. Commission official repeatedly highlight 
that their technical, more long-term perspective of pushing for change in third countries is more 
effective than the often ad-hoc reactions of the MS within second pillar. Furthermore, they were 
able to gain valuable experience during the enlargement rounds, and their instruments and 
procedures so far seem to be better than strict political conditionality or political discussions. In 
contrast, member states but also other Commission DGs criticise this rather technical approach 
to development in third countries, what from time to time leads to conflicts about the concrete 
instruments and mechanisms that should be used to achieve the commonly agreed ENP 
objective of creating stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood.  
Concluding it can be assessed that it is not always only bureaucratic self-interest that motivates 
EU actors, but that in the case of the ENP it was especially specific policy-ideas and policy-
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demands that have been taken into consideration. Unintended consequences of prior 
institutional change, like the enlargement process, explain why the idea for a new framework 
has arisen at all, but, but this factor alone for sure is not enough to understand Member States’ 
motives to allow for the ENP.  
Traditional theoretical approaches would predict that member states would strictly oppose this 
involvement of the Commission into this foreign policy domain due to sovereignty concerns, 
but, interestingly, there is quite a consensus between member states that the Commission fulfils 
quite important tasks in gathering information, assisting in formulating policies and providing 
coherence within the ENP. The member states, of course, try to closely control the Commission, 
so that it does not exceed its limits, but on the other hand the Commission also learnt that it does 
not make sense to pursue a policy that is strongly opposed by member states, as then it would 
only risk strong opposition to its proposals. This lead from a more conflictual interplay of EU 
actors during the first months of ENP to a more consensual policy process, although from time 
to time, of course, turf battles about bureaucratic interests still occur, although here it can be 
assumed that here another factor comes in play that was not considered from the outset: the 
personality factor of the respective people in the posts.  
 
(Interview No. 23, CS; Interview No. 24; Interview No. 26, COM; Interview No. 27, PR 
Germany; Interview No. 28 Cabinet of Relex-Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner) 
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Part III – Conclusion 
Chapter 8: What the Empirical Analysis tells us - Comparing and Analysing the Results 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) had been launched in March 2003 and finally 
established in 2004 with the main objective to provide security and stability for the European 
Union by establishing a stable and prosperous neighbourhood. Externally the aim is to reinforce 
the cooperation with the neighbours to the East and the South, in order to support those third 
countries in their reform attempts. EU internally, the ENP is meant to achieve a long-aspired 
goal: to provide more coherence in EU foreign policy-making and to overcome the so often 
criticised separation between the EU pillars by establishing one framework that would bring 
together all EU activities. More coherence was emphasised as the main factor to allow the EU to 
be an effective and strong partner towards and for its neighbours.   
This thesis aimed at investigating the European Neighbourhood Policy in regard of the EU-
internal objective of providing more coherence. It is especially focusing on the idea of 
institutional coherence, i.e. the coherence between different pillars and their respective actors. 
Therefore it puts forward the question, in what respect and to what extent the single ENP 
framework changed the EU policy-making processes towards the neighbours. The rationale 
behind this question is that it can not automatically assumed that overall horizontal coherence 
between EU activities can be established by just uniting different policy areas with different EU 
policy-making modes under one framework. Therefore the question is scrutinising to what 
extent and in what way the ENP also asked for an adaptation of task allocations and interaction 
between EU actors. Hence, the thesis assumes from the outset that the different policies where 
not only subsumed under one ENP framework, but that this closer link under one framework 
also changed the involvement of and interaction between various actors. The selected timeframe 
under investigation runs from 2002 to 2007, and as empirical illustrations particular attention is 
paid to EU foreign policy-making towards Morocco and Georgia.  
Yet, this thesis also assumes right from the start that it is not enough to just provide a rather 
descriptive account what the various actors contribute to EU policy-making towards the 
neighbourhood, but in case such a change would show empirically, it seems even more relevant 
to assess what factors explain changes in interactions of actors in EU foreign policy-
making towards the neighbourhood, and to ask what constraints the ENP single 
framework did encounter at the same time. The rationale behind this second question is 
derived from the consideration that the changes in task allocation and interaction might only be 
sustainable and long-lasting, if the involved actors intentionally decided for these changes, 
because they considered them to be necessary in terms of pursuing a better and more effective 
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policy and because they were convinced that an adapted way of EU foreign-policy making 
would be profitable to achieve their commonly agreed ENP objective to provide security and 
stability for the EU by ensuring stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood. 
This concluding chapter first presents the main research findings of this thesis, and in a second 
step it critically reflects on the contribution that these results provide in terms of political 
relevance and in terms of contributing to ongoing academic debates. By doing so, the merits of 
this research but also certain challenges in terms of research design and method are pointed out. 
Last, few future research avenues are discussed that the research findings of this thesis point to.   
8.1. The main findings of this research project 
This thesis looked at the European Neighbourhood Policy from an institutional and EU-internal 
perspective, assuming that the single framework approach of the ENP did not only add together 
different policies towards the neighbours, but also changed the way these policies are made at 
EU level.  
After the set-up of the ENP, was it “business as usual” when looking at the way that EU 
foreign-policy making towards the neighbourhood was conducted at EU level? This thesis 
claims that this was not the case, because within the ENP framework considerable alterations to 
the way EU actors are involved in shaping, setting-up, and implementing EU foreign policy 
towards the neighbourhood are observable. However, a careful tracing of developments over 
time followed by a critical investigation reveals that not all was “new” within the ENP, but that 
certain tendencies of informal interaction were already present beforehand that got further 
institutionalised and broadened within the ENP framework. In a similar vein, these findings 
should not be misinterpreted in a way to imply that the ENP caused or lead to an integration of 
EU foreign policy-making, i.e. that the (former) first pillar hijacked and took over EU foreign 
policy-making towards the neighbours. The empirical evidence suggests that the processes 
taking place within the ENP are more complex and varied than a sole differentiation between 
intergovernmental and supranational policy-making at EU level would allow for. At the same 
time, the empirical analysis also clearly rejects a purely intergovernmental interpretation of EU 
foreign policy-making towards the neighbourhood that would assume that it is only member 
states that shape this kind of policy. Hence, while this differentiation might be useful to be 
applied in some policy-areas, this opposing concepts do not really help to understand what is 
going on within the ENP.  
Before looking now into detail of how to answer the two main research questions of this thesis, 
the empirical accounts also points at certain minor findings about the ENP that for a better 
understanding of the main arguments are worth to be kept in mind from the outset.  
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First of all, the ENP was designed not as new policy, with new content and new instruments, 
but it was set up as a policy framework that would “unite the EU’s existing neighbourhood 
policy towards these regions” (European Commission 2003c: 9). When the agenda-setting and 
collecting of different ideas about the new policy framework for “Wider Europe” started, it 
became very clear that there was not one blueprint of how this new initiative should look like. 
Its taking shape, therefore, was also not taking place in any hierarchical manner, but various 
actors contributed with their own ideas and comments, creating a vast amount of aspects that 
had to be negotiated and agreed upon. During this set-up process a clear dominance of single 
member states and the Commission too place, with the European Council playing only a rather 
affirmative role. The European Parliament also presented various far-reaching ideas, and 
although many of them were just ignored by the other actors, it was the European Parliament in 
combination with pressure resulting from external events (e.g. the Rose revolution in Georgia) 
that made sure that the Southern Caucasus countries were taking into account and finally 
incorporated within the ENP framework.  
Secondly, it was surprising to see that during the coming in shape of the ENP and the debate 
about the Wider-Europe initiative all involved EU actors made use of a security-discourse. 
While it is often assumed that this kind of discourse is rather used by the member states or the 
various actors in the Council Secretariat (e.g. the High Representative) only, it was also the 
Commission during these months that strongly relied on the discourse of how important it is that 
EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours is driven by a strong EU security-concern. 
While this choice might at first sight seem surprising, it fits well into the overall strategy that 
the Commission used to get its voice heard, and it also complements the tensions that we could 
observe during the implementation stage of the ENP: while all involved actors agree on the 
overall objective of the ENP to provide security for the EU and its citizens by supporting 
stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood, there were also different perceptions at work how 
this main objective could best be used. The Commission in this regard made use of the strong 
argument that it had had a very positive impact on the EU accession processes during the 2004-
enlargement, which in their view was the most successful EU security policy that the EU had 
ever embarked upon. Hence, the Commission argued that the technical knowledge gained 
during these processes should also be used towards the neighbours.  
Last, the ENP was set-up as a policy framework to bring together all policies of the EU towards 
a respective country, while at the same time it was also meant to harmonise the instruments and 
mechanisms applied by the EU towards the different partner countries. The ENP complements 
existing multilateral and regional frameworks, and was based on the legal agreements that had 
already been in place (i.e. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, or Association 
Agreements). The geographical coverage of the ENP was not clearly set right from the 
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beginning when the initiative was put on the agenda, but originally it was only meant to cover 
the new neighbours in the East, following a clear functional logic of external spin-off of the 
2004 enlargement process. After the first five months of mainly emphasising the new 
framework to be targeted towards the East, it however showed that other member states with an 
orientation towards the South would not agree to such a narrow focus, and hence the 
geographical coverage was widened to the East and the South. It was at last the Southern 
Caucasus that only was incorporated into the ENP framework in 2004. From the 16 partner 
countries that are now encompassed under the bilateral ENP framework, 12 used the 
opportunity to establish a closer cooperation with the EU, while there were also four “problem” 
cases (Algeria, Syria, Belarus and Libya) that were formally part of the ENP but did not 
establish any action plans.  
8.1.1. Changing roles and interactions of EU actors within the ENP? 
The thesis started with the question in what respect and two what extent the single ENP 
framework changed EU policy-making processes towards the neighbours. To be in the position 
to answer this question, a reference point for comparison was first established by investigating 
how the EU frameworks with the respective neighbours was designed before the set-up of the 
ENP, and what role specific EU actors fulfilled within those frameworks. 
The multilateral framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) had been established 
in 1995 and was at this time intended to also provide a coherent framework that would subsume 
economic, political and cultural aspects of the relationship between the EU and the partner 
countries. Yet, considering the slow pace of this framework because of its multilateral nature 
and the clear separation of dossiers in different baskets, the EMP was often criticised as not 
providing the right impetus for reform-willing partner countries. The Common Strategy on the 
Mediterranean was one attempt to reinvigorate and strengthen the EMP, but it fell rather short in 
terms of strategic thinking, as it mainly clarified the task allocations among EU actors. This 
document emphasised formally again that it is the rotating presidency as representative of the 
member states that should provide impetus and implement the EMP. The Commission was 
associated in its area of competences and together with the Council said to be responsible for 
ensuring coherence, but for the rest the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean did not provide 
any formal role for the Commission. However, in practice research showed that the 
implementation of the EMP was mainly shaped by the Commission within the MEDA 
framework. Additionally, the Commission provided support in terms of working as EMP 
secretariat. In regard of interests, member states had for a long time emphasised economic and 
trade interests, while more recently migration and strategic security concerns, also in terms of 
energy security developed.  
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Towards the Southern Caucasus a reverse trend could be observed. Before 1999 it was mainly 
the Commission that was dealing with this region in terms of implementing TACIS and 
supporting reform and stabilisation. It was only after the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements in 1999 that member states showed increased interest in the countries of the 
Southern Caucasus. During this process new priorities of rule of law, support for civil society, 
fight against poverty and conflict prevention had been emphasised, while during the last years 
migration and the fight against organised crime also entered the agenda of cooperation more 
prominently. In terms of EU actors’ involvement before the set-up of the ENP, the EU 
relationship with the Southern Caucasus differs from the EU-Mediterranean relationship in the 
more active involvement of several actors of the Council Secretariat, especially the EUSR and 
the Head of Mission of EUJUST Themis. In comparison to the often highly technical 
relationship with the Mediterranean neighbours, the engagement with the Southern Caucasus 
countries was much less institutionalised before 2003, and focused primarily on energy 
concerns, humanitarian assistance, and attempts for conflict resolution. The Commission is 
similar to the relationship with the Mediterranean responsible for the implementation of projects 
and external assistance, but the Council more often and in more detail discussed the relationship 
with the Southern Caucasus around 2000-2003, especially in the context of CFSP about conflict 
resolution (Nagorno-Karabakh as main frozen conflict in the region) and with the set-up of the 
first rule of law mission in Georgia.  
With this reference point in mind, the set-up of the ENP only triggered institutional adaptation 
within the Commission, where a new ENP unit for general and sectoral coordination was 
established and country desk-officers were moved together within one directorate. Most of these 
first ENP desk officers were recruited from DG enlargement, considering that their technical 
expertise should not be lost and might be usefully applied also in EU relations with the 
neighbours. For the other actors, the establishment of the ENP did not have any direct impact in 
terms of institutional organisation, apart from the slight adaptation that from 2005 onwards most 
ENP dossiers within the Council were now not passed through PSC anymore but went directly 
to COREPER II.  
In terms of policy stages, the decision-making stage was the one where nothing fundamentally 
changed with the set-up of the ENP. It is the member states that have the final say in formal 
decision-making in regard of political aspects, while in external relations the Commission is at 
the forefront, with member states exercising a certain amount of control through comitology. 
However, a close analysis of the involvement of EU actors within the different policy stages 
shows that it is in particular in the policy-specification stage and during implementation that the 
Commission plays a crucial role in supporting and shaping member states’ decisions.  
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During the policy-specification stage the Commission is in charge of putting forward drafts for 
the action plans, and while they are consulting and coordinating with the Council Secretariat 
and the member states especially on the political aspects, it provides a huge advantage for the 
Commission to be the one actor that puts these drafts forward and up for discussion. Member 
states try to exert close control over the Commission, especially when they see reason to 
become suspicious. In this regard it should also be noted that the Commission managed to shape 
the ENP framework in terms of instruments and fundamental concepts quite closely to its own 
experience by emphasising time and again the importance of joint ownership, differentiation 
and added value in public and in working documents. While the Council as well as the 
European Council often reaffirmed this emphasis on certain mechanisms, the analysis clearly 
showed that those elements were mainly coming from the Commission. To triangulate these 
research findings and test them more critically, it was also traced to what extent the rotating 
presidencies in the Council provided for strategic leadership and putting forward specific drafts 
in regard of the ENP. The analysis showed that apart from the Irish presidency in the first half 
of 2004, most rotating presidencies did not consider the set-up of the ENP or its working 
methods as a priority of their six-month work programme. From 2004 onwards, several 
presidencies emphasised the inclusion of migration and energy issues as important aspects of 
closer cooperation with the neighbours in their presidency programmes, but for the rest there is 
no empirical evidence that would suggest a strong policy shaping impact from the presidency. 
In a similar vein, the role of the European Council in this stage is mostly an affirmative one, 
inviting other actors to follow-up on the progress already achieved. 
Regarding agenda-setting and policy-specification the ENP clearly differs from prior EU 
frameworks towards the neighbours. While the Commission could, of course, suggest certain 
ideas within the EMP, it did not have any comparable influence at this stage of the policy 
process.. Therefore these results show that in this stage of agenda-setting and policy 
specification within the ENP the tasks of drafting and assisting in policy formulation shifted 
clearly towards the Commission, especially because the Commission is considered as the best-
situated and best-suited actor. 
Next to this strong role in specifying and shaping policies at the drafting stage, the Commission 
fulfils a strong and important role during the implementation of ENP, that must not be reduced 
to economic and development aspects only. It is the Commission who is responsible for the 
implementation of the ENP action plans and the Association Agreements (or Cooperation and 
Partnership Agreements for the Southern Caucasus), administering the EU external assistance 
and other financial resources for the EU cooperation with the neighbours and being responsible 
for drafting the Annual Action Programmes. The latter can be rejected by member states during 
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comitology, what proved however rather unlikely in practice, as they would need a qualified 
majority to do so.  
While the ENP shows certain features of EU policy-making that already existed beforehand, 
there was a clear adaptation of task allocation within the ENP framework, especially in terms of 
assisting the member states in drafting and specifying policies. Furthermore, the clear 
differentiation and separation between policy documents dealing with EC issues and documents 
discussing intergovernmental CFSP issues vanished, as now all reform suggestions were 
negotiated within one action plan with the partner country. Some of these tendencies already 
showed in prior relations with the neighbours, although only to a certain extent and on an 
irregular basis. The ENP therefore can be assessed as a next step of formalising already existing 
informal practices that got stronger and more visible through the single framework approach of 
the ENP. 
8.1.2. Why change? 
The second research question of this thesis asks what factors explain changes in interactions of 
actors in EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbourhood, and what constraints the ENP 
single framework did encounter at the same time. This question points on the one hand to the 
mode of change (from conflictual to consensual), while on the other hand it also asks for the 
factors that triggered the change in task allocation and interaction.  
It was confirmed by all involved actors and in both cases of Morocco and Georgia that at the 
beginning of the ENP conflicts between actors took place on a regular basis. However, all actors 
also added to this observation that those conflictual interrelationships soon improved and 
became consensual, after actors found their positions and roles within the new framework and 
after they got used to the new ways of interacting with each other. The factor of time in this 
regard contributed positively to this development from conflictual to consensual interaction, 
although this also does not imply that conflicts did not occur anymore once in a while. At the 
same time, also the factor about communication-channels could be confirmed to a certain 
extent, although in both cases a slight adaptation of the logical argumentation proved useful 
after the empirical investigation to strengthen the explanatory power of the two factors.  
In regard of the time factor it was assumed that actors learn over time how to cooperate (what 
was confirmed) but it also clearly showed in the case of the ENP that actors did not socialise in 
a way that constructivist accounts would assume, i.e. they did not adapt their interests because 
of regular interaction, but they rather learnt strategically of how to interact in a way that would 
allow progress and would not result in constant conflicts and stalemates. It was especially 
surprising to observe that it was the EU actors’ interaction towards the Southern Caucasus that 
soon became consensual and smooth, in huge contrast to the prior assumptions that in this case 
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there would be more potential for conflict because of the more politicised issues at stake and the 
higher number of different actors at play. In case of EU foreign policy-making towards 
Morocco, however, the empirical material suggested to take another factor into account that had 
not been considered beforehand: personalities and personal relationships. The case of Morocco 
showed that there were several incidents of conflictual interaction between Commission 
officials and member states, because member states felt ill-informed, ill-represented and ill-
treated by the respective Commission officials in certain occasions. Appropriate communication 
channels are therefore necessary in terms of supporting the potential establishment of good 
personal relationships, but they are surely not sufficient to turn a conflictual interaction into a 
more consensual one. This consideration points to the second adaptation that showed important 
to keep in mind theoretically: it is not always what actors actually do, but perceptions play an 
even more important role in terms of EU actors’ interaction. Member states did not become 
suspicious because of what the Commission did or what happened within the ENP, but if they 
got the impression that the Commission tried to trick them or sell them something that was 
actually against their own national interests, they developed mistrust and resistance towards 
proposals of the Commission, even if in terms of content they did actually agree. Hence, the 
interaction was in most cases not hampered by disagreement about the policy content, but about 
the perceptions that emerged during the interaction process. 
But why then did EU actors allow or even push for a change in roles and interaction, when it 
was plausible to assume that (institutional) change upsets a system or a framework, and might 
also lead to counterproductive conflicts? And why did especially the member states allow for 
more involvement of the Commission, considering that it proved often difficult for them to keep 
the Commission under control and in line with their own interests? Or was it rather that member 
states did not agree to this change intentionally, but that it was just an “accident” or 
coincidence? The theoretical framework of this thesis distinguished between intentional 
motivations of actors (i.e. policy-interest and bureaucratic interest) and situational factors 
(bargaining advantage and unintended consequences of prior institutional change). It has been 
assumed from the outset that only intentional change would have the potential to lead to a 
sustainable and long-lasting adaptation of EU actors’ interaction within the ENP, because if 
these changes were unintended but are now visible, it would be likely that actors try to reverse 
the adaptations and go back to the earlier form of interacting with other actors. 
The elaborations in the last part of this research project provide evidence that within the ENP 
mainly intentional motivations were at play rather than passive situational factors. There is no 
empirical evidence that would suggest that the factor of bargaining advantage played any 
considerable role. The Commission already in 2003 set the ground to be involved in shaping the 
ideas for the “Wider Europe” initiative to make sure that it has a stake in the new framework, 
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but this has to be rather interpreted in terms of bureaucratic interest. There is some evidence that 
would allow assuming that during the early considerations of the framework the member states 
did not fully consider what this would imply for EU actors’ involvement, because in their 
deliberations the task allocations and interaction of EU actors was not explicitly considered or 
discussed. In this regard, it can be argued that there is some evidence for this factor to apply in 
terms of incomplete contracting, but the interpretation in regard of unintended consequences of 
institutional change is rather weak. Quite on the contrary, it was also the member states that 
highlighted several times the weaknesses and insufficiency of the former EU frameworks to 
conduct foreign policy towards the neighbourhood, as the case with the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership illustrated tellingly. Hence these assumptions about situational factors at play have 
to be discarded in particular, when considering the much stronger explanatory power of the 
intentional factors, especially of the policy-interest factor.  
Member states seem confident if not even pleased to have the Commission involved in EU 
foreign policy-making towards the neighbourhood, because they share a strong conviction that 
the Commission fulfils important tasks in gathering routine information, processing this data, 
and applying this gained knowledge in assisting member states in drafting policies. They 
especially welcome the Commission’s involvement in this regard, because they know that they 
would not be able to fulfil these tasks themselves. They would be unable to investigate and 
provide all the necessary technical expertise that is needed to draft the policy documents, and 
the Commission provides an important focal point to collect information from stakeholders of 
third countries, civil society representatives and other stakeholders involved in the field.  
However, in line with the bureaucratic interest hypotheses turf battles between the institutions 
also occurred time and again, especially when the Member States get the impression that the 
Commission “is playing games” with them or uses its information advantage to sell them a 
policy that they might be detrimental to their own national interests. The Commission quite 
understandably is motivated also by a bureaucratic interest in terms of being involved, as the 
ENP framework provided a good opportunity to extend its impact on EU foreign policy-making. 
This push for the Commission to be involved was very visible in the negotiation stage towards 
the ENP strategy paper, where it actively pushed to put its ideas forward and be heard, by 
presenting comprehensive drafts and suggestions to member states that those seemed quite 
pleased to take on board. At the same time, the Commission also puts forward policy-demand 
arguments when explaining for their motivation to fulfil a more comprehensive role within the 
ENP. Commission officials repeatedly highlight that their technical, more long-term perspective 
of pushing for change in third countries is more effective than the often ad-hoc reactions of the 
member states acting within the CFSP domain. Furthermore, the Commission was able to gain 
valuable experience during the enlargement rounds, and their instruments and procedures so far 
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seem to be better than strict political conditionality or political discussions. The Commission 
defends this line of argumentation quite strongly, and it shows that the Commission did not only 
follow bureaucratic interests but that it was also highly convinced that their approach to 
development is more efficient in the long term perspective and hence more successful to achieve 
the commonly agreed ENP objective of creating stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood. 
In contrast, member states but also sometimes single Commission officials criticise this rather 
technical approach to development in third countries, what from time to time leads to conflicts 
about the concrete instruments and mechanisms that should be used to achieve the commonly 
agreed ENP objective of creating stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood.  
Summing up, this thesis showed that the ENP framework in terms of EU actors’ roles and 
interaction was not just ‘business as usual’, but that a considerable change in EU actors’ 
involvement in EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours took place with the set-up of 
the ENP. While this change trigger conflicts at the beginning when the ENP framework was put 
into place, the interaction soon turned more consensual, although this depended to a large extent 
on the concrete persons involved and on mutual perceptions. Rather than unintended 
consequences of prior institutional change or incomplete contracting, the motivation for 
changing the EU actors’ involvement within the ENP is best explained by intentional decisions 
of involved actors that were based on the conviction that an adaptation of EU actors’ interaction 
is best suited and also necessary to achieve the commonly agreed ENP objective of fostering 
stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood. 
8.2. The wider relevance of the research findings & future research suggestions 
What implications do these research findings now have in terms of political relevance and 
academic contribution? What can the results of this research project contribute to the broader 
debates about EU foreign policy making, coherence and the EU relations with the 
neighbourhood? 
In regard of the socio-political relevance, this thesis delivered a detailed account of how the 
ENP framework developed and how it works in practice on a day-to-day basis. A 
comprehensive understanding of certain features and even weaknesses of the ENP is only 
possible when taking into account the way this policy framework developed and how it was 
shaped by different actors and their ideas. By showing why certain ENP elements were shaped 
by various motivations and deliberations contributes to a deeper understanding of why the ENP 
was set up and why it looks the way it is now. Furthermore, the observations of this thesis can 
be relevant when adapting policy frameworks towards other regions or third countries in the 
future, as it points to the importance to take into account if a policy framework deliberately 
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changes the interaction of actors, because it seems unlikely that a new policy framework has any 
additional impact, if not also the institutional interplay is altered.  
The detailed empirical accounts presented in this thesis of how EU foreign policy-making is 
formulated and implemented on a day-to-day basis towards the neighbours deepens our 
understanding of how these processes take place and what mechanisms are at work also at a 
more informal level. By being able to identify the involved actors and their different 
motivations it is possible to understand EU foreign policy-making in a comprehensive manner. 
This thesis showed clearly that a rather intergovernmental account would ignore important 
aspects and developments, and therefore it seems absolutely necessary to also adapt our 
understanding of EU foreign policy-making to allow for the consideration of more informal 
interaction and processes outside the narrow decision-making stage. The thesis showed that 
although the Commission does not have a formal role in decision-making and although it is 
formally the Council presidency and the High Representative that are supposed to put forward 
drafts and provide leadership in EU foreign policy-making, the ENP provided a strong role for 
the Commission in terms of providing information, expertise and knowledge and in terms of 
assisting member states to formulate policies. 
In contributing to the academic literature, the research findings of this thesis contribute to EU 
integration research, and they also provide interesting empirical findings for Foreign Policy 
Analysis. During the last ten years a considerable amount of academic research about the ENP 
has developed, but there the focus was mainly on the used instruments, the mode of interaction 
with third countries, or the impact on the ground. While this existing body of research is highly 
interesting and crucial for our understanding of the EU as an international actor on the ground, it 
often takes as starting point the formally described roles of the actors as outlined in the treaties 
and therefore overemphasising the role of member states in EU foreign policy-making. This 
thesis, however, showed that there are more actors involved than just the member states, and 
that there is a vast amount of dynamics, perceptions and informalities going on that deepen our 
understanding for why a certain foreign policy was embarked upon in a certain way. 
Scrutinising the roles of various actors in different stages of the policy process and by 
considering also their motivations and general perceptions provides a better understanding for 
the decisions taken, i.e. the EU output. In ENP research until now this EU output, however, was 
often used as the starting point in a  rather superficial manner for researching EU outcome (in 
terms of instruments and applied mechanisms) and on EU impact on the ground, and those 
academic contributions did not questioned in how far the dynamics underlying those EU output 
also might impact directly on the EU outcome and EU impact on the ground. While it therefore 
would have gone too far for this thesis to investigate the link between those different aspects, it 
shows that the motivations of actors and their different perceptions of how commonly agreed 
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objectives can be achieved must not be ignored in the analysis of EU outcome (in terms of 
instruments, mechanisms) and the EU impact on the ground.  
At the same time, this thesis contributes to the wider EU integration research, as it provides 
insights that allow comparison to research findings from other policy areas. In this regard the 
question can be asked, to what extent EU foreign policy-making towards the neighbours within 
the ENP framework is specific and different than policy-making in other policy-areas, or to 
what extent we can observe general trends that are common to the majority of EU policy-
making. At the same time such a comparison would also allow for a closer communication 
between comparative politics accounts (as mostly applied in EU integration research) and the 
here applied Foreign Policy Analysis. 
The results of this thesis are furthermore relevant for the more general field of foreign policy 
analysis, because the more general framework developed by Carlsnaes to explain a foreign 
policy action was used as a starting point to structure this research inquiry, and because the prior 
assumptions of the theoretical framework were drawn from bureaucratic politics but also more 
general Foreign Policy Analysis. The empirical analysis of the motivational and situational 
factors underlying the change in EU actors’ interaction showed that not all factors have a strong 
explanatory factor, while at the same time it also pointed towards two factors that seem still 
rather ignored in foreign policy analysis: the role of persons and personal relationships, as well 
as the importance of perceptions. While there seems currently a revival of pointing at the 
salience of individuals in International Relations research, this aspect of personal relationships, 
personalities but also personal role perceptions might constitute an interesting aspect to consider 
for future EU research. Perceptions are, of course, the focus of more constructivist approach in 
International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, but the results of this thesis also show that 
more comprehensive research about how these perceptions are at work would be interesting and 
highly relevant. So far constructivist accounts are often used as contrasting alternative accounts 
to challenge the main theoretical assumptions drawn from liberal intergovernmentalism, but 
considering the results of this research project in terms of pointing to the salience of 
perceptions, the latter might play a more important role in explaining policy-making at EU level 
than is assumed in EU integration research, and especially in EU foreign policy analysis.  
Last but not least, this thesis contributes to the broad debate on coherence in EU foreign policy 
making, with a special focus on institutional coherence. The often criticised lack of coherence is 
in the political debate but also in academic research mostly assumed to be the outcome of turf-
battles and bureaucratic interests, and in this regard the results of this thesis seem rather 
surprising: although bureaucratic interests were at play as well, a common policy-interest was 
strongest in terms of explaining the observed changes. And while actors might have different 
ideas and convictions of how a certain policy might be best achieved, they often worked 
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together to overcome their differences in opinions, because they all agreed on the need to 
deliver a common and strong policy to be able to achieve the commonly agreed objective. This 
strong explanatory power of policy-interest questions the often cited account of bureaucratic 
turf-battles that are said to dominate the Brussels-machinery in EU foreign policy-making. 
 
Yet, this thesis not only answers the two research questions that were developed at the outset of 
this research project, but its results also suggest potential future research ideas, of which five are 
outlined in the following paragraphs. 
First, the thesis showed that learning over time contributed strongly to the development from 
conflictual to consensual interactions within the ENP. However, this thesis was not able to go 
into detail to investigate how this learning process is taking place and which mechanisms shape 
it. The results of this research project also show that learning does not always have to be 
necessarily connected to socialisation, which assumes a constant adaptation and change of 
interests during the learning process. Actors within the ENP framework followed rather a more 
rationale motivation to find their place within the new framework to avoid constant turf battles 
and conflicts with other actors and to be in the position to deliver policy output. The latter has 
been termed “strategic learning” in the academic literature, but there is little comprehensive 
empirical research into this concept and its potential mechanisms. Furthermore, the question 
could be raised conceptually and empirically to what extent every process of “getting used to” 
should be considered a learning process.  
Second, the research findings of the changing interactions within the ENP also provide an 
interesting starting point for comparing dynamics within this area of EU foreign policy making 
with general tendencies in the multi-level governance system in the wider field of EU public 
policy making. Policy frameworks are also time and again established in EU public policies, but 
it can at the same time be assumed that the ENP framework might be specific because of its 
cross-pillar nature. However, this would be an interesting research assumption to start from, 
especially when considering the formal abolition of pillars with the Lisbon Treaty. A more 
structured approach in investigating therefore the concrete differences between those public 
policy frameworks and the ENP might provide interesting insights in how far EU foreign policy 
really has to be considered to be different when it comes to inter-institutional dynamics, 
processes of change and motivations of actors for role adaptation.  
Third, this thesis contributes to our understanding of institutional coherence within the ENP. 
However, it would be a useful exercise to apply the concepts and assumption of this thesis also 
to EU foreign policy-making towards other regions and countries, and even to other EU foreign 
policy frameworks. The ENP so far was the most encompassing and most prominent framework 
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that was tasked to tackle the lack of coherence. But it would be interesting to check if general 
tendencies like the stronger involvement of the Commission in the policy-specification stage are 
specific to the EU policy-making towards the neighbours, or if similar tendencies are also 
observable in EU relations with other third countries. Generally there is some evidence that 
suggests that the Commission tries to harmonise its instruments, procedures and frameworks 
towards all different kind of regions, and hence this thesis could be a good starting point for 
comparing other areas and their trends in EU actors’ involvement with the ENP to see parallels 
but also variations.  
Forth, the timeframe of this thesis had to be limited in terms of the time period under 
investigation, ending in 2007 and hence not taking into account anymore the Russia-Georgia 
war in 2008 and even more importantly, the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty 
formally abolishes the pillar structure, although CFSP is still kept separate from EU community 
policies. Therefore it can also be assumed that even if the pillars are formally not in place 
anymore, the same kind of interaction and task allocations are kept like they have been 
beforehand in EU foreign policy-making. The Lisbon Treaty also creates the post of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, who is chairing the Foreign Affairs Council 
and hence also providing the thematic leadership in the Council. Even more prominently this 
adapted HR post also subsumes the post of the Commissioner for External Relations, with the 
idea that this post provides a bridging function between the Council and the Commission, and 
therefore also contributes to a more coherent EU foreign policy. This new HR is supported in 
this role by the European External Action Service that is considered a separate body which is 
made up among others of officials from DG Relex, the more political posts from DG 
Development, and staff from Council Secretariat. The changes of the Lisbon Treaty highly upset 
the conventional form of EU foreign policy-making in Brussels, and it will be interesting to 
observe in the next months to what extent the EU actors now adapt to the new policy 
environment and also to the European External Action Service as new actor. It can be assumed 
that similar factors like they have been observed in the ENP might be crucial to lead from a 
conflictual to a more consensual interaction within the new EU foreign policy system, and at the 
same time the question can be asked what motivated especially member states to adapt the 
system in such a radical way. Informal accounts of member states often seem to hint towards a 
common understanding of EU member states that they need a strong High Representative to 
make EU foreign policy more coherent and more effective – what would fit also well with the 
logic of a common policy-interest. The findings of this thesis in conceptual and theoretical 
terms therefore might provide an interesting starting point to be applied to the broader area of 
EU foreign policy-making post-Lisbon.   
 243
Last, reflections about future research possibilities can also not ignore the events that have taken 
place in the Mediterranean during spring 2011. The revolution in Tunisia, the democratic 
upheaval in Egypt, as well as the crisis in Libya since March 2011 bring the question to the fore, 
in how far the ENP failed in those countries or at least becomes obsolete because of these 
external events. The effectiveness and added value of the ENP is suddenly questioned, as many 
critics assessed that these few weeks of civil-society upheavals changed more in these countries 
than years of cooperation with the EU within the ENP framework. And although this might 
sound like a convincing assessment, this criticism should rather be targeted towards EU foreign 
policy in general than the ENP framework in particular. The thesis showed that the ENP brings 
together a variety of actors, and that it is often torn between technical and more politicised 
accounts about how the objective of providing stability and prosperity in the neighbourhood can 
be achieved. It also showed that the Commission to a large extent follows a more long-term and 
technical approach in its external assistance that also reflects in the implementation of the ENP. 
In this regard, the Commission also convincingly argues that too quick political changes in the 
partner country might even more likely lead to instability and unrest, what is detrimental to the 
overall goal of the ENP. Those current events in the Mediterranean are currently also used by 
some member states to again ask for a stronger political interference in EU foreign policy-
making towards the neighbourhood, and it will be interesting to observe in the upcoming 
months how this debate will develop and reflect back on the way the ENP works.  
In line with the special focus of this thesis on the changing roles and interactions of EU actors in 
the ENP policy process, these current events are, however, even more interesting in providing 
an extreme empirical case study: it is the reaction of the EU, or more specifically the reactions 
of the different EU actors and their contributions and interactions in regard of those events that 
might provide valuable empirical insights into the state of the EU as an international actor.  
Those events can be considered as extraordinary situations and therefore they provide the most-
difficult cases for testing the assumptions of this thesis empirically. Through a comparison of 
dynamics between actors in every-day ENP policy making (as  it was done in this thesis) with 
EU actors’ interactions in crisis-management and conflict situations (as it is currently 
observable in the Mediterranean) valuable insights could be gained about the coherence of the 
EU as an international actors after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. This thesis showed that 
although bureaucratic interests and turf-battles were present, it was still the policy-interest that 
prevailed for changing EU actors’ interaction. If this could be even shown in such extreme cases 
like in the Mediterranean in 2011, we can assume that even if a common European interest or a 
common European Foreign Policy will not exist in the near future, EU actors show in their 
interactions a strong tendency to be motivated by a common policy-interests - what might not be 
totally satisfying for some observers but is surely good news for EU foreign policy-making. 
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Annex I: Budget for external relations in subheadings 2001-2006 
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Annex II: Total EC external assistance to Georgia 1992-2006 
 
From European Commission (2006): European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - 
Georgia; Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_georgia_en.pdf.  
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Annex III: Zusammenfassung in Deutsch  
Die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik (ENP) wurde 2003/04 von der Europäischen Union 
(EU) ins Leben gerufen, mit der generellen Zielsetzung neue Trennlinien zwischen der 
erweiterten Union und ihren Nachbarn zu vermeiden und durch die Schaffung von Stabilität und 
Wohlstand in den Nachbarländern Sicherheit für die Europäische Union zu gewährleisten. 
Innerhalb des politischen Systems der EU sollte diese neue Nachbarschaftspolitik die 
verschiedenen Politikbereiche der drei Säulen in einem Beziehungsrahmen vereinen: die 
Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (v.a. Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen), die 
Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) und die Zusammenarbeit im Bereich Justiz 
und Inneres. Dieser gemeinsame ENP Rahmen sollte die viel kritisierte Auf- und Zerspaltung 
von EU Außenpolitik überkommen, um somit eine kohärenter EU-Politik gegenüber den und 
für die Nachbarn zu erreichen.  
Die wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit den EU Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen fokussierte 
bisher hauptsächlich an EU-externen Aspekten, wie z.B. der Zielsetzung im Vergleich mit 
anderen Akteuren, den Effekten und Auswirkungen in Drittstatten, oder den eingesetzten 
Instrumenten. Im Gegensatz dazu legt die vorliegende Dissertation ein besonderes Augenmerk 
auf den EU-internen Aspekt der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik: die ENP folgt EU-intern 
der Idee, einen kohärenten und einheitlichen Rahmen für alle EU Aktivitäten gegenüber den 
Nachbarländern aufzubauen. Hierbei behandelt diese Dissertation vor allem die Frage, in 
wieweit mit dem Aufbau und der Entwicklung der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik eine 
Veränderung in den Interaktionen, Routinen und Aufgabenbereichen der involvierten EU-
Akteure zu beobachten ist, wobei vor allem der Zeitraum von 2002 bis 2007 zur Analyse 
herangezogen wird. Zusätzlich werden dabei die Motivationen verschiedener Akteure 
beleuchtet, um abzuklären, warum eine Veränderung der Tätigkeitsbereiche und 
Politikgestaltung einzelner Akteure in erster Linie angestrebt oder dieser zumindest zugestimmt 
wurde. Diese Forschungsarbeit trägt hiermit zu einem besseren Verständnis von der 
Außenpolitikformulierung auf EU Ebene bei, und bezieht sich dabei besonders auf die 
langjährige Debatte über die (fehlende) Kohärenz in der EU Außenpolitik.  
Die Ergebnisse dieses Forschungsprojektes zeigen, dass die Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik 
nicht nur verschiedene Politikbereiche unter einen einheitlichen Rahmen zusammengebracht 
hat, sondern dass diese strukturelle Veränderung auch Auswirkungen auf die (informellen) 
Rollen und Interaktionen der involvierten EU Akteure zur Folge hatte. Die Kommission wurde 
im Rahmen der Politikformulierung und Implementierung bewusst stärker involviert und als 
Experte von den Mitgliedstaaten herangezogen, was im Vergleich zu den vorher existierenden 
Beziehungsgeflechten mit Nachbarstaaten einer Aufwertung der Rolle der Kommission  
entspricht.  
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Während zu Beginn der ENP diese Veränderung zu Konflikten zwischen den Akteuren führte, 
hatte sich eine konsensorientierte Zusammenarbeit nach wenigen Monaten eingespielt. Im 
Bezug auf die herangezogenen Fallbeispiele über die EU-Beziehungen zu Marokko einerseits 
und die EU-Beziehungen zu Georgien andererseits war es überraschend zu sehen, dass die 
Interaktionen der Akteure im Bezug auf Georgien trotz der höheren Anzahl von involvierten 
Akteuren und der stärkeren Politisierung der Politikinhalte konsensorientierter verlief als im 
Fall von Marokko. Dabei zeigte sich, dass die involvierten Personen und die gegenseitige 
Wahrnehmung eine bedeutende Rolle zum Erreichen von konsensorientierter Zusammenarbeit 
zwischen den EU Akteuren einnimmt.  
Die vorliegende Dissertation legt zudem empirisch dar, dass die Motive für diese bewusste 
Anpassung der Arbeitsweise im Rahmen der ENP in erster Linie auf konkrete Politikinteressen 
zurückzuführen sind, die eine starke Einsicht dahingehend zeigen, dass eine effektive und 
erfolgreiche Nachbarschaftspolitik nur durch eine Anpassung der Interaktionen von 
verschiedenen Akteuren möglich ist.  
 
Schlagwörter 
Europäische Union; Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik; EU Außenpolitik; Bürokratie- und 
Organisationstheorien; Institutionalismus; Georgien; Marokko;  
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